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Purpose — This thesis explores the role of accounting in the process of financialisation in 
the Chinese context. In particular, it examines the use of accounting discourse by the China 
Iron and Steel Association (CISA) to resist the financialised price of iron ore during the 2009 
and 2010 iron ore price negotiation. Contingent upon this thesis, financialisation is defined as 
the rising significance of the financial sector in the global iron ore market in general and the 
adoption of the index linked iron ore pricing mechanism of in particular. The investigation 
illustrates how the traditional annual negotiation based iron ore pricing mechanism that had 
been used for nearly four decades shifted towards the financialised index pricing model in 
2010, and analyses why, as the largest iron ore importing and consuming market in the world, 
the Chinese iron and steel industry, and its associated use of accounting discourse, failed to 
resist the financialisation of iron ore price in its negotiation with the three major global iron 
ore suppliers (i.e. BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, and Companhia Vale do Rio Doce—the Big Three 
hereafter). 
Design/methodology/approach — The theory and methodology adopted in this thesis stem 
from Marx’s study of Political Economy. Drawing from Capital Volume III, a Marx-informed 
theoretical framework for financialisation is developed that examines the interaction among 
productive, commercial, and financial capital as a result of the conflict between the 
corresponding social relations and productive forces. Based on Marx’s work in The German 
Ideology, the methodological framework focuses on material production. More specifically, 
three levels of analyses are conducted to explore (1) the mode of production underneath the 
accounting discourse regarding iron ore price, (2) the interaction among the different modes 
of production identified, and (3) the potential of the discourse to change the status quo from a 
class perspective. 
Method/data—The data collected and analysed in this thesis are from (1) iron ore price 
related news from Sina Finance (one of the most popular websites in Mainland China) during 
the 2009 and 2010 iron ore price negotiations, (2) official announcements and documents of 
the CISA, (3) annual reports from major Chinese steel plants and the Big Three, and (4) other 
types of publicly available information related to the Chinese iron and steel industry. Then 
these materials are sorted into three main groups according to the producers of the discourse 
(Marx & Engels, 1974, p.47): (1) the CISA and the major Chinese steel plants; (2) the small 




on Marx’s methodological framework, the analysis begins with presenting the relevant 
accounting discourse produced by each group, then delving into the underlying mode of 
production for the discourse, exploring the interaction among the three groups via their social 
relations and the corresponding productive forces, and finally examining the nature of the 
CISA from a class perspective. After completing Marx’s analysis of the discourse, a 
comparative study is conducted that connects relevant accounting concepts and standards 
with the two pricing methods argued by each group and Marx’s concept of capital. 
Findings —There are three reasons behind CISA’s failed attempt to resist financialisation. 
First, the financialisation of iron ore price is an inevitable trend as a result of and the solution 
to the intensified conflicts between the social relations among the three groups which have 
rendered the traditional annual pricing could no longer meet the increased demand for iron 
ore in the Chinese market. Second, the CISA did not recognise the interaction among 
productive, commercial, and financial capital. Thus, the association missed the opportunity of 
launching China’s own index price which might have otherwise taken the priority in iron ore 
pricing. Third, in opposing the financialised index price, the CISA did not take into account 
the interest of the working class which, according to Marx (Marx & Engels, 2008), would 
lead to the “fall (of the financial capitalist) and the victory of the proletariat” (ibid, p.51). 
Instead, the association was concerned with the interest of the central government. In relation 
to accounting, the research demonstrates that accounting is a malleable tool capable of 
accommodating various socio-political contexts and, correspondingly, supporting different 
arguments. However, a detailed reading of relevant accounting standards and the conceptual 
framework shows that the adoption of the financialised price of iron ore is not only the direct 
consequence of the shift in relevant pricing mechanisms but a result of the underlying social, 
economic, and political structure comprised of contradictions in social relations and 
productive forces from which neither the shift in iron ore pricing nor the evolution of 
accounting concepts and standards can escape.  
Research contributions — The contributions of this study are three-fold. First, in relation to 
extant accounting literature, the research has studied financialisation in the Chinese iron and 
steel industry which passively participated in the process of the shift in iron ore pricing 
mechanism and accepted the resulting financialised index price. The analysis goes beyond the 
use of the same set of accounting discourse (i.e. transparency, fair price, representation of 
market, etc.) by the Big Three and the CISA to argue for and against, respectively, 




response to Arnold’s (2009) call for the examination of “how financial reporting standards 
have shaped and been shaped by the financialisation of the economy” (p.806), the thesis has 
studied and applied relevant accounting concepts and standards in the context of the 
financialisation of iron ore price in China. Second, in relation to theory, the thesis has 
developed a theoretical framework for financialisation based on Marx’s analysis of capitalism 
(primarily from Capital Volume III) that explores the broad movement of productive, 
commercial, and financial capital as well as the corresponding social relations and productive 
forces. This demonstrates the feasibility and suitability of applying Marx’s classical theory in 
the contemporary case of financialisation. Third, in relation to methodology, the thesis 
proposes a Marx-informed discourse analysis drawing from The German Ideology. It leads 
the analysis of accounting discourse to modes of productions which constitute and condition 
the discourse (Marx & Engels, 1974). Thus, this research contributes a Marx-informed 
methodological approach to studies of Political Economy of Accounting in general and of 
accounting discourse in financialisation in particular. 
Future research — Directions for future research are suggested in the following. First, while 
the period (from 2008 October to 2010 May) for which the thesis is concerned witnessed the 
soaring price of iron ore skyrocketed by nearly 200%, the price experienced dramatic 
decrease in the following three years (from 2012 to 2015). Thus, it is of particular interest to 
investigate factors behind the price drop, with particular reference to Marx’s (1959, p.203) 
view regarding the limits upon commercial and financial capital. Second, CISA’s 
dramatically changed attitude towards the financialisation of iron ore price merits further 
exploration. Although the association reiterated, throughout the two annual negotiations from 
2008 to 2010, that iron ore index was speculative and could easily be manipulated (Li RX, 
2010d, 2010e), it launched its own index price one year later (in 2011 October). Subsequently, 
also worth exploring is a comparative study between the Platts index (adopted by the Big 
Three) and CISA’s index in terms of data assessment and organisational structure. Fourth, 
given the contradiction between the discourse of certain officials at the CISA and their actual 
behaviour during the period examined, the identity and accountability of the CISA need to be 
investigated in a wider social and political context. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1. The Research Topic 
The evolving nature of accounting has not only reflected the changes in its technical tools 
(Carmona & Ezzamel, 2007), but also revealed the ever-perplexing form of accounting 
representations alongside social development. Indeed, accounting information nowadays 
carry more ramifications than simply communicating economic events to interest parties, 
rather they reflexively and selectively construct reality (cf. Hines, 1988; Willmott & Sikka, 
1997). It is not only the formal statements of accounting like financial reports (Tinker, 1980), 
management budgets (Boland & Pondy, 1983), and even social and environmental disclosure 
(Spence, 2007) that exhibit such a socially constructive and reflective capacity, but also the 
discursive practice of accounting (Arnold & Hammond, 1994; Ding & Graham, 2007). This 
thesis investigates and evaluates the role of accounting discourse in the context of the 
Chinese iron and steel industry, with particular reference to the financialisation of the iron ore 
price in 2010. 
 
Financialisation is generally understood in the literature of critical accounting as the 
economic and political growth of the financial sector (Andersson et al., 2006; Arnold, 2012; 
Zhang & Andrew, 2014). Contingent upon the context of the thesis, the term financialisation 
refers to the rising significance of financial institutions in the global iron ore market through 
the adoption of the index based iron ore pricing mechanism in 2010. Historically, the price of 
iron ore was determined once a year through an annual negotiation between the world’s 
major sellers and buyers since the late 1960s (Blas, 2010). These include the three mining 
corporations including BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, and Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (the Big 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
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Three hereafter) on the sellers’ side, and the leading steelmakers on the buyers’ side. As 
China became the largest iron ore importing and consuming economy in 2004 (Zhu, 2012), 
the Chinese iron and steel sector began to join the annual negotiation. However, China did 
not reach any agreement with the Big Three for 2009 and 2010 when the concept of index 
pricing was proposed by BHP Billiton whereas the Chinese side strongly opposed it. In 2010 
April, the quarterly indexed iron ore pricing system officially replaced the traditional annual 
negotiation based pricing mechanism in the global market. The standard assessment for iron 
ore became 62% Fe as the prevalent grade in the spot market of Qingdao (China), and the 
index is assessed on a CFR (Cost and Freight
1
) basis. Consequently, despite being the world’s 
largest iron ore importing and consuming economy, the Chinese iron and steel industry had to 
accept the newly adopted iron ore index price for the second quarter in 2010 (i.e. from April 
to June) that exhibited a nearly 100% increase compared to the 2009 annual price (Blas, 2010; 
Sina Finance, 2 April 2010; The Beijing News, 8 April 2010). Alongside the shift in pricing 
mechanism was the emergence of the associated financial derivatives such as swaps and 
futures actively traded in the financial market (Holes, 2013). Thus, researchers (Wang et al., 
2010; Xiao et al., 2012; Xie, 2012; Wang et al., 2014), commentators (Chen SS, 2010d; He, 
2010b), market participants (Li RX, 2010e; He, 2010a; Chen YM, 2010), and government 
officials (Li RX, 2010d) point out that iron ore has now been equipped with characteristics of 
financial capital and its price has become financialised. 
 
While the adoption of the quarterly index price is widely regarded as a result of the rising 
economic and geopolitical significance of iron ore (Blas, 2010), the thesis pays specific 
attention to the role of accounting discourse. In particular, the interpretation and use of 
                                                          
1 CFR refers to Cost and Freight. It is a trade term that requires the cost of the product being shipped and the shipping cost. 
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accounting information by China Iron and Steel Association (as the representative of the 
Chinese iron ore importers) in the 2009 and 2010 annual price negotiations are collected and 
analysed. In so doing, the research explores two areas that have been given insufficient 
attention in the extant accounting literature. 
 
First of all, there is a lack of research interest in exploring the role of accounting discourse in 
opposing financialisation. As shown in the literature review section of the thesis, the extant 
accounting research primarily focuses on how accounting promotes financialisation (Power, 
2010; Nolke & Perry, 2008; NewBerry & Robb, 2008; Arnold, 2009; Muller, 2014; Zhang & 
Andrew, 2014). Thus, the first research question in this thesis focuses on how accounting 
discourse is used by the Chinese iron and steel industry at the 2009 and 2010 annual 
negotiations to resist the financialisation of iron ore price. Based on the publicly available 
documents and relevant financial news in the Chinese media, this thesis also plays a role in 
helping Western audience understand the extent to which accounting and financialisation are 
interpreted and used in the Chinese context. This is achieved through not only identifying and 
analysing the accounting discourse put forward by the Chinese side, but also applying 
relevant accounting concepts and standards to the actual case study per se (i.e. the annual 
negotiation based price vis-à-vis the index price). 
 
Secondly, there is little examination of the particular process regarding how financialisation 
is first proposed, then resisted, and finally implemented in a socialist market economy. While 
this may be because of the language issue as well as the ideology in the Chinese context 
which, as claimed by its national leaders (Deng, 1993; Jiang, 2006b, 2006c), is based on 
Marxism, this thesis addresses both by analysing the Chinese media coverage, as the main 
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source of data within a Marx-informed Political Economy framework. Thereby, the second 
research question concentrates on the reasons behind China’s failed attempt to resist the 
financialisation of iron ore price.  
 
1.2. Marx in the Chinese context 
The application of Marx’s work in the research is threefold. First, this thesis considers Marx’s 
theory as part of the socio-political background in which the investigation is carried out. In 
relation to China’s political context, Marxism is considered as an important theoretical basis 
for the Communist Party of China (CPC) and has become the dominant discourse in People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) since its birth in 1949. While the government of CPC has, 
alongside the opening reform since the late 1970s, shifted its focus from class struggle to 
economic development (Jiang, 2006c, p.334) from the period of Chairman Mao to the current 
president Xi Jinping, dominant ideologies have always been claimed by the national leaders 
and government as the application of Marxism in the Chinese context resulting from the 
practical experience and the collective wisdom of the CPC and the Chinese people (see Jiang, 
2006a, p.157, 2006b, p.8; Hu, 2006). In relation to the Chinese iron and steel market, the 
industry has always been treated as a key strategic sector for national defence and economy 
(Movshuk, 2004). Historically, it has been under strong government influence during famous 
political campaigns such as the Great Leap Forward Movement (1958-1960), the Three-Year 
Natural Disaster (1959-1961), and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) in which ideological 
input significantly intervened with industrial output (Rawski, 1976). To date, most of China’s 
major steelmakers are still state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Despite the fact that these SOEs 
are listed in stock exchanges, the Chinese government holds at least 51% of their shares
2
. 
                                                          
2 Further information regarding the shareholding structure of China’s major steel plants is depicted in Figures 6.2-6.6 in 
chapter six. 
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China Iron and Steel Association (CISA hereafter) as the representative of the country’s iron 
and steel industry is also closely related to the government in terms of funding and staffing
3
. 
Bear in mind the government ideology, not surprisingly, the CISA also claims to follow the 
theoretical guidance of Marx (CISA, 2011b, 2013b). Therefore, in this aspect, the use of 
Marx-informed theory for financialisation and methodology for discourse analysis sheds light 
on both the application of Marxism in the Chinese context as well as the contemporary 
significance of Marx in modern capitalist economy. 
 
1.3. Theorising Financialisation 
Second, this thesis theorises the financialisation of the global iron ore pricing mechanism 
with particular reference to Marx’s Capital and The Communist Manifesto. Financialisation is 
a relatively recent term that represents the economic and political growth of the financial 
sector (Arnold, 2012). The ramifications of financialisation have attracted significant interest 
from researchers across different disciplines such as political economy, finance, and 
accounting (see Boyer, 2000; Feng et al., 2001; Stockhammer, 2004; Crotty, 2005, 2009; 
Orhangazi, 2008; Lapavitsas, 2011; Arnold, 2012; Zhang & Andrew, 2014). However, 
relatively insufficient attention has been given in exploring the interactive process between 
the financial and the non-financial sectors in a wider socio-political context based on a Marx-
informed theoretical framework. Therefore, largely drawing from Marx’s Capital (Volume 
III), this thesis has developed a framework to study financialisation in the Chinese context. 
Although Marx did not refer to the exact word financialisation due to the specific period in 
which he lived and studied, he did in fact comment on the finance and banking sector as  
                                                          
3 A detailed analysis of CISA’s history and organisational structure is provided in section 6.1.1. 
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“an immanent form of the capitalist mode of production, and… a driving force in its 
development to its highest and ultimate form… (and) at the same time… the most potent 
means of driving capitalist production beyond its own limits, and one of the most 
effective vehicles of crises and swindle” (Marx, 1959, p.433). 
Thus, bear in mind Marx’s emphasis on the mode of production, the thesis connects Marx’s 
classical concepts of productive and commercial capital with the contemporary phenomenon 
of financialisation by demystifying the seemingly self-expanding nature of financial capital. 
In so doing, the actual process of financialising iron ore price is explored, with particular 
reference to the Chinese iron and steel sector as the traditional industrial economy vis-à-vis 
the financial market based index. 
 
1.4. Methodological Framework 
Third, this thesis has developed a research methodology for discourse analysis based on Marx. 
Marx’s work has been one area of interest in the field of political economy, and also received 
attention from critical accounting researchers (see Bryer, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1999a, 1999b, 
2000a, 2000b, 2005, 2006, 2012, 2013a, 2013b; Tinker et al., 1991; Tinker & Carter, 2003; 
Tinker & Gray, 2003; Toms, 2005). Critical Perspective on Accounting also published one 
special issue
4
 on Marx and accounting. However, Tinker (1999, p.652) remarked that much 
of the extant accounting literature applying Marx’s work has been confined largely to an 
economistic reading of Marx, leaving his philosophical and political materials untouched. 
Thus, 
“what Marx bequeathed to us was not a definitive analysis of capitalism, but some 
important methodological-political tools for engaging and re-engaging a social system 
that is itself in constant renewal and transformation” (Tinker, 1999, p.655). 
                                                          
4 Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 1999, vol.10, no.5. 
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Responding to Tinker’s (1999) call for engaging Marx’s work as a methodological tool 
capable of exploring contemporary issues, the thesis contributes to the literature by 
developing a Marx-informed methodology to analyse the discourse regarding the pricing 
mechanism of iron ore. Primarily drawing upon Marx’s Economic and Philosophic 
Manuscripts of 1844 and The German Ideology as the philosophical side of Marx (Tinker, 
1999), the thesis has explored the ontological, epistemological, and methodological positions 
of Marx, and thereby put forward a methodological framework through which discourse is 
analysed. 
 
For Marx, there is a dialectic between humans and the external environment, a constantly 
changing process where “circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances” 
(Marx and Engels, 1974, p.59). The way in which humans interact with the outside world is 
juxtaposed with a third factor—society (Marx, 1974, p.92). Thus, to study the discourse put 
forward on the surface level, we should analyse not only the producers of discourse and the 
environment in which they operate, but also delve into the social relations between the two 
(Marx and Engels, 1974, p.64). Furthermore, Marx assigned the material focus on productive 
activities with this form of social relations, since “(t)he first historical act is… the production 
of the means to satisfy their (human) needs, the production of material life itself” (ibid, p.48). 
The way in which society moves forward hinges upon the shift in the mode of production that 
“is always combined with a certain mode of co-operation (i.e. social relation)… and this 
mode of co-operation is itself a ‘productive force’” (ibid, p.50). Social change is triggered 
and realised through the contradiction between productive forces and the associated social 
relations that has become a fetter upon the former (ibid, pp.87-89). 
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With his emphasis on production, Marx considered that discourse “only arises from the need, 
the necessity, of intercourse with other men” (ibid, p.51). Thus, discourse is treated as a 
social product produced by individuals who actively engage themselves in a web of social 
relations. Since discourse is in its nature “practical” (ibid, p.51), it is also conditioned by the 
existing productive forces and corresponding social relations therein. Thus, conflicts in 
discourse “only occur because existing social relations have come into contradiction with 
existing forces of production” (ibid, p.52). The specific context from which discourse derives 
is civil society which “embraces the whole material intercourse of individuals within a 
definite stage of the development of productive forces… and… transcends the Sate and the 
nation (ibid, p.57). As such, analysis of discourse should be conducted from a world-
historical (ibid. p.56) perspective. Taking into account the dialectic interplay between 
discourse and material production, social change is triggered and realised upon the 
coincidence of revolutionary ideas and a revolutionary class (ibid, p.65; see also Tinker, 1999, 
p.646). 
 
Accordingly, this thesis concentrates on how the financialisation of iron ore price is 
interpreted through Marx’s emphasis on production. As such, this thesis has undertaken a 
three-level analysis to address the research questions above. As Marx’s analysis “set(s) out 
from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process” (ibid, p.47), the first stage 
investigates the producers of the accounting discourse, and, more importantly, the productive 
activities that constitute and condition the basis of their discourse. Three groups of discourse 
producers in the Chinese iron and steel industry are identified, including (1) the CISA as 
China’s representative throughout the negotiations, (2) the Big Three as the major suppliers 
of iron ore, and (3) the Chinese small and medium enterprises as other stakeholders. The 
corresponding mode of production underneath each group is explored. Then, the second stage 
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focuses on the interaction among the modes of production with the associated productive 
forces and social relations. The shift from traditional annual negotiation based price to the 
financialised index price is considered the result of as well as the solution to the contradiction 
between relevant productive forces and social relations. Viewed in this way, the analysis has 
revealed the particular conflicts in the social relations among the three groups and changes in 
the related productive forces. In doing so, financialisation is analysed in relation to capitalist 
development. The third stage examines the identity and accountability of the CISA from a 
class perspective, exploring the possibility of changing the status quo (Marx & Engels, 1974, 
p.123). The analysis continues to address the research question by comparing the application 
of Marxism in China with Marx’s projection in The Communist Manifesto, investigating the 
ramifications of Marx in terms of his theoretical relevant and the practical experience in the 
Chinese context. 
 
As the analysis in the thesis begins with the accounting discourse regarding the price of iron 
ore, the research concludes with the implications of accounting with regard to the 
financialisation of iron ore price and the Chinese context. While the relationship between the 
international accounting standards, accounting conceptual framework, and financialisation 
has been studied by a number of accounting researchers (see Zhang & Andrew, 2014; Muller, 
2014), this thesis takes a different approach and seeks to apply accounting regulation in 
practice—the financialisation of the iron ore pricing mechanism. By comparing the two 
pricing methods, and the supporting discourse from each group, with relevant accounting 
concepts and standards, this thesis further locates financialisation in a socio-political context 
comprised of conflicts in social relations and productive forces from which neither the shift in 
iron ore pricing nor the development of accounting concepts and standards can escape. 




The sources of data for addressing the research questions of this thesis are archival and 
divided into four categories. The first category refers to China’s media coverage of the 2009 
and 2010 iron ore price negotiations. The second category is the set of official 
announcements, policies, and regulations regarding the price of iron ore and the Chinese steel 
and iron industry put forward by the CISA and the Chinese government. The third category 
consists of the annual reports of major players on the supply and demand chain including 
China’s state-owned steel conglomerates and the Big Three. The fourth category includes 
other types of publicly available information regarding the price of iron ore such as the iron 
ore index assessment method. 
 
1.5. The Structure 
 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter Two Background presents a brief 
history of the Chinese iron and steel industry and the contemporary landscape of the 
international iron ore market. Chapter Three Literature Review: Political Economy of 
Accounting examines the extant Political Economy of Accounting (PEA) literature with 
particular reference to Marxist accounting studies, as well as researches addressing 
accounting and financialisation. It provides an overview of what the existing research has 
explored, and thus identifies the potential areas of interest to which this thesis is directed. 
Chapter Four: Theorising Financialisation in Iron Ore Market presents a theoretical 
discussion of financialisation based on the extant literature, and then explores a Marx-
informed theory of financialisation on which this thesis is framed. It specifically defines 
financialisation in the context of this research. Chapter Five Methodology: A Marx informed 
Discourse Analysis discusses the philosophical underpinnings of Marx and puts forward the 
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methodological framework for discourse analysis. It clarifies the theoretical foundations and 
the specific method adopted in this thesis. 
 
Chapter Six: Different Interpretations of Iron Ore Price—Identifying Modes of Production 
undertakes the first level analysis that focuses on the exploring the corresponding mode of 
production behind the discourse on the surface level. This chapter begins with discussing the 
accounting discourse from each group regarding iron ore price, and then investigating the 
producers of discourse in detail and their underlying modes of production. 
 
Chapter Seven: Shift to Financialisation of Iron Ore Price—Interaction among Modes of 
Production fulfils the second level analysis. It explores the social relations and the relevant 
productive forces among the three groups as well as the corresponding conflicts therein. By 
providing a detailed story of how the global iron ore market has gradually opened its door to 
trading companies and financial investors other than its traditional customer (i.e. the 
steelmakers), this chapter illustrates the reasons behind the emergence of the financialised 
price of iron ore in the Chinese market. As such, it demonstrates that the financialisation of 
iron ore price is an inevitable trend as a result of as well as the solution to the contradiction 
between the social relations and the productive forces therein. It also evaluates CISA’s view 
on financialisation, alongside the corresponding discussion of Marx’s opinion on the same 
subject matter. 
 
Chapter Eight: Financialisation vs. State—A Class Analysis takes the analysis to the third 
level that examines the role of the CISA from a class perspective. In particular, it compares 
CISA’s mindset with the views of (1) a capitalist, (2) a proletarian government, and (3) the 
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working class. Through the class analysis, this chapter illustrates that CISA’s interpretation of 
interest was largely confined to the national interest of the CPC government, while leaving 
the interests of the oppressed classes such as the small and medium enterprises and ordinary 
workers untouched. In this sense, Marx’s description of communism in The Communist 
Manifesto that projects the fall of capitalism (and financialisation) and the victory of the 
proletariat (Marx & Engels, 2008, p.51) is not realised in the context studied in this thesis. 
Chapter Nine: Discussions and Conclusion summarises the three-level analysis and presents 
a comprehensive answer to the research questions. Taking into account the findings from the 
Marx-informed discourse analysis, implications for accounting in general and the accounting 
concepts and standards regarding the financialisation of iron ore price in particular are 
explored with reference to Marx’s concepts of capital. The suggestions for further research 
and the contribution of this thesis are outlined.           
Chapter 2 Background 
13 
 
Chapter 2 Background 
 
This chapter provides the socio-political and economic context in which the current analysis 
of accounting discourse is carried out. The structure of the chapter is organised as follows. 
The first section (2.1.) presents a brief history of the Chinese iron and steel industry from the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 to date. The second section (2.2.) 
depicts the contemporary landscape of the global iron ore market. 
 
2.1. Chinese steel and iron industry 
Historically, the Chinese steel and iron industry has always been tainted with political 
correctness. Its early days since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 
1949 were characterised by a number of political turmoils, including the Great Leap Forward 
Movement (1958-1960), the subsequent three-year natural disaster (1959-1961), the 
Recovery and Readjustment (1961-1965) and later the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), 
where ideological input significantly intervened industrial output (Rawski, 1976; Wang, 1986; 
Peng, 1987). It was not until the late 1970s when Deng Xiaoping regained the political power, 
the opening reform was introduced, transforming the primary goal of the nation from class 
struggle to economic development; government-planned economy to market-based economy; 
and, public ownership to private ownership, and the development of the iron and steel sector 
gradually stabilised.  
 
In the following two decades (1980-2000), the iron and steel industry continued to be the 
major focus of the opening reform. Since 1996, China has become the largest producer of 
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iron and steel in the world (Trench, 2004). However, there emerged a major production 
bottleneck caused by the shortage of iron ore. According to Ji Yuanjing, the then minister of 
the Metallurgy Industry, the supply shortage of iron ore due to the decline in domestic iron 
ore production must be eliminated by all means, and the import of iron ore may be increased 
dramatically (Economic Daily, 1991). 
 
Apart from the supply of iron ore, government attention was also given to the structural 
reforms of SOEs.  For example, the modern enterprise campaign was initiated in 1992, 
shifting many SOEs from “social and economic conglomerates responsible for social goods 
such as cradle-to-grave welfare for employees and their dependents… (to) purely economic 
entities… which can be expected to operate in a much more entrepreneurial way and to 
compete in international as well as domestic markets” (Hassard et al., 1999, p.55). In the iron 
and steel sector, 11 steel manufacturers were corporatized after the Company Law came into 
effect in 1994 (World Bank, 1997). In 1993, Mananshan Steel became the first publicly listed 
SOE in the country, followed by other major steel makers (Movshuk, 2004). Notwithstanding 
the reform, the state still maintained its ownership in the SOEs even after they were 
corporatized or listed on stock exchanges. In other words, while relieving the SOEs’ social-
welfare burden, the socialist government gave steel firms more responsibility for their own 
profits and losses and thus guided them towards a market-oriented direction, without 
privatising the very state-owned assets. 
 
Following the Fifteenth CPC Congress in 1997, the ‘grasp the large, release the small’ 
initiative was introduced in response to inefficient SOEs. It suggested that government should 
only maintain ownership over the largest SOEs and in the meantime relinquish control over 
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the small and medium SOEs (Naughton, 2007). The iron and steel industry implemented the 
initiative vigorously through a series of mergers and acquisitions around the top four steel 
makers: Baosteel, Shougang Steel, Ansteel, and Wuhan Iron & Steel. In 2009, the State 
Council introduced the Iron & Steel Industry Adjustment and Revitalisation Plan which 
suggests that major SOEs take the lead in the industry wide mergers and acquisitions across 
different regions in the country. Specifically, the State Council (2009) expected to see the 
formation of extra-large steel conglomerates including Baosteel group, Anben group, and 
Wuhan Iron & Steel group, each of which will have the production capacity of more than 50 
million tons. 
 
Alongside the ongoing programmes of SOE reforms, several controversies loomed large on 
the public agenda. The first was the drastic reduction in work force at SOEs. Under the 
pressure of being closed down or bankrupt, some steel corporations increasingly found 
themselves to be overstaffed and considered laying off their employees from 16 up to 50 per 
cent (Hassard et al., 1999). The previous highly regarded ‘iron rice bowl’ (a metaphor that 
likens the life-long secured social welfare enjoyed by SOE employees) of the permanent SOE 
employees no longer existed and redundant full-time workers were increasingly replaced with 
part-time and contract-based workers. Secondly, the divestment of social welfare previously 
provided by large and medium SOEs further added to the instability of China’s society. As 
stated earlier, the social service components were separated from enterprises and shifted onto 
local authorities, which casted great doubt on the quality and quantity of the new social 
welfare system. This leads to the third problem. As more and more workers were laid off and 
social burdens were increasingly transferred onto local governments, the nature of SOEs 
became problematic, which has been shifted from socialist development into private profit 
motive. 
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Turning into the 21st century, reforms are still undergoing and infrastructure construction 
continued and expanded all over the country. The depletion of mineral resources (Brett & 
Ericsson, 2006), the growing need of iron ore for industrial production (Hu et al., 2010), and 
the below average quality of domestic iron ores (Lu & Li, 2009) have been driving the 
unprecedented demand for iron ore in the country. In fact, China has become the largest iron 
ore importer in the world since 2004, followed by South Korea and Japan (Zhu, 2012).  
 
Despite its leading role in iron and steel production worldwide, the Chinese iron and steel 
sector has experienced significant economic hardship in recent years and even exhibits an 
industry wide loss in the first half of 2012  (Bao, 2012). To improve corporate performance, 
many steel makers choose to rely on their accounting magic and financial arrangement. For 
instance, Wuhan Iron and Steel has changed its accounting estimate policy by adding an extra 
three years to the useful life of property, plant and equipment (PPE) to increase the net profit 
figure by RMB 148 million, i.e. approximately AUD 23 million (Wuhan Iron and Steel Co., 
Ltd, 2012). Similarly, SGIS, one subsidiary of Bao Steel, has also increased the useful life 
and the residual value of its PPE, and at the same time reduced the respective depreciation 
rate, contributing to an increase in net profit of RMB 289 million, i.e. approximately AUD 45 
million (SGIS Songshan Co., Ltd, 2012). 
 
In addition to changes in accounting estimate, related-party transaction is another tool. 
Baoshan Iron & Steel raised RMB 9.1 billion profits resulting from the related party 
transactions with the Baosteel group
5
 (Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd, 2012a, 2012b). The 
                                                          
5In April 1 2012, within the same group, Baoshan Iron and Steel Corporation sold part of its stainless steel division and 
specialty steel division to Shanghai Bao Steel Stainless Steel Corporation, Bao Steel Specialty Steel Corporation, and Bao 
Steel Group at the price of RMB 46.9 billion, i.e. AUD 7.2 billion (Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd, 2012b) 
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company will also spend RMB 5 billion, i.e. approximately AUD 770 million on share 
buyback to boost up the firm value (Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd, 2012c). As such, the 
firm’s financial capital will be effectively eroded. 
 
While the corporations exonerate themselves from these technical irregularities in the name 
of protecting shareholder interest and of better presenting a true and fair view on PPE 
(Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd, 2012c; SGIS Songshan Co., Ltd, 2012), the industry as a 
whole tend to attribute such arrangements ultimately to the soaring price of iron ore from the 
upper stream (Zheng & Huang, 2011) and the sluggish demand of steel products from the 
lower stream (Bao, 2012). However, as mentioned earlier, China has become the largest 
importer of iron ore in the global market since 2004, then the questions are asked: Why does 
the Chinese industry still suffer from the prohibitive price of iron ore? What are the 
institutional arrangements and who are the major players in the global iron ore market? What 
is the involvement of the Chinese industry in this global market? In particular, how has the 
language of accounting been used in the market? Therefore, it is to the issue of international 
iron ore trading between the Chinese industry and the global mining oligopolies that we now 
turn to. 
 
2.2. The global iron ore market 
 With the increasing industrialisation and urbanisation, iron ore has been considered as the 
second largest open-traded commodity following crude oil (The Economist, 2012). The 
global iron ore market has long been a seller-dominated space due to the substantial 
imbalance of the iron ore supply and demand and the high level of monopolisation (Hou & 
Yang, 2009). Currently, the market is dominated by the three global oligopolies─ BHP 
Chapter 2 Background 
18 
 
Billiton, Rio Tinto, and Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (Vale hereafter), which have the 
control over 35% of world’s total production of iron ore and nearly 70% of the seaborne iron 
ore market (UNCTAD, 2011).  
 
Until 2010, the pricing process of iron ore has been settled annually in private through a 
bilateral negotiation between the Big Three and the leading purchasers in the world, where 
the former takes precedence over the later (Wilson, 2012; Xiong, 2012). As the largest 
purchaser and importer of iron ore in seaborne trade (Yellishetty et al., 2010), China became 
the major representative on the demand side in the annual pricing negotiation. Baosteel, as 
the country’s largest steel enterprise, participated in the negotiation on behalf of the Chinese 
steel and iron industry since 2004 (Wang, 2007; Sinan Finance, 21 April 2010). However, for 
the 2009 and 2010 iron ore price negotiations, it was the China Iron and Steel Association 
(CISA hereafter) that sat behind Baosteel and negotiated with the Big Three directly (Xu, 
2009c; Zhang XD, 2009e). 
 
Largely due to the political scandal in 2009 in which four members at Rio Tinto’s China 
office including Stern Hu, the then chief representative of the firm at the iron ore price 
negotiation table, were arrested by the Shanghai Public Security Bureau under the charge of 
bribing Chinese steel firms for inside information on the annual price negotiation (Bloomberg, 
2009), China did not reach any annual price agreement with the Big Three. Instead, the CISA 
(2009b) turned to Fortescue Metals Group (FMG), Australia’s third largest iron ore supplier, 
and reached a half year price agreement. In the subsequent year (2010), the Big Three 
decided to change the annual price mechanism from the traditional annual negotiation model 
to a quarterly index system. That is, similar to other globally traded commodities, the new 
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price will be the average spot market index price during the previous quarter (Mining Weekly, 
2010a, 2010b; Dow Jones, 2010). The Chinese steel firms were then left with no option but to 
accept the quarterly index mechanism (China Daily, 2010). Soon after the quarterly 
mechanism was introduced, the global market witnessed a sky rocketed price rise by 99.7% 
in April 2010 (Wilson, 2012). 
 
While the Big Three claim that the new system would bring more transparency than the 
previous annual negotiation (BHP Billiton, 2009) and reflect a more market oriented system 
(Vale, 2010), the quarterly pricing mechanism, according to Wilson (2012), has by far only 
favoured the mining oligopolies by further increasing the iron ore prices and undermining the 
cartelisation effort and thus the bargaining power of Chinese steel firms. In response, the 
CISA contended that using the foreign index fails to reflect the true state of the market and 
the financialisation of the iron ore exacerbates the price manipulation and speculation. 
 
Faced with the rising prices of iron ore, the China Beijing International Mining Exchange 
(CBMX) together with the CISA and the China Chamber of Commerce of Metals Minerals & 
Chemicals Importers & Exports have also launched China Iron Ore Spot Trading Platform in 
May 2012. Iron ore derivatives like swaps and futures are not allowed in this system in order 
to ‘better reflect the price based on actual supply and demand’, said Wang Xiaoqi, the deputy 
chairman of the CISA (cited in Stanway, 2012), and therefore stabilise the global iron ore 
prices (Du, 2012). At the same time, many Chinese steel firms and the CISA have also 
expressed their willingness to a return to the annual pricing mechanism (Stanway, 2012). 
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Thus, while both the Big Three and the Chinese government call for a true market-oriented 
pricing system of iron ore, two competing trading platforms have been set up respectively by 
both parties. Then the questions are posed: how is the accounting discourse used by both 
parties to justify their preferred pricing method including index price, spot price, and the 
annual negotiation based price? Interesting still, how can the Chinese government alone 
justify their support for the market-based pricing system on the one hand and their favour in a 
return to the annual negotiation pricing mechanism on the other?  
 
To answer the questions above, a critical examination of the relations between the Chinese 
government, the state-owned steel firms, the global capitalist oligopolies (i.e. Big Three), and 
the use of accounting language is needed. However, while extant academic literature has 
largely focused on the Chinese SOE reforms (Tung, 1981; Hassard et al., 1999; Nolan & 
Yeung, 2001; Liu & Otsuka, 2004), the technical and energy efficiency of the Chinese iron 
and steel sector (Jefferson, 1990; Ross & Feng, 1991; Sugimoto, 1993; Movshu, 2004; Zhang 
et al., 2006), the econometric models of iron ore pricing (Hou & Yang, 2009; Sun & Xiang, 
2011; Zheng & Huang, 2011; Zhu, 2012), and the foreign policies and relations regarding 
mineral resources (Kirk, 2004; Pei, 2005; Yao & Sutherland, 2009; Yao et al., 2010; Wilson, 
2011, 2012), yet research addressing the interactional relationship between the Chinese steel 
SOEs and global mining oligopolies has been sparse and little interest has been shown in the 
accounting arena.  
 
To fill the literature gap, this research focuses on the use of accounting discourse in the 
interaction between the Chinese steel and iron industry and the Big Three. The Political 
Economy of Accounting (PEA) approach is considered as the theoretical framework. 
Chapter 2 Background 
21 
 
According to Tinker and Neimark (1987), this approach analyses “the ways various social 
protagonists use accounting information… to mediate, suppress, mystify and transform social 
conflict” (pp.71-2), and “places class relations at the forefront of the analysis and is… 
concerned with the effects of accounting information… on the distribution of income, wealth, 
and power” (p.72). It is adopted for the study for the following reasons. 
 
First, as the Chinese market has been one of the fastest developing and one of the most 
politically controlled in the world, using PEA enables this study to investigate more on the 
social and political dimensions of such an economy. In particular, the Marxist concepts and 
frameworks on which many of the PEA researchers so far have drawn (e.g. Bryer, 1991, 1993; 
Neu & Taylor, 1996) is well suited to the analysis relating to the Chinese communist 
government, the very origin of which is initially inspired by Marxism (Deng, 1993).  
 
Secondly, the most distinctive feature of China’s economic reform that the country’s steel 
and iron industry exhibits also adds to the uniqueness of this study. That is, whereas many 
Chinese SOEs are increasingly corporatized and privatised, the entire iron and steel sector has 
always been politically regarded as a strategic industry where national defence and natural 
resources are at stake, and thus remains subjected to state control by allowing only a small 
portion (less than 50%) of the iron and steel SOEs’ shares available on stock markets 
(Movshuk, 2004). Therefore, notwithstanding their subsidiaries listed domestically and 
overseas, these government-owned steel makers are effectively and essentially the “SOEs in 
the guise of a modern corporations” (OECD, 2000, p.18). In other words, while at the 
forefront of China’s globalised economy, the industry also contains most of the socialist 
political characters (i.e. state ownership). As PEA is concerned with how accounting 
information mediates, sustains, and perpetuates contradictions and class conflicts (Neu & 
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Taylor, 1996), it is thus argued that conflicts between economic reform and social welfare at 
macro level, and at micro level between employees of SOEs, government officials, and the 
newly emerged private entrepreneurs will be better analysed via the lens of PEA. 
 
Thirdly, the class conflict in fact extends beyond the national boundaries to the international 
arena. Mainly because of the impending depletion of China’s mineral resources and the 
growing demand for iron ore as the raw materials to steel manufacturers (Brett & Ericsson, 
2006), China has now become the single largest purchaser and importer of iron ores from the 
three global mining oligopolies from capitalist economies──BHP Billiton, Vale, and Rio 
Tinto. The iron ore trading between socialist SOEs and capitalist oligopolies therefore 
contributes novelty to this PEA study through bringing the political focus out from any single 
dominant form of society, whether socialism or capitalism, to a contemporary and interactive 
platform. 
 
Having pointed out the rationale behind the adoption of the PEA branch under the critical 
accounting research paradigm, it is then of necessity to explore the existing PEA literature in 
order to direct the research interest of the study. The next chapter is thus turned towards this 
end.
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Chapter 3 Literature Review: Political Economy of Accounting 
 
The previous chapter has introduced the background of the Chinese steel and iron industry 
and the global iron ore market, which directs the research interest towards the field of 
political economy. This chapter is thus dedicated to explore the extant PEA literature. In 
doing so, it provides an overview of what the existing research has explored, and, based on 
previous studies, identifies the particular theoretical and methodological approaches worth 
further investigation in the thesis. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The first section (3.1.) presents the 
early development of PEA literature in the early 1980s. The second section (3.2.) discusses 
Marx-informed accounting researches as one major stream of PEA. Other streams of PEA are 
delineated in the third section (3.3.). The fourth section (3.4.) summarises the research topics 
examined and methodologies used in the extant PEA studies, and then identifies the literature 
gap to which the current research is able to contribute. Subsequently, the direction of research 
interest is then specified in the fifth section (3.5.). 
   
3.1. Early development of PEA 
Although the concept of political economy has long been developed by scholars such as 
Smith (1980), Ricardo (1952),  and Marx (1887, 1956, 1959), the first study that incorporates 
the political economy of accounting may perhaps be the work of Tinker (1980).  In his paper 
‘towards a political economy of accounting: an empirical illustration of the Cambridge 
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controversies’, Tinker (1980) began with comparing how accounting concepts such as profit 
and rate of profit were explained under neo-classical economics and classical political 
economy. While the former saw profit as an indicator of economic efficiency and focused on 
the forces of production covering the technical factors of the input and output quantities and 
transformation coefficients, the latter considered profit as the return to capitalists and 
concentrated on the social relations of production incorporating the distribution of power 
among different classes in society and the social structure which enforced such a division of 
power. Before Tinker (1980) went on to apply the two theoretical perspectives into a case 
study of a Scottish iron ore company, he elaborated on the Cambridge Controversies (cf. 
Sraffa, 1960; Robinson, 1961; Dobb, 1973) in order to highlight the tautological explanation 
of marginalism: 
“we begin by asking how the rate of profit is determined and the answer is with reference 
to the quantity of capital and its marginal revenue product. We then ask how these are 
determined and the reply is by assuming a division of future income and discounting the 
returns to capital with the market rate of interest. All that has been said is that the market 
rate of interest is a function of the market rate of interest (and an assumed income 
distribution)” (Tinker, 1980, p.153). 
 
Facing with the inability of marginalist theory to explain how income is distributed and 
further how capitalism works, the classical political economy was reinstated to supplement 
neo-classic economics with social and political concepts. Then, by adopting a political 
economy viewpoint, Tinker (1980) interpreted the accounting data of a Scottish mining firm 
(Delco) operating in Sierra Leone via three different periods in which the three respective 
socio-political structures predominated (i.e. early colonial, late colonial, and post-colonial 
periods). Market efficiency and social stability were analysed together, leading to a deeper 
understanding that the distribution of accounting profit among different parties was a 
reflection of the socio-political foundations that existed and changed in Sierra Leone. 
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In so doing, Tinker (1980) powerfully substantiated the logical inconsistency of neo-classical 
economics and the imperfect market competition, and then guided us towards and laid out a 
general framework for further PEA researches based on two dimensions of capital. The first 
was the physical instruments of production as the ‘economic forces of production’, and the 
second the relationship of people in social institutions as the ‘social relations of production’ 
(p.154) (emphases added). To relate the former with the latter, an institutional realm was 
presented to ensure that characteristics of social relations were considered for economic 
production. According to Tinker (1980), PEA attempts to embrace the institutional 
arrangements such as politics, education, religions, law, the military, social welfare, culture, 
science, etc. While he explicitly stressed the importance of analysing accounting information 
as a result of the corresponding institutional interactions, he also placed accounting onto the 
institutional level as one of the factors determining and reinforcing the social distribution of 
wealth, serving as an intermediary between society and economy.  
 
This is not surprising to Cooper (1980). In his discussion of Tinker’s (1980) study, he 
suggested that the assumptions underlying capitalism overwhelmed accounting. That is, the 
institutional structure of capitalism within which concepts and ideas such as private property 
rights and existence of market were conceived and nurtured was generally taken for granted 
by accounting practitioners and researchers. As such, it is suggested that Tinker’s (1980) case 
study of Delco failed to distinguish clearly capitalist principles from the then political 
regimes throughout the three periods (early, late, and post-colonial periods) in Sierra Leone, 
not to mention the interaction between the former and the latter. In the words of Cooper 
(1980), this deficiency led to the rather blurred identification of the periodisation analyses 
and the vague qualitative explanation. In the final part of Cooper’s (1980) commentary, by 
regarding accounting itself as a form of ideology which “prevent(s) us from understanding 
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the society in which we live and the possibility of changing it” (Shaw, 1972, p.33), he pointed 
out the emancipatory potentials of PEA research in relation to a more holistic approach to 
assess accounting in organisations and society.  
 
Cooper and Sherer (1984) went on to further specify the emancipatory characteristics of PEA 
in their study to assess the value of corporate accounting reports. Having pointed out the 
incomplete analyses of accounting reports by the private value and the social value 
approaches due to their shareholder and manager oriented foci, Cooper and Sherer (1984) 
suggested the PEA approach. Here, the authors emphasised the three distinguishing elements 
that PEA should possess: (1) the recognition of “power and conflict in society”; (2) the 
specification on “historical and institutional environments” in which accounting operates; and, 
(3) “the adoption of a more emancipated view of human motivation and the role of 
accounting in society” (pp.218-219). While the first two features accorded with Tinker’s 
(1980) elaboration on PEA, the third element specified the more emancipated roles of human 
motivation and accounting as to proactively “change and reflect differing interests and 
concerns” (Cooper & Sherer, 1984, p.219). Nevertheless, a theoretical framework for PEA is 
yet to be presented. Apart from the three distinguishing features of PEA, Cooper and Sherer 
(1984) also set out three imperatives for doing PEA research: ‘be normative, be descriptive 
and be critical’ (p.219). However, these are said to be simply the “common-sense advice for 
any critical researcher” (Owen, 2010, p.35), and again suffers from being too general and 
lacking specific theoretical supports. 
 
Following the research by Tinker (1980) and Cooper and Sherer (1984), Tinker and Neimark 
(1987) adopted the PEA approach to examine the suppressive role of female workers at 
General Motors (GM) as reflected in corporate annual reports for the period from 1917 to 
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1976. By recognising the political power of accounting annual reports, their longitudinal 
review demonstrated how the accounting annual reports were deliberately designed as 
“ideological weapons aimed at influencing the distribution of income and wealth, in order to 
ensure the company’s continued profitability and growth” (p.72). 
 
Also noteworthy is the work of Tinker, Merino and Neimark (1982) conducted in the PEA 
tradition. While the study critiques the Positive Accounting Theory (PAT), it discusses the 
concept of value extensively including the classical political economy (cf. Ricardo, 1952), 
and does point out that Marx’s theoretical contribution “offers one of the most promising 
sources of radical thought” (Tinker et al., 1982, p.182). Drawing on the Marxist labour theory 
of value, Tinker et al. (1982) critiqued the ahistorical and asocial character of utility-based 
marginalist value and thus illustrated how PAT reinforced and sustained the social relations 
of capitalism. Then alternative ways of conducting radical accounting researches were 
introduced, warning us against narrowly construing and so localising (and limiting) radical 
criticisms, and directing further critical studies towards “an overall context of social conflict” 
(Tinker et al., 1982, p.191) at organisational and international levels. 
 
So far it has been discussed that the need for PEA was established, in response to the logical 
inconsistency of marginalism, as an alternative solution to supplement neo-classic economics 
with socio-political forces in accounting studies. The social significance of accounting was 
substantiated in a PEA tradition. Although an intellectual cul-de-sac was made in PEA at this 
stage, there existed a few areas underdeveloped. First, in relation to the theoretical framework 
for PEA, while Tinker (1980) introduced the social dimension of capital, Cooper and Sherer 
(1984) suggested an ‘imperatives and features’ approach, and Tinker et al. (1982) discussed 
the classical political economy and, inter alia, the labour theory of value, an agreed or 
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particularly favoured established PEA procedure is yet to be developed. Secondly, the 
specific data subject to PEA investigation also remained limited to either the elements of 
financial statements (Tinker, 1980), corporate annual reports (Cooper & Sherer, 1984; Tinker 
& Neimark, 1987), or theoretical debate between neoclassic economics and labour theory of 
value (Cooper, 1980; Tinker et al., 1982). Furthermore, while the socially constructive and 
reflective role of accounting was illustrated, the critical potential of PEA to emancipate and 
ultimately change the accounting arena is yet to be seen. Having pointed out the literature gap 
insofar as PEA is concerned, further research is discussed in the following to see the 
continued development of PEA. 
 
3.2. Marxist PEA 
Although Ricardian or Marxian theories were suggested by Tinker et al. (1982), at least 
implicitly, as potential theoretical frameworks for PEA, much of the PEA studies undertaken 
so far has come from the Marxian strand (Owen, 2003). The central contribution in this 
strand should be attributed to the sustained research effort of Rob Bryer. The following 
section is thus directed towards a detailed discussion of Marxian PEA studies and the work of 
Rob Bryer in particular. 
 
3.2.1. Elements of financial statements in Marxist PEA 
Bryer’s (1991) longitudinal case study specifically incorporated Marx’s Capital. With 
particular reference to Marx’s (1981) ‘great  railway swindle’, Bryer (1991) explored the 
financing of the British railways in the mid-nineteenth century which was generally regarded 
by economic historians as the ‘temporary aberrations of laissez faire capitalism’ on one hand 
and, on the other hand, as the ‘product of a rational and rapacious social hierarchy’ from 
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Marxian point of view. While Bryer (1991) noted the difficulties in undertaking PEA 
research that “(n)ot only must the investigator have a clear grasp of the conceptual 
foundations of accounting, but must also interrogate the historical, economic, social and 
political contexts of its practices” (p.440), he agreed with PEA’s three distinctive features 
suggested by Cooper and Sherer (1984). 
 
In another historical study, Bryer (1993) examined the emergence of modern financial 
reporting (MFR) in Britain in the nineteenth century. Rather than agreeing with the 
appearance of ‘managerial capitalism’ which considered management as a new powerful 
class, Bryer (1993) adopted Marx’s prediction of ‘investor capitalism’ which saw the rise of 
MFR as imperative to the general socialisation of capital. In analysing the historical 
development of the MFR, he delineated the relations between the published company 
accounts, the early auditing practice, and the shareholders’ collective need. Particularly, he 
focused on the role of depreciation accounting as a major tool for management manipulation 
(being either understated or overstated) serving investor interests, and thereby demonstrated 
an efficient British capital market in the late nineteenth century. 
 
Building on his previous study (Bryer, 1993), Bryer (1994) presented a theoretical paper 
evaluating the theoretical relevance to accrual accounting between Marx’s labour theory, 
modern theory of finance (MFT) and MFR. He compared concepts of the general rate of 
profit, required rate of return, and capital asset pricing model under MFT with those under 
Marxian views, and also corresponded concepts such as the objective of accounting, profit, 
capital, production costs, inventories, historical cost, depreciation, current cost accounting 
and goodwill from MFR with their Marxian counterparts. As such, he demonstrated the 
superiority of Marx’s labour theory of value in investigating critical roles of accounting in 
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modern capitalism. One key emphasis here by Bryer (1994) was surplus value as the ‘critical 
question in political economy’. 
 
Bryer’s interest in comparing the conceptual distinctions and overlaps between Marx and 
accounting continued in another paper (Bryer, 1999a). Similar to his previous work (Bryer, 
1994), Bryer (1999a) contended that while the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s 
(FASB) conceptual framework derived from marginalism was ambiguous and subjective, 
Marx’s interpretation of financial accounting lay out a scientific foundation for critical 
accounting. More specifically, he traced the contemporary elements of financial statements 
(i.e. asset, liabilities, equity, profit, revenue, gain, and expense) back to Marx’s theory of 
capital in order to elucidate the suitability of the Marxian accounting concepts. Lay in the 
centre of his critique here was the ‘circuit of industrial capital’
6
 and ultimately the theory of 
surplus value as the origin of profit which reproduced and circulated capital. For Marx, 
accounting “allows total social capital to observe the generation of surplus value and the rate 
of return on capital” (Bryer, 1999a, p.586). It can be argued that this paper is a key study in 
PEA literature incorporating Marxist thoughts. 
 
While Bryer’s (1999a) methodological contribution may well be as the first PEA research 
that compares the accounts of contemporary financial reporting with their Marxian 
counterparts and points out a Marxian foundation for critical accounting, his paper (Bryer, 
1999a) has also attracted a number of criticisms from the same issue of Critical Perspective 
on Accounting
7
. For instance, drawing from Derrida’s analysis, Robson (1999) refuted the 
                                                          
6 According to Marx, industrial capital circulates from initial capital to commodities (including labour power and means of 
production) necessary for production, and from production to commodities or services ready for sale, and then from sale of 
goods or services to a greater amount of capital. Part or all of the new capital will then be reinvested, and capital increases 
again; this is the circuit of industrial capital. 
7Critical Perspective on Accounting, (1999), vol.10, no5. 
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relevance of Marxist accounting, because “Marx was not primarily concerned to explain how 
business people calculate ‘profit’ except to show it was an ideological gloss” (p.624-5).  
 
Macve (1999) argued that Bryer (1999a) misunderstood Marx’s circuit of capital in that his 
(Bryer, 1999a) explanation of Marx’s capital circulation was similar to normal introductory 
economics except the mentioning of surplus value. And, even with the resort to the theory of 
surplus value which Bryer (1999a) seemed only to discuss in the process of production rather 
than ‘the circuit of capital’, he failed to resolve the incorrigible issues in modern financial 
accounting such as rules of recognition and measurement, as the Marxist thoughts to which 
Bryer (1999a) referred were obsolete and thus unable to provide a critical basis for 
accounting. 
 
From a broader perspective, Tinker (1999) used the term ‘Praxis-to-Disclosure Reductionism’ 
to comment on both Bryer (1999a) and Macve’s (1999) overemphasis on Marx’s role ‘in 
measuring and disclosing profit’ (Tinker, 1999, p.645). While Bryer (1999a) devoted the 
entire paper to demonstrate the superiority of Marxist accounting over that of the FASB, 
Macve (1999) simply adopted the same reasoning line to constrain the critical potential of 
Marx’s theory to financial reporting, stating “there is no self-evident Marxist accounting, as 
Rob Bryer or Richard Macve would seem to believe” (Tinker, 1999, p.647), and Marx would 
not be “so stupid as to expect to launch the next revolution by rejigging financial reporting 
practice” (ibid, p.649). According to Tinker (1999), some researchers (including Bryer and 
Macve) simply relied on the ‘economistic caricature’ of Marx while ignoring much of the 
philosophical and political Marx. Instead, Tinker (1999) pointed out that what Marx 
emphasised was “not a definitive analysis of capitalism, but some important methodological-
political tools for engaging and re-engaging a social system that is itself in constant renewal 
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and transformation” (p.655). Clearly, Tinker (1999) here was less interested in the 
‘economistic’ stance of Marx (on the early capitalism), but more concerned with tapping the 
methodological and political potentials out of Marx and applying them into the social 
struggles of a contemporary capitalist world such as the diminished role of the state, foreign 
policy, human rights, and environmental degradation. In commenting on the current variety 
of capitalism, he also mentioned China as one type of “hegemonic structures of capitalism” 
(Tinker, 1999, p.655). Thus, Tinker (1999) after all agreed that Marx’s thoughts could 
revitalise critical accounting research. 
 
In the same issue of Critical Perspectives on Accounting still, Bryer (1999b) responded his 
critics by (re)-emphasising his Marxist focus on the notion of accountability. That is, by 
presupposing an objective ideal of accounting derived from his understanding of Marx, “only 
objective accounts could allow investors to judge management’s behaviour; to punish or 
reward them for their stewardship of capital” (Bryer, 1999b, p.684). Notwithstanding the 
criticisms from different commentators, Bryer (1999b) reached the conclusion that, in general, 
all of them acknowledged the potential for Marxist accounting and welcomed further 
Marxian studies in PEA. 
 
To summarise the discussion so far, despite some criticisms (Robson, 1999; Macve, 1999; 
Samuelson, 1999), the application of Marxist theory into critical accounting research has 
offered us a more fundamental conceptual framework, in comparison to marginalism, of 
accounting which questions the very nature of capitalism (Bryer, 1999a, 1999b). However, as 
Tinker (1999) indicated, the emancipatory potential of Marxist accounting was not to be 
restricted within the confines of conceptual framework and financial disclosure, but to serve 
as a methodological tool examining conflicts in society at large. Therefore, the following 
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section is dedicated to see how Marx’s thoughts explore the issues of accounting other than 
financial reporting. 
 
3.2.2. Accounting change in Marxist PEA 
3.2.2.1. Marxist accounting and the transition to capitalism 
Bryer’s (2000a, 2000b) later studies were concerned with the changed roles of accounting ‘as 
products and producers’ (p.131) of the transition in England from feudalism to capitalism, by 
linking Weber’s (1964) discussion on the calculative mentalities of accounting with Marx’s 
political economy. In his theory paper (Bryer, 2000a), the accounting evolution during the 
transition period corresponded with different forms of extracting surplus value from labour, 
through the “feudal mentality of maximising consumable surplus” to a “transitional 
‘capitalistic’ mentality” (p.136). While the feudal mode of accounting focused on revenue 
and expense accounts, the capitalist mode of accounting relied on the production and sale of 
commodities to generate surplus value, albeit indirectly, and thus profit. With different 
calculative mentalities in the transition elucidated above, Bryer (2000a) further assigned them 
with the respective forms of accountability: “feudal accountability meant… peasants, were, 
ultimately, personally accountable to their lord”, whereas capitalist accountability meant 
“(m)anagement is… accountable to social capital for the realised rate of return on capital 
employed in production, and investors are accountable to each other, by means of profit and 
loss accounts and balance sheets” (ibid, p.142).  
 
According to Bryer (2000a), it was the class struggle in agriculture and international trade 
between the long established feudal merchants and the newly emerged middle class investors 
in the sixteenth and the early seventeenth century that led to the bourgeois revolution and the 
beginning of modern capitalism in England. He regarded the changes in accounting practice 
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as an inevitable product of and the solution to these class conflicts (Bryer, 2000a). To test 
these theoretical arguments via concrete examples, Bryer’s (2000b) archival research 
presented a case study of the changed accounting system of the English East India Company 
(EIC) during its period of bourgeois revolution and the transition to a joint stock body. In 
particular, he examined the company’s financial statements and meeting minutes and the 
corresponding legal documents regarding the development of the accounting system 
alongside the historical development of the EIC. Consistent with his theory paper (Bryer, 
2000a), Bryer (2000b) elucidated the transition from the feudal mode of accounting and 
accountability through to the single entry bookkeeping and into the double entry bookkeeping 
(DEB), as reflected in the changes from the particular accounting terminologies like stock, 
capital, surplus, the ‘true and fair view’, and the capital maintenance to the general practice 
like auditing and DEB. In addition to the accounting evolution in EIC, Bryer (2000b) was 
also concerned with the changes in accounting methods in agriculture. He analysed the 
accounts, texts, and literature of the farmers during the English agrarian revolution and 
demonstrated the ‘capitalistic spirit’ gradually exhibited in these evidence. This was more 
specific in Bryer’s (2006a) another paper dedicated to the genesis of England’s capitalist 
farmers.  
 
While Bryer (2000a, 2000b) successfully analysed the accounting evolution not as an 
historical phenomenon but as a result of class struggles leading to modern capitalism, he also 
explored the underlying context in which such transitions took place. In this aspect, the socio-
political side of Marx referred by Tinker (1999) is investigated. However, whether or not 
Bryer (2000a, 2000b) considered the exploitation superimposed upon the working class and 
poorer countries by the EIC and other capitalists, from Tinker’s (1999) perspective, remains 
arguably blurred. 
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3.2.2.2. Marxist accounting and Industrial Revolution 
Having presented a Marxist accounting history during England’s transition to capitalism, 
Bryer (2005) extended his interest to the British Industrial Revolution (BIR). Consistent with 
the findings in his previous papers (Bryer 2000a, 2000b), Bryer (2005) argued that “the 
primary cause of variations in accounting during the BIR was variations in the social relations 
of production” (p.25). Based on the accounting textbooks and the archives of the 25 leading 
BIR enterprises and other secondary evidence that Bryer (2005) drew from previous studies, 
he demonstrated that “the industrial revolutionaries did not just happen to also be capitalists” 
(p.45), and therefore “the BIR was a capitalist revolution” (p.62). Although Bryer (2005) has 
led us to understand the accounting implications for economic and social change, his study 
focused largely on the accounting changes in business enterprises while leaving the social 
and political ramifications unexplored. 
 
Based on the Marxian political economy of accounting from which much of Bryer’s work has 
derived, Toms (2005) conducted a longitudinal case study of the British Cotton Industry from 
1700 to 2000. Unlike Bryer, Toms (2005) incorporated the Marxian framework, Bryer’s 
Marxist accounting, and capital market theories to develop a PEA model for accounting 
change. In particular, his model consisted of four quadrants / categories, each of which 
representing the degree of productive resource centralisation and of capital socialisation. 
Viewed in this model, he then located the (both financial and management) accounting 
change at the core of and as a resolution to the contradiction between the centralisation of 
resources and the socialisation of capital. 
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3.2.2.3. Accounting for Global Capitalism: capital, labour, and professional service 
In addition to Bryer, Hanlon (1996, 1997) was also concerned with accounting change. 
Although Hanlon did not specify his work as that of Marxist, the locus of his study 
considered the issues of class, and the social relations of production. However, unlike Bryer 
(2000a, 2000b, 2005, 2006a) and Toms (2005) who delved into the particular changes in 
accounting methods and policies, Hanlon (1996, 1997) focused more on the changed 
accounting profession as a whole at a macro level. That is, he would rather take the 
accounting profession as a prototype within the increasingly globalised working environment 
which has changed professional labour from a social service sector in the public interest, to a 
commercialised ethos in the private interest. According to Hanlon (1996), professional 
accountants, as a service class, serve as a control mechanism to assist capitalists in 
controlling productive forces worldwide, and in allocating “surplus value to those 
geographical regions and / or economic sectors that give the highest return of capital” (p.343). 
The working class, on the other hand, has been increasingly excluded from the middle class 
and of course from the accounting profession due to an underprivileged social and 
educational background. 
 
While agreeing with Hanlon (1996) that global capitalism has changed the accounting 
profession, Arnold and Cooper (1999) examined how the latter has also promoted and 
reinforced the former in the context of the neo-liberal privatisation movement and the global 
restructuring of class relations. Their class analysis (Arnold & Cooper, 1999) explored the 
changed relations between labour, capital, government and the accounting profession in the 
case of the privatisation of a UK port. In particular, they illustrated the role of accounting 
valuation in executing the neo-liberal transformation of asset ownership from public to 
private hands, and from the less and under-developed to the developed countries. Social 
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struggles where capital was favoured and labour marginalised were thus masked by the 
seemingly technical and neutral accounting techniques, and the redistribution of wealth and 
the raw exploitation achieved. 
 
To summarise so far, while the changes in accounting techniques and regulations were 
analysed, assigned with a capitalist mentality, and associated with respective underlying class 
struggles and contradictions (cf. Bryer, 2000a, 2000b, 2005, 2006a; Toms, 2005), the 
changed accounting profession per se as an expert labour (middle) class was also elucidated 
with its relation to capital and working class (Hanlon, 1996; Arnold & Cooper, 1999). The 
socially reflective and constructive role of accounting seemed to be demonstrated, whereas 
Hanlon (1997) presented his reservation on this point that “the service class (accountants) has 
agency but it is still limited in its capacity (as derived from capitalism) to create and shape 
(social) change” (p.853). Indeed, the PEA literature and accounting change in particular 
discussed hitherto has predominantly remained their focus within capitalist societies, lacking 
an alternative perspective from a non-capitalist context. Furthermore, the evidence and data 
involved in PEA research so far were largely secondary, including accounting statements and 
reports (Tinker, 1980; Cooper & Sherer, 1984; Tinker & Neimark, 1987; Bryer, 2000b), 
survey and interview of accountants (Hanlon, 1996), historical archives (Bryer, 2000b, 2005, 
2006a; Toms, 2005; Arnold & Cooper, 1999), and statistical results (Hanlon, 1996). 
Responding to these issues, the following section is thus directed towards how Marxist PEA 
develops through the use of primary data in a non-capitalist context.  
 
3.2.3. Discursive formation of accounting in Marxist PEA 
Neu and Taylor’s (1996) study is one of the very first PEA researches that incorporate the use 
and abuse of accounting discourses and calculations with Marxian thoughts. It also concerns 
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the accounting impact in a dual context including one typical capitalist society and a less 
developed country. While putting the accounting discourse into the context of both a 
Canadian university (Queen’s University) and the South African transnationals financed by 
the university investment, Neu and Taylor (1996) argued that: 
“(1) the ideological effect of accounting (as a distributive and hegemonic mechanism) is 
to foreclose other narratives and value positions, (2) in doing so, accounting plays a 
central role in the accumulation of capital and the appropriation of surplus value, and (3) 
accounting is able to fulfil these functions not only because it harmonises with other 
discourses but also because accounting expertise is asymmetrically distributed” (p.437). 
 
To this end, they built up a theoretical link of accounting discourse between the Canadian 
university as at the core of the modern capitalist world and the South African firms at the 
periphery, in order to reveal the exploitative social relations inflicted by the multinationals 
and rationalised and perpetuated by accounting.  
 
In addition, unlike Bryer who adopts an accounting centric perspective, Neu and Taylor 
(1996) situated the accounting discourse among other discourses (whether competing or 
supportive) and in general the historical and socio-political background of both the Canadian 
university and South Africa. In so doing, as claimed by Neu and Taylor, “one can step 
outside the ‘commonsensical’ and see the relationship between anti-divestment interests and 
discursive strategies” (ibid, p.440). Having presented a detailed discussion of the Canadian 
and the South African contexts, Neu and Taylor (1996) examined the university board 
meeting minutes on the controversy of the pro- and anti-divestment of university fund debate. 
Not only did they elaborate on the constructive meanings of accounting calculations, but they 
also analysed the rhetorical use of terms such as ‘academic freedom’, ‘fiduciary 
responsibility’, and ‘economic autonomy’. 
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By viewing accounting discourse among the meeting discussions, it is demonstrated that the 
expert culture and ideological effect of accounting eclipsed the exploitation of the Africans, 
masked the financial interest derived from surplus value, and sustained the status quo. 
However, while indicating the possibility of bringing social change, Neu and Taylor (1996) 
seemed to agree with Hanlon (1997) that constructive role of accounting remained largely 
limited in favour of the powerful (capitalists) in the context of modern capitalism. 
 
The above section has investigated and evaluated the extant PEA literature conducted in a 
Marxist tradition. The aspects examined so far include the accounting conceptual framework, 
accounting history, and accounting discourse. Whilst Tinker (1980) stressed the power of the 
state as one of the critical elements for PEA, the implications for government were not well 
researched as thoroughly as would have been possible with a few notable exceptions (Tinker, 
1999; Bryer, 1991, 2000a, 2000b; Arnold & Cooper, 1999). Instead, many tend to 
concentrate on the influence that industries and capitalists have on accounting (cf. Hanlon, 
1996). Such a trend, according to Woodward and Woodward (2000), is even more prevalent 
in the non-Marxist strand of PEA. Thus, it is to the non-Marxist stream PEA literature that we 
now turn. 
 
3.3. Alternative PEA 
3.3.1. Bourgeois PEA 
Although ‘political economy’ has always been one distinguishing feature of Marxist studies, 
the term can also refer to bourgeois political economy when it comes to PEA research 
(Arnold, 1990). While Marxist PEA focuses on issues of social relations of production and 
class struggle, bourgeois political economy largely neglects these concerns and adopts a 
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pluralistic view of the world (Parker, 2005). In fact, these two approaches are fundamentally 
different and irreconcilable, because Marxism often trivialises the issues which are regarded 
by the bourgeois view as being significant. More importantly, according to Gray et al. (1995), 
bourgeois political economy is one essential approach to the study of accounting disclosure 
of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), as some elements of CSR, albeit trivial under 
Marxism, are to some extent bourgeois by their nature.  
 
For instance, Guthrie and Parker’s (1989) longitudinal analysis of the CSR disclosure of an 
Australian mining company (Broken Hill Pty) centred on the power of the corporation and 
thus corporate reporting. Through the examination of the firm’s annual reports in 100 years, 
they demonstrated the legitimacy theory’s inability of explaining CSR reporting and then 
pointed to the robust potential of PEA, suggesting corporate disclosure as a “proactive 
process of information…designed to set and shape the agenda of debate and to mediate, 
suppress, mystify and transform social conflict” (Guthrie & Parker, 1989, p.351). However, 
the explanatory potential here was only contained at the level of corporate executives who 
utilised CSR for a self-interest motive, leaving the production and distribution of profit 
untouched (see also Woodward & Woodward, 2000). 
 
Moreover, the PEA approach was simply presented as an alternative to legitimacy theory, 
with no further theoretical or methodological discussions presented by Guthrie and Parker 
(1989). Similarly, Adams et al.’s (1998) enquiry into the CSR disclosure by a number of 
European companies suggested the “ability of political economy theory to explain 
motivations for corporate social disclosure decisions” (p.18). Again, they also simply pointed 
out a PEA direction for CSR disclosure without further researches. 
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Following Guthrie and Parker (1989), Abeysekera (2003) considered the intellectual capital 
reporting (ICR) as a tool to better manage the relationship between corporations and their 
respective socio-political and economic arrangements. He too centred his theoretical analysis 
on corporations while downplaying the role of the state. Faced with the Marxian criticisms 
(cf. Arnold, 1990; Tinker et al., 1991) of the bourgeois political economy and supporting the 
Marxist stream of PEA, Gray et al. (1995) suggested, at the same time, that, by agreeing on a 
lower level of political economy, different theories would not compete against one another 
but enrich our understanding of CSR practices.  
 
3.3.2. Other PEA 
Accounting regulation has long been regarded as a result of complex power struggles among 
different interest groups (cf. Chand & Cummings, 2008; Palmrose, 2009), and thus has 
attracted the attention of some PEA studies. For example, Perry and Nolke’s (2006) 
theoretical paper examined the International Accounting Standards Board’s (IASB) 
introduction of fair value accounting as an instrument of neo-liberalism reflective of the 
changed social relations of production in favour of private capital while downplaying the role 
of the state. Arnold’s (2012) case study of the accounting reform in the aftermath of the East 
Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s considered the political power exerted by the alliance 
between the Anglo-American finance sector and the US government over the accounting 
harmonisation in emerging economies and global financial integration in general. 
 
Unlike Perry and Nolke (2006) and Arnold (2012) who focused on the political significance 
of the global financial capitalists (primarily from the US), Rosser (1999) studied the power of 
domestic bureaucratic forces within developing economies on opposing the introduction of 
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Western accounting standards. Similarly, Zhang et al. (2012) demonstrated the fair value 
accounting as a tool of neo-liberalism in the context of China through a qualitative analysis. 
 
Also noteworthy is the quantitative PEA study of Owen (2003) examining the correlation 
between accounting firm mergers and the increase in profit margins of large accounting firms. 
To this end, he adopted Cowling’s (1982) monopoly capitalism model which identified the 
relationship between the level of industry profit margin and the level of industrial 
concentration and merger activity to measure the degree of monopoly. As such, Owen (2003) 
using on the statistical data involved including the fees, staff salaries and staff members in 




Summarising findings of the previous research as has been elaborated above on the political 
economy of accounting, the following six key viewpoints are suggested:  
(1) Both the Marxist and the bourgeois steams of the political economy of accounting 
literature have been reviewed: the Marxist PEA studies have addressed accounting 
conceptual framework (Bryer, 1991, 1994, 1999a; Macve, 1999), accounting and social 
change (Bryer, 1993, 2000a, 2000b, 2005, 2006a; Toms, 2005; Hanlon, 1996; Arnold & 
Cooper, 1999), and ideological effect of accounting discourse (Neu & Taylor, 1996); the 
bourgeois stream is interested in CSR disclosure (Guthrie & Parker, 1989; Adams et al., 
1998) and ICR (Abeysekera, 2003), and other PEA researches explore accounting 
standards and regulation (Rosser, 1999; Perry & Nolke, 2006; Zhang et al., 2012; Arnold, 
2012). 
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(2) While Marxist accounting emphasises the dominant role of the state in shaping and being 
shaped by accounting (Tinker, 1980), other PEA studies consider the power of 
corporations as the primary factor. Furthermore, most of the social contexts on which 
Marxist accounting scholars have focused remain within the capitalist paradigm, thereby 
limiting the emancipatory potential of PEA. Similarly, most of the organisations and 
institutions that extant PEA research concentrates on are private in nature with a few 
notable exceptions (Neu & Taylor, 1996; Rosser, 1999). 
(3) Marxist PEA often considers accounting change as the catalyst for as well as the solution 
to social struggle. The class relations discussed only refer to those between feudal lords 
and merchants (Bryer, 2000a, 2000b), between capital and labour (Bryer, 2000b, 2005, 
2006; Toms, 2005), between global capitalists and emerging economies (Arnold, 2012), 
between capital, labour, the accounting profession, and the capitalist state (Tinker, 1980; 
Hanlon, 1996; Arnold & Cooper, 1999). Little attention has been given to the class 
relation between global capitalists, a socialist government and the corporations therein. 
(4) Indeed, the underlying socio-political environment in which extant PEA studies have so 
far analysed refers primarily to capitalist ideology. Only a few researches consider more 
than one dominant ideology deriving from either one single transitional society 
historically (Bryer, 2000a, 2000b) or two different societies contemporarily (Neu & 
Taylor, 1996). For those studies (Neu & Taylor, 1996) which involve both the core 
capitalist country and the periphery, the role of accounting has been explored only within 
the core, not the periphery. 
(5) Although extensive studies have been undertaken in either a Marxist or a bourgeois 
political economy tradition, there is no theoretical framework on which PEA scholars 
agree.  
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(6) The contemporary PEA literature on the use of accounting discourse in transitional 
economies with competing ideologies has been sparse. 
 
3.5. Directions of research interest 
To fill the void in extant literature, this research explores the use of accounting discourse as 
the product of as well as the solution to the social conflicts between the global capitalist 
oligopolies, the Chinese socialist government and the corresponding SOEs in the Chinese 
context. To make this analytic task feasible, the research focus is to move from the particular 
to the general, as reflected in the following three inter-related areas. 
 
3.5.1. Interaction between the global capitalist economy and a socialist market 
As illustrated earlier, insufficient attention from the extant PEA literature has been given to 
the interaction between two competing socio-political contexts. One exception is the 
investigation of Neu and Taylor (1996) that situates accounting discourse into a dual context 
where one capitalist society reacts to a less developed nation. At present, one of the most 
conspicuous comparisons in this regard is that between China and the developed capitalist 
economy. Therefore, while Neu and Taylor (1996) demonstrate the ideological role of 
accounting language in appropriating surplus value for an advanced capitalist economy, the 
current research studies how the discursive practice of accounting discourse, with specific 
reference to the pricing mechanism of iron ore, has been used for a socialist state and against 
capitalist oligopolies (i.e. the Big Three). 
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In particular, such specific environment in which the accounting discourse is put forward 
involves two paradoxical and yet interacting socio-political contexts, namely the Chinese 
steel and iron industry and the global mining oligopolies. First, they are paradoxical in that 
while the majority of China’s leading steel corporations are SOEs formed and controlled by 
the socialist government and claim to be in the interest of the nation, the Western mining 
oligopolies (i.e. BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, and Vale) are founded by private capital investment 
and operate in the interest of shareholders. Secondly, they are also interacting in that the 
Chinese iron and steel industry has been the biggest purchaser and importer of iron ores from 
the mining oligopolies since 2004 (Zhu, 2012). Moreover, from a macro institutional 
perspective, the newly established quarterly index pricing system for seaborne iron ore gives 
rise to another set of interaction between the increasingly financialised global iron ore market 
and an industry wide stagnation (Bao, 2012) of the Chinese iron and steel sector. The role of 
accounting in such an interaction between finance and manufacturing leads to the next 
discussion on the circuits of capital. 
 
3.5.2. Circuits of capital 
Originating from Marx’s Capital, an economy involves operations of distinct circuits of 
capital----production, commerce, and finance (Grady & Ackroyd, 2013). While Bryer (1999a) 
derives accounting concepts (asset, liability, equity, revenue, and expense) and various 
financial statements from Marx’s (1956) circuit of industrial capital which consists of 
production and commerce, Hanlon (1996) demonstrates the new role of accounting 
profession in helping the capitalist class control productive labour and promote a global 
financial system. Furthermore, Arnold (2012) characterises these finance capitalists as a new 
ruling class which, at least temporarily, takes precedence over all other activities of the 
business world and even directs the global accounting harmonisation. However, research on 
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the interaction between productive, commercial, and financial capital has been sparse with a 
few exceptions (e.g. Arnold and Cooper, 1999). Furthermore, most of the studies examining 
the relationship between production, commerce, and finance often presuppose the supreme 
power of finance and therefore focus on the process regarding how financial capital 
dominates productive and commercial capital. This thesis then studies the interaction between 
the global iron ore market and the Chinese steel and iron industry via the lens of the 
productive, commercial, and financial capital. Questions are asked: will the production and 
commerce capital always passively accept the institutional arrangements by finance capital? 
If not, how will the productive and commercial side compete with their financial counterpart? 
In such scenario, is accounting still promoting the finance sector as elucidated by previous 
studies (e.g. Hanlon, 1996; Arnold & Cooper, 1999; Arnold, 2012) or can accounting be in 
favour of the production and commerce to compete with finance, and how and why? 
 
To fill the literature gap and answer the questions above, therefore, this thesis explores the 
proactive confrontation of the productive and commercial with financial capital. In particular, 
I will elaborate on the use of accounting discourse by the Chinese steel and iron industry in 
resisting the financialised pricing mechanism of iron ore. Moreover, the unique characteristic 
of Chinese SOEs as operating (and monopolising) in a socialist market economy and at the 
same time being increasingly involved with globalised markets will be taken into 
consideration. In so doing, I will address the ‘why’ question as to the reasons that accounting 
discourse is set to serve the interests of productive and commercial capital, and ultimately 
failed to resist the participation of financial capital in the global iron ore market.  
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3.5.3. Social change and class conflicts 
At a deeper level, the broader socio-political context in which the shift from the long term 
negotiation pricing model to the quarterly index pricing mechanism took place will be 
examined. Based on the extant literature and Marxist PEA in particular, social change comes 
as the consequence of the class conflicts between the social relations of production and the 
productive forces (Bryer, 2000a, 2000b; Toms, 2005; Arnold & Cooper, 1999). Accounting 
in itself is also part of such changes (Neu & Taylor, 1996; Hanlon, 1997). Thus, the analysis 
of accounting discourse in this thesis goes beyond the confines of the iron ore price, and 
extends to the relevant social relations and productive forces with which the Chinese steel 
and iron industry and the Big Three are concerned. 
 
Furthermore, unlike the previous studies that concern the issue of class, this thesis explores 
the major state-owned steel enterprises, as a relatively new type of class, in the so called 
socialist market with Chinese characteristics—a term used by the CPC government to 
describe the combination of planned economy with free market (see Deng, 1993, p.149; Jiang, 
2006a, pp.198-205, 2006b, p.17). In this context, the former Chinese president Jiang Zemin 
commented on the development of SOEs as “not only an important economic issue, but also a 
significant political issue” (Jiang, 2006c, p.71). Thus, while Bryer (2000a) explained the 
capitalist accountability that “management is… accountable to social capital for the realised 
rate of return on capital employed in production, and investors are accountable to each other” 
(p.142), the present research contributes to the literature by exploring the accountability of 
China’s SOEs from a class perspective. 
 
To address these directions of interest (3.5.1.—3.5.3.), and given that there is not any 
methodological framework for PEA upon which researchers have hitherto unanimously 
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agreed or used, this thesis has thus developed the methodological and theoretical framework 
in the following two chapters (chapter four and chapter five). To this end, this research draws 
primarily from Marx’s discussion of finance in Capital, and his philosophical and 
methodological thoughts in Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and The German 
Ideology, for several reasons. Firstly, Marx’s theory serves as part of China’s social and 
political context in which the research is carried out. As mentioned in section 1.2., Marxism 
has always been considered as a vital theoretical basis for the CPC since the establishment of 
People’s Republic of China (Jiang, 2006a, p.157, 2006b, p.8; Hu, 2006). Secondly, 
responding to Tinker’s (1999) call for engaging Marx’s work as a methodological tool 
capable of exploring contemporary issues, the current research aims to develop a Marx-
informed methodology to study the accounting discourse regarding the price of iron ore. 
Thirdly, while the concept of capital movement, and particularly the industrial capital, has 
been explored by scholars such as Bryer (1999a) and Grady and Ackroyd (2013), the concept 
of financial capital and its relationship with the productive and commercial capital from a 
Marx’s perspective remains largely under researched. To fill the gap, this thesis also engages 
in a theoretical discussion of financial capital based on Marx’s work, contingent upon the 
case of the shift in the iron ore pricing mechanism. This is discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 Theorising Financialisation in Iron Ore Market 
 
This chapter provides a theoretical discussion of the extant literature on financialisation, in 
order to develop the theoretical framework for studying the financialisation of iron ore price 
in this thesis. The chapter is structured as follows. The first section (4.1.) introduces the term 
financialisation in general. Section 4.2. first reviews the existing literature of financialisation 
from (Post-) Keynesian perspectives and subsequently presents a critique on this approach. 
Then, based on Marx’s Capital, section 4.3. is directed towards a Marxist framework of 
financialisation which explores the relationships between productive, commercial, and 
financial capitalists, and between financial capitalists and ordinary workers, in the context of 
contemporary capitalism. Section 4.4. pulls the arguments together and provides implications 
of the Marxist approach for further research directions, specifically indicating research 
potentials for critical investigations in accounting literature. In the final section (4.5.), the 
term “financialisation” is defined, contingent upon the current case study of the financialised 
price of iron ore in the global market. 
 
 
4.1. Introducing Financialisation 
Although the term financialisation has only been popularised in recent decades, it has been 
applied to the examination and analysis of a wide variety of phenomena ranging from the 
globalised financial markets (Arnold, 2012), the growing significance of shareholder value in 
management decision making and corporate strategy (Crotty, 1990; Boyer, 2000; Feng et al., 
2001; Andersson et al., 2006; Lazonick, 2008; Andersson et al., 2010b), the increased 
financial investment and income streams from non-financial sectors (Stockhammer, 2004; 
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Crotty, 2005; Orhangazi, 2008), the recent global financial crisis (Crotty, 2009; Lapavitsas, 
2011), and the international financial reporting standards (Nolke & Perry, 2008; Zhang & 
Andrew, 2014; Muller, 2014; Haslam et al., 2015). Despite the fact that extant research has 
approached financialisation from the aforementioned perspectives, the concept remains 
elusive with no precise definition agreed upon. At a minimum, as has been broadly analysed, 
financialisation refers to the economic and political growth of financial markets and financial 
institutions. For instance, Arnold (2012) defines financialisation as a political product leading 
to economic transformations wherein financial capital dominates over domestic as well as 
global economies. The specific way in which financialisation has gained its prominence, 
according to Krippner (2005), lies in its pattern of accumulation with profit directly and 
increasingly garnered through financial channels rather than through production and 
commerce.  
 
To further explore the social, economic, and political ramifications of financialisation, this 
chapter presents two theoretical reviews of two different approaches—(Post-) Keynesian, and 
Marxist. In particular, while the (Post-) Keynesian perspective has been widely applied in 
extant literature of financialisation, a Marxist political economy framework in this respect has 
been given relatively less attention. To fill this gap, I begin with a critique of the (Post-) 
Keynesian and then focus on a Marxist approach. By so doing, it is hoped to shed light on a 
new understanding of financialisation, which will then inform the theoretical lens of the 
thesis.  
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4.2. (Post-) Keynesian approaches to Financialisation 
4.2.1. Extant review on literature of (Post-) Keynesian financialisation 
Much of the contemporary research in the area of financialisation has been developed in the 
(Post-) Keynesian tradition, examining the relationship between flourishing financial markets 
and stagnating non-financial sectors. In particular, a common presumption here is that, since 
ownership dominates management, financial enterprise comes to dominate non-financial 
enterprise. For instance, Crotty (1990) presents three (Post-) Keynesian views on financial 
sector domination with specific reference to Keynes (1936), Tobin (1977), and Minsky (1975, 
1982, 1983). Keynes (1936) argued that stockholders and the financial market in general take 
precedence over management in calculating the expected rate of profit on capital, and, 
consequently, an equity market populated by comparatively ill-informed stockholders 
dominates management decision-making in non-financial sectors. In this sense, it is argued, a 
disquieting instability informs the financial sector where a large number of ignorant 
speculators trade for short-term capital gains. 
 
Contrary to Keynes’ (1936) assumptions of irrationality and ignorance in capital markets, yet 
claiming his theory to be an appropriate extension of Keynes, Tobin (1977) puts forward an 
efficient and stable financial market with rational investors. Under such circumstance, 
stockholders and managers will share identical information with the shared purpose of 
maximising the value of stock. However, as Tobin (1977) points out, while market investors 
as shareholders initiate and continuously evaluate the economic activities of the enterprise, 
managers become passive agents who execute business decisions made by the efficient 
market. In other words, the financial market is portrayed as dominant, and management 
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(particularly those with a non-financial background) becomes at best functionary and perhaps 
redundant. 
 
Similar to Tobin (1977), Minsky (1983) not only treats shareholders and managers as 
theoretically identical, but also considers that the financial sector dominates the real sector
8
. 
For Minsky, the real sector has always been guided by finance, in that 
“(t)he profitability of existing capital… can only change if investment and expected 
investment decline. Thus we have to look elsewhere—to arguments other than those 
derived from assumed properties of production functions and hand waves with regard to 
over-investment… The natural place to look… is in the impact of financing relations” 
(Minsky, 1983, p.13). 
Therefore, since finance directs the development of the real sector, economic instability is 
again rooted in financial markets. 
 
While disagreeing with Tobin (1977) and Minsky’s (1983) alignment with neo-classical 
theory, Crotty (1990) argues that owners and managers are in fact conceptually different 
regarding their respective roles and objectives. Rather than assuming the notion of a pure 
dictatorship of finance, Crotty (1990) champions a particular type of “semiautonomy” 
between financial and nonfinancial sectors where “both management and wealth-holder 
decisions have macroeconomic effects that change the environment within which the other 
agent operates” (p.537). In the era of contemporary capitalism, however, Crotty (1990) does 
recognise the constraint superimposed by financial markets upon management, and he 
                                                          
8 The use of the terms “real sector” and “real economy” here refers to the non-financial sector within the same economy. 
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reaches the same conclusion as those of Keynes, Tobin, and Minsky that “financial markets 
dictate enterprise investment decisions” (p.540). 
 
More recently, based on the Post-Keynesian theory of investment (Lavoie, 1992), 
Stockhammer (2004) explores the potential negative impact that financialisation has on 
capital accumulation and growth of the real sector. In particular, and consistent with Lavoie 
(1992), Stockhammer (2004) proposes that the goal of the firm is not simply about 
profitability, but covers a wide range of aims such as organisation growth, market expansion 
and so forth. However, the shareholder revolution (Lowenstein, 2004) coupled with the neo-
liberal movement has shifted the decision-making power from management to financial 
market investors and made profit maximisation the single most important aim of the firm. As 
such, the increasing power of the financial sector, which seeks short term capital gains 
(Schaberg, 1999), would intrinsically suffocate the long term growth of the real economy.  
 
Similar to Stockhammer (2004), Orhangazi (2008) also proposes the negative impact of 
financialisation on real capital accumulation. However, unlike Stockhammer (2004), who 
analyses the depressive effects regarding investment behaviour of non-financial businesses at 
a macro-economic level, Orhangazi (2008) attributes the issue, at the firm level, to not only 
the increased financial investment (see also Crotty, 2005) but also the increased payments 
that the real sector has made to financial markets (e.g. Boyer, 2000; Aglietta & Breton, 2001). 
Although this is substantiated by his econometric tests, Orhangazi (2008) limits his findings 
to the context of US economy, and warns those countries shifting towards the US-style 
financial system about the potential impediments brought by finance. 
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To sum up the (Post-) Keynesian approach discussed above, financialisation is portrayed as 
the expansion of financial markets and institutions in both size and power. The financial 
sector has grown so fast that it is now threatening the growth of real economy with its 
endogenously generated financial instability (Crotty, 1990, 2009) and its depressive impact 
on the real sector. However, this view is problematic for several reasons, and the following 
section thus provides a critique of the Post-Keynesian approach to understandings of 
financialisation. 
 
4.2.2. Critiques on (Post-) Keynesian approach to Financialisation 
An important limitation of the (Post-) Keynesian approach is that it restricts the 
understanding of financialisation to a comparison of financial and non-financial sectors. 
Further, within these two broadly defined ‘sectors’, consideration is limited to interactions 
that take place within the confines of the owner-manager paradigm: business owners / 
shareholders represent the interest of financial markets, and managers operate to achieve 
growth in real sectors. In reality, this is not always the case. On the one hand, not all non-
financial businesses have been fully capitalised in stock markets, especially in those 
developing countries to which most of the productive activities in the developed world are 
outsourced. Thus, company owners operating in emerging economies are not from financial 
sectors and prefer long term business growth as opposed to short term capital gains. On the 
other hand, corporate managers nowadays focus not only on the real growth of firms, but also 
on the short term gains. This is partly because of the ex post factors such as performance 
related payment schemes and stock options that have turned management of non-financial 
firms into “financial market players” (Rossman & Greenfield, 2007, p.2) seeking short term 
investment gains, particularly when there exists long-term uncertainty (McSweeney, 2009).  
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A second limitation relates to the working class, which has been increasingly influenced by 
financialisation, in at least two aspects. First, the rising significance of finance has not only 
shifted the decision making power from managers to shareholders, but it has also deprived 
employees of their political and economic bargaining capacity: the long established wages-
productivity-profit nexus that has traditionally ensured workers’ status has been gradually 
eroded by modern corporations via downsizing, casualisation, and outsourcing, in an attempt 
to please financial market investors. In other words, ordinary workers (and particularly those 
from non-financial sectors) have been increasingly subjected to the instability and insecurity 
of their jobs in the name of financial restructuring (Arnold & Cooper, 1999; Rossman & 
Greenfield, 2007). Even the daily lives of ordinary workers have become deeply implicated 
in activities of financialisation: mortgage payments have now become commonplace and 
often necessary in housing and vehicle markets (Cook et al., 2009), and the increasingly 
privatised and financialised pension and insurance funds rely heavily on financial markets 
(Cutler & Waine, 2001). Further, due to the unstable nature of financial institutions and 
systems, responsibilities and risks have been shifted from the market to individuals and 
households in times of economic crisis (Langley, 2004, 2006; Dixon & Monk., 2009). The 
crux of the matter then becomes the wide ranging influence that finance has on normal 
workers in terms of household income, consumption, savings and investment. Overall, taking 
the working class into consideration, financialisation can be located and assessed in society at 
large; locking financialisation inside the commercial world would “hide as much as (it) … 
reveal(s)” (Tinker & Carter, 2003, p.578), resulting in a fundamental disregard of labour in 
both academic research and government policy. 
 
Stepping outside of the owner-manager-labour conflict, the (Post-) Keynesian dichotomy of 
financial and non-financial sectors simply assumes a strong sense of homogeneity, by 
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universalising different data and analyses from various non-financial firms. Whilst in so 
doing the contrast and conflict between financial and non-financial sectors can be easily 
established, it nevertheless overlooks some critical difference within the real sector. The 
traditional political economy approach (e.g. Smith, 1980; Ricardo, 1952), for instance, would 
emphasise on the value of labour and hence the process of production. From Marx’s 
perspective, there exists a critical difference between productive and commercial sections 
within the same non-financial sector: whilst commercial as well as financial activities 
appeared long before the birth of capitalism, or in Marx’s (1959, p.424) words, the 
“antediluvian” age, it is the (capitalist mode of) production which separates human labour 
from the means of production, and which enables large scale production and has thus given 
rise to capitalism. Turning to the contemporary stage of economic globalisation, many, if not 
most, non-financial firms in advanced capitalist economies have already outsourced 
manufacturing activities to the developing world, whereas the commercial sector remains 
comparatively less affected. Viewed in this way, the (Post-) Keynesian approach seems to be 
overly reductionist as it takes the entire non-financial sector as the subject of analysis while 
neglecting the endogenous heterogeneity and hybridity from within. 
 
From the perspective of the exogenous relationship that exists between financial and non-
financial sectors, it has been shown that much of the (Post-) Keynesian literature has either 
presumed or hypothesised the deterministically depressing effect that financialisation would 
have on non-financial sectors, leaving no room for the positive side (if any) of finance, and 
assigning the real sectors with a purely passive role (e.g. Crotty, 1990, 2009). Had finance 
presented no benefits towards social and economic progress in its earlier stage of 
development, it would not have risen to such prominence in contemporary capitalist societies. 
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On the other hand, also of particular relevance is how productive and commercial activities in 
the real sector as the subject engage and interact with finance as the object. After all, if 
financialisation, as generally agreed in extant literature, refers to the increase in the size and 
power of financial markets and institutions, a richer story could be told by paying particular 
attention to the historical and institutional settings ranging from the rise of finance, its 
interaction with other parts of the economy, and its present dominance. To state it simply, 
what should be noted is the historical and geographical contingency of capitalism (e.g. Hall & 
Soskice, 2001) in general and financialisation (e.g. Arrighi, 1994, 2007) in particular. For 
instance, in the early stage of capitalism, Marx (1959) points out that finance (in the form of 
interest-bearing capital) enabled the refining of production “by ruining the feudal lord and 
small-scale producer… and centralising the conditions of labour into capital” (p.426). In this 
sense, finance was subordinated in general to the “conditions and requirements of the 
capitalist mode of production”, recruiting new forces of industrialists and merchants and thus 
reinforcing the supremacy of capital (pp.428-9). When capitalist development reached its 
maturity in one region, it became highly likely that the (financial) capital would flow to those 
less developed areas, which would subsequently become involved with the production and 
trade. Viewed in this way, finance, as the extant literature would agree, may slow down the 
growth in the local “real economy”, but it does not necessarily bring the negative effects on 
non-financial firms elsewhere. That is, from a world-system perspective (Power, 2009) that 
considers financial and non-financial sectors as the common elements across regional and 
national boundaries in the contemporary business world, it is less surprising that finance may 
not be as detrimental as was seen in any individual areas or countries alone. Thus, to fully 
appreciate how finance has affected, and been affected by, the real economy, there is an 
urgent need to first of all recognise the historically and geographically contingent nature of 
financialisation, and then to (re-)define the concept of financialisation appropriate to the 
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specific temporal and spatial context within which it corresponds, without presupposing or 
universalising any findings from local to global. 
 
Once we realise that financialisation should be analysed within the international political 
economy as a whole, another limitation of the (Post-) Keynesian approach becomes apparent. 
This limitation relates to the selection and use of data. While many studies collect and 
analyse the data from financial and non-financial sectors in developed countries (e.g. the US 
and the UK) (e.g. Andersson et al., 2006; Andersson et al., 2010; Haslam et al., 2015), some 
other researchers (e.g. Grabel, 1995; Demir, 2007) have used the data from developing 
nations. However, little connection has been made between developed and developing 
countries, nor is there any reflection on the actual process in which any two different 
countries interact. Further, the empirical analyses in (Post-) Keynesian studies are not always 
conclusive, nor are the statistical findings overwhelming (e.g. Stockhammer, 2004; 
Orhangazi, 2008; van Treeck, 2009). Therefore, faced with the limited use and analysis of 
data, attention should be turned to the overlapping areas between developed and developing 
countries where the financial capital coordinates and / or competes with the real sector therein.  
 
To summarise the critique so far, the (Post-) Keynesian approach to financialisation limits the 
interaction between financial and non-financial within the owner-manager paradigm while 
ignoring the broader social implications of financialisation on ordinary people. It reduces the 
complexity by universalising the distinctions between production and commerce. Taking the 
financial and non-financial together, (Post-) Keynesian literature fails to recognise the 
interrelationship between the two, by assuming the deterministically detrimental effects of the 
former on the latter. This is, at least in part, due to the limited selection and use of data which 
constrain the analyses within national contexts, and thereby overlook the interrelationship 
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between finance and real sectors globally. Given these deficiencies, what has yet to be 
accomplished is a closer examination of the process of how financialisation coordinates and / 
or competes with non-financial sectors, particularly in the context of manufacturing sectors, 
without presupposing the dominance of any party, on a global scale that sees advanced 
capitalist economies interacting with emerging markets. 
 
Although a concrete exploration as such (of the proposed approach above) is lacking in 
literature as well as theory, there does exist another stream of studies which exhibits the 
potential to satisfy this demand and thus merits further elaboration, namely the Marxist 
political economy approach towards financialisation. As urged by Crotty (1990) that 
“Marxists will have to take financial phenomena more seriously than they have traditionally 
done” (p.541), already many Marxian researchers have begun to investigate financialisation 
in terms of the conflict between financial capitalists and industrial capitalists (Dumenil & 
Levy, 2004), financial expropriation of the working class (Lapavitsas, 2009a； Fine, 2010), 
poverty (Fine, 2007), global and geo-political relocation of production, commerce, and 
finance (Grady & Ackroyd, 2013), and the global financial crisis (Lapavitsas, 2009b). 
However, it is argued here that a detailed theoretical framework for financialisation largely 
remains absent. The following section, therefore, attempts to theorise financialisation towards 
the Marxist political economy approach, by referring primarily to Marx’s (1887, 1956, 1959) 
Capital.  
 
4.3. Marxian approach to financialisation 
While Marx never actually refers to the term “financialisation”, its theoretical underpinnings 
for radical analysis of the political economy accounting can be found in Marx’s concept of 
interesting-bearing capital / loanable capital (Capital, Vol III, chapters 21-25). That is, 
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Marx’s concept of the money capital traded as a commodity that accrues revenue in the form 
of interest. This interest, furthermore, is argued to result from the profits generated by the 
investment projects of the manufacturing and commercial capitalists. Although Marx was 
rarely concerned with other types of financial capital / financial assets in his work, as many, 
if not most, of the financial instruments nowadays have only been invented and popularised 
in the last several decades, he did refer to the financial products other than interest-bearing 
capital and consider them to be the “derivatives of this form (interest-bearing capital) and 
presuppose its (interest-bearing capital’s) existence of” (Marx, 1959, p.256). Admittedly, 
some might maintain that, even with the recognition of interest-bearing capital, Marx’s 
interpretation is limited to the particular social, political, historical, and technological 
background in which he lived. However, we endeavour here to place financialisation (in the 
form of interest-bearing capital) in Marx’s Capital not simply as a part of the history that 
Marx has studied, but with the aim of developing and applying “some important 
methodological-political tools (that Marx bequeathed to us) for engaging and re-engaging a 
social system that is itself in constant renewal and transformation” (Tinker, 1999, p.655; see 
also Cooper & Tinker, 1994; Cooper, 1997).  
 
Seeing in this way, interest-bearing capital has to be the point of departure for developing a 
Marxist theoretical framework for financialisation. Therefore, the following sections first 
(section 4.3.1.) present the often mystified nature of interest-bearing capital in particular 
relation to its self-expanding pattern; second (section 4.3.2.), attempt to demystify such an 
accumulation by establishing the affiliation between the movement of interest-bearing capital 
with that of the industrial  (which contains productive and commercial) capital; third (section 
4.3.3.), explore the interrelationship between finance (as represented by interest-bearing 
capital), production, and commerce further via the concept of idle money; fourth (section 
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4.3.4.), following the discussion of idle money, investigate the link between finance and the 
working class; and, finally (section 4.4.), present further directions for critical analyses of 
financialisation within Marx’s political economy framework. 
 
4.3.1. The mystified nature of (financial) capital 
Although Marx’s (1959) discussion of interest-bearing capital in Capital did not begin until 
Chapter 21 Volume III, in analysing the “General Formula for Capital” from Volume I he 
already pointed out, albeit briefly, the often mystified and circular nature of (financial) capital. 
Capital, Marx (1959) argues, is self-expanding in that money transforms from its monetary 
value as financial (or interest-bearing) capital to take on a functioning capital guise, which, in 
turn, further enhances the wealth of the financial capital. In other words, when money is 
transferred from a financial capital-holder to a functioning capital-holder, the functioning 
capital-holder converts the money into commodity capital (in the form of labour), which is 
used to generate a return (profit) that eventually flows back to the financial capital-holder in 
the form of interest. Seen in this way, lending money is nothing more than the financial 
capital-holder giving away the functioning right (i.e. the profit-making ability) of the 
monetary capital to a functioning capital-holder (i.e. the borrower) in exchange for an interest 
payment. This enables money to “become a commodity… sui generis” (Marx, 1959, p.222) 
which takes the form of capital. More importantly, unlike other commodities which 
depreciate over time, money as a commodity not only remains intact but also increases its 
value over time through consumption (except the case of inflation). 
 
Marx argued that, because money has the capacity to create more money, an “automatic 
fetish” is created, along with a “mystification” of the nature of capital: 
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“It is the capacity of money, or of a commodity, to expand its own value independently 
of reproduction—which is a mystification of capital in its most flagrant form… a form in 
which the source of profit is no longer discernible, and in which the result of the 
capitalist process of production—divorced from the process—acquires an independent 
existence” (ibid, p.256) (emphasis added) 
More significantly, this mystification of capital has led many to take the interest income as 
the natural product of capital, so that capital is considered to be  
“a self-regulating automaton, as a mere number that increases itself… (and) the law of its 
growth (as) in the formula s = c(1 + i)
n
, in which s = the sum of capital + compound 
interest, c = advanced capital, i = rate of interest… and n stands for the number of years 
in which this process takes place” (p.258). 
Even more romanticised has been that, when capital, and so is its self-expanding magic, is in 
the hands of the borrower, she or he will be able to literally pay the interest and the principal 
by creating and using new loans, arriving at the “pleasant progression of an infinity of loans” 
(ibid, p.259).  As such, 
“(i)n its capacity of interest-bearing capital, capital claims the ownership of all wealth 
which can ever be produced, and everything it has received so far is but an instalment for 
its all-engrossing appetite. By its innate laws, all surplus-labour which the human race 
can ever perform belongs to it” (p.259) 
Interestingly and ironically, regarding the aforementioned law of capital growth as well as the 
“pleasant infinity of loans”, parallels can still be drawn with today’s financial world, with 
regard to both commercial arena and academic circle, where interest / discount rates are 
widely applied in calculating present as well as future values of capital investment, the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model, for instance. Despite the contemporary relevance of such “laws 
of capital growth” (i.e. s = c(1 + i)
n
, or, M– M’), Marx (1959) considers these laws as 
superficial and thoughtless, and hence his investigation continues, devolving deeper the 
mystified character of capital. For him, the ability of money to reproduce and increase itself 
is “by no means a feature of interest-bearing capital alone” (ibid, p.227) but is in fact 
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representative of the total circuit of capital movement as a whole. That is, neither the ex ante 
transfer of capital from lender to borrower nor the ex post receipt of capital from borrower to 
lender is a part of capital circulation. Rather, it simply helps prepare and supplement the real 
circulation process to be later carried out by industrial capitalists. Thus, the rate of interest to 
a large extent should depend on the general condition of the productive and commercial 
activities within the same economy. Viewed in this way, the movement of interest-bearing 
capital should not be the concluding remark here to understand finance, but rather the point of 
departure to fully appreciate how money as interest-bearing capital creates more money with 
regard to the circuits of industrial capital. Therefore, the following section considers the 
production and circulation of industrial capital and then explores its interaction with interest-
bearing capital. 
 
4.3.2. The demystification of capital 
According to Marx (1956), industrial capital consists of two parts: production and commerce, 
which move as a circuit whereby commercial capitalists first spend money on labour and the 
means of production which are then put into the sphere of production by productive 
capitalists. Once the production process has been completed, during which time surplus value 
is extracted, the finished product becomes a commodity available for sale in the hands of 
commercial capitalists. Finally, when the sale is made, the surplus value is realised in 
monetary form as profit. Once the initial money has been put back to businesses, the 
industrial circuit can be reproduced, and even expanded if surplus value (i.e. the profit), or 
part of it, is reinvested. Here, one common factor that flows from the productive to the 
commercial activities is surplus value: whilst it is extracted originally from the exploitation of 
human labour in the sphere of production, its monetary value can only be realised in the 
subsequent commercial transactions; and, when the realised surplus value is employed to 
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initiate new commercial activities, the production scale can be extended and thereby 
generates new surplus value that, in turn, leads to more commercial transactions. 
 
Having demonstrated the movement of industrial capital and the role of surplus value as the 
link between productive and commercial activities, the broader circulation between 
production, commerce, and interest-bearing capital is delineated in five phase in Figure 4.1 
below. 
 
In the first phase, M – M, the interest-bearing / financial capitalist lends money (M) as a 
commodity to the industrial capitalist who later utilises the money as productive and 
commercial capital (M). In the second phase, M – C, the previously borrowed money is 
converted into commodity capital (C) which is then spent on the productive capital including 
labour power (L) and means of production (MP) in the third phase (P). When the use-value of 
labour (L) and means of production (MP) are consumed in production process (P), 
commodities and /or services are produced with greater exchange value (C’) which are then 
sold for greater monetary value (M’)in the fourth phase. In the fifth phase, while being able to 
retain the profit (∆M) generated from phases two to four, the industrial capitalist returns the 
original money (M) to the financial capitalist, with an interest payment (iM) which is a 
portion of the profit (∆M). With its reflux to the lender, the capital is “always ready to 
perform the same process over again” (Marx, 1959, p.226). 
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Taking the five phases as a whole, Marx (1959) argues that 
we shall see that a definite amount of value is continually advanced, and that this same 
amount plus surplus-value, or profit, is withdrawn from circulation. The actual acts of 
exchange do not, at any rate, reveal how this process is promoted. And it is precisely this 
process of M as capital, on which the interest of the money-lending capitalist rests, and 
from which it is derived (pp.226-7) (emphases added) 
To put it simply, the above quotation from Marx (1959) demystifies the previously mystified 
self-expanding nature of capital, by revealing the true identity of the surplus value originating 
from the exploitation of human labour in the sphere of production. The participation of the 
interest-bearing capital does not change or produce any individual value of the commodities 
or services produced; it does affect however the way in which the surplus value (previously 
extracted from production) is to be distributed. While sharing a portion of surplus value with 
industrial capitalists, the interest-bearing capitalists not only successfully avoid the trouble of 
employing capital in the actual production and circulation of the goods and services in the 
first instance, but also make invisible the real exploitative process from which he or she later 
benefits. By so doing, interest appears only as interest, the natural product of capital, whereas 
the surplus value that generates the interest is no longer the subject matter. This, viewed by 
Marx (1959), is how financial capital is mystified, assigned with an independent existence, 
and deemed to be self-creating and self-expanding. 
 
In addition, the demystification of the circuit of capital also reveals the status of surplus value 
that permeates the broad circulation of capital from finance to production. Now the question 
becomes to what extent the three types of capital collaborate and / or disarticulate with one 
another in relation to surplus value. The answer, according to Marx (1959), is twofold. At the 
manifest level, since part of the profit generated and realised by the productive and 
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commercial capitalists is to be absorbed by financial capitalists, there exists a paradoxical 
relationship between the two: the more the surplus value is extracted by one party, the less 
stays in the hands of the other.  
 
At the latent level, however, the relationship between the two parties may not be as 
antagonistic as that between surplus value and labour wages. That is, while the qualitative 
difference between surplus value and wages results in “the quantitative division of the 
produced value”, the “qualitative differentiation” that distinguishes interest-bearing 
capitalists from their productive and commercial counterparts “proceeds rather from the 
purely quantitative division of the same sum of surplus-value” (Marx, 1959, p.238) 
(emphases in original). For Marx (1959), the distribution of surplus value among productive, 
commercial, and financial capitalists is not considered as any class antagonism, but rather as 
the conflict that takes place among different fractions within the same capitalist class. 
Therefore, despite the internal conflict among interest-bearing, productive, and commercial 
capitalists, their collective interest in the form of surplus value may still be able to expand at 
the expense of the working class. That is, to increase the interest of one particular type of 
capitalists does not necessarily mean to jeopardise the interest of other capitalists; instead, 
human labour can be the source of value that contributes to the entire capitalist class. 
 
To summarise the discussion so far, the inter-relationship between the circuits of productive, 
commercial, and financial capital is presented in the flow of the surplus value which can 
directly be generated via the capitalist mode of production, and part of which will also flow 
to financial capitalists in the shape of interest revenue. Through this way, not only can the 
interest-bearing capitalists avoid employing capital for the real production of surplus value by 
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lending money to productive and commercial capitalists in the first place, but the conflict in 
re-distributing profits between the two is also insulated from class antagonism as in between 
labour and capital. Although interest-bearing capitalists share the surplus value generated by 
productive and commercial capitalists, they are not necessarily antagonistic against one 
another, as any conflict in allocating the surplus remains within the same capitalist class. On 
the other hand, letting go of the question whether or not interest-bearing capital will always 
be in conflict with productive and commercial capital, the point we can reach at this stage is 
that any analysis of finance and hence financialisation would be incomplete without referring 
to its non-financial counterparts within the same economy. 
 
Furthermore, while, in theory, the relationship between the financial, productive and 
commercial capitalists may not always be as competing as it seems to be, it is also difficult to 
draw a clear distinction among the three parties in practicality. For instance, productive, 
commercial, and financing activities may be carried out simultaneously by the same 
industrial capitalists who receive the previous separately distributed shares of profit 
(Stockhammer, 2004). This is especially so in the context of neo-liberal movement and 
financial market deregulation where non-financial corporations have become increasingly 
involved in financial activities (e.g. Orhangazi, 2008). Given the discussion above, it may be 
inappropriate to assign a passive role to the non-financial sector in its interaction with 
financial market, since, first of all, their interest may not be antagonistic as that in between 
labour and capital, and, second, the former may sometimes become the latter, thus blurring 
conflicts between the two. Viewed in this way, our focus becomes the extent to which 
production and commerce contribute to, and / or even possess control over, the rise of finance. 
Therefore, the question is no longer what the three types of capital produce and share (i.e. 
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surplus value, or, ∆M)), but rather what initiates the movement of the three. It is to this 
question that the following section is now turned. 
 
4.3.3. The intra-relationship between finance, production and commerce 
According to Marx (1959), the deeper intra-class relationship among the three types of capital 
manifests itself via idle money. Here, the term “idle money” does not mean the money of the 
idle people, but refers to the existing surplus value in the form of money held by productive 
and commercial capitalists, which stays outside industrial circulation and thus “does not take 
part in the process of creating surplus-value” (ibid, p.47). It takes the forms of either an actual 
money hoard such as reserve fund that ensures the continuity of the industrial and 
commercial capital circulation, or “mere outstanding money (such as) claims on debtors by 
capitalists who have sold C’ (commodities)” (ibid, p.48), that are waiting to be transformed 
into the “really functioning capital” (ibid, p.48). Activities dealing with this idle money were 
at first simply safekeeping and bookkeeping by the “cashier of the merchants and industrial 
capitalists”, and later became “supplemented by lending and borrowing and by credit” (Marx, 
1959, p.212) in the hands of the interest-bearing capitalists. In other words, the initial start-up 
interest-bearing capital originally comes from production and commerce. Viewed in this way, 
the money lending and borrowing activities are not the pure advance of the interest-bearing 
capitalists, but the application of the idle money previously generated by productive and 
commercial capitalists, and, as demonstrated earlier, a subsequent redistribution of surplus 
value among production, commerce, and finance within the same capitalist class. Even in 
extreme scenarios where all the idle money utilised by interest-bearing capital originate from 
productive and commercial capital, the interest revenue generated therein may ultimately 
accrue to the latter two. In such cases, the productive and commercial capitalists themselves 
become the interest-bearing capitalists; the non-financial sectors provide the start-up capital 
Chapter 4 Theorising Financialisation in Iron Ore Market 
69 
 
of, and are consequently entitled to all the profits from the financial sector. Seeing in this way, 
it is no longer appropriate to separate interest-bearing capitalists from their productive and 
commercial equivalents by simply gazing at the sectors in which they operate: productive 
capitalists may penetrate financial sector and interest-bearing capitalists can also come from 
non-financial sectors. Therefore, our analysis must look beyond sectorial boundaries and 
perceive the specific capitalist activities which can then be effectively distinguished as 
financial or non-financial. While this explains the vague demarcation between finance and 
non-finance, it still leaves us the question whether the interest-bearing capital would always 
dominate.  
 
Although this was the case in the pre-capitalist ages where usurer’s capital, the antiquated 
form of interest-bearing capital, impoverishes and paralyses production by taking away the 
means of production, and perpetuates such miserable conditions (Marx, 1959, p.425), modern 
capitalism has aligned, and even subordinated the interest of the usury capital with that of 
capitalist production by concentrating in the first place the means of production. So were 
born the banking and credit systems, through which the previously deemed notorious usurer’s 
capital was disguised, legitimised, and promoted in its new form as interest-bearing capital, 
serving as the “most developed product” and an “immanent form of the capitalist mode of 
production, and… a driving force in its development to its highest and ultimate form” (p.433). 
Interest-bearing capital obtains social and political legitimacy through the modern credit 
system on the one hand, and, in return for such recognition, it has become a subordinate form 
of capitalist production on the other.  In this sense, finance no longer impedes, but rather 
assists, and even by itself becomes the capitalist mode of production. While Marx (1959) 
later points out the potential dominant power of finance over commerce and industrial 
production, as the “most potent means of driving capitalist production beyond its own limits, 
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and one of the most effective vehicles of crises and swindle” (p.433), he also emphasises the 
inter-dependence between finance, commerce and production in that 
“as long as the capitalist mode of production continues to exist, interest-bearing capital, 
as one of its forms, also continues to exist and constitutes in fact the basis of its credit 
system” (p.433). 
While interest-bearing capital should indeed be subordinated to its productive counterpart in 
Marx’s theory, yet the question remains in reality that nowadays the former still dominates 
the latter, in some, if not many, developed capitalist economies (Grady & Ackroyd, 2013). 
Then can we follow the general assumption put forward by many other researches (e.g. 
Crotty, 1990, 2009; Arnold, 2012) that the financial market (i.e. interest-bearing capital) 
takes precedence over the rest of the economy both economically and politically? Here, 
unlike much of the extant literature with the concluding remark that financial sector must be 
balanced with, if not subordinated to, non-financial sectors, we would rather take this 
conclusion as the point of departure in answering the above question in reality. Of course, 
Marx (1959) did not address the issue directly, which might have been due to the historical 
stage of capitalism development that he studied at the time, as well as his major focus on 
capitalist production. But this does not mean that our exploration will be limited to an 
“economistic” reading of Marx here; it is rather through Marx’s dialectical methodology that 
certain insights can be obtained (Tinker, 1999). 
 
Delving into this question in reality (through Marx’s dialectic), we must first revisit the 
previously illuminated vague demarcation between financial and non-financial sectors. For 
instance, a productive capitalist may him or herself become an interest-beating capitalist 
when the former converts his or her idle money into the interest-bearing capital and engages 
in the corresponding financial activities thereafter. Therefore, it is now rather unrealistic to 
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discuss the sectorial dominance of financial over non-financial, but to only perceive whether 
financial activities throughout the entire economy take precedence over non-financial 
activities. And, since capitalists have the capacity to initiate and extract surplus value from 
productive, commercial, and interest-bearing activities, therefore, whether or not to become 
financial or non-financial capitalists or both hinges upon their individual choices. Then our 
question becomes how capitalists choose the appropriate activities. While Marx did not 
specifically answer this question, he did point out the sole purpose of all capitalists, namely, 
producing surplus value for capital expansion (Marx, 1959, p.172). Now the answer becomes 
even clearer: capital, and hence capitalists, will always follow whichever sector that extracts 
the highest surplus value. At this stage, two points can be put forward. First, financial 
activities will take over the non-financial in an economy where the profit from the former is 
higher than that of the latter. However, when the profit as such is lower, then the first 
statement is inversed. This is the second point. Albeit seemingly contradictory and mutually 
exclusive, the two statements are in fact complementary and dialectical with the same 
fundamental and ultimate purpose as to maximising surplus value for self-expansion. If we 
adopt a world-system perspective (Power, 2009) that views world economies as a whole, 
neither financial nor non-financial activities would dominate one another within capitalist 
world economies. Taking the contemporary capitalist context into consideration, parallels 
with both points can be found in developed (Orhangazi, 2008) and developing countries 
(Grady & Ackroyd, 2013) respectively. 
 
To summarise our discussion so far, the intra-relationship between productive, commercial, 
and interest-bearing capitals is presented first through idle money and second with the 
conceptual ambiguities which blur the demarcation between financial and non-financial 
sectors. Then turning our focus onto the specific activities (productive, commercial, and 
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interest-bearing) that capitalists choose to take, a dialectical relationship has been 
demonstrated: there is no fundamental difference between financial and non-financial 
capitalists or activities; and if there does exist difference, it will only be historical and 
geographical. 
 
4.3.4. Conflict between financial capitalists and the working class 
Having considered the dialectical relationship between finance, production, and commerce as 
existing within the same capitalist class, attention should now be turned to financialisation 
and its influence on ordinary workers. As demonstrated earlier, in addition to the job 
insecurity brought by, however indirectly, financial market investors, the money-dealing 
activities of interest-bearing capitalists have nowadays been increasingly interwoven with the 
income of ordinary workers directly(housing mortgage payments for instance). Questions can 
now be asked as to: first, if there exists the class conflict between workers and interest-
bearing capitalists; second, if conflict does exist, whether it will be equally irreconcilable as 
that between labour and production, and; third, if so, how the working class should (re)act 
against the interest-bearing capital.  
 
It may be that Marx’s analysis of the relationship between workers and interest-bearing 
capitalists in Capital was somewhat incomplete and unfinished, perhaps due to the historical 
limitation on the development of capitalism that he experienced and analysed, However, 
certain insight can still be obtained from his limited writings regarding the subject matter in 
Capital, as well as through the methodology of historical materialism. To begin with, in 
considering the pre-capitalist economies, Marx in fact noticed the two ways in which money 
dealing activities (in the form of usury) took place between different capitalists, and between 
workers and capitalists: 
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The characteristic forms… in which usurers’ capital exists in period antedating capitalist 
production are of two kinds… The same forms repeat production themselves on the basis 
of capitalist production, but as mere subordinate forms. They are then no longer the 
forms which determine the character of interest-bearing capital. These two forms are: 
first: usury by lending money to extravagant members of the upper classes, particularly 
landowners; secondly, usury by lending money to small producers who possess their 
own conditions of labour (Marx, 1959, p.424). 
Under modern capitalism, not only has usurers’ capital been made subordinate to the 
capitalist mode of production that determines the “character of interest-bearing capital” as 
discussed in the previous section, but the lower class target that usurers used to deal with has 
also changed from the independent small producers mainly consisting of peasants with their 
own means and conditions of production, to proletariat labour without the means of 
production. In particular, while the self-employed peasants and artisans borrowed money for 
their own small scale production, the wage-labour under the capitalist mode of production 
“has no occasion to borrow any money as a producer” (Marx, 1959, p.425), as both the 
condition and the product of the labour are now in the hands of capitalists. Instead, Marx 
(1959) went on and argued that “when he (the worker) does any money borrowing, he does 
so, for instance, at the pawnshop to secure personal necessities” (p.425). Here, interest-
bearing capital in no way directly assists the labour production, but only provides the worker 
with the money for subsistence purposes, or, to put it simply, for the reproduction of the 
labour force. In this way, the same view point as concluded previously can be reached, albeit 
from a different perspective: the worker-capitalist relationship. That is, interest-bearing 
capitalists maintain the supremacy of capital not only through financially supporting 
capitalist production but also by sustaining the regeneration of labour power. 
 
From the workers’ point of view, on the other hand, the question remains still unanswered 
regarding the class conflict between ordinary workers and interest-bearing capitalists. While 
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Marx (1959) did not address this problem explicitly, he did point out the parasitic effect of 
interest-bearing capital upon the working class that “interest-bearing capital retains the form 
of usurer’s capital in relation to persons or classes, or in circumstances where borrowing does 
not, nor can, take place in the sense corresponding to the capitalist mode of production” 
(p.428).  Now the answer to our first question becomes apparent. The class conflict does exist 
between workers and interest-bearing capitalists, and it does not ameliorate the exploitative 
condition that usurers imposed on the peasant class.  
 
But can we equal this present class conflict to its pre-capitalist counterpart? Or, is there any 
new element that distinguishes the contemporary one from the previous? Here again, 
although Marx (1959) did not point out this relationship directly, it is through his problematic 
that the answer flows. First of all, since interest-bearing capital belongs to the capitalist mode 
of production with the potential to even become, in itself, the “highest and ultimate form” of 
the latter, and also because the “immediate purpose and compelling motive of capitalist 
production” (p.167) is the expansion of capital by surplus value, then the conflict between 
interest-bearing capitalists and workers would seem to be no more different from that 
between production and labour. That is, interest-bearing capital does extract surplus value 
from production. To illustrate this point in detail and at the same time further demystify the 
concept of interest-bearing capital, it is now necessary to consider the process in which 
interest-bearing capitalist exploitation takes place. In fact, already demonstrated earlier has 
been the indirect way (i.e. the general circuit of capital) that surplus value is first appropriated 
by productive capitalists and later transferred to interest-bearing capitalists in the form of 
interest revenue. However, our focus in this section is on the direct relationship between 
interest-bearing capital and the working class, namely how the lending and borrowing 
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activities between the two facilitate capitalist exploitation. Therefore, in what follows the 
direct money dealing activities---lending and borrowing are examined respectively. 
 
In the case of lending where private savings, investment, and pension funds of the working 
class are placed into the hands of bankers and financial investors, it is argued that the interest 
and other types of investment returns received by workers is an implicit form of wages for the 
regeneration of the labour force. To appreciate this point, the following two aspects need to 
be illuminated. First of all, personal savings and private investment in financial institutions 
will not automatically render the working class “capitalists”. For, unlike the interest-bearing 
and industrial capitalists with and in whom workers deposit savings and make investment, 
workers do not possess any real “governing power over labour and its product” that 
constitutes the essence of capital (Marx, 1974, p.35). Instead, it is always the productive 
capitalists who directly appropriate surplus value from labour production, and the commercial 
and interest-bearing capitalists who realise and share the unpaid labour afterwards. To put it 
simply, the main difference here between the working class savers/ investors and the 
capitalist investors (the interest-bearing capitalists in particular) rests upon the controlling 
right over the private savings and personal investment from two different perspectives. On 
the one hand, in relation to the capitalists involved, these savings and investment become 
their capital with the purpose of producing more capital, even though “neither the lenders nor 
users of this capital are its real owners or producers” (Marx, 1959, p.433). While maintaining 
the legal ownership of their savings and investment, the real owners of the capital, that is, the 
working class savers and investors, on the other hand, take no part in the actual process of 
production but rather indirectly receive part of the capitalists’ profit in return.  
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Since these savings and investment are not capital from the working class point of view, nor 
are they capitalists in this sense, then the question is to what extent the workers’ sharing of 
capitalist  profit should be accounted for. This brings us to the second aspect. Here again, 
although Marx (1956, 1959) did not address this issue explicitly, our analysis based on his 
methodology regarding the social formation of capitalism continues. Without the capitalist 
incentive as producing surplus value, ordinary workers thus save and invest only for 
subsistence purposes (e.g. housing, living expenses). This coincides with Marx’s (Marx & 
Engels, 1974; Marx, 1974)  opinion on wages of the working class as “providing for the 
subsistence of the worker for the duration of his work and as much more as is necessary for 
him to support a family and for the race of labourers not to die out” (Marx, 1974, p.21). 
Viewed in this way, we can now assign a broader definition with the labour wage that not 
only contains the nominal and explicit wage revenue paid directly by the capitalist employers, 
but also the indirect and implicit revenue in the form of interest and other investment returns 
paid by the interest-bearing capitalists. The conclusion that can be reached so far is that 
workers’ savings and private investment in banks and financial institutions do not change 
their class status within the social hierarchy of capitalism. Rather, their income received from 
interest-bearing capitalists is part of the total wage that the capitalist class has to offer for the 
regeneration of labour power. 
 
In the case of borrowing where workers borrow money from banks and other financial firms, 
Marx (1959) already pointed out that, under developed capitalism, workers separated from 
the means and products of labour only borrow to “secure personal necessities” (p.425). He 
went on and commented on this type of borrowing that  
“the working class is… swindled in this form… also done by the retail dealer, who sells 
means of subsistence to the worker. This is secondary exploitation, which runs parallel to 
the primary exploitation taking place in the production process itself. The distinction 
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between selling and loaning is quite immaterial in this case and merely formal, and… 
cannot appear as essential to anyone” (p.435). 
Here, Marx (1959) described the phenomenon as the “secondary exploitation” superimposed 
collectively by interest-bearing and commercial capitalists upon the working class borrowers. 
While this might sound a bit confusing and somewhat unexplained, our understanding can 
still proceed from the appropriate logical reasoning of Marx. To this end, we must first agree 
that interest-bearing capitalists, like their productive and commercial counterparts within the 
same class, exist to extract surplus value for the self-expansion of capital. Thus, the interest 
expense paid by workers is one form of surplus value. In particular, since surplus value 
originates from labour production, then the interest-bearing capitalists who lend money to 
workers will also interact with other types of capitalists. This is where Marx’s (1959) 
mentioning of the “retail dealer” comes into play: insofar as the purchase of private 
necessities on which workers request bank loans or mortgages is concerned, both the interest-
bearing and commercial capitalists involved will have the same interest (i.e. surplus value) in 
realising and sharing the unpaid labour that derives from capitalist production. In other words, 
interest-bearing capitalists appropriate surplus value through the alliance with its commercial 
equivalents. Indeed, Marx (1959) noted that, like traditional usurers, interest-bearing 
capitalists would absorb surplus labour to the extent that “the wage-slave (the working 
class)… can become a creditor’s slave in his capacity as consumer” (p.425) (emphasis added). 
 
Specifically, based on Marx’s (1959) interpretation here that “the distinction between selling 
and loaning is quite immaterial… and… cannot appear as essential to anyone” (p.435), it is 
then reasonable to conclude that, in this case, interest-bearing capitalists play the same role as 
their commercial counterparts do. That is, the interest payment charged on the working class 
borrower will be part of the total price of the commodity that she or he has purchased from 
commercial capitalists, as it is only in this case can the lender become the seller. In other 
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words, the real price / value of the commodity is equal to its original price charged by the 
seller plus the interest payment to the lender: the quantitative division between the retailer’s 
price and the interest expense on it does not even amount to the qualitative differentiation 
between commercial and interest-bearing capitalists. 
 
Summarising our discussion so far, there does exist the class conflict within the increasing 
money-dealing activities between workers and interest-bearing capitalists through both 
directions: as their commercial and productive counterparts, interest-bearing capitalists aims 
at appropriating surplus value. The two direct interactions between the working and the 
capitalist class in this case are examined respectively. On the one hand, workers’ investment 
return, savings, private investment, and pension funds, however large it might be, does not 
change their class status, but only amounts to an implicit form of wage revenue that they 
receive to ensure the regeneration of labour force in capitalist societies. On the other hand, 
interest charged on workers is part of the total price for the products and / or services for 
which they have borrowed money, and hence part of the surplus value realised by interest-
bearing capitalists. 
 
Turning to the contemporary globalised capitalist economy, the proliferation of money 
dealing activities such as mortgages, pension funds, and some other financial instruments has 
increased the social, economic, and political significance of the financial sector. This in turn 
also reinforces the bargaining power of finance in its sharing of surplus value with productive 
and commercial sectors. Ultimately, the interest-bearing capital, as the most developed form 
of capitalist production, would “become the most potent means of driving capitalist 
production beyond its own limits, and one of the most effective vehicles of crises and swindle” 
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(Marx, 1959, p.433). Faced with the exploitation and even the potential crises posed by 
interest-bearing capitalists, a solution is therefore needed. 
 
4.3.5. Proposed solutions to financialisation 
While much of extant literature on financialisation has demonstrated, albeit through different 
approaches, the (potential) negative impact of financial sectors on the rest of the economy, 
many, if not most, researches have interpreted the phenomenon without proposing solutions 
(e.g. Orhangazi, 2008; Grady & Ackroyd, 2013). Even for those who have proposed 
alternative changes, the suggestions merely scratch the surface of the issue and neglect the 
structural conflict between the working and the capitalist classes. For instance, Stockhammer 
(2004) calls for more regulation in financial markets. Demir (2007) recommends that national 
savings must be compulsorily invested into the real productive activities rather than financial 
markets. Perhaps less radical than Demir (2007), Crotty (2009) emphasises the need for a 
balance, through government enforcement, between the financial and the real sectors, forging 
financial markets a “more limited but more productive and less dangerous role” (p.577). He 
also supports the use of public funds to alleviate the crises caused by financialisation. 
Primarily via government regulatory mechanisms, most of these remedies only seek to 
maintain the current hierarchical order of capitalist societies and leave the social conflict 
unaddressed, or, in Tinker and Carter’s (2003) words, the solutions “hide as much as they 
reveal” (p.578). These proposals reveal only the surface of the problem by attributing the past 
and future economic crises to the apparent imbalance between financial and non-financial 
sectors. By consequently putting forward a series of regulations to adjust that balance as if the 
problem is simply confined to the capitalist class, they hide in the meantime the fundamental 
contradiction between capital and labour. Since mortgages, lifesavings, and pension funds of 
the ordinary workers have been increasingly involved with financial capitalists substantially 
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as demonstrated earlier, the threat posed by the so called “unbalanced power of finance” 
never was a new idea emerged in modern capitalism; it is rather the same structural crisis, the 
contradiction between capitalists’ pursuit of surplus value and the wages of labour, in a 
financial disguise. 
 
On the other hand, as for Marx’s approach to financialisation, the “point, however, is to 
change (the status quo)” (cited in Dillard, 1991, p.8). That is, the purpose of exploring the 
rising power of finance, in Marx’s interest-bearing capital terms, is to change the status quo. 
Following Marx’s logic, it is the contradiction deeply rooted in societies that initiates social 
change and moves us forward (Bryer, 2000a, 2000b, 2005, 2006). Therefore, rather than 
being sidestepped via financial market regulations, the relationship, or rather the class 
conflict, between financial sectors and ordinary workers, must be brought onto government 
agenda as the point of departure for future critical investigations. For instance, questions can 
then be asked as to whether public money should be used to bail out financial capitalists or to 
serve the interest of the great majority working class; whether pension funds should be 
nationalised and kept separate from the financial market for capitalists; whether regulations 
are needed secure workers’ position in non-financial sectors, and so forth. 
 
4.4. Concluding remarks and implications for accounting research 
We have so far investigated two theoretical approaches to financialisation. While the (Post-) 
Keynesian perspective provides the basis for much of the extant financialisation literature, it 
nevertheless suffers from a number of limitations. That is, the power of finance and its 
interaction with the rest of the economy has mostly been confined to the owner-manager 
paradigm and the triumph of financial markets over non-financial sectors, without any 
consideration to the social, political, and economic ramifications on ordinary workers. In 
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other words, what the (Post-) Keynesian approach has offered us is simply a lens of the 
bourgeois economics which takes individual as the subject of analysis, and neglects the 
notion of capital as a social relation. What is needed therefore is a structural analysis that 
concerns the entire capitalist and the working classes, as well as the changes (if any) in the 
power relations, within the same economy in which financialisation operates. 
 
The attention is therefore turned to a Marxist political economy approach which exhibits the 
potential to satisfy our concerns. In particular, this exploration takes four steps which 
gradually develop the concept of financialisation, or in Marx’s term, the interest-bearing 
capital. I have: first, demystified the inner structure and the self-expanding pattern of finance 
via its capital movement with production and commerce; second, deconstructed the sectorial 
barrier set in between financial and non-financial sectors, thereby demonstrating the 
interdependent and dialectical relationship between financial and non-financial activities; 
third, examined the direct relationship between financial capitalists and the working class, 
and; fourth, analysed the proposed remedies to threats posed by financialisation and then 
offered the solution through the Marxist approach. Bearing in mind these discussions, a 
Marxist definition of financialisation can be put forward: there never was a new concept as 
financialisation; it is rather the capital movement on a global scale chasing after a higher 
surplus value in the financial disguise.  
 
Parallels of the theoretical investigation as such can be drawn with extant accounting 
literature. Already many accounting researchers have studied financialisation in relation to 
the aligned interests between shareholders and managers (Andersson et al., 2006; Andersson 
et al., 2007), financialisation directing corporate strategy (Carter & Mueller, 2006; Andersson 
et al., 2008; Andersson et al., 2010a, 2010b), financialisation and corporate collapse in a 
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political economy context (Froud et al., 2004), the separation of non-financial and financial 
activities (Newberry & Robb, 2008), financialisation and accounting standards harmonisation 
(Dixon & Monk, 2009; Arnold, 2012; Zhang & Andrew, 2014), and financial literacy (Bay et 
al., 2014). However, many, if not most, of the current accounting studies of financialisation 
have to a large extent focused on either the owner-manager paradigm or the financial and 
non-financial dichotomy or both, falling into the (Post-) Keynesian dilemma of limiting 
themselves within bourgeois economics. Further, the present focus of the accounting studies 
as such has been mostly on accounting regulations and fair value reporting in particular, 
while leaving the everyday language of accounting untouched. It is at this point therefore that 
a structural analysis of how accounting interacts with financialisation in different social 
stratums is needed. More specifically, accounting discourse should be engaged into critical 
investigations of financial activities “whose functioning is so often intertwined with 
(accounting)” (Hopwood, 2009, p.550). Such refinements, it is argued, can shed light on the 
social, political, historical, and environmental significance of financialisation, and how it may 
differ in various contexts within contemporary global capitalist economies. 
 
4.5. Defining financialisation in the context of the global iron ore market 
Taking the concluding remarks here into consideration, specific relevance can be drawn to 
the investigation on the global trading of iron ore in this thesis. In particular, the debate over 
the financialised pricing mechanism of iron ore is the subject of this study, where the use of 
accounting language by the Chinese iron and steel industries is examined and analysed. 
Indeed, financialisation, the phenomenon which emerged in the past decade, exerts profound 
influence on a wide variety of aspects from macro-economy to our everyday lives, much of 
the extant literature studying the Chinese context however has only recently turned their 
focus to the rising socio-political significance of finance and its impact on China’s economy. 
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For instance, Tang (2007) analyses the pros and cons that financialisation has on China’s 
economic structure. Cai and Liu (2008) examine China’s unbalanced level of development 
between monetization and financialisation. Zhao (2012) delineates the necessity and the 
future prospect of financialisation in the Chinese artistic market. Turning to the commodity 
markets, Zhang and Wang (2009) examine the adverse impact of financialised commodity 
price on the Chinese economy. They argue that, while overwhelming industrial demand, 
financial demand has been the driving force behind international commodity price bubble 
which has in turn slowed down the Chinese as well as the world economy. Particularly, Chen 
(2011) and Su (2011) explore the potential threat posed by financial market speculations on 
prices of oil and agricultural commodities respectively. Regarding the iron ore market in 
particular, Yang and Chen (2011) point out the penetration of financial capitalists such as 
HSBC, JP Morgan, and Citicorp into the dominant global suppliers of iron ore (i.e. BHP, Rio 
Tinto, and Vale), and thus the disadvantaged positions of the Chinese iron and steel firms 
therein.  
 
Based on the extant literature above, financialisation in this research can then be narrowly 
defined in two respects. First, as mentioned by Yang and Chen (2011), the major 
international suppliers of iron ore have been increasingly financialised in that their largest 
shareholders are now from the financial sectors. As at the end of 2012, specifically, the share 




   
% of issued capital 
1. HSBC Custody Nominees (Australia) Limited 16.86 
                                                          
9
 While both BHP Billiton Limited and BHP Billiton Plc are listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the 
former has a primary listing on the Australian Securities Exchange, and the latter has a premium listing on the 
London Stock Exchange. The two corporations work together and are referred to as the BHP Billiton Group 
(BHP Billiton 2012 Annual Report). This dual listed company structure (the DLC structure) puts shareholders 
from both companies in substantially the same position as if they were from one single economic entity. 
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2. J.P. Morgan Nominees Australia Limited 
 
12.17 
3. National Nominees Limited 
   
9.66 
4. Citicorp Nominees Pty Limited <BHP Billiton ADR Holders A/C> 6.56 
5. Citicorp Nominees Pty Ltd 
   
3.38 
6. J.P. Morgan Nominees Australia Limited <Cash Income A/C> 1.92 
7. BNP Paribas Noms Pty Limited <Master Cust DRP> 
 
1.59 
8. Citicorp Nominees Pty Limited <Colonial First State Inv A/C> 1.26 
9. AMP Life Limited 
    
0.88 
10. UBS Wealth Management Australia Nominees Pty Ltd 0.47 
11. BNP Paribas Noms Pty Ltd <SMP Accounts DRP> 
 
0.45 
12. HSBC Custody Nominees (Australia) Limited <NT-Comnwlth Super Corp A/C> 0.44 
13. Australian Foundation Investment Company Limited 0.44 
14. BNP Paribas Noms Pty Ltd <DRP> 
  
0.25 
15. ARGO Investments Limited 
   
0.25 
16. Perpetual Trustee Company Limited 
  
0.24 
17. Queensland Investment Corporation 
  
0.20 
18. Computershare Nominees Cl LTD <ASX Shareplus Control A/C> 0.20 
19. Navigator Australia Ltd <MLC Investment Sett A/C> 0.17 
20. HSBC Custody Nominees (Australia) Limited-GSCO ECA 0.15 
total 
    
57.54 
Table 4.1 Twenty largest shareholders of BHP Billiton Limited as of December 2012 
Source: BHP Billiton 2012 Annual Report 
BHP Billiton Plc
2 
    
% of issued capital 
1. PLC Nominees (Proprietary) Limited 
  
20.87 
2. GEPF Equity 
    
4.08 
3. Chase Nominees Limited <LEND> 
  
3.8 
4. State Street Nominees Limited <OM02> 
 
3.71 
5. State Street Nominees Limited <OM04> 
 
2.85 
6. Chase Nominees Limited 
   
2.81 
7. National City Nominees Limited 
  
2.51 
8. The Bank of New York (Nominees) Limited 
 
2.40 
9. Nortrust Nominees Limited 
   
2.29 
10. HSBC Global Custody Nominee (UK) Limited <357206> 2.28 
11. Vidacos Nominees Limited <CLRLUX2> 
 
1.85 
12. Lynchwood Nominees Limited <2006420> 
 
1.73 
13. BNY Mellon Nominees Limited <BSDTGUSD> 
 
1.68 
14. State Street Nominees Limited <OD64> 
 
1.61 
15. Nortrust Nominees Limited <SLEND> 
  
1.58 
16. Industrial Development Corporation 
  
1.58 
17. Nutraco Nominees Limited <781221> 
  
1.40 
18. Chase Nominees Limited <BGILIFEL> 
  
1.18 
19. BNY Mellon Nominees Limited <BSDTGABN> 
 
1.12 




    
62.21 
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Table 4.2 Twenty largest shareholders of BHP Billiton Plc as of December 2012 




    
% of issued capital 
1. HSBC Custody Nominees (Australia) Limited   20.53 
2. J.P.Morgan Nominees Australia Limited   13.97 
3. National Nominees Limited       11.83 
4. Citicorp Nominees Pty Limited     3.98 
5. BNP Paribas Noms Pty Ltd (DRP)     2.52 
6. Citicorp Nominees Pty Limited (Colonial First State Inv a/c) 2.18 
7. J.P.Morgan Nominees Australia Limited (Cash Income a/c) 1.95 
8. AMP Life Limited (BSP a/c)       0.98 
9. UBS Wealth Management Australia Nominees Pty Ltd 0.91 
10. Australian Foundation Investment Company Limited 0.83 
11. Argo Investments Limited       0.56 
12. HSBC Custody Nominees (Australia) Limited (NT-Comnwlth Super Corp a/c) 0.54 
13. Perpetual Trustee Company Limited     0.43 
14. BNP Paribas Nominees Pty Ltd (Agency Lending DRP a/c) 0.35 
15. Navigator Australia Ltd (MLC Investment Sett a/c) 0.22 
16. UBS Nominees Pty Ltd       0.21 
17. Woodross Nominees Pty Ltd     0.19 
18. Australian United Investment Company Limited   0.19 
19. UBS Nominees Pty Ltd       0.15 
20. QIC Limited         0.14 
total         62.66 
Table 4.3 Twenty largest shareholders of Rio Tinto Limited as of December 2012 




    
% of issued capital 
1. Riversdale Mining Limited 
   
43.14 
2. Shining Prospect Pte Ltd 
   
12.7 
3. Blackrock, Inc. via its funds 
   
10.82 
4. Capital Group Companies, Inc., THE via its funds 
 
5.53 
5. Capital Research and Management Company 
 
4.95 
6. State Street Corporation 
   
2.07 
7. Legal & General Group Plc 
   
<3% 
8. Aberdeen Asset Management Plc 
  
1.83 
9. UBS AG 
     
1.69 
10. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 1.48 
11. Standard Life Plc 
    
1.47 
                                                          
10
 Similar to the DLC structure in the case of BHP Billiton, the Rio Tinto Group consists of Rio Tinto Limited, 
which is registered in Australia and is listed on the Australian Securities Exchange, and Rio Tinto Plc, which is 
registered in England and Wales and is listed on the London Stock Exchange. The two companies operate 
together as one economic entity in that the boards of directors of each firm are the same and the shareholders of 
the two firms are placed in substantially the same position (Rio Tinto 2012 Annual Report). 




     
1.45 
13. The Central People's Government of China 
 
1.30 
14. Credit Suisse Group AG 
   
1.28 
15. Deutsche Bank AG 
   
1.19 
16. Sun Life Financial Inc 
   
1.09 
17. Franklin Resources, Inc. 
   
1.07 
18. Prudential Plc 
    
1.07 
19. Aviva Plc 
    
1.06 




    
96.18 
Table 4.4 Twenty largest shareholders of Rio Tinto Limited as of December 2012 
Source: Osiris Database, accessed 09, October, 2013 
Vale S.A. 
    
% of issued capital 
1. Valepar S.A.         52.70 
2. BNDES Participacoes S.A. BNDESPAR     6.70 
3. Aberdeen Asset Management Plc     2.71 
4. Blackrock, Inc.         2.68 
5. Vanguard Group, Inc.       1.41 
6. Baillie Gifford & Co Limited       1.23 
7. Lazard Limited         0.98 
8. Franklin Resources, Inc.       0.95 
9. Government of Norway       0.73 
10. Government of Brazil       0.72 
11. Schroders Plc         0.66 
12. JP Morgan Chase & Co.       0.60 
13. ITAU Unibanco Holdings       0.59 
14. FMR LLC         0.58 
15. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.       0.54 
16. AXA            0.51 
17. T. Rowe Price Group, Inc.       0.51 
18. Fisher Investments, Inc.       0.49 
19. Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP     0.45 
20. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company   0.43 
total         76.17 
Table 4.5 Twenty largest shareholders of Vale S.A. as of December 2012 
Source: Osiris Database, accessed 09, October, 2013 
Valepar shareholders % of issued capital 
Litel Participacoes S.A. 49.00 
 Bradespar S.A.   21.21 
 Mitsui     18.24 
 BNDESPAR   11.51 
 Electron S.A.   0.03 
 total     100.00 
 Table 4.6 Shareholders of Valepar as of December 2012 
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Source: Vale 2012 Annual Report 
 
 
As shown in the tables above, almost all of the top twenty largest shareholders of BHP 
Billiton and Rio Tinto come from financial sectors, accounting for more than 60% of the total 
shares at each corporation. Of particular interest are the proportions of the shares held by 
some leading multinational financial conglomerates. For instance, HSBC owns 17.45% 
shares of BHP Billiton Limited, and 2.28% of BHP Billiton Plc, making itself overall the 
largest shareholder at the BHP Billiton Group. It is also the largest shareholder of Rio Tinto 
Limited, making up 21.07% of the shares. Following HSBC, J.P. Morgan is the second 
largest shareholder in both BHP Billiton Limited and Rio Tinto Limited, accounting for 14.09% 
and 15.92% of the shares respectively. Citicorp holds significant portions of shares in BHP 
Limited and Rio Tinto Limited, with 11.20% and 6.16% respectively. Similarly, State Street 
owns 9.05%, 2.07%, and 0.38% shares of BHP Plc, Rio Tinto Plc, and Vale respectively. 
 
Also noteworthy is the shareholder structure of Vale. Unlike BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto that 
are not controlled, by any means, by another corporation or any government or natural person 
(BHP Billiton 2012 Annual Report; Rio Tinto 2012 Annual Report), Vale has a controlling 
shareholder (i.e. Valepar). As a former state-owned enterprise in Brazil, Vale has undergone 
a process of privatisation, resulting in the establishment of Valepar. Despite its sole purpose 
of holding the controlling interest (52.7% as of December 31, 2012) in Vale, Valepar has also 
been gradually penetrated by shareholders from financial sectors. That is, consistent with 
table 4.6, the major shareholders at Valepar include two Brazilian holding companies (i.e. 
Litel Participacoes S.A. and Bradespar S.A.), the investment branch of The Brazilian 
Development Bank (i.e. BNDESPAR), and a Japanese corporate conglomerate (i.e. Mitsui). 
In addition to the controlling shareholder Valepar, J.P. Morgan is the twelfth largest 
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shareholder with 0.60% shares, whereas HSBC and Citicorp also appear on the list of the top 
50 shareholders at Vale, holding 0.30% and 0.13% shares respectively. 
 
On the other hand, while being the largest shareholders of the three mining oligopolies, some 
financial institutions are also sponsors of the depositary receipts, a negotiable financial 
instrument that enables shares from foreign stock exchanges to be traded in local financial 
markets. For instance, J.P. Morgan Chase Bank has been the issuer of American Depositary 
Receipts (ADRs) on behalf of Rio Tinto and Vale in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), 
and has also been the issuer of Hong Kong Depositary Receipts (HDRs) on behalf of Vale in 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE). Citibank, on the other hand, serves as the sponsor 
of the ADR programme for BHP Billiton in NYSE. While the fact that the three mining 
giants have been increasingly penetrated by financial instructions as stated above does not 
simply mean that the latter possesses absolute control over the former, it is certain however 
that the former must align its interest with that of the latter (i.e. financial capitalists) to a large 
extent.  
 
The second aspect of the financialisation, and perhaps more directly related to the current 
trading pattern of the global iron ore market, refers to the quarterly indexed pricing system 
that is also heavily linked to financial market investors. While international commodity prices 
have long been considered as volatile and subject to financial market speculations (Tang & 
Xiong, 2012), to date little attention has been given to the newly developed index mechanism 
for iron ore pricing. Following the Rio Tinto scandal in 2009, a quarterly index pricing 
mechanism was established and became effective in 2010, in place of the traditional annual 
negotiation based pricing. Alongside the newly developed pricing system, three major indices 
for iron ore have emerged—Metal Bulletin Iron Ore (MBIO) Index from Metal Bulletin, The 
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Steel Index (TSI) from Steel Business Briefing Ltd, and Platts IODEX from McGraw Hill 
Financial Inc. Of these, Platts IODEX is the most popular. Not only is this index adopted and 
promoted by the Big Three (Yuan, 2013), but Platts, the provider of the index, also acquired 
Steel Business Briefing Ltd, the publisher of TSI, in July 2011, further reinforcing the 
dominant pricing power of IODEX in the global iron ore market. 
 
Moreover, unlike the MBIO and the (former) TSI stemming from international publishers (i.e. 
Metal Bulletin Ltd and Steel Business Briefing Ltd, respectively) specialised in estimating 
and providing metal and steel prices, the IODEX comes from Platts, a leading global 
organisation that offers price information of not only metals, but also energy, petrochemicals, 
and agricultural products. Beyond its publishing capacities, Platts is in fact a subsidiary 
division of McGraw Hill Financial which provides international capital and commodity 
markets with credit ratings, analytics, consultancies, and benchmarks. In other words, the 
effective controlling entity of the dominant publisher of iron ore price to date, McGraw Hill 
Financial Inc., is also from financial sectors. 
 
Exploring further the ownership structure of McGraw Hill Financial (see Table 4.7), of 
particular interest are some of the same financial conglomerates who hold shares of both 
McGraw Hill Financial as and the three mining firms at the same time. For instance, Capital 
Group Companies, the number one shareholder of McGraw Hill Financial Inc. that holds 
11.48% shares of the firm, also owns 10.48%
11
 shares of Rio Tinto Plc as the fourth largest 
shareholder, and 0.15% shares of Vale. Similarly, while being the second largest shareholder 
of BHP Billiton Plc and sixth largest shareholder of Rio Tinto Plc, State Street holds 4.85% 
                                                          
11The is the combined amount of shares of Rio Tinto Plc held by Capital Group Companies Inc. (5.53%) and Capital 
Research and Management Company (4.95%), as Capital Research and Management Company is the wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Capital Group Companies Inc. 
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shares at McGraw Hill Financial Inc., ranking as the fourth largest shareholder of the firm. 
The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, the fourth largest shareholder of BHP Billiton 
Plc and one of the top 20 shareholders at Rio Tinto Plc owning 5.20% and 0.99% shares 
respectively, is also among the top 20 shareholders at McGraw Hill Financial with 1.40% 
shares. By the same token, other companies that hold shares among the three mining firms 
and McGraw Hill Financial Inc. include Blackrock, Vanguard Group, T. Rowe Price Group, 
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company, AXA, Credit Suisse Group, and Deutsche 
Bank AG. 
McGraw Hill Financial, Inc. 
   
% of issued capital 
1. Capital Group Companies, Inc.     11.48 
2. Blackrock, Inc.         6.63 
3. Vanguard Group, Inc.       4.94 
4. State Street Corporation       4.85 
5. T. Rowe Price Group, Inc.       3.73 
6. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company   3.37 
7. Morgan Stanley         2.94 
8. McGraw Harold III         2.74 
9. Dodge & Cox         2.58 
10. Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan     2.25 
11. Independent Franchise Partners, LLP     2.24 
12. Windy City Investments Holdings, L.L.C.   2.24 
13. Northern Trust Corporation     1.48 
14. Och-Ziff Capital Management Group LLC   1.42 
15. Sun Life Financial Inc.       1.41 
16. Bank of New York Mellon Corporation   1.40 
17. Deutsche Bank AG       1.39 
18. AXA            1.30 
19. Credit Suisse Group       1.10 
20. Government of Norway       1.00 
total         60.49 
Table 4.7 Twenty largest shareholders of McGraw Financial, Inc. as of December 2012 
Source: Osiris Database, accessed 09, October, 2013 
 
Equally worth mentioning out of these firms is Blackrock. While being the second largest 
shareholder of McGraw Hill Financial, third largest shareholder of Rio Tinto Plc, and the 
fourth largest shareholder of Vale, Blackrock seems to be less connected to the BHP Billiton 
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Group (i.e. BHP Billiton Limited and BHP Billiton Plc) and Rio Tinto Limited whose top 
three shareholders are, as discussed earlier, HSBC, J.P. Morgan, and Citigroup instead. 
However, a closer examination on the ownership data of these three firms suggests otherwise.  
That is, Blackrock is in fact the number one largest shareholder of HSBC, J.P. Morgan, and 
Citigroup: it holds, in total, 25.34% shares of HSBC; 5.72% of J.P. Morgan; and 7.91% of 
Citigroup. 
 
To summarise the shareholder structure analyses so far, an inextricably entangled web 
weaved by financial conglomerates in the iron ore market can be drawn as follows (see 
Figure 4.2). 
 
“               ” indicating parent company control 
“               ” indicating top five shareholders 
Figure 4.2 The network of financial capitalists in the global iron ore market 
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As can be seen from the network above, the adoption of index pricing has further promoted 
the penetration of financial investors in the global iron ore market, where the major 
shareholders of the three dominant iron ore suppliers and of the price publishers are to a large 
extent overlapping. The term “financialisation” is thus identified, contingent upon the context 
of the thesis, as the rising forces of financial capital in the global iron ore market and, in 
particular, in the iron ore pricing mechanisms. 
 
To summarise the investigation of financialisation thus far, this chapter begins with a review 
of the existing literature including the early studies by Crotty (1990), Stockhammer (2004), 
Orhangazi (2008), and so forth, and then indicates the areas that have received insufficient 
attention from extant research. In response to these, a Marxist approach is explored, primarily 
drawing from Capital, as the theoretical framework of the thesis. Subsequently, with 
particular reference to the shareholding structure of the three leading suppliers of iron ore (i.e. 
BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, and Vale), and the newly established index pricing mechanism, 
financialisation is considered as the increasing involvement and dominance of financial 
institutions in the current global iron ore market. However, developing the Marxist informed 
framework for the analysis of financialisation in contemporary capitalism is not enough, as 
“what Marx bequeathed to us was not a definitive analysis of capitalism (and financialisation), 
but some important methodological-political tools” (Tinker, 1999, p.655; see also Cooper & 
Tinker, 1994) to change the status quo (Marx, 1969). Therefore, the exploration of Marx 
continues in the next chapter which is directed towards a Marx-informed methodological 
framework for this thesis. 
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Chapter 5 Methodology: A Marx informed Discourse Analysis  
 
This chapter is dedicated to continue the exploration of Marx, primarily from the 
methodological perspective, in an attempt to establish a Marxist approach to the study of 
PEA in general and in particular the analysis of the accounting discourse involved in the 
financialisation of iron ore price. The philosophical underpinnings of the thesis are outlined 
within the Marxist tradition, and a discourse analysis based on a Marx-informed PEA 
framework is illuminated as the methodological approach of this study. In light of the Marxist 
discourse analysis framework, subsequently, the specific method of analysis that the thesis 
uses, and the data collection process, are explicated in detail. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The first section, while reviewing the 
extant Marxist accounting literature, delineates the theoretical underpinnings of Marxist 
accounting, including Marx’s view point on ontology, epistemology, methodology, human 
nature, and social orientations. The second section develops a Marxist PEA discourse 
analysis as the research method. The third section explains the specific analysis method and 
the data collection that the thesis uses corresponding to the Marxist framework 
aforementioned. 
 
5.1. Philosophical assumptions of Marxist accounting research 
While there is much Marx-informed accounting research undertaken in the past few decades 
with regard to methodological debates (Cooper & Tinker, 1994; Neimark, 1990, 1994; 
Cooper, 1997; Bryer, 1994, 1999b; Macve, 1999; Tinker, 1999), historical studies (Tinker & 
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Neimark, 1987; Tinker et al., 1991; Tinker & Gray, 2003; Bryer, 1991, 1993, 2000a, 2000b, 
2005, 2006, 2012, 2013a, 2013b), accounting conceptual framework (Bryer, 1999a), and 
capitalism crises (Tinker & Carter, 2003), insufficient attention has been given to explicitly 
elucidate the theoretical underpinnings for a Marxist accounting approach. To both fill the 
literature gap and put forward the methodological support of the thesis, this section is thus 
dedicated to exploring the perspectives that Marxist accounting takes on with respect to the 
basic components of knowledge which, according to Gaffikin (2008), refer to ontology, 
epistemology, and methodology. 
 
5.1.1. Marx’s ontological perspective 
Ontology concerns the nature of reality and existence (Gaffikin, 2008). In this respect, the 
general dichotomy that sets “critical” accounting aside from its mainstream (positivist) 
counterpart has been that the former claims a non-realist ontology and thus conceives a 
subjectively created society by and within which accounting is constructed and constructing 
(e.g. Chua, 1986; Hines, 1988), the latter champions a realist/ positivist ontology and so 
perceives an objective world whose solid existence is independent of human cognition (and 
thus accounting). While the realist ontological belief of the latter has long been subject to 
criticisms (e.g. Tinker et al. 1982; Mattessich, 1964; Hines, 1988; Hopwood, 1994), the non-
realist ontology held by the former is nevertheless not without limitations. If, say, our ideas 
and cognition have been constantly shaping and shaped by the external environment that 
surrounds us, then the question is which one came first, the ideas or the material world? Put 
simply: it would be somewhat solipsistic if we were the only existence of the world and 
everything else a fabrication of our mind; it would be also rather deterministic if the external 
environment were the initial driving force that has constructed the contemporary world, and 
humans a product of the environment.  
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To solve the idealism / materialism binary, Hegel stated that neither human ideas nor the 
external environment is the ultimate driver behind socio-historical development; instead, 
there is a deeper and pre-structured reality / law which existed prior to and thus subsumes 
human thinking. For Marx, however, this does not seem to be the case when Hegel developed 
his dialectic “beginning as it does with logic, with pure speculative thought, and ending with 
absolute knowledge—with the self-conscious, self-comprehending, philosophic or absolute 
(i.e., superhuman) abstract mind” (Marx, 1974, p.128) (emphases in original). Therefore, in 
Marx’s (1974) opinion, Hegel regarded mind as the essence of human, and as the premise, the 
truth, and the absolute prius of the natural world, again falling into the solipsist category. 
 
Marx (1974), in his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, presented a “Critique of 
the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole” (p.124) and argued that Hegel, in the 
very beginning of his philosophy (i.e. Phanomenologie), solely and, in Marx’s opinion, 
mistakenly, considered material entities only in their form as thoughts estranged from the 
abstract philosophical thinking, which had unsurprisingly rendered his analysis ended with 
absolute knowledge. Marx, on the other hand, leaned towards the material side: 
(m)an is directly a natural being. As a natural being and as a living natural being he is on 
the one hand endowed with natural powers, vital powers—he is an active natural being. 
These forces exist in him as tendencies and abilities—as instincts. On the other hand, as a 
natural, corporeal, sensuous, objective being he is a suffering, conditioned and limited 
creature, like animals and plants (Marx, 1974, p.135) (emphases in original). 
In other words, Marx agreed to some extent that we, as humans, have our own active and 
natural instinct, but this self-autonomic power is at the same time limited by outside forces in 
that 
the objects of his (human) instincts exist outside him, as objects independent of him; yet 
these objects are objects that he needs—essential objects, indispensable to the 
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manifestation and confirmation of his essential powers (ibid, p.135) (emphases in 
original). 
However, Marx did not simply attribute the ultimate cause to the external environment, but 
rather signified the coexistence between human and the outside world that 
(a) being which does not have its nature outside itself is not a natural being, and plays no 
part in the system of nature. A being which has not object outside itself is not an 
objective being. A being which is not itself an object for some third being has no being 
for its object (ibid, p.135) (emphases in original). 
For instance, on the one hand, we as humans would no longer be the natural and / or objective 
beings if the surrounding environment did not exist and / or, we did not have the needs for 
any objects of the external world; the material world, on the other hand, is an object of 
humans—an object existing outside us and yet indispensable to the integration and expression 
of our natural existence—just as humans an object of the material world, being an expression 
of  the nurturing characteristics of the world. To state it simply, the existence of human 
beings is predicated upon the existence of the outside world; and vice versa. As such the 
aforementioned idealism / materialism binary seems to be somewhat redundant and 
contradictory, as the dichotomy per se would postulate the independent existence of either 
human ideas or external environment which Marx has already denied. 
 
Nevertheless, having realised the co-existence between man and nature is not enough, as 
Marx went on to comment that 
…man is not merely a natural being: he is a human natural being… Therefore, human 
objects are not natural objects as they immediately present themselves, and neither is 
human sense as it immediately is – as it is objectively – human sensibility, human 
objectivity. Neither nature objectively nor nature subjectively is directly given in a form 
adequate to the human being… (ibid, p.136) (emphases in original). 
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Then, the question becomes what sits in between human and nature, and thus unifies the two 
together? For Marx, the answer is society, since 
(t)he human aspect of nature exists only for social man; for only then does nature exist 
for him as a bond with man—as his existence for the other and the other’s existence for 
him—and as the life-element of human reality. Only then does nature exist as the 
foundation of his own human existence. Only here has what is to him his natural 
existence become his human existence, and nature become man for him (ibid, p.92) 
(emphases in original). 
In other words, the human / nature coexistence is juxtaposed with a third factor, society, 
which plays an equally indispensable role: society produces and is also produced by human. 
Not only does the social character of human beings exist in the direct interactions among 
people, and between people and society, but it is predicated on the individual activities 
performed by people. This is because the very existence of any individual him or herself is a 
social activity: whatever he or she thinks or does belongs to the social being. Thus, despite 
the physical distinction, human beings and the external environment in which we reside are at 
the same time in unity with one another: the “antithetical character” (p.96) between the two is 
lost within the framework of social relations. Here, unlike idealism and materialism, Marx 
(1974) attempted to constitute the “unifying truth of both” (p.135) which he referred to as the 
dialectic between humans and the environment, a constant changing process where 
“circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances” (Marx & Engels, 1974, 
p.59). Although it was Hegel who first conceptualised the method of dialectic, Marx (1887) 
“openly avowed… (himself) the pupil of that mighty thinker (Hegel)” (p.14). Nevertheless 
the difference between the two is, as discussed earlier, that while the Hegelian dialectic 
begins with pure ideas, the Marxian counterpart starts from material activities. 
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Having illustrated the ontological view held by Marx, that is, the dialectical relationship 
between human beings and the external environment, questions still remain as to where 
human ideas come from, how they are obtained, and what their main purpose is. These are to 
be addressed in the following sections. 
 
5.1.2. Marx’s Epistemological perspective 
Epistemology refers to the theory of knowledge (Gaffikin, 2008); it determines what is to 
count as valid knowledge (Chua, 1986). Following Marx’s logic, contrary to the Hegelian 
philosophy which starts from and concludes with the abstract absolute knowledge (as 
mentioned previously) and which has been, in so doing, detached from the material world, 
knowledge itself cannot stand on its own but must come from and be proved by practice 
(Marx & Engels, 1974). In fact, knowledge is “nothing else than the material world reflected 
by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought” (Marx, 1887, p.14). Thus,  
“(t)he production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly 
interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language 
of real life” (Marx & Engels, 1974, p.47). 
Moreover, while obtaining and testing knowledge from material activities, Marx also 
acknowledged the “one-sidedness” of knowledge in that 
“every historical period has laws (i.e. knowledge) of its own… As soon as society has 
outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to 
another, it begins to be subject also to other laws (i.e. knowledge)” (Marx, 1887, p.14) 
(emphases added). 
This is because, for Marx, knowledge refers to not only the comprehension of the existing 
state of the material world, but also the recognition of the negation of the state to change the 
status quo; knowledge, in its essence, is therefore critical and revolutionary. In relation to 
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extant accounting literature, this is also echoed by Tinker (1999) that “(f)or Marx, thought, 
ideas, and ‘philosophies’, are simultaneously products of reality and a force for engendering 
that reality” (p.646). Taking the material practice as the point of departure, Marx was 
interested in investigating the natural law of social movement and its corresponding impact, 
both positive and negative, on society at large. The way in which his investigation was 
carried out leads us to methodology. 
 
5.1.3. Marx’s Methodology 
As elucidated earlier, for Marx, knowledge must be obtained from practice. Consequently, his 
investigation begins with the real life and the real living individuals in their “empirically 
perceptible process of development” under certain modes of production (Marx & Engels, 
1974, p.48). In addition, while the living individual is a product of the ever-changing material 
world, the latter has also been constantly shaped by the former. As a consequence, to explore 
any particular phenomena requires us to study not only the people and the environment in 
which they operate but also the corresponding social relations between the two (ibid, p.64). In 
fact, Marx (1887) has explicitly illustrated the specific approach in his Afterword to the 
Second German Edition of Capital as 
“to appropriate the material in detail, to analyse its different forms of development, to 
trace out their inner connexion. Only after this work is done, can the actual movement be 
adequately described. If this is done successfully, if the life of the subject-matter is 
ideally reflected as in a mirror, then it may appear as if we had before us a mere a priori 
construction” (ibid, p.14) (emphasis added). 
Also in his The Poverty of Philosophy, Marx (1973) indicated that 
“as a matter of principle in political economy, the figures of a single year must never be 
taken as the basis for formulating general laws. One must always take… a period of time 
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during which modern industry passes through the various phases of prosperity, 
overproduction, stagnation, crisis, and completes its inevitable cycle” (p.214) 
That is, to conduct any valid investigation, one must explore not only the contemporary but 
also the historical environment, so as to trace out the inner connection behind different 
periods of time and / or different stages of development in which the subject matter operates. 
Having outlined Marx’s approach, the question now becomes how the word ‘different’ can be 
defined in such a context, and / or, how Marx would account for the phases of prosperity, 
overproduction, stagnation, and crisis. While this is not particularly addressed in the above 
quotation, from his major works such as Capital and The German Ideology we know that 
Marx was always interested in history, and thus it is his interpretation of history that may be 
able to answer our question.  
 
According to Marx, and consistent with his dialectics on the existence of social reality, 
history does not stand on its own and must be interwoven with human beings. In fact, 
“(t)he first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human 
individuals…and men must be in a position to live in order to be able to ‘make history’” 
(Marx and Engels, 1974, p.42-48).  
And because 
“…life involves before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and 
many other things. The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy 
their needs, the production of material life itself. And indeed this is an historical act, a 
fundamental condition of all history, which today, as thousands of years ago, must daily 
and hourly be fulfilled merely in order to sustain human life” (ibid, p.48) 
Here, the production of material life refers to not only the satisfaction of the means of 
subsistence but also the procreation of the next generation. With the initial need of living 
being satisfied and the population increased comes the newer and greater need of 
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production which then creates wider social relations in terms of family and production. 
Following the expansion pattern as such, Marx argued that 
“a certain mode of production… is always combined with a certain mode of co-operation 
(i.e. social relation), or social stage, and this mode of co-operation is itself a ‘productive 
force’… the multitude of productive forces accessible to men determines the nature of 
society, hence, that the ‘history of humanity’ must always be studied and treated in 
relation to the history of industry and exchange” (ibid, p.50) (emphasis added). 
In other words, to study history we must turn our attention to the mode of production that 
consists of the respective “productive force” and social relations. More importantly, it is to 
Marx the materialistic connection between men as determined by the need and the mode of 
production that creates a “‘history’ independently of the existence of any political or 
religious nonsense which in addition may hold men together” (Marx and Engels, 1974, 
p.50). The immaterial things such as consciousness, spirit, language and so forth, on the 
other hand, are considered, from the very outset, merely the social products so long as 
human beings exist.  As such, “(r)eligion, family, state, law, morality, science, art, etc., are 
only particular modes of production” (Marx & Engels, 1974, p.91) (emphasis in original). 
Viewed in this way, the answer to our previous question becomes clear: the focus of 
Marx’s investigation is the mode of production that underpins the socio-historical 
landscape within which the subject matter is conceived and nurtured. More specifically, to 
explore the mode of production we must delve into the particular force of production that 
constitutes the former with certain social relations. 
 
Unlike the classical political economists such as Smith (1980) and Ricardo (1952) who 
simply defined productive force within the economic sphere, Marx re-interpreted the 
notion on a philosophical level: it refers to not only the sizes of capital, divisions of labour, 
and technical inventions but, as it evolves, becomes a form of social power which arises 
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from the natural (albeit not voluntary) cooperation of individuals, “not as their own united 
power, but as an alien force existing outside them, of the origin and goal of which they are 
ignorant, which they thus cannot control, which on the contrary passes through a peculiar 
series of phases and stages independent of the will and the action of man, nay even being 
the prime governor of these” (Marx & Engels, 1974, p.54). While being independent of 
individual productions, the very same power in its entirety also determines and even 
changes society as a whole in that 
“… all collisions in history have their origin… in the contradiction between the 
productive forces and the form of intercourse” (p.89). 
And since 
the forces of production, the state of society… can and must come into contradiction with 
one another (p.52), 
history will then move forward through replacing the older form of social intercourse that 
has become a fetter upon the existing productive force with a new one (p.87), advancing 
the relevant mode of production accordingly. 
 
Subsequently, two points at this stage can be revealed here. First, individuals, and so are 
their ideas, thoughts, consciousness, and other mental productions as such, are always 
limited by productive forces as much as the latter supersedes the former. Second, 
productive forces, coupled with the changing forms of social intercourse / relations, 
determine the mode of production and thus the historical development of society. Bear in 
mind the relationship from the material to the mental productions, a Marxist analytical 
framework has now emerged, that investigates not only the subject-matter (whether 
material or otherwise) per se but also the underlying productive forces and the forms of 
social relations. This then can, in Marx’s own words, be concluded as 
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“(e)mpirical observation must… bring out empirically, and without any mystification and 
speculation, the connection of the social and political structure with production” (ibid, 
p.46). 
Furthermore, Marx went on to comment on the social conditions under which his 
investigation is undertaken that  
“(t)he social structure and the State are continually evolving out of the life-process of 
individuals… as they operate, produce materially, and hence as they work under definite 
material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will” (ibid, p.46-47). 
Of particular notice here, and also another distinguishing feature that has made Marx so 
distinct from his contemporaries, is his assumption on social orientations. That is, society is 
always moving toward change; any conflict can be traced back to the contradiction 
between the existing productive forces and the corresponding social relations. Thus, not 
only did Marx consider and explicate the subject-matter in a dynamic socio-historical 
context, but he would also proactively take the analysis as the point of departure to change 
the status quo (Marx & Engels, 1974, p.123). 
 
5.1.4. Marx’s view on social change 
Already illustrated in the previous section are how productive forces and social relations 
move history forward, and, earlier than that, how thoughts, ideas, and concepts reflect the 
material world, as discussed in the epistemology section. Attention is now turned to the 
process in which, from a Marx’s perspective, our knowledge of the subject-matter leads to 
social change. First of all, much as its origin derives from material practice, the 
interpretation of knowledge is not to be contained at the linguistic or philosophic level 
(p.41), but to be achieved “in the real world and by employing real means” (p.61), for 
language per se is practical which arises from social relations. Then, in the real material 
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world, knowledge recognises both the present state of things and also the negation of the 
present, and therefore inevitably comes into contradiction with the exiting social conditions 
which “can only occur because existing social relations have come into contradiction with 
existing forces of production” (p.52). As such, society will then proceed forward through 
the replacement of the old productive forces and relations with the newer ones. In short, 
knowledge identifies conflicts in society, which can then be attributed to the deeper 
contradiction between productive forces and social relations that ultimately changes the 
status quo. Only now, after having considered the connections between knowledge, 
productive forces and social change, can we indeed appreciate Marx’s point that  
 “all forms and products of consciousness cannot be dissolved by mental criticism, by 
resolution into “self-consciousness” … but only by the practical overthrow of the actual 
social relations which gave rise to this idealistic humbug; that not criticism but revolution 
is the driving force of history, also of religion, of philosophy and all other types of theory” 
(pp.58-59). 
 
Insofar as Marx’s methodological approach is concerned, the philosophical assumptions of 
the thesis are outlined including ontology, epistemology, methodology, and social 
orientations. Following these underpinnings, the next section is dedicated towards a Marx-
informed Political Economy of Accounting framework in which the discourse analysis of 
this study is undertaken. 
 
5.2. A discourse analysis informed by Marx’s Political Economy of Accounting 
As the credit goes to Tinker (1980) who initially conceptualised the Political Economy of 
Accounting (PEA) as an alternative approach to accounting studies, PEA was first concerned 
with exploring accounting by taking into consideration both the economic forces of 
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production and the social relations of production. Cooper and Sherer (1984) further 
elaborated on the concept that PEA “emphasizes the infrastructure, the fundamental relations 
between class in society… (and) recognizes the institutional environment which supports the 
existing system of corporate reporting and subjects to critical scrutiny those issues… that are 
frequently taken for granted in current accounting research” (pp.208-9). Tinker and Neimark 
(1987) later gave the definition that PEA investigates  
“the ways various social protagonists use accounting information and corporate reporting 
to mediate, suppress, mystify and transform social conflict. The approach places class 
relations at the forefront of the analysis and is, accordingly, concerned with the effects of 
accounting information and corporate reporting on the distribution of income, wealth, 
and power” (pp.71-72). 
Recently, Arnold (2009) also referred to this stream of studies as being able to understand 
“the links between the micro world of accounting and the macro economy” (p.805), and thus 
called for a renewed theoretical emphasis on PEA research. Despite the various 
characteristics assigned with the concept itself, PEA, it is argued, may still seem to exhibit 
little difference from other general critical accounting studies that examine accounting in its 
social, historical, and political context. Thus, this approach has sometimes been labelled as 
merely a “slogan” that falls short of any concrete methodological framework which would 
otherwise justify its adoption (Woodward & Woodward, 2000; Toms, 2005). In particular, 
relatively little attention has been given to the specific meaning or strand of the “political 
economy” in extant PEA literature with a few notable exceptions (e.g. Tinker et al. 1982; 
Bryer, 1991, 1993, 1999a, 1999b, 2000a, 2000b, 2005; Toms, 2005). Responding to this 
deficit and also consistent with Marx’s philosophical underpinnings discussed earlier, an 
attempt is made in the following to first explore and evaluate the specific notions of 
“discourse” and “analysis” from Marx’s perspective, which would then, in so doing, present a 
Marx-oriented PEA framework for analysing accounting discourse. 
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5.2.1. “Discourse” from a Marxist perspective 
In general, discourse takes various forms of ‘communicative events’ including 
“conversational interaction, written text, as well as associated gestures, face work, 
typographical layout, images” (van Dijk, 2001, p.98) and so forth. Consistent with the notion 
as such, Marx regarded the term as any language that “only arises from the need, the 
necessity, of intercourse with other men” (Marx & Engels, 1974, p.51). For this reason, Marx 
argued that discourse is in its nature “practical”, whose existence hinges upon not only its 
users themselves but also others to whom the discourse is made. In other words, discourse is 
considered a social product, produced by practical individuals who actively engage 
themselves in a web of social relations. 
 
Whilst Marx’s interpretation of discourse at this level may be no more different than many of 
the contemporary notions of discourse in that discourse resonates with extant social 
conditions, what does actually distinguish Marx from the general understanding lies in his 
emphasis on the material activities on which discourse is based. That is, the production of 
ideas, conceptions, and consciousness, originates from the production of the means of 
subsistence as, in Marx’s (Marx & Engels, 1974, p.47) opinion, the first historical act. Since 
discourse is the “immediate actuality of thought” (ibid, p.118), it is thus argued that the 
production and the consumption of discourse are also conditioned by certain productive 
forces and the corresponding social relations therein. Alongside the development of material 
production and social relations, the content of human thoughts and the products of our 
thoughts (i.e. discourse) will be changed accordingly. 
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Bear in mind the focus on productive forces and social relations, the specific context, or in 
Marx’s own words, the “form of intercourse”, from which discourse derives is civil society 
(ibid, p.57).  Emerging in the eighteenth century, the concept 
“embraces the whole material intercourse of individuals within a definite stage of the 
development of productive forces… and, insofar, transcends the State and the 
nation…(and) in all ages forms the basis of the State and of the rest of the idealistic 
(ideological) superstructure” (ibid, p.57). 
Viewed in this way, unlike other linguistic studies that explicate discourse in national, 
regional, ethnic, philosophical, ethical, and / or political contexts, Marx would rather come 
back to civil society (and its underlying mode of production) as the starting point on which 
any other ideological structure is based. Moreover, due to the transcendence of national 
boundaries, the existence of civil society is predicated on the existence of a “world market 
through competition” (ibid, p.56). For instance, 
“if in England a machine is invented, which deprives countless workers of bread in India 
and China, and overturns the whole form of existence of these empires, this invention 
becomes a world-historical fact. Or again, take the case of sugar and coffee which have 
proved their world-historical importance in the nineteenth century by the fact that the 
lack of these products, occasioned by the Napoleonic Continental System, caused the 
Germans to rise against Napoleon, and thus became the real basis of the glorious Wars of 
liberation of 1813” (ibid, p.58). 
 
In addition to the world-historical context in which Marx situates civil society as the specific 
context that engenders discourse, he also pointed out the ruling class (i.e. the ruling material 
force) as the main producer and distributor of discourse. This is because 
“(t)he class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the 
same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby… the ideas of those who 
lack the means of mental production are subject to it” (p.64). 
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 The dominant material relationship here manifests itself in the production and distribution of 
ruling discourse. More specifically, within the ruling class, it is those “active… (and) 
conceptive ideologists who make (discourse) the perfecting of the illusion of the class about 
itself” (p.65). Subsequently, in so doing, the ruling discourse gradually takes on the form of 
universality, and the interest of the ruling class becomes the common interest of the society 
correspondingly. Discourse, in this sense, serves to maintain and perpetuate the domination 
of the extant ruling class. 
 
Already explicated have been that discourse comes from civil society which embraces certain 
productive forces and social relations, and that it is produced primarily by the ruling material 
class. The question remaining to be answered is to what extent discourse shapes society, apart 
from legitimising and reinforcing the status quo. Although Marx did not specifically address 
this issue, he stated elsewhere that, without considering the real existing world, even the 
“world-shattering” discourses would be merely the “staunchest conservatives… as they are 
only fighting against… the phrases of this world” (p.41), for liberation could not be achieved 
by simply liberating people from the domination of discourses (p.61). On the other hand, with 
the consideration of the material world, Marx, on the contrary, did acknowledge the 
possibility of social change via discourse, when “the existence of revolutionary ideas (and 
thus discourse)… presupposes the existence of a revolutionary class” (p.65). In other words, 
discourse alone may not be able to change the status quo; it may only change the status quo 
to the extent that the underlying social class from which the discourse derives does so. Of 
course this is not to say that discourse can never initiate social change; it is however to 
emphasise the need for an appreciation of the dialectical interplay between discourse and the 
oppressed class, the coincidence of which changes the status quo (see also Tinker, 1999, 
p.646).  
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To summarise the discussion so far, discourse has the power of legitimatising and thereby 
sustaining the interest of the existing ruling class, yet pari passu, also retains the capacity to 
change the status quo, provided that both scenarios have been shaped by and simultaneously 
shaping the corresponding social classes: the former involves the ruling ones, and the latter 
concerns the ruled. Having illustrated the relationship between discourse and its underlying 
context (i.e. civil society) and the possibility of social change from a Marxist perspective, the 
next section explores how specific discourse analyses can be carried out in order to reveal 
these relations. 
 
5.2.2. “Analysis” from a Marxist perspective 
Following the above delineation of discourse, a Marxist approach to discourse analysis is 
next investigated. This corresponds to Marx’s interest in production on which discourse is 
based, civil society from which discourse arises, and class perspectives through which 
discourse is perceived and interpreted, respectively. 
 
5.2.2.1. Analysis of the underlying productive activities of discourse 
First of all, unlike some of the conventional linguistic studies that take the discourse per se as 
the point of departure, Marx’s analysis “set(s) out from real, active men, and on the basis of 
their real life-process… demonstrate(s) the development of the ideological reflexes and 
echoes of this life-process” (p.47). That is, Marx would pay specific attention to the producer 
of the discourse and especially to his or her productive activities that constitute and condition 
the basis of the discourse. Here, the productive activities refer to the producers’ “practical 
position in life, their job and the division of labour” (p.68) in particular, and their respective 
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productive forces and social relations in general. In the field of PEA, Tinker (1980) also notes 
the theoretical significance of the productive forces and the relevant social relations which he 
considers as the two dimensions of capital—the former refers to the economic forces of 
production and the latter the social relations of production. As such, he argues that accounting 
(and thus accounting discourse), as a “product of the socio-economic reality” (Tinker, 1980, 
p.149), can be explored through investigating the distribution of power and the corresponding 
institutional and social conditions. Drawing from the material focus on production, a Marxist 
discourse analysis, at this level, concerns the producers of discourse, and particularly the 
productive forces and social interactions in which they participate. Nonetheless, questions are 
asked of the extent to which the productive forces are to be categorised and illuminated, and 
the extent to which the social relations are to be defined and perceived. 
 
5.2.2.2. Analysis of the underlying Civil Society of productive activities 
Whilst Tinker (1980) emphasises both sides of capital (i.e. economic production and social 
relations), Marx further situates them in the context of civil society, the form of social 
relations that determines and is determined by productive forces, as the basis of his 
historiography and of his critique of Political Economy. For Marx, civil society transcends 
nations and states in that the concept itself directly arises from production and commerce 
which then lay down the foundation of the “State and of the rest of the idealistic 
superstructure” (p.57). Viewed in this way, our emphasis on production is not to be limited 
within the confines of national contexts but to be conceived via different modes of production 
such as production and / or commerce from a world perspective. This is not only because, 
historically, the entire social structure of any nation hinges upon the “stage and development 
reached by its production and its internal and external intercourse” (p.43), but also due to the 
fact that, observing from without, the relations among different nations also depends on their 
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development of productive forces and the social relations therein. Moreover, alongside the 
division of labour and the resulting conflict of interest between separate individuals and 
communities, comes the State which, 
“takes an independent form… divorced from the real interests of individual and 
community, and at the same time as an illusory communal life, always based, however, 
on the real ties existing in every family and tribal conglomeration… and especially… on 
the classes, already determined by the division of labour, which in every such mass of 
men separate out, and of which one dominates all the others” (pp.53-54). 
Here, the State deviates from the very purpose with which it was born as to mediate the 
contradiction between individuals and communities. Instead, it provides and to some extent in 
itself becomes the arena where distinctive classes compete with one another. As such, the 
State is in no way helping unite the interests of different social groups, but only justifying and 
universalising the particular interest of the ruling class as the common interest, the dominant 
discourse, of the whole society. For instance, Marx noted that, in modern capitalist societies, 
“the State… is nothing more than the form of organisation which the (capitalists)… 
necessarily adopt both for internal and external purposes, for the mutual guarantee of their 
property and interests” (p.80). Regulation, in this sense, follows the will of the ruling class 
(i.e. capitalists) in that “(w)henever, through the development of industry and commerce, new 
forms of intercourse have been evolved e.g. assurance companies, etc., the law has always 
been compelled to admit them among the modes of acquiring property” (p.81). 
 
Having pointed out Marx’s greater emphasis on civil society in comparison to the “illusory 
form of the State”, the structure of a Marxist discourse analysis is rendered clear. Rather than 
concentrating on the national and / or political contexts, the focus is on the basic elements of 
civil society that include industrial and commercial activities. However, as capitalism evolves 
to date, financial capital, or in Marx’s term, interest-bearing capital has also become essential 
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and integral to contemporary capitalist societies. Although Marx did not account for financial 
activities in the notion of civil society, he did in fact extend his analysis to “interest-bearing 
capital” in Volume III of Capital, and consider the capital as such the most advanced and the 
most potent form of capitalist production (Marx, 1959, p.433). Therefore, given the relevance 
and importance of financial capital, the Marxist discourse analysis, at this stage, explores the 
corresponding modes of production such as industrial, commercial, and financial activities in 
which the discourse is put forward in a global context.  
 
Moreover, as civil society transcends the illusory form of the state to which Marx further 
added that 
“all struggles within the State, the struggle between democracy, aristocracy, and 
monarchy, the struggle for the franchise, etc. etc. are merely the illusory forms in which 
the real struggles of the different classes are fought out among one another” (p.54), 
the crux of the issue here is to not only examine the industrial, commercial, and financial 
capitalists within the same class alone, but also acknowledge and investigate the oppressed 
working class to which the discourse as a social product can be extended. In the following 
section, therefore, it is to the class perspective that we now turn. 
 
5.2.2.3. Analysis of the underlying classes of Civil Society 
As the aim of Marx’s investigation is to change the status quo (Marx & Engels, 1974, p.123), 
and the root from which social change derives is embedded in class conflicts, the analysis at 
this level involves the impact of discourse on both the ruling and the ruled classes, explores 
the struggles between the two, and examines the relationship between the discourse in 
question and the potential social change. This is also consistent with Marx’s view of 
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discourse that while dominant discourse put forward by the ruling class serves to legitimise 
and perpetuate the status quo, the dialectical interplay between discourse and the ruled class 
does exhibit the possibility of social change. In particular, Marx pointed out the premises for 
the oppressed class, coupled with the relevant discourse, capable of initiating such changes 
that 
“when productive forces and means of intercourse are brought into being, which, under 
the existing relationships, only cause mischief, and are no longer productive but 
destructive forces… and connected with this a class is called forth, which has to bear all 
the burdens of society without enjoying its advantages, which, ousted from society, is 
forced into the most decided antagonism to all other classes” (Marx and Engels, 1974, 
p.94). 
 
View in this way, the discourse analysis at this stage now begs the questions that to what 
extent the discourse concerns the conflicts between the ruling class and the ruled, and that to 
what extent such conflicts are solved by or sustained through the discourse in question and 
why. 
 
Admittedly, as capitalism develops to date, some researchers (and the post-modernist 
scholars in particular) argue that the concept of class struggle is obsolete and no longer 
relevant as modern capitalist societies have entered into the post-industrialised and / or 
postmodern era. Nevertheless, the aftermath of the economic crisis in the 1980s and the 
globalisation of capital have witnessed the transition from the Fordist Welfare State based on 
a compromise between capital and labour to a new era of capital accumulation and 
restructuring on a global scale (Harvey, 1989; Hanlon, 1996). As productions are being 
shifted from advanced capitalist countries to newly emerged developing economies to 
achieve greater flexibility and lower cost, the interest of the working class has been gradually 
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and naturally marginalised through casualization and outsourcing (Cooper, 1997; Arnold & 
Cooper, 1999). Class conflict at this stage should not be sidestepped as it would appear so on 
the surface but be brought to the very forefront of critical examination. It is thus in this 
context that the class perspective is as relevant today as in the period in which Marx had 
observed and analysed. 
 
Another concern which might lead us to refute the idea of class is that modern capitalism has 
rendered the class identity rather obscured and conflicting in that many people are both 
workers and capitalists at the same time. In response to this, Tinker et al. (1991) pointed out 
that “class conflict is not a conflict between ‘individuals’ but between social role aggregates 
in which individuals participate in several, often conflicting, roles” (p.30). In this sense, it 
may be possible that “by engaging the same dispute through conflicting roles, an individual 
may ultimately contribute to her/his own exploitation” (p.30). However, the focus of the 
question here is not on the individuals but on the class “in which they participated not as 
individuals but as members of a class” (Marx & Engels, 1974, p.85), since firstly the 
“subsuming of individuals under definite classes cannot be abolished (until the 
accomplishment of the communist revolution)” (p.83), and more importantly the power of a 
class is not simply the united power of all individuals within that class as a whole but an alien 
force existing outside the individuals which they cannot control and which conversely may 
even be able to control them (Marx & Engels, 1974, p.54). Consequently, it is argued here 
that, despite the identity of individuals on the surface, however conflicting and obscure it 
might be, it is the interests of and the conflict between different classes that underlying the 
purpose of the analysis at the third level. 
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5.3. Research method and data collection 
Having developed the Marxist-informed framework for discourse analysis, this section 
applies the framework to set out the specific analysis method that the thesis uses, the 
corresponding data collection process, and the reliability and validity of the data collected. 
 
5.3.1. Three levels of analyses of the accounting discourse on financialisation 
As the research question of the thesis considers the role of accounting discourse, in particular 
on the part of the Chinese iron and steel industry, in the process of the financialised pricing 
mechanism in the global iron ore market, three levels of analyses are put forward following 
Marx’s focus on material production, civil society, and class perspective.  
 
In the first layer, the discourse around the iron ore pricing controversy from both the Chinese 
iron and steel industry and the international iron ore suppliers (i.e. the three oligopolies: Rio 
Tinto, BHP Billiton, and Vale) are collected and analysed with the attempt to explore the 
practical meaning of the discourse as informed by the corresponding underlying modes of 
production. At this level, questions are asked of whether the controversy between the two 
parties over the price of iron ore can be traced back to the discrepancies between different 
modes of productions. Relevant social relations and productive forces corresponding to the 
different modes of production are explored. In the second layer, the underlying productive 
activities discussed and identified from the first layer are brought further to the context of 
civil society in which different modes of production coordinate and / or conflict with one 
another. More specifically, the producers of the discourse, i.e. the Chinese industry and the 
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global oligopolies, are considered as different fractions in the same capitalist class in a global 
arena. 
 
While the two preceding analyses examine the interactions among corporations, the third 
layer extends the scope of the investigation and lends a perspective on classes other than 
capitalists themselves. In the context of the Chinese iron and steel industry as one heavily 
state-controlled sector, the analysis at this level takes into consideration the interest of the 
working class and the issue of accountability insofar as the state-owned enterprises are 
concerned. In so doing, it attempts to answer the question of whether the Chinese communist 
government has achieved a real market economy with socialist characteristics as informed by 
Marx’s theory and particularly The Communist Manifesto, or if it is in fact another form of 
capitalism that evolves on its own. 
 
5.3.2. Data collection 
Since this thesis is concerned with the practical meaning of accounting discourse in the 
process of financialisation, the data that the research uses largely consists of primary sources 
from publicly available materials. This refers to the use of the accounting information by the 
Chinese steel industry found in news articles, government announcements, corporate media 
releases, and other forms of media reports during the iron ore price negotiations. As 
accounting is generally regarded as the process of identifying, measuring, categorizing, and 
reporting corporate activities (primarily economic transactions) to the users of the 
information to make informed decisions, thus, it is argued that almost no better data could be 
obtained to represent and reveal the meaning of accounting than the accounting discourse put 
forward by the end users of accounting information in real practice. In so doing, the study can 
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also avoid using the statistical data alone, the validity and reality of which, in the Chinese 
context, would otherwise be questioned (Xiao et al., 2004; Tang, 2000).  
 
In general, the data of this thesis can be divided into four categories. The first category refers 
to the media coverage of the iron ore price negotiation in China, contributing to the major 
part of the data used in the current research. Specifically, the data is collected from Sina 
Finance, a website that contains and updates a wide variety of financial news in China and 
across the globe. As one of the most popular and commonly used websites in Mainland 
China, Sina has been acknowledged and referred to by those who investigate accounting 
topics in the Chinese context (e.g. Ding & Graham, 2007; Zhang et al., 2012). In relation to 
annual iron ore price negotiations, the Sina Finance launched the special website to each 
year’s negotiation from 2006 to 2011 (the 2006 annual negotiation: 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/focus/lntksztp/index.shtml; the 2007 annual negotiation 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/focus/2007tkstp/index.shtml; the 2008 annual negotiation 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/focus/iron2008/; the 2009 annual negotiation 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/focus/iron2009/index.shtml; the 2010 annual negotiation 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/focus/iron_2010/; the 2011 annual negotiation 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/focus/iron_2011/). 
 
The period of data collection ranges from 2008 October to 2010 May because: (1) the idea of 
adopting the index pricing mechanism was initially raised in the 2008 iron ore annual price 
negotiation and partially adopted in 2009 by BHP Billiton; (2) it was then formally discussed 
in the 2009 annual negotiation and also recommended by the publisher of the index—Platts at 
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the time, and; (3) this pricing mechanism became generally accepted in the global iron ore 
market during the 2010 negotiation. 
 
The specific collection method is as follows. First, all the news articles and media releases 
available from Sina Finance’s special webpages for the 2009 and 2010 annual negotiations 
(i.e. 2009 negotiation http://finance.sina.com.cn/focus/iron2009/index.shtml; 2010 
negotiation http://finance.sina.com.cn/focus/iron_2010/) are downloaded. Each article is 
input in a single Microsoft Word document in its original language (i.e. Chinese) with the 
corresponding web address in the end of each document. Second, in addition to the articles 
and commentaries directly post on the special pages for two annual negotiations, there are 
also links of other relevant articles which are not presented on the special pages straightaway 
but available from those directly post articles. These articles are also downloaded together 
with the first round downloaded articles and input in Microsoft Word in the same manner. 
 
Third, when the download is completed, all the articles referred to in the first and second 
stages are filtered through two relevant criteria: (1) the topics of the article shall be related to 
the iron ore price negotiations; (2) the producers of the discourse shall be one of the 
participants of the iron ore market which include (1) the major buyers of iron ore from the 
Chinese iron and steel industry and their political stakeholders (i.e. large Chinese State-
owned steel enterprises, the Chinese Iron and Steel Association or the CISA,  China Chamber 
of Commerce of Metals, Minerals & Chemicals Importers & Exporters or the CCCMC, the 
Ministry of Industry and Information or the MII, the Ministry of Commerce or the MOC, and 
the State Council); (2) other buyers from the Chinese iron and steel industry (i.e. China’s 
small and medium steel firms, China’s iron ore trading firms and ports); (3) the iron ore 
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buyers from Japan, Korea, and Europe which were on the same buyers’ side with China in the 
negotiation; and (4) the global iron ore suppliers (i.e. BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, Companhia 
Vale do Rio Doce or Vale, Fortescue Metals Group or FMG, etc.) and the iron ore price index 
publishers (i.e. Platts).  
 
Fourth, after leaving out the articles and commentaries purely written by journalists or market 
analysts or other professional researchers in the third stage, the existing available data are 
organised in a chronological order dating from 2008 August to 2010 October via Microsoft 
Excel. All relevant discourse are translated by the author of the thesis and input into the Excel 
sheets, categorised by  (1) the producer of the discourse from the four groups considered in 
stage three, and (2) the date, author, name, and web address of the article in which discourse 
is reported. In particular, for simplicity purposes, members of the four groups are outlined 
with different colours corresponding to different groups. That is, the first group (i.e. major 
Chinese steel SOEs and government agencies) is indicated by dark red; the second group (i.e. 
other iron ore buyers from the Chinese market) by orange; the third group (i.e. iron ore 
buyers from other countries) by light green; the fourth group (i.e. iron ore suppliers and index 
publishers) by dark blue. In the case of more than one article is reported on the same day, 
sub-headings (e.g. (1), (2), (3), etc.) are used to indicate the specific articles for that period. In 
the case that, despite the filtering process in stage three, no specific discourse is found, the 
date, author, name and web address of the article are still input in Excel. 
 
Fifth, an initial assessment of the raw data is undertaken to combine the similar discourse 
produced by the same person and reported on the same day or period (i.e. a week), in order to 
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refine the data. Overall, more than 600 news articles from Sina Finance have been collected 
and analysed in accordance with the method illustrated above. 
 
The second category of data is the set of official announcements and regulations regarding 
the iron ore pricing mechanism in particular and the Chinese steel and iron industry at large 
by the CISA and the Chinese government. The third category consists of the annual reports of 
the major players on the supply and demand chain including China’s top four state-owned 
steel plants (i.e. Baosteel, Shougang, Anshan Iron and Steel, and Wuhan Iron and Steel) as 
well as the Big Three. The fourth category contains other types of publicly available 
information regarding the price of iron ore such as the index price assessment methodology 
stated by Platts. For those materials that are only available online, the author has downloaded 
the content in Microsoft Word and also added the corresponding web address to the 
document. 
 
5.3.3. Reliability and validity of the data 
Since most of the news articles, reports, and other types of documents introduced above are 
originally written in Chinese, there is a need to outline the reliability and validity of the data, 
which are accomplished through three steps. First, as a native speaker of Chinese, the author 
of the thesis has single-handedly translated the Chinese texts into English which are 
subsequently input into the respective Microsoft Excel and Word documents. Second, these 
documents are assessed by the supervisors of the author (two of whom
12
 are native English 
speakers) in term of both grammar and content. They consult with the author and help revise 
                                                          
12 Dr. Kathy Rudkin and Dr. Corinne Cortese. 
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the wording of the English texts (where necessary) while maintaining the original meanings 
intact. Third, this consult-revise procedure is carried forward to the writing up of the thesis. 
For each reference made in the thesis, the author has reached the agreement with the 
supervisors to strengthen the empirical validity and the theoretical relevance of the data. 
5.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis are outlined following the Marxist 
tradition; the discourse analysis based on a Marxist methodological approach is discussed and 
developed. The specific analysis method and the data collection process are also explicated in 
detail. In the next chapter, the Marxist discourse analysis will be applied to the controversy 
over the fair price of iron ore between the Chinese iron and steel industry and the three 
oligopolistic global iron ore suppliers (i.e. BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, and Vale), with an 
attempt to investigate the underlying mode of productions for both parties on the supply and 
demand chain of the international iron ore market. 
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Chapter 6 Different Interpretations of Iron Ore Price—
Identifying Modes of Production 
 
In the preceding chapters, the theoretical framework and the methodological approach of the 
thesis are discussed and developed. A Marxist theorised framework for financialisation is 
presented and the term financialisation is defined with particular reference to this thesis as the 
rising significance of financial capital in the global iron ore market in general and the iron ore 
pricing mechanism in particular. Consistent with the Marxist-informed PEA framework, 
subsequently, a discourse analysis informed by Marx’s theoretical framework as the 
methodology of the study is explored. The specific data collection and classification 
procedures are explicated at the end of chapter five. In this chapter, the accounting discourse 
around iron ore pricing between the Chinese iron and steel industry and the global iron ore 
suppliers (i.e. the Big Three) is analysed, in order to unveil the underlying modes of 
production which, in Marx’s opinion, constitute and condition the basis of discourse. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The first section (6.1.) introduces the 
producers of the discourse concerning the heated argument over the iron ore price within the 
period from October 2008 to April 2010. The second section (6.2.) delineates a timeline of 
significant events with regard to the annual iron ore price negotiations that occurred during 
the designated time frame aforementioned. In section three (6.3.), the controversial arguments 
around the fair price of iron ore are located and identified corresponding to different 
producers of the discourse. This is then explored in section four (6.4.), where the discourse of 
fair price is further analysed with specific reference to relevant market components. Based on 
the analysis in section four and Marx’s interpretation of different types of capital, the 
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respective modes of production are identified and assigned to the producers of discourse in 
section five (6.5.). The final section (6.6.) provides some concluding remarks. 
 
6.1. Producers of discourse in iron ore price negotiations 
As illustrated in chapter five, analyses following a Marxist framework “set out from real, 
active men, and on the basis of their real life-process” (Marx and Engels, 1974, p.47). 
Therefore, the first and foremost step of the analysis in this thesis begins with an 
investigation of the producers of discourse and particularly of their “practical position in life, 
their job and the division of labour” (ibid, p.68). In the context of the annual iron ore price 
negotiations for the financial years of 2009 and 2010, and consistent with the groups 
identified in the data collection process as described in chapter five, the producers of 
discourse here are classified into the following four groups: (1) the major iron ore buyers 
from the Chinese iron and steel industry and their relevant political stakeholders such as 
government departments and semi-government organisations; (2) other buyers from the 
Chinese iron and steel industry including small and medium steel enterprises and iron ore 
trading companies; (3) other major iron ore buyers from Japan, Korea, and Europe which 
were on the same buyer’s side with the Chinese firms in the negotiations, and; (4) the three 
oligopolistic global iron ore suppliers and the iron ore index promoters and publishers. In line 
with these classifications, the following sections introduce each group in greater detail. 
 
6.1.1. The major Chinese buyers and relevant political stakeholders 
As explicated in chapter two, the Chinese iron and steel sector has always been tainted with a 
sense of political correctness and government control, since the birth of the People’s Republic 
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of China (PRC) in 1949 (see e.g. Rawski, 1976; Peng, 1987). To date, the majority of the 
largest steel plants in China are still either state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or subsidiaries of 
even larger SOEs. For instance, data from the China Iron and Steel Association (CISA) 




 out of the ten largest steel plants in China were directly 
state-owned, two enterprises
15
 were the subsidiaries of their state-owned parent entities, and 
only one firm
16
 was privately owned. Among the top 50 steel plants in 2009, there were only 
nine privately owned firms; the other 41 were either state-owned enterprises (SOE) or 
subsidiaries of SOEs. Furthermore, despite the fact that many of these large SOEs are listed 
on the Shanghai Stock Exchange or Hong Kong Stock Exchange, or both, less than 50% of 
their shares are allowed to trade in the financial market, while the government maintains the 
control of the SOEs by holding the majority of shares (Movshuk, 2004).  
 
Having pointed out the dominance of SOEs in China’s iron and steel industry, also worth 
noting is, inter alia, the CISA which is of significant political importance to the function of 
the industry in general and the country’s participation in the iron ore annual price negotiation 
in particular. Chinas has become the world’s largest producer of iron and steel since 1996 
(Trench, 2004) and the largest iron ore importer since 2004 (Zhu, 2012). The Chinese iron 
and steel industry began its participation in annual iron ore negotiations since 2003, and 
                                                          
13 The reason why the year 2009 is selected to illustrate the dominance of state ownership in China’s iron and steel industry 
is that the period of time in which the accounting discourse is collected and examined in this study is from August 2008 to 
April 2010. Thus, the industry data in 2009 is considered relevant to the research. 
14 These include Shanghai Baosteel Group Corporation, Shougang Company Limited (Group), Anshan Iron and Steel Group 
Corporation, Wuhan Iron and Steel (Group) Corporation, Taiyuan Iron and Steel (Group) Company Limited, Jinan Iron and 
Steel Group Corporation, Handan Iron and Steel Group. 
15  These include Laiwu Steel Group Corporation (a subsidiary of Shangdong Iron and Steel Group Co Ltd which is 
controlled by the provincial government of Shandong) and Maanshan Iron & Steel Company Limited (a subsidiary of 
Magang (Group) Holding Col., Ltd which is controlled by the provincial government of Anhui). 
16 This is Jiangsu Shangang Group Company Limited. 
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Baosteel Group was subsequently chosen by the Ministry of Industry and Information as 
China’s representative on the negotiation table. Baosteel held this role until the 2009 annual 
iron ore negotiation, when CISA, under the permission of the State Council, took over the 
responsibility and represented the Chinese industry as a whole in the negotiations (Xu, 
2009c). While from the 2010 iron ore negotiation onwards Baosteel seemed to be the 
representative of the Chinese side again, it was the CISA that actually had the final say on the 
Baosteel’s decisions (DFdaily, 17 June 2009; Zhang XD, 2009e; Cao, 2009c). The following 
subsections are dedicated to a detailed introduction of the major steel firms which are the 
producers of the discourse collected and their overlaps with the CISA. 
 
CISA 
Prior to its formal establishment and the change of names in January 1999, the CISA was 
then called the Chinese Metallurgy Enterprise Management Association (CMEMA), being 
founded in January 1989. On March 10 1998, the former Ministry of Metallurgical Industry 
(MMI) was officially revoked at the first meeting of the Ninth National People’s Congress 
through Decisions on the Institutional Reform of the State Council (i.e. Decisions). The 
purpose of the Decisions was to ‘remove the organisational structure which led to the 
integration of government administration with enterprise’. As a result of these decisions, ten 
ministries were abolished, on the ground that these departments were the offspring of the era 
of China’s centrally planned economy, the existence of which would be unfavourable to the 
market optimisation of resources as well as the active role that enterprises should take in a 
market economy (Luo, 1998). Consequently, many of the staff members at the former MMI 
joined to the CMEMA which carried on part of the ministry’s regulatory role. In less than one 
year, the organisation was renamed as China Iron and Steel Association, i.e. the CISA. The 
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first chairman of the association was Wu Xichun, one of the deputy ministers of the former 
MMI; and the first deputy chairman Wu Jianchang was also the deputy minister at the 
ministry. At the same time, the remaining function of the former MMI was taken over by the 
State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC). 
 
Also alongside the enactment of the Decisions, in addition to the revocation of the MMI, was 
the organisational restructuring and the name change of the State Planning Commission 
(SPC) which was then the direct regulator of the CMEMA. That is, as the CMEA turned into 
CISA, the State Planning Commission also became the State Development Planning 
Commission (SDPC), which still regulated the CISA. It was not until 2003 when the then 
Chinese premier Wen Jiabao further promoted government reforms that the SDPC and the 
SETC merged into one organisation, the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC hereafter). Since then, the regulator of the CISA became the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC hereafter), and the term ‘planning’ 
was completed removed from the departments concerned, at least on the surface. Moreover, 
the employee salaries of the CISA are also covered through the funds of the SASAC. The 
historical development of the CISA and its close relationship with the Chinese government 
are illustrated in Figure 6.1 below. 




To investigate the producers of discourse at this stage in the case of the CISA, senior staff 
members of the organisation and, if relevant, their professional and political backgrounds are 
identified, in order to “explain… from their practical position in life, their job, and the 
division of labour” (Marx and Engels, 1974, p.68). In 2009 and 2010
17
, the detailed list of 
staff members at the CISA is presented as follows. 
Table 6.1 The third session leading members of China Iron & Steel Association in 2009 
Title Name 
Chairman Deng Qilin 
Honorary Chairman Wu Xichun 
Party Secretary & Legal Representative & Vice 
Chairman 
Liu Zhenjiang 
                                                          
17
Consistent with the designated period of time from which the data of this study is collected, the period from 2009 to 2010 
is chosen to set the background of the Chinese Iron and Steel industry, which of course involves the CISA. 
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Executive Vice Chairman Luo Bingsheng 
Vice Chairman Zhu Jimin; Li Xiaowei; Zou Zhongchen; Wang 
Yifang; Cui Chen; Shen Wenrong; Xu Lejiang; 
Gu Jianguo; Yu Tianchen; Wang Ziliang; Zhang 
Xiaogang; Li Xiaobo; Fan Zhengwei; Zhang 
Changfu 
Secretary-general Shan Shanghua 
Deputy Secretary-general Qi Xiangdong; Li Shijun; Chen Xiaofu; Yang 
Zunqing; Li Kemin; Chi Jingdong; Jiang Qihua; 
Wu Xinchun 
Advisors Wu Jianchang; Pu Haiqing 
(CISA, 2012a, 2012b) 
While holding their positions at the CISA, most of these staff also work at the major SOEs in 
the Chinese iron and steel sector and some are even government officials. For instance, the 
chairman of the CISA, Deng Qilin, was also the general manager and the deputy secretary of 
the Communist Party of China (CPC) Committee at Wuhan Iron and Steel Corporation (the 
fourth largest steel enterprise in China). 
 
Among the vice chairman of the CISA, Zhu Jimin, was also the member of the Beijing 
municipal party committee as well as the CPC committee secretary and the chairman of 
Shougang Group (the second largest steel enterprise). Li Xiaowei was the member of the 
Hunan provincial party committee, and the chairman of Hunan Valin Steel Tube & Wire Co., 
Ltd. (the parent entity of three top 100 steel enterprises
18
). Zou Zhongchen was the deputy 
secretary of the CPC committee and the chairman of Shandong Steel Group (the parent entity 
of two top 10 steel makers
19
). Wang Yifang was the chairman, general manager, and the 
deputy secretary of the CPC committee of Hebei Iron & Steel Group (the parent entity of 
                                                          
18 These include LY steel, Xiangtan Iron & Steel, and Hengyan Steel Tube, which were ranked number 28, 36, and 82 of the 
top 100 steel companies respectively in China in 2009 (CISA, 2009e). 
19 These include Laiwu Steel Group (the 6th largest steel maker) and Jinan iron and Steel Group (the 8th largest steel maker). 
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three top 50 steel plants
20
). Cui Chen was the chairman and the secretary of the CPC 
committee of Baogang Group (the 17th largest steel maker). Xu Lejiang was the chairman, 
and the member of the CPC standing committee of Shanghai Baosteel Group (the largest steel 
maker). Gu Jianguo was the chairman of Anshan Iron and Steel Corporation (the third largest 
steel maker). Yu Tianchen was the member of the city part committee of Benxi, as well as the 
chairman and the secretary of the CPC committee at Benxi Iron and Steel Group (the 13th 
largest steel maker). Wang Ziliang was the chairman, general manager, and the deputy 
secretary of the CPC committee at Anyang Iron and Steel Group (the 21st largest steel 
maker). Zhang Xiaogang was the chairman, general manager, and the CPC committee 
secretary at Anshan Iron and Steel Group (the 3rd largest steel maker). Li Xiaobo was the 
chairman, general manager, and the member of the CPC committee at Taiyuan Iron and Steel 
Group (the 7th largest steel maker). Fan Zhengwei was the chairman and the secretary of the 
CPC committee at Panzhihua Iron and Steel Group (the 11th largest steel maker). 
 
In addition to the aforementioned vice chairmen who were also the senior management of the 
country’s major state-owned steel plants at the same time, other vice chairmen and chairman 
at the CISA either previously held government positions or worked at major SOEs in the iron 
and steel sector or both. For instance, the honorary chairman, Wu Xichun, was the deputy 
minister and the member of the CPC committee at the former MMI, and the CPC committee 
secretary at Anshan Iron and Steel Group. Luo Bingsheng was the chairman and the CPC 
committee secretary at Shougang Group (the 2nd largest steel maker) prior to his 
appointment as the executive vice chairman of the CISA. Liu Zhengjiang, the CPC 
committee secretary, legal representative, and the vice chairman of the CISA, was previously 
                                                          
20 These include Handan Iron & Steel Group, Tangshan Iron & Steel, and Chengde Iron & Steel, which were ranked number 
10, 12, and 41 of the top 50 steel plants respectively in 2009 (CISA, 2009e). 
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the head of the personnel department at the former MMI before joining the CISA. Zhang 
Changfu was the CPC committee secretary and the head of the service and administration 
bureau at the SASAC and the member of the CPC committee of the SASAC. Perhaps the 
only exceptional case among the vice chairmen is Shen Wenrong, who was the founder and 
the chairman of Shagang Group (the 5th largest steel maker and privately owned), but whom 
also worked as the deputy secretary of the Zhangjiagang municipal party committee in mid-
1990s. 
 
While most of the secretary-generals did not serve at the same time as senior management at 
major SOEs or government officials as did the chairmen and vice chairmen, they did however 
have the working experience at government departments and agencies in the past and even at 
present. The secretary-general, Shan Shanghua, was also the president and the CPC 
committee secretary at China Metallurgical Industry Planning and Research Institute from 
February 1996 to October 2009, as well as the independent director at Shougang Group. The 
deputy secretary-generals, Qi Xiangdong and Li Shijun, both worked at the former MMI 
prior to their appointment at the CISA. Chen Xiaofu was the deputy head of the discipline 
inspection division at State Bureau of Metallurgical Industry. Yang Zunqing was the 
executive vice president of the Metallurgical Council at the China Council for the Promotion 
of International Trade (CCPIT). The three other deputy secretary-generals, Chi Jingdong, Wu 
Xinchun and Jiang Qihua, also worked at either major SOEs (Sinosteel Group in the case of 
Chi Jingdong and Wuhan Iron and Steel Group in the case of Wu Xinchun) or semi-
government agencies (China Metallurgical News in the case of Jiang Qihua) concurrently. 
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Summarising from the investigation above of the corresponding political and professional 
background of the leading members at CISA which were not shown on the association’s 
website, the findings are presented in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2 Political and professional backgrounds of the leading members of the CISA in 
2009 
Position(s) at CISA Name (Previous) position(s) 
at major SOEs in steel 
sector 
(Previous) position(s) at 
government 
department(s) 
Chairman Deng Qilin President & CPC 
secretary (Wuhan Iron 
and Steel) 
 
Honorary chairman Wu Xichun Independent director 
(Anshan Iron and Steel) 
Deputy minister & CPC 
committee member 
(former MMI) 
Vice chairman & secretary 
of the CPC committee & 
legal representative 
Liu Zhenjiang  Head of the personnel 
department (former MMI) 





Vice chairman Zhu Jimin CPC secretary & 
chairman (Shougang)  
Member of the Beijing 
municipal party 
committee 
Vice chairman Li Xiaowei Chairman (Hunan Valin 
Steel) 
Member of the Hunan 
provincial party 
committee  




Vice chairman Wang Yifang Chairman, president, & 
CPC secretary (Hebei 
Iron & Steel) 
 
Vice chairman Cui Chen Chairman & CPC 
secretary (Baogang) 
 
Vice chairman Shen Wenrong Chairman & CPC 
secretary (Shagang) 
Deputy secretary of the 
Zhangjiagang municipal 
party committee 
Chapter 6 Different Interpretations of Iron Ore Price—Identifying Modes of Production 
132 
 




Vice chairman Gu Jianguo Chairman (Maanshan 
Iron and Steel) 
 
Vice chairman Yu Tianchen Chairman & CPC 
secretary (Benxi Iron 
and Steel) 
Member of the Benxi 
municipal party 
committee 
Vice chairman Wang Ziliang Chairman, president, 
deputy CPC secretary 
(Anyang Iron and Steel) 
 
Vice chairman Zhang Xiaogang Chairman &president 
(Anshan Iron and Steel) 
 
Vice chairman Li Xiaobo Chairman, president, 
CPC committee member 
(Taiyuan Iron and Steel) 
 
Vice chairman Fan Zhengwei Chairman & CPC 
secretary (Panzhihua 
Iron and Steel) 
 
Vice chairman Zhang Changfu  CPC secretary & head of 
the service and 
administration bureau 
(SASAC) 
Secretary-general Shan Shanghua Independent director 
(Shougang) 
President & CPC 
secretary (China 
Metallurgical Industry 
Planning and Research 
Institute) 
Deputy secretary-general Qi Xiangdong Independent director 
(Xinxing Ductile Iron 
Pipes Co., Ltd) 
Head of the economic 
adjustment department 
(former MMI) 
Deputy secretary-general Li Shijun Independent director 
(Angang Steel Co., Ltd.) 
& Independent director 
(Sansteel MinGuang 
Co., Ltd)  
Deputy head of the 
technology department 
(former MMI) 
Deputy secretary-general Chen Xiaofu  Deputy head of the 
Disciplinary Inspection 
department at State 
Bureau of Metallurgical 
Industry 
Deputy secretary-general Yang Zunqing  Executive vice president 
of Metallurgical Council 
of CCPIT 
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Deputy secretary-general Li Kemin unknown unknown 
Deputy secretary-general Chi Jingdong Consultant (Sinosteel 
Jinxin Consultation) 
 




Deputy secretary-general Wu Xinchun Head of the technical 
innovation department 
(Wuhan Iron and Steel) 
 
Advisors Wu Jianchang Independent director 
(Taiyuan Iron & Steel) 
Deputy minister (former 
MMI) 
Advisors Pu Haiqing  Executive vice governor 
& deputy provincial party 
committee of Sichuan; 
mayor & deputy city part 
committee secretary of 
Chongqing & Managing 
director of State Bureau 
of Metallurgical Industry  
 
As shown in Table 6.2, while the managers and directors from many of the largest SOEs
21
 in 
the Chinese iron and steel sector as well as some current and previous government officials at 
the same time dominated the composition of senior management at the CISA, their 
counterparts at small and medium size and / or privately owned steel enterprises were not 
present in the same management team of the association. 
 
Considering the aforementioned professional and political backgrounds of the senior 
management at the CISA, it is indeed very hard to perceive the CISA as an “industrial 
organisation” which the association itself claims to be on its website (CISA, 2013a). 
Therefore, rather than conceiving the functioning role of CISA as “a bridge between the 
                                                          
21 In fact, all of the top 10 steel enterprises had their chairmen and / or directors holding senior positions at the CISA 
concurrently. On the whole, there were 17 out of the top 30 steel makers which the senior members of the CISA came from. 
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government and enterprises” (CISA, 2013a), it seems more convincing to regard its raison 
d’etre as yet another government organisation serving the interests of large state-owned steel 
plants, leaving the small and medium size privately owned steel companies unrepresented 
(Huang & Mei, 2010). Indeed, a closer examination of the association’s own introduction 
also adds a sense of political correctness in that the CISA is “(g)uided by the Party’s lines, 
rules and policies, (and) follows scientific development view and provides services to the 
enterprises, the industry, the government and the society” (CISA, 2013a) (emphases added). 
Here, while the ‘party’ purports to the CPC, the ‘scientific development view
22
’ refers to, at 
that time, the latest ideological slogan of the CPC put forward by the then President Hu Jintao 
(Mulvenon, 2009). 
 
Aside from the political component, another factor that has rendered the CISA close its door 
to most small and medium enterprises is one of the criteria to join the association that, in 
order to join the association, steel plants must reach at least an annual steel production of 1 
million tons or above (CISA, 2011a). As a result, the vast majority of the CISA member 
firms were large size (and mostly state-owned) steel enterprises. In fact, the significant 
overlap as such between the CISA and major SOEs in the same sector is also reflected 
throughout the discourse from the Chinese iron and steel industry in the 2009 and 2010 iron 
ore price annual negotiations. Thus, in addition to the CISA, there is also a need to introduce 
other producers of discourse from the major SOEs in the Chinese iron and steel industry 
including Baosteel, Shougang, Ansteel, and Wuhan Iron and Steel. The following sections are 
directed towards this end. 
                                                          
22
The concept of ‘scientific development’ was first introduced by then the Chinese president Hu Jintao in 2003 and officially 
included in the CPC’s revised constitution at the 17th party congress in October 2007 alongside the CPC’s existing pantheon 
of Chairman Mao’s thought, Deng Xiaoping theory, and Jiang Zemin’s ‘Three Represents’. (Holbig, 2009). 
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Baosteel Group Corporation 
Establish in December 1978 and headquartered in Shanghai, Baosteel Group Corporation 
(Baosteel) is regarded as a typical product of China’s opening reform in the late 1970s. 
Despite its relatively short history compared to other major SOEs in the same industry, 
Baosteel has grown into China’s largest iron and steel enterprise with the highest level of 
modernisation, and the second largest steel producer in the world (after ArcelorMittal). 
Primarily interested in the iron and steel sector, Baosteel manufactures premium iron and 
steel products with three major product lines including carbon steel, stainless steel, and 
special steel which are not only sold to China’s domestic market but also exported to more 
than 40 countries worldwide. In 2014, Baosteel has been listed among the Fortune Global 
500 for the 11th consecutive year and ranked 211th (Baosteel Group Corporation, 2014). It 
has also been awarded the highest credit ranking by the world’s leading credit rating agencies 
including Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch Ratings (Baosteel Group Corporation, 
2014). For the financial year ended December 31 2009, Baosteel reported the net profit 
(before tax) of RMB 7,294 million
23
 and had total assets of RMB 201,143 million
24
 (Baoshan 
Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. 2009). 
 
Despite having its subsidiary, Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd., listed on the Shanghai Stock 
exchange in 2000, a significant portion (more than 70%)
25
 of the firm’s share are held by the 
                                                          
23 The net profit of RMB 7,294,555,395.87 is equivalent to AUD $1,215,759,232.65 (i.e. AUD 1,216 million), assuming the 
exchange rate between Chinese RMB and Australian dollar is 6:1. 
24  The total assets of RMB 201,142,782,516.38 is equivalent to AUD $33,523,797,086.06 (i.e. AUD 33,524 million), 
assuming the exchange rate between Chinese RMB and Australian dollar is 6:1. 
25 For the financial year ended December 31 2000, Baosteel Group held 85% of the shares of Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. 
(Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd., 2000). The figure remained so until 2005 when the firm issued new shares to the public and 
Baosteel Group held still 77.89% shares (Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd., 2005). For the financial year of 2009, the 
proportion of shares held by Baosteel Group was 73.97% (Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd., 2009). According to the 
subsidiary’s latest annual report (for the financial year 2013), the parent entity still holds 79.71% shares of the subsidiary 
(Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd., 2013). 
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parent entity, Baosteel Group which is directly under the control of the Chinese central 
government through the SASAC, and thus remain non-tradable in private financial markets 
ever since. As indicated in its 2013 annual report, the actual controller of Baosteel is the 
SASAC (Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. 2013) and the relationship between the listed entity, 





As shown in Figure 6.2, similar to the case of the CISA, Baosteel Group is also under the 
control and management of the SASAC. The SASAC, in turn, not only supervises and 
manages the state-owned assets under the supervision of the central government of CPC, but 
also makes personnel decisions on the top management of its supervised SOEs (SASAC, 
2014). It is thus not surprising that the directors and executives at Baosteel are also members 
of the CPC and subject to government supervision. As found in the data collected, many of 
                                                          
26 The relationship for the year ended December 31 2009 was similar, except that, as mentioned in the previous footnote, 
Baosteel Group owned 79.71% shares of Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. 
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the producers of discourse came from Baosteel, it is thus necessary to clarify their relevant 





, combined the group’s overlap with the CISA (as indicated in 6.2), is 
presented in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3 Profile of senior management at Baosteel Group Corporation in 2009 




 Titles held at CISA 
Chairman of board of 
directors 
Xu Lejiang Secretary of CPC 
committee 
Vice chairman 
Managing director & 
President 
He Wenbo Member of CPC 
committee 
 
Vice president Fu Zhongzhe Member of CPC 
committee 
 
Vice president Dai Zhihao Member of CPC 
committee 
 
Vice president Zhao Xia Member of CPC 
committee 
 
Vice president Zhou Zhuping Member of CPC  
Vice president Zhao Zhouli Member of CPC  
Vice president Cui Jian Member of CPC  
Secretary to the board of 
directors 
Chen Ying Member of CPC  
                                                          
27 As the parent entity of Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. under the control of the SASAC, Baosteel Group Corporation’s 
image and influence are more widely recognised and accepted than those of its listed subsidiary, in both practical and 
political terms. Therefore, the profile of the group is considered and presented. For the same reason, this also applies to other 
major SOEs described and analysed in this chapter. 
28 The table is of course not to be considered exhaustive, for (1) Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. is under the control of 
Baosteel Group Corporation which thus merits more attention; (2) the major difference between the management teams of 
Baosteel Group and Baoshan Iron & Steel is the existence of the independent directors, all of whom are outsiders to the 
parent entity and thus whom are not included in the above table; and (3) the complete profile of Baosteel Group’s 
management team for the year 2009 is not available. 
29
 While collecting and examining the profile of senior management at both Baosteel Group Corporation and Bashan Iron & 
Steel Co., Ltd, the findings show that the political identity of directors and executives are unanimously hidden from the 
corresponding annual reports (in both Chinese and English versions), and it is only through the group’s Chinese website can 
those political status be traced. However, this is not uncommon in the case of China’s major SOEs whose subsidiaries are 
listed in public stock exchanges (see e.g. Gong, 2011). 
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Outsider director Wu Yaowen Member of CPC  
Secretary of CPC committee 
for Disciplinary Inspection 
Liu Zhanying Member of CPC 
committee 
 
Deputy secretary of CPC 
committee for Disciplinary 
Inspection and director of the 
supervision department 
Zhou Guiquan Member of CPC 
committee 
 
General manager of the 
department of operating 
finance 
Zhu Kebing Member of CPC 
committee 
 
(Adapted from Baoshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. Annual Report 2009 and the website of Baosteel 
Group at http://www.baosteel.com/group/index.htm accessed 24 March 2014) 
 
Shougang Company Limited (Group) 
Following Baosteel, Shougang Company Limited Group (Shougang Group) was ranked 2nd 
in China’s top 100 steel enterprises in 2009 according to the CISA (2009e) data and was also 
among the Fortune Global 500 since 2011. Compared to the relatively short history of 
Baosteel, the establishment of Shougang Group can be traced back to 1919, even before the 
founding of the PRC. Headquartered in Beijing, the group has five subsidiaries listed on stock 
exchanges. That is, in addition to Beijing Shougang Company Limited which is the group’s 
first major subsidiary and listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, the other four subsidiaries 
including Shougang Concord International, Shougang Concord Century, Shougang Concord 
Grand, and Shougang Concord Technology are listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 
With its primary focus on the steel industry, the group is also interested in mining, machinery, 
electronics, construction, real estate, and services sectors (Shougang Group, 2014). Aiming to 
be the world’s leading steel enterprise, Shougang Company Limited achieved the net profit 
Chapter 6 Different Interpretations of Iron Ore Price—Identifying Modes of Production 
139 
 
(before tax) of RMB 450 million
30
 and recorded the total assets of RMB 18,507 million
31
 for 
the financial year 2009 (Shougang Co., Ltd. 2009). 
 
Similar to the shareholding structure of Baoshan Iron & Steel, a significant portion (above 
60%) of the shares of the listed subsidiary, Shougang Company Limited, is held by the parent 
entity, Shougang Group, and remains non-tradable in private markets. However, unlike 
Baosteel Group which is directly controlled by the SASAC at the level of the central 
government, Shougang Group is, through Beijing State-owned Capital Operation and 
Management Center, under the supervision of the SASAC of People’s Government of Beijing 
City at the municipal level. According to the group’s annual report for the financial year 
2013
32
, the controlling relationship between the subsidiary and its actual controller is 
presented in Figure 6.3. 
                                                          
30 The net profit (before tax) of RMB 450,805,775.96 is equivalent to AUD 75,134,296 (i.e. AUD 75 million), assuming the 
exchange rate between the Chinese RMB and the Australian dollar is 6:1, which was nearly the average exchange rate during 
the period concerned. 
31
 The total asset of RMB 18,507,644,802.61 is equivalent to AUD 3,084,607,467.1 (i.e. AUD 3,084 million), assuming the 
exchange rate between the Chinese RMB and the Australian dollar is 6:1. 
32 This relationship back to 2009 is same as its 2013 counterpart. 




Here, the SASAC of Beijing Municipality plays a similar role as the SASAC which 
supervises Shougang Group as well as appoints and removes senior executives of the entity. 
To explore the political background of the directors and executives at Shougang and their 
relationship, if any, with the CISA, the profile of the group’s senior management is illustrated 
in Table 6.4. 
Table 6.4 Profile of senior management at Shougang Group in 2009 




 Titles held at CISA 
Chairman of  board of 
directors 
Zhu Jimin Secretary of CPC committee 
of Shougang Group 
&Member of the Beijing 
municipal party committee 
Vice chairman 
Vice chairman of board of 
directors & President 
Wang Qinghai Deputy secretary of CPC 
committee of Shougang 
 
                                                          
33
Same as Baosteel Group and other major Chinese SOEs, the political identity of directors and executives are unanimously 
hidden from the corresponding annual reports (in both Chinese and English versions), and it is only through the group’s 
Chinese website can those political status be traced. 




Director  Huo Guanglai Deputy secretary of CPC 
committee of Shougang 
Group &Secretary of CPC 
committee for Disciplinary 
Inspection 
 
Director & Executive vice 
president 
Xu Ning Member of CPC committee  
Director & Vice president Wang Yi Member of CPC committee  
Director& Chief accountant Fang Jianyi   
Assistant general manager Qiankai Member of CPC committee  
Independent director of 
Shougang Co., Ltd. 
Shan Shanghua Member of CPC Secretary-general 
(Adapted from Shougang Company Limited Annual Report 2009 and the website of Shougang Group 
at http://www.shougang.com.cn/shougang_cn_web/ accessed 24 March 2014) 
 
Anshan Iron and Steel Group Corporation 
Anshan Iron and Steel Group Corporation (Ansteel Group) is China’s second largest steel 
manufacturer after merging with Panzhihua Iron and Steel Group
34
 in 2010. In 2009, It was 
ranking 3rd among China’s top 100 steel enterprises (CISA, 2009e) and 462nd among the 
Fortune Global 500 in 2011 (Ansteel Iron and Steel Group Corporation, 2014). Similar to 
Shougang Group, it has a long history that can be traced back to the second decade of the 
20th century. Today, the group has “three major production bases located in Anshan, 
Bayuquan, and Chaoyang, with an annual integrated capacity of 25 million tons of pig iron, 
raw steel and rolled steel” (Ansteel Iron and Steel Group Corporation, 2014), manufacturing 
high-end steel products such as “the auto sheet, electric household appliance sheet, container 
plate, ship plate, heavy rail, oil tubing, pipeline plate, vessel plate, cold-rolled silicon steel, 
etc.” (Ansteel Iron and Steel Group Corporation, 2014). The group’s major subsidiary, 
                                                          
34 Panzhihua Iron and Steel Group was ranked 11th among the top 100 Chinese steel manufacturers in 2009 (CISA, 2009e). 
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Angang Steel Company Limited, is dual listed on both the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange since 1997. For the financial year 2009, Angang Steel Company 
Limited reported the net profit (before tax) of RMB 843 million
35
 and the total assets of RMB 
100,987 million
36
 (Angang Steel Company Limited, 2009). Same as the case of Baosteel 
Group, Ansteel Group is under the direct supervision of the SASAC, and, according to its 
2013 annual report
37
, the specific relationship is illustrated in Figure 6.4. 
 
The professional and political profile of the senior management at Ansteel Group, and their 
overlap with the CISA (if any), are presented in Table 6.5. 
Table 6.5 Profile of senior management at Ansteel Group in 2009 
                                                          
35
The net profit (before tax) of RMB 843 million is equivalent to AUD 140.5 million, assuming the exchange rate between 
the Chinese RMB and the Australian dollar is 6:1. 
36
The total asset of RMB 100,987 million is equivalent to AUD 16,832 million, assuming the exchange rate between the 
Chinese RMB and the Australian dollar is 6:1. 
37
The shareholding structure in 2009 is very similar to its 2013 equivalent, except that Ansteel Group held 67.29%, instead 
of 67.80% (as in 2013), shares of the listed subsidiary (Angang Steel Company limited, 2009). 
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Position(s) at Ansteel Group Name Political identity
38
 Titles held at CISA 
President of Ansteel Group 
&Chairman of  board of 
directors of Angang Steel Co., 
Ltd. 
Zhang Xiaogang Secretary of CPC committee 
of Ansteel Group 
Vice chairman 
Chairman of the supervisory 
board of Angang Steel Co., 
Ltd. 
Wen Baoman Deputy secretary of CPC 
committee of Ansteel Group& 
President of CPC School of 
Ansteel Group & Member of 
the Anshan municipal party 
committee 
 
President & Vice chairman of 
board of directors of Angang 
Steel Co., Ltd. 
Tang Fuping Member of CPC committee of 
Ansteel Group 
 
Vice president & Chief 
accountant of Ansteel Group
   
Yu Wanyuan   
Vice president of Ansteel 
Group 
Yao Lin Member of CPC committee of 
Ansteel Group 
 
Vice chairman of Angang 
Steel Co., Ltd. 
Yang Hua Member of CPC committee of 
Ansteel Group &Secretary of 
CPC committee of Angang 
steel Co., Ltd. 
 
Independent non-executive 
director of Angang Steel Co., 
Ltd 
Li Shijun Member of CPC & (former) 
Deputy head of the technology 
department of (former) MMI 
Deputy secretary-
general 
(Adapted from Angang Steel Company Limited Annual Report 2009 and the website of Ansteel 
Group at http://www.ansteelgroup.com/a/index.php accessed 24 March 2014) 
 
Wuhan Iron and Steel Group Corporation 
Wuhan Iron and Steel Group Corporation (Wuhan Iron and Steel Group hereafter) was 
founded in 1958 in Wuhan, Hubei province, and regarded as the “first super-large state-
owned iron and steel complex established after the foundation of P. R. China” (Wuhan Iron 
and Steel Group Corporation, 2014). To date, as one of the most important iron and steel 
                                                          
38
 Same as other major Chinese SOEs, the political identity of the senior management is usually hidden from annual reports 
(see footnote 17 for a detailed explanation). 
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production base in the country with advanced manufacturing processes and production 
equipments, Wuhan Steel is engaged in the production of a wide variety of iron and steel 
products including “hot-rolled coil, hot-rolled section steel, hot-rolled heavy rail, plate of 
moderate thickness, cold-rolled coil, galvanized plate, cold-rolled oriented and non-oriented 
silicon steel sheet, color coated plate, and high-speed wire rod, etc.” (Wuhan Iron and Steel 
Group Corporation, 2014). Moreover, the group is also interested in high-tech industries and 
international trade. In 2013, the group was ranked 328th among the Fortune Global 500 and 
the 4th largest iron and steel enterprise in the world (Wuhan Iron and Steel Group 
Corporation, 2014). The main subsidiary of the group, Wuhan Iron and Steel Company 
Limited, is listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange since 1999. For the financial year ended 
31 December 2009, the company realised the net profit (before tax) of RMB 1,957 million
39
 
and the total assets of RMB 73,324 million
40
 (Wuhan Iron and Steel Company Limited, 
2009). As shown in the subsidiary’s annual report
41
, similar to other major Chinese SOEs 
aforementioned, the governing structure of Wuhan Steel Group is illustrated in Figure 6.5. 
                                                          
39 The net profit (before tax) of RMB 1,956,678,485.59 is equivalent to AUD 326,113,080.93 (i.e. AUD 326 million), 
assuming the exchange rate between the Chinese RMB and the Australian dollar is 6:1. 
40 The total asset of RMB 73,324,006,864.66 is equivalent to AUD 12,220,667,810.78 (i.e. AUD 12,221 million), assuming 
the exchange rate between the Chinese RMB and the Australian dollar is 6:1. 
41 The controlling relationship in 2009 is similar to its 2013 equivalent, except that the group held 64.71% shares of the 
subsidiary (Wuhan Iron and Steel Company Limited, 2009). 




The professional and political backgrounds of the senior management at the group, and their 
overlap with the CISA (if any), are presented in Table 6.6. 
Table 6.6 Profile of senior management at Wuhan Iron and Steel Group in 2009 
Position(s) at Wuhan Iron 
and Steel Group 
Name Political identity
42
 Titles held at CISA 
President of Wuhan Iron & 
Steel Group; Chairman of 
board of directors of Wuhan 
Iron & Steel Co., Ltd 
Deng Qilin Deputy secretary of CPC 
committee of Wuhan Iron & 
Steel Group 
Chairman 
Vice president of Wuhan Iron 
& Steel Group; Vice chairman 
of board of directors of Wuhan 
Iron & Steel Co., Ltd 
Wang Zhenyou Secretary of CPC committee of 
Wuhan Iron & Steel Group and 
Wuhan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd; 
(former) Mayor of Huangshi 
city; (former) Mayor & Deputy 
secretary of the Yichang 
municipal party committee 
 
Vice president of Wuhan Iron 
& Steel Group; director of 
Wuhan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd 
Hu Wangming Member of CPC committee of 
Wuhan Iron & Steel Group 
 
                                                          
42
 Same as other major Chinese SOEs, the political identity of the senior management is usually hidden from annual reports 
(see footnote 17 for a detailed explanation). 
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President and director of 
Wuhan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd 
Wang Ling Member of CPC committee of 
Wuhan Iron & Steel Group 
 
Director and chairman of trade 
union of Wuhan Iron & Steel 
Co., Ltd 
Ma Qilong Member of CPC committee of 
Wuhan Iron & Steel Group 
 
Vice president & Chief 
accountant of Wuhan Iron & 
Steel Group; director of 
Wuhan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd 
Peng Chen   
Chairman of supervisory board 
of Wuhan Iron & Steel Co., 
Ltd 
Zhang Tiexun Member of CPC committee 
&Secretary of Disciplinary 
Inspection Commission of 
Wuhan Iron & Steel Group; 
(former) Deputy secretary of 
Disciplinary Inspection 
Commission & (former) 
director of Supervision Bureau 
of Haicheng City (Liaoning 
province) 
 
Assistant general manager of 
Wuhan Iron & Steel Group 
Liu Qiang Deputy secretary of CPC 
committee of Wuhan Iron & 
Steel Co., Ltd 
 
(Adapted from Wuhan Iron and Steel Company Limited Annual Report 2009) 
As shown from the above analyses of the four largest SOEs, not only do the vast majority of 
their directors and executives hold political titles and some even previously served as senior 
government officials, but the entities themselves are also under the control of the SASAC that 
appoints and removes the management team of SOEs. Furthermore, equally intimate is the 
relationship between these SOEs and the CISA, considering the significant overlap between 
the two groups. That is, senior members of these top four SOEs in steel sector also hold 
important positions at the CISA such as the chairman, honorary chairman, executive vice 
chairman, and three other vice chairmen, secretary-general, and deputy secretary-general. 
Figure 6.6 below summarises the close relationship among these major SOEs, the CISA, and 
the Chinese government. 




In fact, the affinity depicted above is also evidenced in the data collected that it is these senior 
members of the CISA or major SOEs or both who were the primary producers of discourse 
from the Chinese iron and steel industry in the media coverage. It is thus considered 
appropriate to classify the CISA and the major SOEs aforementioned into the same group in 
the discourse of iron ore price negotiations for the designated frame of period (2008-2010). 
While the main producers of discourse on behalf of China’s iron and steel sector are 
introduced and discussed above, the subsequent section then concerns the opposite group in 
the iron ore price debate on the sellers’ side, namely the three leading iron ore suppliers in the 
world including BHP Billiton, Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, and Rio Tinto. 
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6.1.2. The Big Three and other major iron ore suppliers 
As mentioned in chapter two, the international trade of iron ore has historically been a seller-
dominated market stemming from the high level of monopolisation on the parts of the iron 
ore suppliers (Hou & Yang, 2009). Thus, despite the annual price negotiation between the 
iron ore buyers and sellers since the early 1970s (Sukagawa, 2010), it has been generally 
acknowledged that the three largest iron ore manufacturers on the suppliers’ side—BHP 
Billiton, Rio Tinto, and Companhia Vale do Rio Doce are the real drivers of the negotiations 
and the resulting price of iron ore thereafter (Wilson, 2012), hence the name the Big Three. A 




BHP Billiton is one of the “world’s largest producers of major commodities, including iron 
ore, metallurgical and energy coal, conventional and unconventional oil and gas, copper, 
aluminium, manganese, uranium, nickel and silver” (BHP Billiton, 2013, p.2). As a 
consequence of the merger of the Australia-based Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited 
and the UK-based Billiton Plc in 2001, BHP Billiton is now headquartered in Melbourne and 
dual listed on both the Australian Securities Exchange and the London Stock Exchange. With 
its reported market capitalisation of approximately US$ 147,100 million
43
 and net profits of 
US$ 10,900 million
44
 for the financial year ended 30 June 2013 (BHP Billiton, 2013), the 
organisation is considered the largest mining company in the world. 
                                                          
43 This is equivalent to AUD 163,281 million, assuming the exchange rate between the US dollar and the Australian dollar is 
0.9:1. 
44
This is equivalent to AUD 12,099 million, assuming the exchange rate between the US dollar and the Australian dollar is 
0.9:1. 
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Companhia Vale do Rio Doce 
Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (Vale hereafter) is a multinational mining corporation 
headquartered in Brazil and with operations in more than 30 countries spanning across five 
continents. Founded in June 1942, Vale was initially a public company under the control of 
the Brazilian Federal Government until the firm’s privatisation in 1997. To date, Vale is 
listed on the stock exchanges of Sao Paulo Hong Kong, New York, Madrid and Paris. It has 
grown into the world’s third largest mining company, as well as the world’s largest producer 
and exporter of iron ore and iron ore pellets. The company also produces “manganese ore, 
ferroalloys, coal, copper, platinum group metals (‘PGMs’), gold, silver, cobalt and potash, 
phosphates and other fertilizer nutrients” (Vale, 2013). For the financial year ended 31 
December 2013, Vale reported the total assets of US$ 124,597 million
45
 and realised the net 
profits (before tax) of US$ 7,241 million
46
 (Vale, 2013). 
 
Rio Tinto Group 
Founded in 1873, Rio Tinto was originally based in Spain, and has to date grown into a 
“leading global mining group that focuses on finding, mining and processing the Earth’s 
mineral resources” (Rio Tinto, 2013, p.1). Currently, the group is headquartered in London 
and Melbourne, and dual listed on the London Stock Exchange and the Australian Securities 
Exchange. The group now has more than 66,000 employees working at five product groups 
including aluminium, copper, diamonds & minerals, energy, and iron ore. Moreover, its iron 
ore group is the world’s second largest iron ore producer after Vale (Rio Tinto, 2013). For the 
                                                          
45
This is equivalent to AUD 138,303 million, assuming the exchange rate between the US dollar and the Australian dollar is 
0.9:1. 
46
This is equivalent to AUD 8,037.5 million, assuming the exchange rate between the US dollar and the Australian dollar is 
0.9:1. 
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financial year ended 31 December 2013, the group reported the total assets of US$ 111,025 
million
47
 and the net profits (before tax) of US$ 3,505 million
48
 (Rio Tinto, 2013). 
 
6.1.3. Other buyers (private small and medium enterprise) from the Chinese market 
In addition to the above major players on both the supply and demand sides in the annual iron 
ore price negotiations, there also exists another group of iron ore buyers from the Chinese 
iron and steel sector, most of whom are privately-owned small and medium size enterprises. 
More specifically, this group contains both private steel manufacturers and private iron ore 
trading companies. There were about 1200 steel plants operating in the Chinese iron and steel 
sector in 2009, and nearly 70 of which were large size companies (Wang J, 2009b). In other 
words, there were about more than 1000 small and medium steel plants in the sector. 
Although these small and medium firms did not participate in the iron ore negotiations in 
person, they did have their own voice heard, albeit in much smaller proportions relative to the 
discourse of the major players, in the media coverage.  
 
Compared to their compatriots in the Chinese iron and steel industry, the vast majority of 
which are SOEs, these firms are not the members of CISA, given the CISA entry criteria as 
mentioned earlier that steel plants must at least reach the annual production level of one 
million tons (CISA, 2011a). Furthermore, the professional and political profile of the senior 
management team of the CISA illustrated earlier also reveals the absence of any 
                                                          
47
This is equivalent to AUD 122,128 million, assuming the exchange rate between the US dollar and the Australian dollar is 
0.9:1. 
48
This is equivalent to AUD 3,855.5 million, assuming the exchange rate between the US dollar and the Australian dollar is 
0.9:1. 
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representatives from the small and medium firms in China’s iron and steel sector, which 
arguably renders these entities unrepresented at the CISA (Huang & Mei, 2010).  
 
Nor have they received much support from the central government as have their state-owned 
counterparts. In fact, contrary to the SOEs, the small and medium companies in the same 
sector have become in recent years the target of the industrial restructuring under the central 
government’s broader macro-economic adjustment schemes. That is, in an attempt to limit 
the country’s staggeringly rapid economic growth, which might otherwise lead to inflation, to 
a sustainable level, the Chinese government has introduced many new regulations and 
national policies to the domestic markets where the iron and steel industry is at the very 
forefront (Sukagawa, 2010). For instance, in order to control the overall industrial output, the 
State Council issued the Iron & Steel Industry Adjustment and Revitalisation Plan
49
 (Plan 
hereafter) in March 2009 that encourages the curtailment of obsolete steel production 
capacity (among small and medium size steel plants) and promotes mergers and acquisitions 
among major SOEs such as Baosteel, Anshan Iron and Steel, and Wuhan Iron and Steel 
(State Council, 2009). Based on the spirit of the Plan, the CISA subsequently introduced the 
Steel Industry Self-discipline Agreement on Standardising the Order of Domestic Steel 
Market
50
 to maintain the market stability by primarily tackling issues in steel pricing and 
marketing.  
 
                                                          
49
The original Chinese name is 钢铁产业调整和振兴规划. The translation is done by the author of the thesis. 
50
The original Chinese name is 钢铁行业规范国内钢材市场秩序自律公约. The translation is done by the author of the 
thesis. 
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With particular reference to the country’s iron ore import, the CISA together with China 
Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals & Chemicals Importers & Exports (CCCMC 
hereafter) issued the Suggestions On the Promotion of the Iron Ore Import Agency System
51
 
(Suggestions hereafter) in 2006 that attempts to impose a threshold on iron ore importing and 
trading companies in accordance with the appropriate national and industrial standards. In 
2009, to further implement the Plan and the Suggestions, the CISA also published the Steel 
Industry Self-discipline Agreement on Standardising the Trade Order of Imported Iron Ore
52
 
which requires small and medium enterprises to stop importing iron ore by themselves but 
adopt the agency system and purchase from the major SOEs instead. 
 
Bear in mind the regulations and principles above, it is reasonable to conclude that, even 
though the group of small and medium steel plants and iron ore trading firms was not closely 
related to the CISA (that is, the main producer of the discourse in question), the interaction 
between the two does exhibit a certain level of reflection to the extent of how the social 
relations of production of the latter have affected and been affected by that of the former. In 
other words, consistent with the Marxist notion of discourse (discussed in chapter five) as a 
social product comprised of productive forces and social relations, it is considered relevant 
and useful to investigate how the discourse of small and medium enterprises is supported and 
/ or suppressed, both directly and otherwise, by their state-owned counterparts. 
 
                                                          
51
The original Chinese name is 关于推进铁矿石进口代理制的意见. The translation is done by the author of the thesis. 
52
The original Chinese name is 钢铁行业规范进口铁矿石贸易秩序行业自律公约. The translation is done by the author of 
the thesis. 
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6.1.4. Other buyers from other countries  
As the traditional annual iron ore pricing mechanism invites major players from both the 
supply and demand sides to join the negotiation, there are meanwhile other iron ore buyers 
than the Chinese group sitting at the same table, namely ArcelorMittal and ThyssenKrupp 
(representing the European market), Nippon Steel (representing the Japanese market), and 
Posco Steel (representing the Korean market) (Chen SS, 2009a). By the same token as group 
three, although these foreign steel companies are not directly related to the focus of the thesis 
as to the role of accounting discourse from the Chinese iron and steel sector in the process of 
the financialised pricing mechanism of iron ore, they do form part of the wide wed of social 
relations that constitutes the discourse in question. 
 
While the above sections provide the introduction to the four groups of the producers of 
discourse, the “practical position… job and the division of labour” (Marx and Engels, 1974, 
p.68) of the first group are discussed in detail as the point of departure for the discourse 
analysis based on the Marxist theoretical framework discussed in chapter five. Before 
analysing the actual discourse put forward by the above four groups, it is necessary to present 
the storyline over the period concerned. The following section therefore is directed to this 
end. 
 
6.2. Timeline of Financialisation---the annual iron ore negotiations for the financial 
years 2009 and 2010 
As stated in chapter five, the period over which the data is collected in this thesis contains the 
annual iron ore price negotiation in two consecutive years that ranges from 2008 October to 
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2010 May. This is because: first of all the concept of using the index pricing model was 
originally raised in 2008 and partially adopted in the end of the 2009 annual negotiation by 
BHP Billiton, and; secondly the index pricing was then discussed and became generally 
accepted in the global iron ore market in the end of the 2010 annual negotiation. The timeline 
for each year’s annual negotiation (from 2009 and 2010), therefore, is presented in Table 6.7 
and Table 6.8 respectively. 
Table 6.7 Timeline of the 2009 annual iron ore price negotiation 
Date Group(s) concerned Event 
2008 Nov All groups The negotiation began 
2008 Dec CISA proposed a 82% price drop 
2009 Jan CISA & Nippon Steel proposed a 40% price drop 
2009 Feb CISA issued the two Agreement that forbade China’s domestic firms 
re-selling any iron ore initially purchased from long term 
contracts 
Vale gave up the priority of setting the initial annual price for 2009 
2009 Apr Rio Tinto offered a temporary 20% price drop for Asian buyers 
Vale offered a temporary 20% price drop 
Big Three withdrew from the negotiation, which was unfinished on the 
part of Chinese firms 
2009 May Rio Tinto refuse the proposed 40% price drop 
Rio Tinto & Nippon Steel agreed on the new annual price that was 33% lower than the 
2008 annual price (on May 26) 
Posco Steel followed the initial price reached by Nippon Steel and Rio 
Tinto (on May 28) 
CISA did not follow the new price and claimed that the Chinese 
buyers would not compromise 
2009 Jun China Aluminium & Rio Tinto failed in the attempted US$ 19.2 billion investment in Rio 
Tinto 
BHP Billiton & JFE Steel followed the initial price reached by Rio Tinto and Nippon 
Steel (on June 11) 
Vale & Nippon Steel & Posco Steel agreed on a new annual price that was 28.2% lower than the 
2008 annual price (on June 10) 
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ArcelorMittal accepted the above price, i.e. 28.2% price drop (on June 19) 
CISA & Big Three did not reach any agreements in the negotiation by the 
traditional due date (i.e. June 30) 
CISA  proposed to establish a new negotiation method and a new 
pricing mechanism exclusive to the Chinese market 
2009 Jul CISA claimed that it would accept a price drop between 33% to 40% 
 Big Three offered a new temporary price that contains 33% reduction 
(i.e. same as the newly agreed annual price by Rio Tinto and 
Nippon Steel) 
 Rio Tinto & Chinese government Rio Tinto’s chief representative in the negotiation with three 
other employees at the firm’s Shanghai Office were arrested 
by Chinese National Security Bureau under the charges of 
commercial bribery and stealing China’s national secrecy 
 CISA acquiesced that large steel firms accepted the temporary 33% 
discount off  price (i.e. the newly agreed annual price) from 
the Big Three 
 Vale & ThyssenKrupp agreed on the 33% off discount price 
 Vale announced that half of its iron ore export to China were using 
the newly agreed annual price; 
show its interest in adopting the index pricing mechanism 
 BHP Billiton on July 29 announced that 23% of its iron ore would be sold at 
the newly agreed annual price; the other 30% would be priced 
based on quarterly average, spot and indexed pricing models; 
price of the remaining 47% of its iron ore was still under 
negotiation 
2009 Aug CISA turn to negotiate with small and medium size iron ore 
suppliers from Australia, India, Africa, Vietnam and UAE 
 CISA proposed to establish a unified iron ore price that applies to all 
types of iron ore in the Chinese market 
 CISA & FMG CISA on August 17 announced the result of its negotiation 
with FMG that the latter would sell iron ore to Chinese buyers 
at the price that was 35.02% lower than the 2008 annual price, 
from July to December 2009 
 Rio Tinto did not recognise the price by CISA and FMG, and claimed 
that this price had nothing to do with Rio Tinto’s iron ore 
price 
 CISA claimed that its negotiation with the Big Three was still in 
process 
 Vale & BHP Billiton did not adjust their price according to the agreement reached 
by CISA and FMG 
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 Vale  denied any negotiation with the CISA for the 2009 annual 
price and continued to use the temporary price 
2009 Sept Rio Tinto denied any negotiation with the CISA for the 2009 annual 
price and continued to use the temporary price 
 Baosteel said that the negotiation is still undergoing and not yet 
finished 
 BHP Billiton said it was still in the negotiation with some Chinese steel 
plants and would begin the negotiation for the 2010 price 
negotiation in October; proposed to shift the annual pricing 
mechanism to index pricing 
 Shandong Steel Group said that CISA was preparing for the 2010 price negotiation 
 CISA claimed that it was still in the negotiation with BHP Billiton 
and Vale for the 2009 price 
2009 Oct CISA claimed that the negotiation with the Big Three was still in 
process, and would discuss both the 2009 and the 2010 annual 
price at the same time  
Table 6.8 Timeline of the 2010 annual iron ore price negotiation 
Date Group(s) concerned Event 
2009 Sept CISA claimed to strictly implement the “Chinese price” exclusive to 
the Chinese market 
 BHP Billiton said the 2010 price negotiation will begin in October 
 Rio Tinto suggested mixed pricing based on spot market contracts 
2009 Oct CISA continued to propose the “Chinese price” model; 
claimed that the new annual price should start at Jan 1 to Dec 
31, which accords with the Chinese financial year; 
supports the long term pricing mechanism 
 Big Three made no comment on the “Chinese price”; 
proposed a 30%-35% price increase 
 CISA  regarded the proposed price rise as “unreasonable” and would 
not accept it; 
invited FMG to join the 2010 price negotiation 
 FMG & CISA were still negotiating the iron ore price for the 4
th
 quarter in 
2009 
2009 Nov Rio Tinto pointed out the possibility of adopting a new pricing 
mechanism for the Chinese iron ore import market; 
warned that the ‘Chinese price’ proposed by CISA may place 
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the negotiation in a difficult situation 
 Nanjing Iron and Steel expected the 2010 annual price to be increased by 5%-10% 
 Vale was not prepared for the 2010 negotiation and decided to 
follow the outcome reached by Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton 
2009 Dec FMG declared that, as China did not fulfil the financing agreement 
by September, the previously reached contract price was no 
longer effective; the Japanese price was then adopted 
 CISA found little room for the Big Three to increase the iron ore 
price 
 FMG  reversed its previous statement regarding changing its own 
2009 price to the Japanese price 
 Vale  claimed that the 2010 annual price would increase by 10%-- 
20% 
 Macquarie Bank predicted the 2010 iron ore price to be increased by 30% 
 Morgan Stanley predicted the iron ore price to be increased by 20% in 2010 
and 30% in 2011 
2010 Jan Big Three turned to the Japanese steel plants in the negotiation which 
took place in Singapore 
 Deutsche Bank predicted the 2010 iron ore price to be increased by 35%  
 Merril Lynch predicted the 2010 iron ore price to be increased by 50% 
 Goldman Sachs predicted the 2010 iron ore price to be increased by 35% 
 Union Bank of Switzerland predicted the 2010 iron ore price to be increased by 40%-50% 
 Vale was not in a hurry to join the negotiation 
 Baosteel & Wuhan Iron and Steel went to Singapore to join the negotiation 
2010 Feb Shagang Group expected the 2010 iron ore price to be significantly increased 
 Shougang Group supported the long term pricing mechanism 
 CISA reiterated its goal to establish a unified price exclusive to the 
Chinese iron ore import market; 
agreed that the iron ore price would increase 
 BHP Billiton suggested that the iron ore price would increase; 
reiterated that a more flexible pricing mechanism should be 
adopted to reflect future market changes 
 Rio Tinto argued that the current long term pricing mechanism needs to 
be changed 
 BHP Billiton & Japanese steel plants adopted the quarterly pricing model for coking coals 
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2010 Mar BHP Billiton unilaterally issued the temporary iron ore price containing a 
40% price increase; 
further promoted the index pricing 
 Morgan Stanley predicted the 2010 iron ore price to be increased by 60% 
 
 CISA & Baosteel & Hebei Steel 
Group & Ministry of Industry and 
Information  
claimed that China could not accept index pricing; 
Insisted on the long term pricing model based on the “Chinese 
financial year” 
 CISA claimed that China would not accept and could not afford the 
proposed 90% plus price increase 
 Major Chinese state-owned steel 
plants 
collectively wrote and sent a petition letter to the Chinese 
Premier asking for government intervention in iron ore import 
market 
 Australian Trade Minister claimed that the Australian government would not intervene 
the iron ore price negotiation 
 Chinese Ministry of Commerce & 
Ministry of Industry and Information 
officially advocated the long term pricing mechanism 
 Vale informed major Chinese steel plants to raise iron ore price by 
90%-100%; 
would adopt more flexible pricing and marketing policies (on 
March 17) 
 Rio Tinto will adopt short term market based pricing mechanism 
 Big Three & Japanese steel plants reached the agreement to adopt the short term pricing 
mechanism based on spot market (on March 22); 
the proposed price contained a 90%-100% increase 
 Vale & Nippon Steel reached the initial price agreement for the 2
nd
 quarter of 2010 
(on March 30); 
the price contained a 90% increase 
 BHP Billiton claimed to have persuaded many of its Asian clients to adopt 
the short term pricing mechanism based on CIF price (on 
March 30) 
2010 April Chinese Ministry of Industry and 
Information & Ministry of 
Commerce & Baosteel 
strongly opposed the short term pricing mechanism of iron ore 
 Vale announced that it reached the quarterly price agreement with 
97% of its clients (on April 1) 
 Posco Steel & Vale accepted the quarterly price agreement with Vale for the 2
nd
 
quarter in 2010, showing a price increase of 83%-86% (on 




 BHP Billiton  reached the price agreement with its Asian clients for the 2
nd
 
quarter in 2010, containing a price increase of 99.7% (on 
April 7) 
 Rio Tinto announced on its website that it was in the negotiation 
regarding the quarterly pricing mechanism (on April 9) 
 CISA  asked all domestic steel plants and trading firms to stop 
importing iron ore from the Big Three for the next two months 
 Chinese Ministry of Commerce was planning an anti-monopoly investigation on the quarterly 
pricing model proposed by the Big Three 
 Chinese Ministry of Industry and 
Information 
was considering a new regulatory mechanism for China’s iron 
ore import market 
 FMG announced to adopt the “market based pricing mechanism” 
(on April 22) 
 CISA acquiesced that domestic steel plants could, under the 
guidance of CISA, use the temporary price earlier reached by 
Japan and Korea to import iron ore from the Big Three; 
i.e. the CISA indirectly accepted the quarterly pricing 
mechanism  
2010 May Baosteel accepted the temporary price to import iron ore; 
still advocated the long term pricing mechanism 
 Vale announced that it reached the quarterly price agreement with 
100% of the firm’s clients 
 
From the tables above, a story can be perceived of how the iron ore pricing mechanism has 
been shifted from the traditional annual benchmark pricing to the indexed quarterly pricing, 
particularly from the perspective of the Chinese iron and steel industry. In the aftermath of 
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the 2009 annual iron ore price negotiation kicked off in 
November 2008.  On the sellers’ side, it was always the Big Three that represented the global 
iron ore suppliers. On the buyers’ side, however, the CISA for the first time came to the 
forefront on behalf of the Chinese iron ore buyers to take part in the negotiation. At the time, 
due to the wide repercussion of the GFC, the global steel market was seriously affected which 
lowered down the global demand of iron ore. Thus, while the Big Three unanimously reduced 
Chapter 6 Different Interpretations of Iron Ore Price—Identifying Modes of Production 
160 
 
their iron ore production (Wang YJ, 2008), the Chinese buyers were in general optimistic 
about and confident in the forthcoming iron ore price. For instance, in December 2008, the 
CISA called for a new annual price that contained an 82% reduction compared to the 2008 
annual price, on the ground that China’s domestic steel price went below its 1994 level, and 
so should the iron ore price (Xiao, 2008). In February 2009, while offering no comments on 
the CISA’s proposed price, the CEO of Vale, Jose Carlos Martins announced that Vale 
withdrew from the current iron ore price negotiation and would wait for the result reached by 
BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto.  
 
As there was not any price agreement reached from the negotiation on April 1, the traditional 
starting date to which the new annual price would apply, Rio Tinto offered a temporary 20% 
off discount based on the 2008 annual price to its Asian clients (Xing, 2009). Subsequently, 
Vale also began to offer the same discount price (Deng, 2009a). The temporary discount price 
offered by the Big Three was not however appreciated by the CISA, as the latter considered it 
as the former’s unilaterally determined annual price in a disguised form, and insisted on at 
least a 40%-50% price drop (Xu, 2009a). Rio Tinto responded to the CISA’s request in the 
following month and claimed that the proposed 40% price drop was not acceptable (Wang J, 
2009a). 
 
On May 26, Nippon Steel, the representative of the Japanese steel sector in the negotiation, 
reached the price agreement with Rio Tinto that the 2009 iron ore annual price would be 
decreased by 32.95%
53
 compared to its equivalent last year (Chen SS, 2009a). Subsequently, 
                                                          
53
More specifically, the price of fine ore was reduced by 32.95% and the price of lump ore reduced by 44.46%, in 
comparison to their equivalents in 2008. However, as the major type of iron ore that was at the centre of the price negotiation 
was fine ore (Yu X, 2009), the iron ore price discussed in both the data collected and in general the thesis refers to that of 
fine ore. 
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on Posco Steel, the Korean representative in the negotiation, adopted this initial price, as it 
was the tradition that once an initial price has been reached by any two parties from the buyer 
and the sellers’ group respectively, and then all other firms on the supply and demand chain 
will simply follow this price afterwards (Sukagawa, 2010). Similarly, the Taiwanese steel 
enterprises including China Steel and Dragon Steel also followed the initial price in the 
subsequent week. On June 11, BHP Billiton and JFE Steel (the second largest Japanese steel 
corporation) also followed the initial price reached. 
 
Once the initial price was settled by the two Australian mining giants, Vale, as promised in its 
earlier statement, also reached the agreement on June 10 with Nippon Steel and Posco Steel 
for the 2009 annual price that contained a 28.2%
54
 decrease compared to the 2008 price. 
Subsequently, ArcelorMittal, the largest steel maker in Europe, followed this price on June 
19. ThyssenKrupp, the largest German steel maker, also accepted the price on July 21. 
 
While other major mining companies and steel firms around the world accepted the initial 
price set by either the Australian or the Brazilian suppliers, CISA on the other hand chose not 
to adopt any of these initial prices in that the newly agreed price failed to objectively and 
faithfully reflect the changes in the international iron ore market for the past year (Jiao, 
2009a). Instead, the Chinese association still insisted on its previously proposed 40% to 44% 
price drop. Even after June 30, the traditional due date for iron ore negotiation, CISA’s stance 
remained unchanged and further claimed that the association would rather establish a new 
negotiation method and correspondingly a new pricing mechanism exclusive to the Chinese 
                                                          
54
 For the same reason stated in the previous footnote, only the price change of fine ore is mentioned here. The price of lump 
ore was reduced by 44.47% as per Vale’s agreement in the above case. 
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buyers (Zhang C, 2009a). At this time the Big Three, on the other hand, did not respond to 
any of the CISA’s claims but offered further a temporary 33% off discount to their Chinese 
clients. That is, the Big Three began to adopt the initial price (which contained a 33% 
decrease compared to the 2008 price) reached by the Japanese and Korean firms for their iron 
ore export to China in the form of ‘temporary price’. Some Chinese steel plants then had no 
option but to accept the price on the condition that iron ore suppliers would refund for the 
overpayment or charge for any shortage once the Chinese side has agreed an official price 
with the Big Three. Subsequently, the CISA, after a one and half-month resistance to the 
initial price, acquiesced that the Chinese buyers could use the 33% discount as the temporary 
price to purchase iron ore from the Big Three till the end of the negotiation (Chen SS, 
2009b). 
 
Two events also noteworthy from June to July 2009 both came from Rio Tinto. Firstly in 
June, Rio Tinto unilaterally terminated its financing agreement with China Aluminium who 
promised to offer a US$ 19.5 billion equity investment to help the former overcome the 
financial difficulties caused by the GFC. Eventually, instead of taking the Chinese 
investment, Rio Tinto turned to its market competitor BHP Billiton. The event was said to 
pose another serious challenge to the iron ore negotiation as the two mining giants (i.e. Rio 
Tinto and BHP Billiton) were forming an even greater alliance. Secondly, in the following 
month (i.e. July), four employees at Rio Tinto’s Shanghai office including its chief Chinese 
representative Stern Hu (who was also the firm’s representative in the negotiation) were 
arrested in Shanghai by the Chinese State Security Bureau. They were charged with bribing 
the internal staff of China’s steel manufacturing companies, stealing China’s national 
secrecy, and thereby resulting in serious and substantial damages to China’s economic safety 
and national interests (Sun, 2009a). While being treated as an individual case independent of 
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the iron ore negotiation in particular and the Sino-Australia diplomatic and economic 
relationship in general (Miao et al., 2009; Sun, 2009a; Zhang HY, 2009a; Zhang Yi, 2009a), 
the industrial espionage case including the arrest of Rio Tinto’s representative for the 
negotiation did lead both parties on the seller and buyers’ sides to a stalemate (Jin, 2009). 
Consequently, the negotiation on the part of the CISA did not reach any result by the end of 
July.  
 
While the CISA claimed that the negotiation was still in process, and kept reiterating the idea 
of establishing a unified iron ore price exclusive to the Chinese market, its counterparts on 
the other side of the negotiation table seemed satisfied with the initial price reached by the 
Japanese and Korean firms. For instance, Vale on July 29 announced that 50% of its iron ore 
sold to China were already priced at the new annual price earlier agreed by other major steel 
firms around the world. Rio Tinto also expressed its support for the initial price. Moreover, 
not only was the ‘Chinese price’ unheeded, but the indexed pricing mechanism was officially 
brought forward for the first time. That is, BHP Billiton at the same time told the press that 
while the price of 47% of the firm’s iron ore were still under negotiation, the 23% of the iron 
ore would be using the newly agreed annual price, and the remaining 30% would be priced 
based on a mixed pricing mechanism including the quarterly average, the spot market, and 
the indexed prices (Han, 2009a). In this regard, the CISA opposed the spot index pricing 
which would attract market speculations (Wang ZK, 2009). 
 
In the beginning of August, while not being able to reach any agreement with the Big Three, 
the CISA turned its focus to the medium and small size mining companies from India, South 
Africa, and Vietnam in the hope that these relatively small size suppliers could serve as the 
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complement to the three global mining giants (Deng, 2009b). Subsequently, on August 17, 
the CISA for the first time in history reached the price agreement with a non-Big-Three 
supplier, namely FMG. According to the arrangement, the newly agreed price contained a 
35.02%
55
 price cut compared to its 2008 equivalent. Furthermore, as the traditional starting 
date for the new yearly price (April 1) already past, the period for which this new price would 
remain effective began from July to December 2009 (CISA, 2009a). Despite being 
acknowledged by the Chinese government and the CISA as a huge breakthrough for China’s 
iron and steel sector, this price was not accepted by the Big Three (Zhang Yi, 2009b; Yue et 
al., 2009). In addition, given that the promised amount of iron ore supplied by FMG was only 
20 million tons which accounted for even less than 4% of China’s estimated annual iron ore 
import for 2009 (i.e. 500 million tons), the FMG price was applied more in a symbolic sense 
than in the actual practice, and thus limited to a few large size state-owned steel plants (Yue 
et al., 2009; Zhang Yi, 2009c). For this reason, in October 2009 when six months had passed 
since the traditional beginning date for the new price (i.e. April 1), the CISA claimed that its 
negotiation with the Big Three was still undergoing, and would discuss the 2009 and the 2010 
annual price at the same time. 
 
While the idea of establishing a unified price exclusive to the Chinese iron ore market was 
raised in the beginning of the 2009 iron ore negotiation and reiterated in the end, it was given 
greater emphasis and formal recognition in the beginning of the 2010 negotiation (i.e. 
October 2009) by both the CISA and the Chinese government (Gold Bull Information, 24 
September 2009; Xu, 2009b). In particular, the so called ‘Chinese price’ did not differ in 
nature from the traditional long term pricing mechanism which the international iron ore 
market had been using since the 1970s. In other words, unlike the indexed pricing promoted 
                                                          
55 To be more precise, the price of fine ore was reduced by 35.02%, and the price of lump ore reduced by 50.42%. 
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by BHP Billiton involving the overthrow of the long run pricing practice, the ‘Chinese price’ 
refers to the annual price that only applies to China’s iron ore market, replacing both the 
traditional long run price and the spot market price. In addition, according to the CISA, 
attached to this unified price was another claim that, as it is exclusive to the Chinese market, 
the price shall follow the Chinese accounting report period beginning from 1 January to 31 
December (Gold Bull Information, 29 September 2009). 
 
At this time, the Big Three held the similar view as per last year. On the one hand, both Rio 
Tinto and BHP Billiton did not show much interest in the ‘Chinese price’ but continued to 
promote the indexed pricing model. With the particular reference to the ‘Chines price’, Rio 
Tinto considered it as an “unfair benchmark price” which would place the negotiation in a 
very difficult position (Han, 2009b). Vale, on the other hand, adopted the same strategy as it 
did in last year’s negotiation. That is, it announced in the beginning of the negotiation that, 
before making any specific decisions, the firm would wait for the outcome reached by Rio 
Tinto and BHP Billiton (Gold Bull Information, 29 September 2009).  
 
In mid-October, while the Financial Times reported that the Big Three proposed to increase 
the 2010 annual price by 30%-35%, the CISA replied that, under the market condition where 
supply was over demand, there was no room for price increase (Du, 2009). At the same time 
when the CISA kept emphasising that iron ore market supply would be over the demand in 
the foreseeable future (Zhang C, 2009b; Cao, 2009b; Yu L, 2009a), the Big Three on the 
contrary held the completely opposite view that the present iron ore supply was not enough 
(Yang Y, 2009b). Thus, they unanimously expressed their optimism about the rising iron ore 
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demand and increased their iron ore production level accordingly (Zhou & Zhang, 2009; 
Yang Y, 2009a; Yu L, 2009b). 
 
On December 14, Vale told the press that the new annual iron ore price was expected to 
increase by 10%-20% (Yang LM, 2009). Subsequently, some financial institutions including 
Macquarie Bank and Morgan Stanley predicted that the new iron ore price be increased by 
20%-30% (Chen SS, 2009c). In the subsequent month (i.e. January 2010), their prediction 
even went up to 35%-50% (DFdaily, 14 January 2010; Sina Finance, 14 January 2010; Jiao, 
2010a). Baosteel, China’s largest steelmaker, commented however that there would be 
limited room for the iron ore price to increase (Li R, 2009). Shagang Group, the 5th largest 
steel maker and the largest private owned steel plant in China, held the different view that the 
iron ore price would be increased by more than 10% (Yuan, 2009a). 
 
It was not until February 2010 that the CISA finally admitted that the iron ore price this year 
might increase (Han, 2010a). However, the association still reiterated its goal in the 
negotiation to establish a unified price, based on the traditional long term pricing mechanism, 
exclusive to the Chinese market (Sina Finance, 9 February 2010). The Big Three on the other 
hand kept promoting the indexed pricing mechanism. For instance, the half year report of 
BHP Billiton published in the same month showed that 46% of the firm’s iron ore sales for 
the first half of the 2009-2010 financial year were sold based on the short term pricing model 
that contained spot market price, indexed price, and quarterly average price (DFdaily, 11 
February 2010). Rio Tinto also argued that the old annual pricing mechanism needed to be 
changed for its own survival (Chen SS, 2010a). In addition, the Big Three were so confident 
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in the rising iron ore demand from China that even with the full production capacity they 
could not meet the demand of the Chinese market (Chen SS, 2010a). 
 
In March, the idea of the ‘Chinese price’ continued to appear on the agenda of the CISA and 
other major steel plants in China. Particularly when BHP Billiton unilaterally raised the 
temporary price of its long run iron ore contract with Chinese clients by 40% (Huang, 2010), 
Hebei Steel Group, the parent entity of two top 20 steel makers
56
 in China, suggested that the 
Ministry of Industry and Information take the initiative and establish a ‘national mineral 
resources joint stock company’ unifying all of China’s iron ore import and domestic 
transactions (Yu L, 2010a). Furthermore, while BHP Billiton pointed out that the indexed 
pricing mechanism would be able to better reflect the constantly-changing market conditions 
and follow economic principles, both Hebei Steel Group and the CISA replied that China still 
insisted on the long term benchmark system, as the corresponding price, once the indexed 
mechanism could be applied, would be ‘unreasonable’, ‘unfair’, and ‘immoral’ (Guan, 2010).  
 
Faced with the impending application of the indexed pricing mechanism, senior executives of 
China’s major steel plants, while attending the two annual political sessions
57
 in Beijing, 
collectively sent a petition letter to the Chinese premier seeking government intervention in 
the iron ore import market at the national level (Yu L, 2010b). In response to this, the 
Australian Trade Minister Simon Crean commented that the Australian government would 
not intervene the negotiation, and that nor should the Chinese government. He further pointed 
                                                          
56
These include Handan Iron & Steel Group and Tangshan Iron & Steel Group. 
57
 The two sessions are National People’s Congress (NPC) and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
(CPPCC), which are held annually year (usually in every March) in Beijing. According to the Chinese Constitution (The 
Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 2004), the purpose of the two sessions is to enable the 
general public to collect, organise, and communicate public opinions and information to the central government of the CPC. 
Chapter 6 Different Interpretations of Iron Ore Price—Identifying Modes of Production 
168 
 
out that while Australia recognised China’s market economy, China should then adhere to, 
rather than interfere in, the principles and laws of the market (Ma, 2010a). Subsequently, both 
the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Industry and Information declared to 
provide necessary support to the CISA while keeping the negotiation within the boundaries of 
corporations (Xue, 2010a, 2010b). Thus, when the Big Three claimed to shift the pricing 
mechanism and reached the short term (i.e. quarterly) price agreement containing a 90% price 
hike with the Korean and Japanese steel plants in the end of March (Lin, 2010; Sina Finance, 
30 March 2010), CISA chose not to accept (China Business Network, 30 March 2010b).  
 
In the beginning of April, in an attempt to resist the quarterly indexed price, CISA suggested 
that all domestic steel plants and trading firms stop importing iron ore from the Big Three for 
the next two months (Yuan, 2010a). The boycott, albeit being called for in the name of 
securing China’s national economic development and the Chinese iron and steel sector in 
particular, was not very well executed. In addition to the major steel makers such as Wuhan 
Iron and Steel (4th largest steel plant) which promised to follow CISA’s call, other 
participants in the domestic market including other steel plants and trading companies treated 
it as the Dutch courage that was against market (Zhu, 2010a; Yu L, 2010d). The attempted 
boycott of the Big Three was not simply limited to China’s domestic market but echoed at the 
political level. The Ministry of Commerce claimed that its Anti-Monopoly Bureau was 
planning on an anti-monopoly investigation of the quarterly pricing mechanism promoted by 
the Big Three (Xue, 2010c). The Ministry of Industry and Information announced that it was 
considering a new regulatory mechanism for China’s iron ore import market (Deng Y, 
2010c). 
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Despite the attempted boycott from the Chinese market, the new quarterly price was set 
subsequently for the second quarter of 2010. Vale and Posco Steel reached the 83%-86% 
price increase agreement on April 2 and BHP Billiton announced on April 7 that it reached 
the agreement with its Asian clients containing a 99.7% price hike (Sina Finance, 2 April 
2010; The Beijing News, 8 April 2010). On April 22, even FMG, the only mining company 
that successfully reached the agreement with the CISA in 2009, also announced that it would 
follow the industrial shift to adopt the ‘market based pricing mechanism’ (Zhu & Ruan, 
2010). At the political level, the Australian Trade Minister responded to the boycott that that 
government should not intervene with the market but let the market decide the price 
(DFdaily, 6 April 2010). 
 
After the one-month long failed boycott of the Big Three, the CISA finally accepted the 
quarterly price reached by Japan and Korea in the same month and acquiesced that domestic 
steel plants were permitted to use the price temporarily to purchase and import iron ore till 
the Chinese negotiation team and the Big Three reached an agreement (Yu L, 2010e). At the 
same time the association also reiterated the social, economic, and political significance of 
the iron ore price to China’s national interest and the country’s economy. Subsequently, 
Baosteel, China’s largest steel enterprise, admitted at the firm’s quarterly results 
announcement conference in May that it already began to use the quarterly index price earlier 
proposed by the Big Three, as the new pricing mechanism became an ‘irresistible trend’ 
(Zhu, 2010b). 
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6.3. Competing connotations of the fair iron ore price 
Although the end of the story shows that Chinese iron ore buyers had to adopt the short term 
index pricing eventually, it is not to say that the CISA accepted the new mechanism without 
any confrontation. In fact, since the focus of this study is on the particular process of the iron 
ore pricing mechanism shift, in order to explore the reason why the CISA, as the industry 
representative of the world’s largest iron ore importing country, failed in its attempt at 
resisting the financialised price, a closer examination of the arguments made by both parties 
at the negotiation table regarding the change of iron ore pricing is needed. 
 
While the short-term based index pricing was not applied to the global market until the first 
quarter of 2010, the concept was formally proposed and discussed during the 2009 
negotiation. In May 2009 when the Big Three and the CISA already past the traditional finish 
date of the negotiation (i.e. April 1) and reached a stalemate, BHP Billiton continued to 
promote the index pricing. In particular, the mining company argued that the new method 
would be able to reflect changes in market conditions in time. Also, as index pricing has long 
been applied in the oil and coal sectors, BHP Billiton argued that replacing the conventional 
long term pricing with the short-term based pricing that enables the market supply and 
demand to decide will also be in line with economic principles (Liu, 2009). For the same 
reason that market changes shall be reflected, the CISA on the other hand rejected the 2009 
‘initial price’ reached by Nippon Steel and Rio Tinto as the price failed to objectively and 
genuinely reflect the iron ore market supply and demand (Jiao, 2009a). Ironically, while the 
CISA seemed be to in agreement with BHP Billiton that the 2009 annual price could not 
represent the market, the former also opposed the index price promoted by the latter for the 
very same reason. As China is the largest iron ore importing country in the global seaborn 
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iron ore market, Mr. Li Xiaowei, the vice chairman of the CISA, argued that the leading 
market status of the Chinese buyers should be reflected by, neither the newly agreed annual 
price from Japan nor the index price promoted by BHP Billiton, but the ‘Chinese price’ 
exclusive to the Chinese market (Han, 2009a).  
 
By the end of the 2009 negotiation, BHP Billiton was not convinced of the counterargument 
put forward by the CISA, and adopted the index pricing for 30% of its global clients instead 
(Yue & Zhou, 2009). Marius Kloppers, the firm’s CEO, advocated that the new method 
would better reflect market movements (Lin, 2009). Yet again based on the same argument, 
CISA concluded the price negotiation with FMG, and commented that the final price agreed 
by both parties “objectively reflects the current supply and demand condition of the iron ore 
market” (Bao, 2009).  
  
The different connotations of ‘the reflection of market’ continued in the 2010 price 
negotiation, with Rio Tinto and Vale expressing their interest in index pricing (Wang, J 
2010a; Sina Finance, 24 March 2010a; Zhang Yi, 2010b). For instance, while attending a 
mining industry conference in Singapore, Sam Walsh, the executive director of Rio Tinto, 
commented that Rio Tinto would support any pricing mechanism that was capable of 
reflecting the basic market conditions, and at the moment the company began to turn its 
attention to spot market pricing as well as index pricing, and preferred the latter (Sina 
Finance, 24 March 2010a). In June 2010, already having adopted the short term based pricing 
mechanism, Roger Agnelli, Vale’s global CEO, told the press that the new price formula (i.e. 
short term based pricing) was determined by the market, not the company (21st Century 
Business Herald, 1 June 2010). 
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However, in the meantime the Chinese negotiation team defended its opposition against 
index pricing on the same ground that market conditions shall be reflected, Jia Yinsong, the 
former inspector at the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information, advocated the long 
term negotiation pricing at the 2010 China Iron Ore Conference for the reason that index 
pricing failed to represent market supply and demand relationships (Li Y, 2010a). More 
specifically, the Chinese side maintained that as the calculation mechanism of the new iron 
ore pricing was not transparent in the first place, it would not of course be able to reflect the 
market afterwards (Li RX, 2010a). 
 
In fact, similar to the argument for market representation, transparency was another concept 
that caused competing connotations by both sides. On the one hand, BHP Billiton claimed 
that, compared to the traditional long run pricing, index pricing exhibited a higher level of 
transparency as it would be able to replace the secret closed door negotiation between the 
buyers and sellers every year, and avoid industrial espionage events such as the Rio Tinto 
case from happening (Deng, 2009c; China Business Network, 30 March 2010a). Similarly, 
after Vale adopted the short term based index price, Roger Agnelli, the firm’s CEO, 
applauded the transparency brought by the new pricing mechanism “which enables everyone 
to perceive the future price and (thus) helps steel plants control costs and management 
inventory” (Wan, 2010a). Pedro Gutemberg, Vale’s head of the magnetite and ferroalloy 
division, also pointed out that the new pricing mechanism would be more transparent as it 
was based on publicly available information (Chen SS, 2010b). 
 
While the Big Three promoted the transparency of index pricing, the Chinese side on the 
other hand pointed out the potential information asymmetry as a result of the new price. That 
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is, although the pricing information from iron ore buyers would be in general transparent, the 
counterpart offered by the sellers would always be a mixture of truth and falsehood that 
would lead the buyers to an unfair position and the sellers an advantageous one (Lang & 
Zhang, 2010). Furthermore, even suppose that buyers and sellers both provide necessary 
market information, the calculation of iron ore index was still not transparent as it was not 
based on the actual transactions of iron ore in a physical market (Li RX, 2010a). 
 
Coupled with the notions of market reflection and of transparency was the fair price of iron 
ore. During the 2009 negotiation when the Big Three agreed on the ‘initial price’ with the 
major Japanese, Korean, and European steel plants, and CISA reached the so called ‘Chinese 
price’ with FMG, both groups claimed their price as the fair price. For instance, while Tom 
Albanese, the CEO of Rio Tinto, announced that “we believe that the negotiated result 
already agreed (By Rio Tinto and other steel firms) is a fair price that reflects market 
conditions” (Yue & Zhou, 2009), Li Yizhong, the minister of the Chinese Ministry of 
Industry and Information, supported the Chinese price as it was reached based on the 
principle of fairness (Zhou RX, 2009a). Yaojian, the spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce, also acknowledged and welcomed then the newly agreed Chinese price that it 
would be able to help establish the fair trade order in the international iron ore market (Gong 
& He, 2009). With the controversy over the fair price unresolved by the end of the 2009 
negotiation, so was the discrepancy between the ‘initial price’ by the Big Three and the 
Chinese price. 
 
Moving into the 2010 negotiation, the debate concerning the fairness of iron ore price 
continued and intensified. In the beginning of the negotiation, Sam Walsh, the chief executive 
Chapter 6 Different Interpretations of Iron Ore Price—Identifying Modes of Production 
174 
 
of Rio Tinto’s Iron Ore group, warned in the firm’s shareholder newsletter that any attempt 
by the Chinese steel plants to establish unfair benchmark prices would lead the negotiation to 
a predicament (Han, 2009b). To defend the Chinese price, Wu Xichun, the honorary 
chairman of the CISA, pointed out at the CISA industry conference that it was unfair to 
China that as the largest iron ore importing country in the world China could not take 
advantage of the stable long run price but to accept the fluctuated spot market price (Yu L, 
2010f). Instead, what would be fair then was that China could have its own long run iron ore 
price exclusive to the Chinese market (Yu L, 2010f). Consequently, when the Big Three 
claimed to shift the pricing mechanism and reached the short term (i.e. quarterly) price 
agreement containing a 90% price hike with the Korean and Japanese steel plants in the end 
of March (Lin, 2010; Sina Finance, 30 March 2010), the CISA chose not to accept (China 
Business Network, 30 March 2010b). 
 
The proposed price increase by the Big Three, once the short-term pricing mechanism could 
be applied, at this point amounted to 90%-100% (Yu L, 2010c; Yang LM, 2010a). This had 
gone far beyond CISA’s bottom line at 50%, which was already considered by the CISA as 
‘not fair’ (Guan, 2010). Rather, from the Chinese side, what would be “fair” was a price that 
enabled both the Chinese steel plants and the mining companies to keep a reasonable level of 
profitability (China News Service, 22 July 2009). On the one hand, the ‘unfairness’ of the 
short term pricing model was already argued by the Chinese association that accepting the 
indexed price means that while promising suppliers the long term procurement amount of 
iron ore, steel plants would also lose the bargaining power towards the Big Three (Caijing, 27 
April 2009). On the other hand, however, what was unfair from Rio Tinto’s perspective was 
the conventional long term mechanism which no longer fairly represented the price of iron 
ore (Zhou XY, 2010). 
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It has thus far been depicted the controversy regarding the price of iron ore based on concepts 
including the reflection of market, transparency, and fair price. While using the same set of 
accounting discourse, CISA and the mining companies (i.e. Big Three) nonetheless put 
forward the nearly opposite arguments. In CISA’s point of view, a fair iron ore price should 
be a unique long term price exclusive to the Chinese market reflective of the leading status of 
Chinese buyers in the iron ore supply and demand relationship where market information 
would be transparent from both the buyers’ and the sellers’ sides and where both the buyers 
and sellers could maintain a reasonable level of profitability. From the perspective of the Big 
Three, however, a fair price refers to an index-based short term price based on transparent 
market information that fairly and constantly reflects changes in market supply and demand. 
With the completion connotations above, the question is rendered as to why the same 
concepts and reasons have led both parties to arrive at differing conclusions. Since 
accounting needs to be understood in the specific socio-political circumstances, and the 
meaning of accounting discourse is a contested terrain that shifts over time and different 
parties (Tinker, et al., 1991), it is necessary for the study to explore the discourse of iron ore 
pricing at a deeper level.  
 
Already presented has been that both CISA and the Big Three were able to use similar 
notions to defend their own ‘fair price’ of iron ore, a good point of departure is then to 
investigate how the components of the ‘fair price’ were interpreted by both parties. The most 
conspicuous elements with which both parties were concerned are (1) market and (2) the 
supply and demand relationship. Holding differing opinions on these two may be attributed to 
(3) the different views of iron ore as the commodity traded within the market, (4) the 
corporate ownership of market participants, and / or (5) the influence of government. Bear in 
mind these factors, the analysis is also in line with, as illuminated in chapter five, Marx’s 
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methodological framework with the material focus on production That is, the investigation at 
this level then concerns the particular mode of production and social relations in which the 
producers of discourse (as explored in 6.1) participate. 
 
6.4. Accounting discourse as a contested terrain that shifts over different groups 
This section is aimed to unveil the underlying modes of production on parts of both the 
Chinese buyers and the mining firms that constitute the basis of discourse. To this end, the 
following five components are considered: market, supply and demand, value of iron ore, 
corporate ownership, and role of government. 
 
6.4.1. Discourse of market 
As discussed earlier, while both the CISA and the Big Three advocate that the iron ore price 
is decided by the market mechanism, they then reached considerably different conclusions 
regarding what the fair price of iron ore should be. This section therefore further investigates 
the specific context in which the discourse of market is put forward by the groups involved 
including (1) the CISA, (2) the Big Three, and (3) other market participants. 
 
6.4.1.1. The market interpreted by CISA 
As China is the largest iron ore importing and steel producing country in the world, the CISA 
always emphasised the strong interconnectedness between iron ore price and China’s 
domestic steel market in the negotiation as well as the uniqueness of the Chinese market, and 
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thus urged the Big Three to offer a unique price exclusive to the China’s domestic steel 
manufacturers.  
 
For instance, in the beginning of the 2009 negotiation, CISA’s secretary general, Shang 
Shanghua, asked the Big Three to lower down the forthcoming iron ore price to its 1994 level 
(i.e. a 82% price cut), on the ground that China’s steel price had also gone back to the 1994 
level (Sina Finance, 9 December 2008). This was because, Shan argued, the increase and 
decrease in the iron ore price should keep the same pace with those of the steel price, given 
that iron ore is the raw material for steel production (Xinkuaibao, 10 December 2008). 
Alongside the 82% price decrease, Shan also proposed that the traditional period to which the 
annual iron ore price applied that began from 1 April and ended on 31 March also be changed 
to accord with the Chinese financial reporting period from 1 January to 31 December, as it 
would be more suitable to the business operation as well as financial reporting of China’s 
steel manufacturers (Xinkuaibao, 10 December 2008).  
 
In March 2009 when the negotiation reached a stalemate and CISA changed the proposed 
82% price cut to 45%, Qi Xiangdong, the deputy secretary general at the CISA, still 
maintained that  
“we are neither talking about the exact percentage that the long run iron ore price should 
drop nor concerned with how much this year’s steel price would reduce compared to its 
last year equivalent, the biggest focus (for the CISA) is to achieve a reasonable 
relationship between the prices of steel and of other commodities including coal and iron 
ore on the same industrial chain. (We) must ensure the reasonability of the profit 
allocation on the industrial chain” (Zhang Yi, 2009d).  
Qi continued to explain that  
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“while the iron ore suppliers were profiteering last year, (China’s) steel plants suffered 
huge losses. This situation was not reasonable and could not last long. Therefore, (we) 
should on the one hand lower down the raw material cost of iron ore and on the other 
hand increase the steel price to a proper level” (Zhang Yi, 2009d).  
At about the same time, Wu Xichun, the honorary chairman of CISA, also pointed out that 
major iron ore suppliers should take the interests of steel enterprises into full consideration 
while negotiating with the Chinese buyers. According to CISA’s data, the loss-suffering 
status of (China’s) domestic steel plants would even exacerbate for the next two months. 
“Under such circumstance, if iron ore suppliers still do not consider an appropriate price cut, 
they will leave no room for steel plants to survive. Nor will they themselves have any space 
for profits either… after all, our (i.e. mining companies and steel plants) fundamental 
interests are the same”, said Wu (Securities Times, 20 March 2009). Luo Bingsheng, CISA’s 
vice chairman, also elaborated on such an interest-sharing relation that as the global iron ore 
price gone up by 412% for the past five years (i.e. from 2003 to 2008), the international 
mining companies, by gradually increasing iron ore price every year, had made huge profits 
at the expense of steel plants which was not normal. Steel enterprises and mining companies 
should have a win-win relationship that looks after the interests of both parties (Ruan, 2009a).  
 
On the same basis that the relationship between iron ore suppliers and steel plants shall be 
interest-sharing and reciprocal, CISA rejected the new annual price that contained a 32.95% 
price cut reached by Nippon Steel and Rio Tinto (China Galaxy Securities, 5 June 2009; Xu 
YL, 2009d). The secretary general Shan Shanghua emphasised that “mining companies and 
steel manufacturers should be interdependent as close as lips and teeth. (Therefore,) while the 
(Chinese) steel industry in general suffers from losses, the iron ore suppliers on the upper 
stream have no reason to continue to profiteer” (Wan, 2009a). The spokesperson of the 
Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information, Zhu Hongren, also held the same opinion. He 
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hoped that, through communication, coordination, and negotiation, both the iron ore suppliers 
and steel manufacturers could soon agree on a relatively fair and reasonable price so that both 
parties would be able to retain a normal level of profitability (China News Service, 22 July 
2009). 
 
As China did not accept the 2009 initial price, the idea of index pricing was raised, where the 
Chinese side also maintained the close connection between iron ore and steel prices. When 
responding to the promotion of the quarterly pricing model based on Platts index, Yang 
Siming, the chairman and CEO of Nanjing Iron and Steel United Co., Ltd. (i.e. a subsidiary 
of Nanjing Iron and Steel Group owned by the Chinese government, top 20 steel plant in 
China), suggested the CISA to link the quarterly price of steel with that of iron ore (Caijing, 
27 April 2009). 
 
In the belief that the Chinese domestic steel sector was the most influential factor for the 
forthcoming iron ore price, another CISA official even admitted that, in order to reach a 
better price with the Big Three, the association attempted to coordinate the production 
schedule of (China’s) domestic steel manufacturers. One typical example was that Shan 
Shanghua, the secretary general, went to Baosteel in person in the end of May discussing the 
company’s possible increase in steel price. “The association (i.e. CISA) wants to see that 
each major steel plant hold on for a while and do not raise steel price at this particular 
moment. (Because) once the steel price is increased, there will be obviously less space for the 
(iron ore) negotiation. However, on June 10 (2009), Baosteel increased its steel price for July 
by the amount which was even RMB 200 / ton higher than anticipated. This made secretary 
general Shan very upset” (Deng, 2009d). 
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In addition to the strong connection between iron ore price and China’s domestic steel 
market, CISA also emphasised the uniqueness of the Chinese iron ore market. In particular, 
the Chinese market, in the view of CISA, was so influential as though it would be the only 
determinant factor that the Big Three should take into consideration. For instance, in the 
beginning of the 2009 iron ore negotiation, CISA’s secretary general Shan Shanghua pointed 
out that the year of 2009 would be witness a buyer’s market (Li JL, 2009a). After Japan and 
Korea reached the initial price agreement with Rio Tinto, Shan told the press that China 
would not accept the price as “we (i.e. the Chinese market) are currently the largest iron ore 
importing country around the globe, and thus should have a cheaper price” (Gold Bull 
Information, 15 May 2009). For the same reason, he further indicated that Japan’s iron ore 
import accounted for less than one sixth of its Chinese counterpart, and so could not represent 
Asia to set up the price. Instead, “as the number one iron ore importing market the world 
over, China should establish a new pricing mechanism based on our actual iron ore demand 
for steel production” (Gold Bull Information, 12 June 2009; Zhang C, 2009a). Luo 
Bingsheng, the vice chairman, also added that, regardless of the Japanese and Korean 
enterprises accepting the new annual price from Rio Tinto, the Chinese steel plants are the 
number one client for Rio Tinto. In 2008, there were about 55% of Rio Tinto’s iron ore that 
were sold to China (Zhang Yi, 2009e). 
 
When CISA finally reached the price agreement with FMG (i.e. Australia’s third largest iron 
ore supplier) in August, Liu Zhenjiang, CISA’s vice chairman and the secretary of the CPC 
committee, commented that  
“this year (i.e. 2009) China will import nearly 500 million tons of iron ore, accounting 
for more than 50% of the trading amount of global seaborn iron ore… With the massive 
commodity import like this, as far as the major suppliers are concerned, they should 
consider China’s market share. This is certainly not a simple matter of the buyer’s 
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interests. When others import 10 to 20 million tons of iron ore, they will then determine 
the price for China’s 500 million tons of iron ore, which makes it very hard to be fair to 
China. The unfairness has to be stopped. Based on the concept of fair market, we must 
begin to build the Chinese model” (Xinhuanet, 17 August 2009). 
 
Summarising from the discourse above, a picture of the iron ore market from CISA’s 
perspective emerges, that is, a market largely affected by China’s domestic steel sector and 
dominated by the Chinese plants for steel production only. However, questions are asked as 
to whether or not the Chinese steel sector really is the most influencing factor and whether or 
not China’s iron ore buyers are capable of establishing the Chinese price for the global 
market. Before answering these questions, it is thus to the market discourse of the Big Three 
which we now turn. 
 
6.4.1.2. The market interpreted by Big Three 
Compared to CISA, the Big Three depicts a larger market comprised of global buyers and 
influenced by macro-economic policies when discussing the iron ore price. In the beginning 
of the 2009 iron ore price negotiation, Tom Albanese, the then CEO of Rio Tinto, indicated 
that China’s weak iron ore demand was only temporary as a consequence of the tightened 
monetary policy by the Chinese government; considering the pace of China’s economy 
development (at 8%-9% annual GDP growth rate) and the implementation of new 
government policies, the iron ore demand would go up next year (i.e. 2009) (Chen, 2008a). In 
2009 March, Guy Elliott, Rio Tinto’s chief financial officer (CFO hereafter), said at the Asia 
Mining Conference that the company was not in a hurry to conclude the iron ore negotiation, 
as it expected that the economic stimulus package in US, China, and other countries would 
help the steel and metal markets recover (Caijing, 27 April 2009). 




For the Big Three, China was not the only market to which they could sell iron ore. After 
CISA and FMG reached the so called ‘Chinese price’ in August 2009, Tom Albanese, the 
CEO of Rio Tinto, told the press that at the moment the company was primarily selling iron 
ore with the temporary benchmark price (reached by Nippon steel and Rio Tinto before the 
Chinese price) to steel manufacturers in Japan and other regions, and would continue to do so 
until market condition changes. He expressed that using the temporary benchmark price was 
appropriate, despite the Chinese price which was just agreed by CISA and FMG (Gold Bull 
Information, 21 August 2009). In fact, Amanda Buckley, Rio Tinto’s press officer at the 
Australian Headquarter, commented that “the price agreed by Chinese steel enterprises and 
FMG has nothing to do with our 2009 annual iron ore price. Rio Tinto will continue to 
negotiate with its own clients around the globe” (Shanghai Morning Post, 18 August 2009). 
Vale also dismissed the applicability of Chinese price but emphasised the global price. “If 
you already have a widely recognised price agreement, and everyone uses that price to buy 
and sell iron ore, then why would you go into another negotiation?”, said Roger Agnelli, 
Vale’s CEO (Xu, 2009e). 
 
Aside from the concern with iron ore consumers around the globe, the Big Three also pointed 
out factors affecting the iron ore price other than the Chinese domestic steel market. For 
instance, BHP Billiton revealed that its cooperation with Nippon Steel was not limited to iron 
ore trade, but also involved the long term shipping agreement which on its own would help 
Nippon Steel save a huge amount of cost (Suo, 2009a). Zhu Kai, the president of Vale China, 
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also mentioned the relevance of shipping cost (primarily based on the Baltic Dry Index
58
, i.e. 
BDI index hereafter) that “the fluctuation in shipping costs is huge, ranging from 8 USD / ton 
to 108 USD / ton, and (thus) resulting in substantial influence on clients’ cost control… (in 
the past,) due to the small number of long term charter agreements signed by the Chinese 
steel enterprises with shipping companies, the Chinese (iron ore) buyers had paid more costs” 
(Deng, 2009e). Therefore, to enlarge Vale’s market share in China, Zhu Kai expressed the 
firm’s aim in 2009 as to stabilise the iron ore delivery cost by establishing its own shipping 
fleet (Deng, 2009e; Zhang C, 2009c). 
 
6.4.1.3. The market interpreted by Chinese small and medium enterprises 
The different interpretations of market not only exist between the CISA and major iron ore 
suppliers, but also derive from the small and medium enterprises within the Chinese iron and 
steel sector, a third group worthy of further investigation. As illustrated earlier (in 6.1.3.), this 
group mostly consists of privately-owned steel plants and trading companies which did not 
directly participate in the iron ore price negotiation. However, they were still the stakeholders 
in this case and their voices were presented in the media coverage during the period. It is thus 
argued that their discourse reflect, both directly and otherwise, to what extent they would 
agree with CISA, the association which claimed to be their representative in iron ore price 
negotiation. 
 
With regard to the concept of market, this group perceived a different market than what the 
CISA conceived of. That is, unlike the CISA which simply linked the level of steel output 
                                                          
58
The Baltic Dry Index (BDI index) measures the price of shipping raw materials by sea. It is issued on a daily basis by the 
London-based Baltic Exchange (The Baltic Exchange, 2015a). In this thesis, the terms shipping cost and BDI index are used 
interchangeably. 
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with the iron ore price and attempted to unify the price in China’s domestic market, the small 
and medium enterprises pointed out a market where iron ore was not only traded between 
mining companies and steel plants as the raw material for steel production, but also resold 
among trading firms and steel plants as the retail inventory. 
 
The manager at a medium size steel plant based in the city of Tangshan (Hebei province) 
pointed out that  
“the majority of steel manufacturers in Hebei province established since 2002 have 
neither the long term iron ore contracts (with the Big Three) nor any other channels to 
import iron ore… (Thus,) the ‘import license’ has in fact given a ‘privilege’ to most large 
steel enterprises—they have monopolised the ‘long term based iron ore’ purchased from 
the international iron ore suppliers at a cheaper price. Apart from those consumed for 
their own steel production, the rest of the iron ore are sold to the ‘unlicensed’ small and 
medium steel enterprises at higher prices. The difference between ‘long term based price’ 
and ‘spot price’ has thus given rise to a new market with huge space for ‘arbitrage’” 
(Wang J, 2009b). 
He further added that 
“(o)f course, having the import license does not mean having the long run iron ore supply 
straightaway. After 2005, although there were 118 qualified enterprises with ‘iron ore 
import license’, only a few number of them could actually purchase the long term based 
iron ore… This is because the major foreign mining firms are quite picky and only 
choose those large size steel plants with great potential as the ‘long term partners’. It is 
very rare that any small and medium or privately owned steel enterprises could have the 
opportunity to order the long term contract based iron ore” (Wang J, 2009b). 
Even for those firms that have been granted with the import license, the sufficient and stable 
long term supply of iron ore is not guaranteed either. Zhao Qiang, the general manager of a 
steel enterprise based in Hebei province, revealed that while his company had signed up long 
run iron ore contracts with Vale and FMG, the total ordered amount was less than 2 million 
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tons, which was far below the firm’s actual demand. Thus, his company also faced the same 
expensive iron ore price as did those small and medium enterprises. 
 “We would also like to sign up bigger contracts. However, as our total iron ore demand 
is still too small (compared to the bigger players with larger quantity of demand), the 
major suppliers are not willing to talk with us at all. (Thus,) We have to purchase from 
Baosteel and Sino Steel at higher prices. Sometimes, the price can be 500 RMB / ton 
more expensive than its long term contract counterpart” (Zhang XD, 2009a). 
It is not that the CISA did not consider this secondary market for iron ore trade, as the 
association introduced the Suggestions On the Promotion of the Iron Ore Import Agency 
System in 2006 and the Details on the Implementation of Iron Ore Import Agency System in 
2010. However, these policies were not very well implemented as they were issued by the 
association instead of government and thus were not legally enforceable (Guan, 2011). 
 
Xu Tao, the vice president of a small steel enterprise (i.e. Tangshan Jianlong Co., Ltd) based 
in the city of Tangshan, told the journalist that 
“While our nation’s iron ore import agency system states that, when re-selling the 
imported iron ore to those unlicensed steel firms, licensed iron ore importing companies 
can only charge a 3%-5% agency fee and cannot profiteer from the reselling, this policy 
has, in reality, become a dead letter… In this aspect, I think the key thing is that many 
licensed iron ore importing firms or those who are able to receive long term priced iron 
ore elsewhere simply sell us at the spot market price that subsequently creates many 
problems… in July 2008 when the long term price was 700-800 RMB / ton, Tangshan 
Jianlong could not use this price. Instead, the company bought iron ore from trading 
companies at the price of 1400 RMB / ton, which nearly doubled its long term 
counterpart… While these licensed firms made a fortune (from re-selling iron ore), the 
unlicensed ones had to suffer from the prohibitive price of iron ore” (Economy 30 
Minutes, 2009). 
The market as such even existed for some licensed companies. As explained by Liu Zenglin, 
the general manager at Baoye Group which is another private steel enterprise also based in 
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the city of Tangshan, even though the company did have the long term iron ore contract every 
year for 3 million tons, its annual demand for iron ore nevertheless amounted to 15 million 
tons. In other words, the other 12 million ton iron ore had to be purchased from trading 
companies in the spot market. He added that 
“While in theory the users of iron ore are eventually steel manufacturers, this is not so in 
the case of those trading companies which do not purchase iron ore for production 
purposes. Rather, they are simply concerned with the gap between the long term based 
price and its spot market counterpart, the higher the better. They do not actually consider 
whether or not the steel plants in the lower stream could accept the raw material cost. As 
long as you need (iron ore), the bigger the price gap the better. As steel plants make 
purchases from them, these trading firms will be even bolder to import more from 
overseas with a higher import price (and thus an even higher selling price to China’s 
domestic steel plants). This is a vicious circle” (Economy 30 Minutes, 2009). 
As such, this difference between the long term contract-based price and the spot market price 
posed more challenges to the small and medium enterprises. As a buyer of second hand iron 
ore from China’s domestic market, a privately owned medium size steel plant based in Hebei 
province told the journalist that 
“without the import license, (the company) must find a licensed firm as the agent when 
(the company) needs to import iron ore, and because of this, (the company) needs to pay 
a significant amount of money as commission… the agency fee is about 1-3 USD / ton, 
which means that the company would have to pay 100-200 million RMB as the agency 
fee every year since the firm’s annual iron ore import is 10 million tons. Instead of 
calling it as the agency fee, it is rather something from reselling. When iron ore was in a 
high demand, the price that those licensed firms sold us with was 1.5-2 times more 
expensive than the original price” (Deng, 2009c). 
Consequently, these small and medium enterprises even suggested the government to abolish 
the iron ore import agency system as it “on the one hand has caused unfair competition in the 
(iron ore import) market, and on the other hand only exists in name” (Deng, 2009c). 
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Moreover, not only did CISA fail in its attempt to suppress the secondary iron ore transaction 
market, but the association also exacerbated such a market. When the CISA went into a 
stalemate with the Big Three in the negotiation and called for the ban on iron ore 
‘speculations’ in the secondary market, “large trading firms such as Laibao and Jiaji soon 
adopted a new strategy which, instead of selling 100,000 tons of iron ore per day like they 
normally did in the past, now only offers 10,000 tons in the spot market everyday… (this is 
because) now it is another good opportunity to stockpile iron ore. While the CISA will keep 
containing the iron ore import amount till the end of the negotiation, the decreasing amount 
of iron ore supply means the corresponding increasing price. The iron ore price will thus be 
higher in future”, said Shang Yong, an iron ore trader (Suo, 2009b). 
 
In the similar way as CISA failed to extend its control over the market for small and medium 
steel enterprises, much of the association’s success in the 2009 negotiation (i.e. 35.02% price 
cut reached by CISA and FMG) remained within CISA and its member firms. The market in 
which privately owned small and medium steel plants operated, on the other hand, remained, 
if not worse, the same. As the spokesperson of Puyang Iron and Steel (a private steel plant 
based in Hebei province) explained that “this price cut (agreed by CISA and FMG) only 
applies to FMG’s clients, whereas we cannot share the benefit”, since the company at the 
moment did not have any iron ore contracts with FMG. He further pointed out that the iron 
ore supply from FMG was limited, and so was its subsequent influence on the Chinese steel 
enterprises (Yue et al., 2009). Moreover, regardless of whichever mining firms that the CISA 
reached an agreement with, it was already not feasible for the major SEOS and small and 
medium enterprises to stay in the same team. “Long term price negotiation is a matter which 
concerns CISA and large steel enterprises. It has nothing to do with us. Compared to the long 
term price negotiation, we are more willing to focus on the spot market” (Zhang C, 2009a), 
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said the director of an unlicensed steel plant in Hebei. In response to CISA’s call for a nation-
wide iron ore boycott against the Big Three who might then offer a better price to the Chinese 
market, the director of a medium size steel plant explained that 
“to unite us (i.e. small and medium enterprises with major SOEs) against the foreign 
suppliers, we must align our interest together! With those large size licensed firms that 
held the discourse power on behalf of the Chinese market, we do not in the first place 
share the same interest, and nor do we face the same ‘enemy’. How can we follow 
CISA’s proposal? ... In the past these enterprises (i.e. licensed SOEs) had benefited from 
the long term contract based iron ore. But now the market has changed, then they say 
they could not afford the (iron ore) price, and ask us to cooperate” (Zhang Yi, 2009f). 
 
In addition to the secondary market that significantly differs from the one idealised by the 
CISA, this group also indicates other influencing factors of iron ore price than the Chinese 
steel market. Similar to the Big Three, an iron ore trading company based in Rizhao port 
(Shandong province) pointed out the influence that shipping costs (i.e. BDI index) might 
have on the price of iron ore. For instance, BHP Billiton had the control over 60% of the dry 
bulk shipping capacity in the Chinese-Australian seaborne market, which gave the mining 
giant the ability of artificially raising the shipping cost and so the spot price of iron ore at 
(China’s) domestic ports (Xu, 2009f). The manager of China National Chartering Co., Ltd. 
also expressed the same concern that while in the beginning of 2009 the cost of shipping iron 
ore from Brazil to Chian was 10 USD / ton, the price at the moment was increased to 30 USD 
/ ton. Due to the lack of the time charter agreement (i.e. long term charter agreement), he 
illuminated, that  
“the shipping right is in the hands of the consignors (i.e. iron ore suppliers in this case) 
who charter ships at any prices they prefer, and so the Chinese steel plants have to accept 
the price however expensive it may be… This is the most important problem that the 
Chinese side should solve, rather than simply focusing on a few US dollars that the iron 
ore price could be reduced by” (Suo, 2009a). 




To summarise the discourse of market interpreted by the small and medium companies in the 
Chinese iron and steel sector, a market that is more complex than the one pictured by CISA 
emerges. First, similar to the Big Three that consider other influencing factors of iron ore 
price than steel production demand, the small and medium enterprises also take into account 
the international shipping cost for iron ore transactions. Second, and more importantly, they 
operate in a market which the CISA would not recognise and which the Big Three were not 
directly involved with. In other words, they have created to some extent a secondary market 
by themselves, that is, a market largely within China where iron ore transactions occur not 
primarily between the Big Three and the Chinese iron ore importers but in fact among 
China’s ‘licensed’ importing companies and those unlicensed ones where iron ore may have 
been sold a few times to reach its end users with the final price much higher than its original 
selling price. 
 
6.4.1.4. Conclusion and discussion for the discourse of market 
To conclude the analysis of the different interpretations of market by (1) the CISA, (2) the 
Big Three, and (3) the small and medium enterprises in the Chinese iron and steel industry, 
three types of market emerge. The first is, as depicted by the CISA, an iron ore market purely 
based on the development of China’s domestic steel sector, and primarily influenced and 
dominated by the Chinese iron ore consumers. The second one, as viewed by the Big Three, 
is a world market influenced by both the macro-economic and political environment around 
the globe and the specific market conditions such as the global shipping cost (i.e. BDI index). 
Thirdly, the small and medium enterprises operating in the Chinese iron and steel industry 
perceived another market based on factors from both global and domestic markets. On the 
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one hand, this group, similar to the Big Three, also considers the international price of iron 
ore as well as the global shipping cost (i.e. BDI Index) as the determinants of iron ore price. 
On the other hand, however, unlike the mining giants or the CISA, the global iron ore price is 
regarded as the cost of goods (i.e. iron ore) sold on the part of the Chinese licensed iron ore 
importers who subsequently resell the previously imported iron ore to, and consequently 
profiteer from those unlicensed privately owned small and medium companies. With CISA’s 
failed attempt in suppressing and perhaps the unintended facilitation of such a market, it 
becomes an area beyond the reach of the Chinese association, in both regulatory and 
beneficial terms. 
 
6.4.2. Discourse of supply and demand 
Having identified the three categories of market from the perspectives of the three groups, the 
next concern is the discourse of supply demand which gives rise to competing point of views 
regarding the price of iron ore. For instance, when negotiating the 2009 annual price, CISA 
contended that iron ore supply was over demand whereas the Big Three emphasised the 
opposite scenario (Yu L, 2009a; Yang Y., 2009b). Also, in the debate over iron ore index 
pricing, whilst the Big Three claimed that the new pricing mechanism could be determined 
and reflected by market supply and demand (Liu, 2009), the CISA argued that the supply and 
demand represented by the indexed price was problematic (Li Y, 2010a) and only the 
‘Chinese price’ was able to “objectively reflects the… supply and demand” (Bao, 2009). 
 
Based on the different interpretations of market explored earlier, it is thus no longer difficult 
to explore the respective opinions on supply and demand under theses market conditions, 
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which have been extensively used to substantiate their own argument by both parties at the 
negotiation table. 
 
6.4.2.1. The supply and demand interpreted by CISA 
Since the CISA considers the Chinese steel market as the primary determinant of iron ore 
price, the association has thus paid sufficient attention to the supply and demand level shown 
in the Chinese domestic steel sector, leaving the global market supply and demand relatively 
undiscussed. In the beginning of the 2009 price negotiation, Luo Bingsheng, the executive 
vice chairman of CISA, equated iron ore demand with steel production demand in that 
“while the continuous increase in iron ore price for the past few years has stimulated the 
investment in (China’s) domestic mining resources and resulted in the gradual increase in 
domestic iron ore production… (Thus,) the increase in domestically produced iron ore 
can totally meet the demand for domestic steel production” (Yao, 2008). 
For him, the only motive that Chinese companies purchase iron ore was to manufacture steel, 
as Luo further argued that with the current iron ore inventory stock, China’s domestic steel 
plants could maintain their normal production for three to four months without importing any 
iron ore (Chen, 2008a). Moreover, he predicted that, as China’s steel production would 
reduce in 2009, the excessive demand of iron ore would no longer be the case (Li JL, 2009b). 
Shan Shanghua, the secretary general of CISA, also expressed the similar view that the 
existing iron ore inventory at China’s ports in the beginning of November was already above 
90 million tons, and so was able to meet China’s steel production demand till the end of the 
first quarter in 2009 (DFdaily, 7 November 2008). 
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While claiming that iron ore demand solely depended on the steel demand, the CISA also 
found that the country’s iron ore import kept increasing when the steel production was 
significantly reduced (Xia, 2009). However, rather than recognising the rising demand of iron 
ore, Shan Shanghua criticised that the increased amount of iron ore supply in the Chinese 
market only created the illusory demand (Su, 2009), on the ground that the nation’s iron ore 
import in the first quarter of 2009 was much higher than its demand of steel production (Gold 
Bull Information, 15 May 2009; Zhang Yi, 2009f). Luo Bingsheng, CISA’s vice chairman, 
commented that the excessive import of iron ore distorted the supply and demand relationship 
in (China’s) domestic iron ore market, and substantially disturbed the iron ore price 
negotiation (Ruan, 2009b). In the meantime, the association discredited those small and 
medium enterprises which at the time reached the iron ore procurement arrangement with 
foreign iron ore suppliers. The official at the CISA told the journalist that 
“do those so called arrangements really count? There are some small and medium size —
which of course are not considered small by overseas standards—steel plants which do 
not know anything but simply sign up contracts (with iron ore suppliers). However, they 
forgot that they themselves do not have such right to sign the contract… It is not that we 
do not know about the excessive iron ore import by trading firms in the first half of the 
year. Now (we) are looking for those which imported the most and then conduct 
investigations on them, Once you break the national standards, you must be punished” 
(Wang J, 2009c). 
 
As for the Big Three who privately sold iron ore to those unlicensed Chinese firms, on the 
other hand, the CISA also dismissed their supply with the remark that the main reason behind 
Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton’s recent shipment to China was to create the illusory increase in 
market demand (Su, 2009). In general, Luo Bingsheng, the vice chairman of CISA, 
commented that  
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from 2009 January to July, iron ore trade via spot market accounts for 82.74% of the 
nation’s entire iron ore import. The excessive import of iron ore, purchased through 
trading companies, distorts the supply and demand relationship in the Chinese market, 
and greatly disturbs the iron ore price negotiation (Ruan, 2009b). 
In other words, rather than acknowledging the increase in supply and demand, the association 
simply regarded it as the unnecessary excess which contributed nothing but caused distortion 
and disturbance in the market. Similarly, the deputy minister of the Ministry of Commerce, 
Fu Ziying, also commented on the rising demand for iron ore as irrational (Han, 2009c). 
 
With the privately-owned iron ore trading firms and steel plants being discredited, steel 
production was another concept that received specific attention from the CISA. In an attempt 
to establish a nationwide unified iron ore price exclusive to China, Shan Shanghua also 
pointed out that the new pricing mechanism must be based on the actual iron ore demand for 
steel production (Gold Bull Information, 12 June 2009). Having linked the iron ore demand 
with the demand for steel production was not enough; the term actual demand was also 
defined, or perhaps confined, by the industry association. Faced with the fact that while most 
of the CISA member firms had reduced their daily steel output from 1.14 to 1.11 million tons, 
the rest of the industry (mostly non-CISA member firms) increased the production level from 
0.29 to 0.34 million tons per day (Xu, 2009f), Shan Shanghua labelled the increased steel 
production at non-CISA member steel plants as the overproduction which made the iron ore 
negotiation exceptionally difficult and exacerbated the illusory demand for iron ore for the 
Chinese market (Yue & Zhou, 2009). Apparently, the actual demand for steel production did 
not mean the actual steel production on the part of the non-CISA member firms.  
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Nonetheless, this is not to say that steel production at major SOEs would have no problem at 
all; operations of SOEs were also subject to the will (or command) of the industry 
association. Given the production overcapacity claimed by the CISA, Li Yizhong, the 
Minister of the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information, at the State Council press 
conference suggested that domestic steel plants shall not launch any new projects within the 
next three years (Yangcheng Evening News, 14 August 2009). 
 
While disavowing the activities, including iron ore importing and steel manufacturing, of the 
non-CISA member firms (most of which were privately-owned small and medium 
enterprises), the industry association also, either consciously or otherwise, disregarded the 
interests of these firms. When claiming to have achieved the price agreement with FMG in 
the 2009 negotiation, Liu Zhenjiang, the vice chairman and the secretary of the CPC 
committee at the CISA, emphasised that the negotiation result was accepted by parties from 
the supply and demand chain (Xinhuanet, 17 August 2009). However, the promised amount 
of iron ore supply by FMG was only 20 million tons that did not even take up 4% of the 
nation’s entire demand for 2009 (Dong, 2009a). Consequently, similar to the way in which 
the market described by CISA was separated from the one considered by small and medium 
enterprises, most, in not all, of FMG’s iron ore supply went to the hands of those CISA 
member firms (Yue et al., 2009).  
 
To summarise CISA’s discourse of supply and demand, the interpretation largely remained 
within the confines of China’s domestic market in two particular ways. On the one hand, the 
concept of iron ore demand was equated to the actual demand for steel production, which was 
conditional upon CISA’s approval and thus effectively excluded the so called overproduction 
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operated by the non-CISA member plants. On the other hand, the term iron ore supply was 
limited to CISA’s own authorised channel in terms of both qualification and quantity. This 
primarily referred to transactions between iron ore suppliers and the licensed Chinese 
companies, most of which were the industry’s leading SOEs. With regard to qualification, 
CISA discredited both the iron ore supplier and the unlicensed receiver at the same time. As 
for quantity, non-CISA member firms were naturally omitted due to the limited amount of 
authorised supply. Viewed in this way, it is thus not surprising for CISA to conclude that (its 
regulated) supply was over demand in the iron ore market. 
 
6.4.2.2. The supply and demand interpreted by Big Three 
As the Big Three views the iron ore market as affected by the international macro-economic 
and political environment, they also consider the corresponding global influence when it 
comes to supply and demand. Contrary to CISA which delineated a general picture where 
iron ore supply was over demand, the Big Three held the opposite opinion. For instance, even 
in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, Vale expected that China’s iron ore demand 
would bounce back in mid-2009, as by then the country would run out of iron ore inventory 
stock and also because other mining firms might not be able to meet China’s demand (Chen, 
2008a). Tom Albanese, the CEO of Rio Tinto, also held the similar view that China’s weak 
iron ore demand was only temporary as a result of the nation’s tightened monetary policy. 
However, as the Chinese economy kept increasing at the annual growth rate of 8%-9%, and 
alongside the implementation of new government policies, the demand would soon recover in 
2009 (Chen, 2008a). Lu Jiucheng, the president of Rio Tinto Asia and China, explained that 
the economic stimulus package by the Chinese government would continue to increase 
(China’s) domestic steel demand, and thus the need for iron ore (Gold Bull Information, 20 
May 2009). 
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While being optimistic about the rising demand of iron ore (Deng, 2009a), the Big Three also 
increased their iron ore supply accordingly by signing up the export agreement with China’s 
small and medium enterprises. In other words, the supply of iron ore was no longer restricted 
to the long term based contract only available to large size SOEs. For the first quarter of 
2009, when Vale’s export to China hit a record high of 32 million tons, the firm’s senior 
management explained that in the past Vale only sold iron ore to large size steel plants, these 
days however the company began to sign contracts with medium and small plants. This was 
because “as long as there is someone willing to buy, we are ready to sell” (Caijing, 27 April 
2009). Furthermore, it was not just the long term based contract that was used by mining 
firms to extend their supply. The short term based index price was also accepted by both 
parties to the meet the rising demand for iron ore. In June 2009 when the annual price 
negotiation was nowhere near its conclusion, BHP Billiton started to sign up iron ore 
contracts with the Chinese private steel firms (Wan, 2009a). Rio Tinto also began to sell iron 
ore to China’s spot market (Chen SS, 2009d). Vale as well expressed the same intention 
(Wan, 2009a; Yu L, 2009b). Unsurprisingly, the Big Three continued to supply iron ore at 
either the long term price earlier reached by Japanese and Korean firms or the short term 
based spot price when the mining giants did not reach any result with CISA in the 2009 
negotiation after July 1, the traditional start date for the new annual price (Jiao, 2009b; Li Q, 
2009). Therefore, unlike the CISA which attempted to limit the supply and demand via 
regulatory means, the Big Three seemed to open their door of supply to meet all types of 
demand including SOEs and private buyers from different markets.  
 
Underlying such distinction between the two is their attitude on the market supply and 
demand equilibrium. That is, contrary to the statement of CISA which only acknowledged the 
supply and demand figures approved by the association, and discredited all other 
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unrecognised private arrangements, the Big Three, at least on surface, claimed to let the 
market return to its supply and demand equilibrium. When no outcome was achieved by both 
parties in the 2009 negotiation, the president of Rio Tinto Asia and China, Lu Jiucheng, 
indicated that the company would wait till the market recovered to its normal state and then 
began the rational conversation (with the CISA) (Caijing, 27 April 2009). In response to 
CISA’s proposed 40% price cut, Zhu Kai, the president of Vale China, commented that “the 
40% price cut is simply the expectation of the Chinese side, anyone can make expectations, 
but in the end it is still up to the market to decide…the Chinese market has already shown 
some signals of recovery, I believe its iron ore demand and thus import will continue to 
increase in April and May” (Deng, 2009a). In rationalising the adoption of index pricing 
during the 2010 price negotiation, BHP Billiton expressed its belief in the market in that the 
new pricing mechanism meant handing over the price setting power to the market (DFdaily, 8 
March 2010). 
 
To summarise the Big Three’s discourse of supply and demand, they considered the term 
from a macro-economic and political perspective which suggested that China’s economy and 
government policies would boost steel demand and thus iron ore demand. With the optimism 
for the rising demand, the Big Three lowered down the previous threshold for long term iron 
ore contract and opened the door for short term based supply as well, which further 
corresponds to their belief in the equilibrium where market itself would be able to adjust 
supply and demand. 
 
Chapter 6 Different Interpretations of Iron Ore Price—Identifying Modes of Production 
198 
 
6.4.2.3. The supply and demand interpreted by Chinese small and medium enterprises 
As the small and medium enterprises primarily operate in a secondary market within China 
where iron ore may have been sold a few times before reaching its end users who would 
actually consume the product for steel production, their interpretation of supply and demand 
is largely confined within that market.  
 
On the one hand, in terms of supply, as the CISA and Big Three reached the stalemate in the 
2009 negotiation, the iron ore supply for small and medium enterprises was no longer limited 
to those re-sold by the major licensed SOEs, but also directly came from the Big Three via 
either signing long term contracts or bidding in the spot market. In 2009 June when no result 
was achieved in the negotiation by both parties, the Big Three began to sign up long term iron 
ore contracts to those small and medium steel plants which, despite CISA’s condemnation, 
took the opportunity to enter long run iron ore contract market (Zhang Yi, 2009f). At about 
the same time, an increasing amount of iron ore also became available in China’s spot market 
(Wang J, 2009c). Since 2009 April, as pointed out by a domestic iron ore trader, “the Big 
Three took the initiative to charter ships sending iron ore to China. They even began the 
shipment without firstly locating any buyer… in the past many small companies could not 
order iron ore in large quantity due to limited capital. At present mining firms have loosened 
the requirement so that they would deliver iron ore first, and collect payment later” (Su, 
2009). 
 
On the other hand, alongside the opened door to the long term as well as short term iron ore 
supply from the Big Three came higher demand by the small and medium firms in three 
aspects. First, the iron ore demand from small and medium plants kept increasing at all costs. 
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When the Big Three first offered long term based contract to small players from the Chinese 
industry, the cheap price stimulated the small players to import more than their actual 
demand for steel production. “In fact, (we) do not need that many iron ore”, admitted by Liu 
Wei, the general manager assistant of Tianzhu Iron and Steel Group (based in the city of 
Tangshan), “the company is now operating at the full production capacity and using only the 
imported iron ore. Its cheap price is the main reason” (Zhu, 2009). Another private steel plant 
director also confirmed that “according to normal business logic, as long as I have the money, 
why cannot I purchase as much as I can for the rest of the year when the price is low?” 
(Wang J, 2009c). 
 
The second factor that too pushed up the iron ore demand on the part of small and medium 
plants was the small and medium size iron ore trading companies. 
 “While according to Big Three’s past principle long run iron ore contracts were not to be 
made available to trading companies which did not engage in steel production activities, 
now the Big Three just turn a blind eye to this issue. As long as the trading company 
could sign up an agreement with even small size steel plants, then they would be able to, 
in effect, enjoy the benefit of long term priced iron ore from Vale… (that is,) small steel 
plants simply use their own name to import iron ore on the surface, with the actual 
purchaser being the trading company underneath” (Zhang Yi, 2009f). 
Subsequently, the trading company which purchased iron ore via these small and medium 
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Thirdly, even the licensed SOEs also began to privately import iron ore through the small 
players when the CISA called for the iron ore boycott towards the Big Three (Zhu, 2009).  
“many steel plants rather sold their products at a loss to maintain the cashflow and at the 
same time borrowed funds from banks to increase the level of steel output, instead of 
reducing it… their demand for iron ore is not low either. However, due to their sensitive 
identity (as major SOEs and CISA member firms), many of them choose to delegate 
import tasks to the trading companies and small firms” (Wang J, 2009c). 
As opposed to CISA’s call, even these licensed firms justified their behaviour through market 
supply and demand.  
“Before the negotiation can be finished, CISA does not allow the Chinese steel plants to 
purchase iron ore from the Big Three. However, that is not the solution, as the Chinese 
factory could not survive without producing steel (which needs iron ore as the necessary 
raw material). In addition, the entire second quarter gives the Chinese iron and steel 
industry the best time and opportunity to recover production and profit. (Thus,) in from 
of market interests, no single firm would like to stop everything as planned by the 
CISA… I think there is only one simple principle for China’s iron ore negotiation. That 
is, whatever belongs to market shall be determined by market. In front of the market, 
enterprises will even reject the price cut if it renders them suffer losses, and may accept 
the price increase if it results in profits” (Zhang XD, 2009a). 
 
In fact, the overall rising, contrary to CISA’s attempted control over, supply and demand 
within the gradually unleashed market environment in which small and medium enterprises 
operated are rationalised by the belief in market mechanism. In other words, rather than 
CISA’s claim that the supply and demand shall give way to iron ore negotiations, “it is 
actually the market supply and demand that has determined the progress of the negotiation” 
(Tao, 2009), said Xu Bin, the analyst of Anbound Group (a private consulting company). 
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To summarise the supply and demand interpreted by the small and medium enterprises in the 
Chinese iron and steel industry, the concept is affected by a multitude of factors. First, the 
supply of iron ore primarily came from (1) long term contracts with the Big Three and (2) 
purchases in China’s spot market. Responding to the increased availability of iron ore supply 
in multiple channels, the demand was also dramatically increased. More specifically, three 
groups’ demand manifested: (1) small and medium size steel plants which privately signed up 
long run contracts with Big Three and / or purchased from spot market, (2) small and medium 
iron ore trading companies which first imported from Big Three unofficially and then resold 
the iron ore in spot market, and (3) licensed (large size) steel companies which secretively 
purchased from small and medium enterprises. 
 
6.4.2.4. Conclusion and discussion for the discourse of supply and demand   
To conclude the above analysis of the supply and demand discourse, a clear distinction can be 
drawn between the view held by CISA and those advocated by Big Three and the small and 
medium enterprises. In the case of CISA, both supply and demand are contingent upon the 
association’s approval where supply is limited to licensed firms (most of which are leading 
SOEs in the industry) and demand confined to the level of steel production authorised by the 
association. The cases of Big Three and the small and medium firms by contrast exhibit a 
relatively less regulated concept of supply and demand in a more opened market 
environment. That is, not only through the official import channel promoted by the CISA, 
iron ore supply has also been made available in the short term based spot market as well as 
via the long term based contract with those unlicensed small and medium enterprise in the 
Chinese industry. Accordingly, the amount of demand is calculated based on the iron ore 
purchase by all types of companies in the industry including major SOEs as well as small and 
medium steel plants and trading companies. Such a belief in the market mechanism is thus 
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one of the main reasons why the supply and demand interpreted by CISA differs significantly 
from those understood by the other two groups (i.e. Big Three and small and medium 
firms)—CISA champions a heavily regulated market whereas the other two groups believe in 
a self-adjusting one. Viewed in this way, supply and demand seem to be mutually reinforcing 
in that the increased supply attracts more demand which in turn further stimulates supply.  
 
Having illuminated the commonality shared by the Big Three and the small and medium 
firms, nonetheless, there does exist some differences between their understandings of supply 
and demand. Firstly, the Big Three view from a macro-economic and political perspective to 
justify the (potential) rising demand in the first place and then begin to proactively supply 
iron ore in multiple channels in the second place, whereas the Chinese small and medium 
enterprises, in a relatively passive manner, welcomed the increased supply on the one hand 
and emphasised the increasing demand on the other. This may be further explained by the 
second difference between the two groups. That is, the supply and demand chain in the case 
of Big Three is relatively simpler in that iron ore is simply transferred from the seller (i.e. Big 
Three) to the buyer (i.e. all types of firms in the Chinese iron and steel industry). In the case 
of small and medium enterprises, on the other hand, iron ore supply must first be imported 
from the Big Three in the upper stream and then can be traded for a few times among major 
SOEs and the small players. The distinction here in the trading pattern can be attributed to 
how the value of iron ore is perceived by Big Three and small and medium firms. In fact, the 
CISA may also have its own interpretation of iron ore, given that the association simply 
equates iron ore demand to steel production demand. Therefore, it is now to the discourse of 
the value of iron ore that this analysis proceeds. 
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6.4.3. Discourse of the value of iron ore 
With the different interpretations of market and supply and demand from the three groups, it 
is not difficult to deduce how each group would consider the value of iron ore. For instance, 
as CISA emphasises the strong link between iron ore market with steel market, and between 
iron ore demand with steel production demand, how the association views the value of iron 
ore will also be closely related to steel products. Those small and medium enterprises which 
engage in secondary transactions of iron ore, on the other hand, think of it as a common 
commodity irrelevant to the steel market. The Big Three that take into account the global 
macro-economic and socio-political atmosphere may also consider something otherwise. The 
following sections are then dedicated to explore the discourse of the value of iron ore from 
the three groups. 
 
6.4.3.1. The value of iron ore interpreted by CISA 
From the very beginning of the 2009 negotiation, the secretary general, Shang Shanghua, 
indicated that there were more than 90 million tons of iron ore stock waiting to be unloaded 
at China’s ports that were enough for (domestic) steel plants to consume till the end of the 
first quarter in 2009. Thus, any proposed increase in iron ore price became meaningless 
(DFdaily, 7 October 2008). Viewed in this way, it appears as if the only purpose of iron ore 
is, as one of the major raw materials, to manufacture steels. CISA maintained this concept of 
iron ore in the following two years. When the 2009 negotiation reached a stalemate, the 
association used this argument to threaten the Big Three that the Chinese steel manufacturers 
would be able to maintain their normal production level without importing iron ore for two 
months, whereas the Big Three could not afford that (Gold Bull Information, 20 May 2009). 
Even faced with the fact that for the first quarter of 2009 the nation imported in total 187 
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million tons of iron ore, Shan Shanghua did not acknowledge the rising amount of import but 
simply regarded it as an illusion on the ground that the actual iron ore consumption for the 
steel sector was only 30 million tons for the period (Zhang Yi, 2009f). In other words, the 
import which went beyond the actual consumption level contributed nothing but created a 
non-existent market. 
 
The association’s recognition of iron ore as the raw material for steel manufacturing and at 
the same time the repudiation of it as a tradable commodity may perhaps be best exemplified 
by the Rizhao event. Established in 2009 May, Rizhao International Iron Ore Trading Centre 
(Rizhao Centre hereafter) was aimed at providing the third party intermediary services 
including iron ore transactions and financing and would also launch the Chinese iron ore 
price index—Rizhao Index. Two weeks later the CISA released an official announcement 
which condemned the Rizhao Centre. 
“Chinese market does not allow any speculation of the imported iron ore. Iron & Steel 
Industry Adjustment and Revitalisation Plan (Plan hereafter) clearly states that iron ore 
import must adopt the agency system and unify the price. However, there are now the 
quoted price and the online transaction price that emerged in the (Chinese) iron ore 
import market, and some particular regions established the iron ore trading centre (i.e. 
Rizhao Centre), which already breached the policies required by Plan. Their activities 
are clearly speculative in nature which would distort the market, and (thus) must be 
stopped at once. The association called for an immediate disqualification from relevant 
government departments” (China Business Times, 16 June 2009). 
As a consequence, the CISA, together with the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, and the 
CCCMC, conducted an investigation on Rizhao Centre which indicated that the Centre’s 
attempt to build an internationally advanced electronic trading platform as a world-class iron 
ore e-market and establish the Rizhao Index as the bellwether of iron ore price the world over 
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was beyond the Centre’s operation scope and resulted in significantly negative impact on 
society. In the investigation report, CISA asked that  
“the Trading Centre must publicly announce not to engage in any trade or transactions 
involving iron ore import, not to publish the iron ore price or the price index; the Trading 
Centre must undertake internal re-organisation, must be renamed… not to initiate any 
‘speculative activities’ irrelevant to its business activities” (Zhou B, 2009). 
In response, Rizhao Centre accepted all requirements set out by the CISA, and promised not 
to engage in any iron ore transactions by any means (Xu YL, 2009g). Obviously, if the iron 
ore transactions within China’s domestic market were considered irrelevant and speculative 
as per CISA’s investigation, the purpose of iron ore really was limited to steel production. 
This was then, with the insistence of the CISA, enforced through a series of semi-compulsory 
regulations and standards including Suggestions on the Promotion of the Iron Ore Import 
Agency System, Steel Industry Self-discipline Agreement on Standardising the Trade Order of 
Iron Ore Import, and Iron Ore Importing Enterprise Assessment Criteria and Application 
Procedure, most of which disavowed iron ore trade between trading companies and small and 
medium steel plants. 
 
To further eliminate the secondary market of iron ore as such, Luo Bingsheng, the executive 
vice chairman of CISA, even suggested to the Ministry of Industry and Information at the 
steel enterprise symposium in July that government abolish iron ore spot market transactions 
in the nation. At the same time, the chairman of the association and the president of Wuhan 
Iron and Steel (the fourth largest steel plant) proposed to restrain the number of iron ore 
import licenses and also trace the distribution of the imported iron ore in the Chinese market 
(Xu, 2009h). While the Ministry of Industry and Information did not give a straightforward 
response to CISA’s request, the association’s call did confirm that the use and distribution of 
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iron ore were simply confined to steel manufacturers. The next question that begs an answer 
becomes what kind of iron ore price that CISA would consider as valid and fair. 
 
As the association equated the demand for and the use of iron ore with steel production, it is 
thus foreseeable / understandable that the price of iron ore was also closely related to that of 
steels. Indeed, throughout the two year negotiations, CISA always emphasised the strong 
correlation between iron ore price and steel price. From the beginning of the 2009 
negotiation, Shan Shanghua, the secretary general, claimed that iron ore price must drop to its 
1994 level which would then accord with the price level of steel in the Chinese market (Sina 
Finance, 9 December 2008). Not surprisingly, underneath the concern with steel price was the 
recognition of iron ore as the raw material of steel and thus as the cost of the steel inventory. 
This is reflected in one of the three principles which the CISA insisted during the negotiation 
was to maintain the balance between the production cost of the Big Three and that of Chinese 
enterprises (Zhou Y, 2009a).  
 
Also due to the fact that CISA viewed iron ore only as part of the raw material for steel 
production, the price of iron ore must thus be long term based in much the same way as how 
steel production budget should be prepared. In the debate of the long term contract based 
price versus the short term index based price that followed the 2009 negotiation and climaxed 
during the 2010 negotiation, CISA advocated the long term pricing mechanism which served 
as an indispensable tool for cost control on the part of steel manufacturers. In opposing the 
index price, Shan Shanghua pointed out that the short term based price was not favourable for 
steel plants to organise their production schedule (Caijing, 27 April 2009) and cost control 
(Yue & Zhou, 2009). That is, the use of long term price implies the identity of iron ore as the 
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raw material for steel products on the one hand and the long term basis of its price on the 
other. Similarly, this emphasis on the long term basis continued later in the association’s call 
for the ‘Chinese price’ (Yue & Zhou, 2009) where Shan Shanghua claimed to establish a new 
pricing mechanism based on China’s “own steel production demand” (Gold Bull Information, 
12 June 2009).  
 
To summarise the discourse of the value of iron ore, the CISA has literally confined the use 
of iron ore as the raw material for steel manufacturing, which corresponds to the association’s 
equation of iron ore demand with steel demand. Accordingly, the price of iron ore is 
intimately linked with that of steel products. Furthermore, the long term price is preferred, 
compared to the short term based one, and justified by the CISA in that long term based iron 
ore contracts serve as an important tool for production schedule and cost control on the part 
of steel plants.  
 
6.4.3.2. The value of iron ore interpreted by Big Three 
While the CISA, from the perspective of steel plants, considers iron ore simply as the raw 
material for steel manufacturing, the Big Three on the other hand view their product as a 
tradable commodity for sale which is subject to not only changes in steel demand but also the 
immediate market movements and the macro-economic conditions worldwide. 
 
As the producer and seller of iron ore, first of all, the Big Three by their nature regard iron 
ore as a commodity which is not necessarily limited to long term sales agreements with steel 
plants. For instance, the Big Three showed their intention to sell iron ore in China’s spot 
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market when the CISA rejected the long term based price for 2009 initially agreed by Nippon 
Steel. In 2009 June Vale for the first time publicly expressed its interest in selling iron ore in 
the spot market (Xu YL, 2009i) and began to do so in the following month (i.e. July) (Cao, 
2009a). Rio Tinto pointed out that for the 2009 financial year, already nearly half of the iron 
ores that the company manufactured were sold in spot markets (Yu X, 2009).  
 
Not only was iron ore traded in the spot market, it also became available for small and 
medium size steel plants and trading companies, regardless of its use afterwards. For the first 
quarter of 2009, Vale attributed its record high quarterly sales of 32 million tons in China to 
the fact that the firm began to sell iron ore to small and medium size steel plants as well as 
trading companies. “Usually, as long as someone is willing to buy, we are ready to sell” said 
the senior manager at Vale China (Caijing, 27 April 2009). Viewed in this way, iron ore in 
fact becomes a commodity, the value of which extends from simply the raw material for steel 
production to a world recognised goods ready for sale to any willing parties. Indeed, in 
promoting index pricing, BHP Billiton reiterated that the pricing mechanism had long been 
adopted and applied in petroleum and coal industries worldwide (Liu, 2009), which thus 
equated the attribute of iron ore to those of the other two global commodities. Jose Carlos 
Martins, CEO of Vale, also rationalised the firm’s adoption of index pricing after its 2010 
price negotiation with the CISA came to a dead end, that 
“under the new pricing mechanism (i.e. index pricing)… iron ore will become a 
commodity same as oil, copper, alumina, and soybean… there will be no blame and no 
disagreement. It will be either buy or not buy; (iron ore) transactions will be made with 
freedom” (21st Century Business Herald, 1 June 2010). 
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If iron ore is considered as a tradable commodity, then it is not surprising that the Big Three 
tend to price the commodity as per market conditions in the cases of both long term and short 
term pricing mechanisms. During the 2009 price negotiation when the long term pricing 
mechanism was at the verge of replacement, both Rio Tinto and Vale accepted the newly 
agreed annual price (reached by Nippon Steel) on the ground that it was able to fairly reflect 
market conditions (Yue & Zhou, 2009; Xu, 2009e). The argument for basing iron ore price on 
market movements became even more frequently raised and advocated by the Big Three later 
in the case of the short term based index pricing. First proposed by BHP Billiton during the 
2009 negotiation, the mining giant claimed that the conventional annual pricing mechanism 
which had last for the past 40 years was outdated (Lin, 2009), whereas the index pricing 
mechanism was more reasonable as it would be able to constantly reflect market changes in 
time (Liu, 2009). During the 2010 negotiation, Vale also justified its adoption of index 
pricing in that the traditional long term price based on the annual bilateral negotiation 
between buyers and sellers can no longer fit in the every-changing market conditions (China 
Business Network, 6 May 2010), and the new pricing mechanism on the other hand was 
totally suitable for the firm’s various clients across different markets and regions (Caijing, 24 
March 2010). Specifically, Roger Agnelli, Vale’s global CEO, pointed out that index pricing 
could enable market participants to perceive the future price of iron ore (21st Century 
Business Herald, 1 June 2010). Sam Walsh, the executive director of Rio Tinto, also 
indicated the firm’s interest in adopting index pricing so long as the new price would reflect 
the basic conditions of market (Sina Finance, 24 March 2010a). 
 
Of particular notice here is that the market condition on which iron ore price shall be based is 
different from the interpretation of market by the CISA. While the Chinese industry 
association equated iron ore market with the country’s domestic steel market on the ground 
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that (1) iron ore was considered only as the raw material for steel production and (2) the 
China was the largest iron ore purchasing market the world over, the Big Three on the other 
hand took the global market into account where iron ore price was influenced by not only the 
steel sector but also the micro as well as macro-economic and political conditions ranging 
from international shipping index (Suo, 2009a; Deng, 2009e; Zhang C, 2009c) to government 
economic stimulus package (Chen, 2008a; Gold Bull Information, 20 May 2009). 
 
To summarise how the Big Three have considered the value of iron ore, the mineral product 
is perceived as a tradable commodity, the purpose of which is not only limited to the 
production use for steel manufacturing, but also in itself sets up a class of internationally 
recognised goods in the similar nature to oil, copper, soybean, and other global commodities. 
In other words, the exchange value of iron ore is preferred before its conventional use value. 
Consequently, iron ore price is determined by market exchanges, in both long term and short 
term bases, among the Big Three, major steel plants, and small and medium size steel plants 
and trading companies, in the broad context of the global micro- and macro-economic 
environment and socio-political milieu. 
 
6.4.3.3. The value of iron ore interpreted by Chinese small and medium enterprises 
Following their interpretations of iron ore market and the correspondingly supply and 
demand relationship, the small and medium enterprise from the Chinese iron and steel sector 
consider iron ore as a commodity whose function also extends beyond the production use for 
steel manufacturing to commercial transactions between willing parties operating, in most 
cases, secondary market. More specifically, largely due to the regulatory environment in the 
Chinese industry as well as the nature of their business, the majority of the small and medium 
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players had been unable to directly purchase iron ore from the Big Three for the immediate 
use for steel production. As a consequence, iron ore was in the first place sold to these 
companies through the ‘licensed’ firms at varying premium prices which, both directly and 
otherwise, gave rise to the secondary market where the mineral product could be (re)sold for 
a few times not as the raw material for steel but in the form of a common commodity. 
 
It was not that relevant regulation did not exist to maintain the consistent interpretation of 
iron ore’s value within the entire Chinese industry. As explained by Xu Tao, the vice 
president of Tangshan Jianlong Co., Ltd (a small steel plant based in the city of Tangshan), 
there was the iron ore import agency system introduced by the Chinese government which 
prohibited the profiteering activities of those licensed importing companies that might 
otherwise sell iron ore at higher prices to the small players (Economy 30 Minutes, 2009). 
However, this regulation became a ‘dead letter’ that only existed in words not in practice. 
Faced with the limited availability as well as the exorbitant price of iron ore from those 
licensed importing companies, small and medium enterprises, rather than immediately 
consuming iron ore for production, were also provoked to resell iron ore in order to either 
transfer the huge cost burden to the next buyer or make extra profits or both. Geng Bingxi, 
the deputy secretary general at China Chamber of Industry and Commerce for Metallurgical 
Enterprises, pointed out that  
“while satisfying their own production demand, some large steel enterprises usually sell 
the extra iron ore import to make profits; subsequently, the medium and small companies 
on the other hand resell the secondary imported iron ore in the domestic market, many of 
which have been resold for more than one time” (Zhang C, 2009a). 
In the second place, even the small and medium steel plants which bought iron ore from 
major SOEs (i.e. licensed iron ore importer) or elsewhere did not put all of their purchase into 
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steel manufacturing but rather stocked some, if not many, in warehouses waiting for the price 
increase in the foreseeable future (Zhai, 2009). Gradually,  
“the profits derived from reselling iron ore may become even higher than that made from 
selling steel products. Relevant data shows that while the accumulated iron ore import in 
our nation from January to May (in 2009) amounted to 242 million tons exhibiting a 26% 
increase compared with the same period in 2008, steel sales for the entire industry for the 
first quarter of 2009 however was only RMB 449.99 billion containing a 22% decrease 
compared with the same period in 2008. Also, while the first quarter of 2009 experienced 
a RMB 3.31 billion loss, the same period in 2008 witnessed a huge profit of RMB 44.16 
billion. That is, in the context of the general depression of (China’s) domestic iron and 
steel industry and the non-existence of the actual iron ore demand for steel production, 
iron ore import keeps increasing. This can only mean that everyone, from steel plants to 
trading companies, has been playing games over the raw material (i.e. iron ore). It must 
be a lucrative business here, otherwise they would not be so into it”, 
Said Jiang Qian, the chief researcher at the energy sector of China Investment Consulting 
(Zhang C, 2009a). Such commodity attribute of iron ore became even more obvious in the 
case of trading firms. Liu Zenglin, the president at Baoye group based in the city of 
Tangshan, commented that 
“while in theory the end user of iron ore should be steel enterprises, in practice this is not 
quite so in the case of the trading companies who do not purchase iron ore for 
production. Instead, they just consider the gap between the long term price and the spot 
market counterpart, the higher the better. They do not actually consider whether or not 
steel manufacturers in the lower stream could accept the raw material cost. So long as 
you need iron ore, the bigger the price gap the better” (Economy 30 Minutes, 2009). 
 
As such, reselling iron ore within China’s domestic spot market, which was supposed to be a 
simple redistribution of iron ore import from licensed to unlicensed firms in the eyes of the 
CISA, became a profitable business itself. Viewed in this way, similar to how the Big Three 
perceived the value of iron ore, the small and medium enterprises in the Chinese iron and 
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steel sector also preferred the exchange value of the mining product compared to its use value 
for steel production. 
 
However, what distinguishes the small and medium firms from the Big Three in this regard is 
the price of iron ore. Of course it is true that, as discussed earlier, both groups indicated their 
belief in an efficient market which helps determine a fair and reasonable price for iron ore. 
Nonetheless, the distinction here involves how the two groups interpret the concepts of 
market and supply and demand. Recall from the previous discussion (in section 6.4.1.4.), 
while the Big Three considered the world market as a whole and justified their action with 
particular reference to the socio-economic factors both within and outside China, the small 
and medium enterprises passively accepted the global trend on the one hand and engaged in 
their own unique market within China on the other hand.  
 
Given the above distinction, it is argued that while aligning the price of iron ore with those of 
other global commodities such as oil and copper and acknowledging the influence of BDI 
index, the Big Three actively promoted the latest index pricing mechanism the world over. In 
contrast, the Chinese small and medium enterprises acted more in a relatively passive 
manner, accepting whichever type of price available in the market. For instance, when the 
Big Three could not reach the price agreement with the CISA in 2009 and began to lower 
down the threshold for long term based contracts, China’s small and medium firms welcomed 
the change and accepted the long run price subsequently (Caijing, 27 April 2009; Deng, 
2009e; Zhang Yan, 2009). As iron ore was made increasingly available in spot market (Su, 
2009), the small and medium players were even more willing to purchase. A private steel 
manufacturer explained that  
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“in the past because we did not have the license to buy the long term contract based iron 
ore, and had to purchase from the spot market with higher prices; at present the spot 
market price is lower than the long term price… according to normal business logic, as 
long as I have money, why is it not allowed to purchase all the iron ore that we need for 
the whole year at the low price?” (Wang J, 2009c). 
 
While the index pricing mechanism was being promoted by the Big Three, these small and 
medium companies viewed the proposed forthcoming change as the good news for two main 
reasons. In the first place, as they had been unable to share the long term contract based price 
with their SOE counterparts in the past but had to accept the exorbitant price of the secondary 
iron ore charged by those SOEs, whether or not the annual price negotiation would result in a 
favourable price to China remained almost irrelevant (Economy 30 Minutes, 2009). 
Subsequently, they were more concerned with spot market price instead, which was 
nonetheless significantly higher, in most of the time, than the long run based price that only 
their SOE counterparts were able to use. However, as the idea of index pricing was 
increasingly raised and discussed by the Big Three, the indifference on the long term price 
became a zeal for the index one. This was because, in the second place, the small and 
medium firms believed that by adopting the index price they would be able to compete with 
their SOE counterparts in a fair manner. Overall, their apathy on the long term price, passive 
acceptance of the spot market price, and enthusiasm towards the index price were explained 
by a small steel plant in Tangshan, 
“as long as the (long term price) negotiation outcome is confirmed, whether or not the 
resulting price is substantially increased has no meaning for us… basically we can only 
purchase iron ore from spot market. Therefore, even though the spot price rises to 150 
USD / ton, we will still accept the price, so long as our clients can take the price increase. 
This is the case for many small and medium size firms in Tangshan. When they cannot 
compete with large steel makers in terms of raw material costs, it is then only a matter of 
cost control and management effectiveness for each firm to improve their profitability. 
However, if the index pricing, which is more flexible, is realised, small and medium steel 
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plants will be able to adopt the new pricing mechanism much quicker and sooner than 
large size companies” (Sina Finance, 22 March 2010). 
Shen Wenrong, the chairman of Shagang group (the largest private steel plant) also 
commented on the index price that “as it is a product of market economy, it is thus neither 
good nor bad. We can only learn how to embrace it…we cannot just ignore it simply because 
it is unfavourable to us. Instead, we should further study and investigate index pricing and 
how it will affect us” (Li RX, 2010b).  
 
It is also of particular interest to note that the small and medium enterprises did not always 
passively accept whatever price offered by the three major international suppliers. The 
Rizhao International Iron Ore Trading Centre, for instance, was founded in mid-2009 with 
the aim to not only providing the intermediary service for iron ore transactions but also 
launching the Chinese iron ore price index—Rizhao Index. However, the Centre was shut 
down two weeks after its establishment, due to what the CISA considered as the speculative 
nature of the business (China Business Times, 16 June 2009). Thereafter, the small and 
medium enterprises could only accept the pricing mechanism from the global market and, 
following CISA’s failure in resisting index pricing, adopted the quarterly index price. 
 
To summarise the value of iron ore interpreted by the small and medium players in the 
Chinese iron and steel sector, this group regarded the mineral product not only as the raw 
material for steel production but also a commodity available for sale and resell. Thus, in 
relation to the value of iron ore, both the value in use and the value in exchange are 
considered, with the latter taking precedence over the former. While trading iron ore as 
commodities within China, the pricing mechanism that small and medium enterprises have 
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adopted follows whatever is offered to them by the Big Three in the market, under the 
administrative constraint imposed by the CISA. 
 
6.4.3.4. Conclusion and discussion for the discourse of the iron ore value 
To conclude the above analysis of how the value of iron ore is perceived by the three groups, 
the purpose and price of the mineral product are revealed and explored corresponding to each 
group. For the CISA, in line with the association’s emphasis on steel market, iron ore is 
considered only as the raw material for steel production, the price of which depends on the 
value in use and thus is determined by the demand for steel production. On the other hand, 
both the Big Three and the small and medium size firms in the Chinese iron and steel 
industry consider the mineral product more in the nature of a commodity rather than that of 
the raw material for steel manufacturing. This is because: on the part of the Big Three and the 
Chinese trading companies, it is the nature of their business that treats iron ore as a tradable 
commodity for sales; on the part of the small and medium steel plants, the unique context of 
the Chinese iron and steel sector has led them to engage in the reselling of the iron ore which 
were supposed to be consumed for steel production. Nonetheless, the distinction between the 
Big Three and the small and medium firms rests on their perceptions of the iron ore price. 
While both believing a market-based price, the former aligns the identity of iron ore with 
other international commodities and therefore takes the lead to promote the index price, and 
the latter plays a relative passive role in accepting prices offered in the market. 
 
Having put forward the discourse of market, supply and demand, and the value of iron ore on 
the parts of (1) the CISA, (2) the Big Three, and (3) the Chinese small and medium 
enterprises, attention should now be turned to the respective mode of production on which the 
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discourse of the three groups is based. After all, it is the underlying mode of production 
which constitutes and conditions the corresponding discourse (Marx & Engels, 1974). 
 
6.5. Respective modes of production to each group 
As illustrated in chapter four, the modes of production considered in this thesis include 
production, commerce, and finance. In particular, their respective capital movements are 
explored, with the first two (i.e. productive and commercial capital) comprising the circuit of 
industrial capital. For instance, the movement of productive capital begins with the purchase 
of human labour and the means of production and ends with the finished goods ready for sale. 
Commercial capital involves the ex ante purchase and the ex post sale of commodities. 
Financial capital lends money to industrial capitalists at first and receives the principal plus 
interest income afterwards. Granted, it is naïve and unrealistic to narrowly define any of the 
enterprises represented by the three groups analysed above as productive, commercial, or 
financial capitalists, given the increasing involvement between financial and non-financial 
sectors in modern corporations (see e.g. Orhangazi, 2008). The major Chinese SOEs 
represented by the CISA, for example, may also engage in some financing activities in 
addition to the primary focus on steel manufacturing. Therefore, it is necessary to pointed out 
that the following analysis simply concerns the mode of production which the three groups 
adopted, both consciously and otherwise, to constitute their discourse regarding the price of 
iron ore. 
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6.5.1. Mode of production by CISA 
Following CISA’s interpretation of market, supply and demand, and the value of iron ore, a 
relatively closed circuit of productive capital can be perceived in Figure 6.7 below.  
 
Starting from the purpose of iron ore, the CISA assigned the mineral product (C) simply as 
the means of production (MP), that is, the raw material for steel (C’) manufacturing. The 
price of iron ore is thus intimately linked with that of steel products. This also justifies the 
Chinese association’s confinement of iron ore supply and demand to the level of (domestic) 
steel output (C’). As such, iron ore, once has been imported from the Big Three at the price of 
M, must be converted immediately from commodity (C) into the means of production (MP). 
Coupled with the input of human labour (L), the production means (MP) is then turned into 
steel products (C’) available for sale at the price of M’, when the production process (P) is 
completed. Given such a direct transformation of iron ore (C) into steel product (C’) and that 
China is the largest importer of iron ore in the world, the Chinese steel market naturally 
becomes the major determinant for the global iron ore market. The whole process / 
movement is facilitated and enforced through relevant administrative procedure and 
regulatory requirement introduced by both the CISA and other government departments.  
 
While these regulations are set out to, in theory, prohibits any reselling of iron ore in the 
country (except those authorised by the iron ore import agency system), they are nevertheless 
not well implemented in practice which has led to the emergence of an unofficial market 
where iron ore becomes a tradable commodity among the small and medium enterprises in 
the Chinese iron and steel sector. Thereafter, the next question becomes which mode of 
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production that these firms use to construct, rationalise, and reinforce their discourse over the 
price of iron ore, and in particular the transaction of secondary iron ore in the domestic 
market. The following section is thus directed towards this end. 
 
6.5.2. Mode of production by Chinese small and medium enterprises 
Unlike the CISA, the small and medium size trading firms and steel plants in the Chinese iron 
and steel sector not only consume iron ore for steel production but also sell the mineral 
product to make profits. More importantly, considering the unique market where these small 
and medium players resell iron ore for profits, it is the commodity attribute of iron ore 
underneath their discourse regarding the mineral product’s price. In other words, iron ore is 
treated as a commodity (C), purchased first by the small and medium enterprises from either 
domestic or overseas suppliers at the price of M, and sold later to other market participants at 
the price of M’. The movement of capital can be illustrated in Figure 6.8 as follows. 
 
Admittedly, not all of the iron ores bought by the small and medium steel plants was 
subsequently sold to other companies for profits. However, the fact that at least some of these 
iron ore were put into steel production in the first place does not render the small and medium 
players into the category of productive capitalists, as Marx indicated 
“(s)hould merchant’s capital (i.e. commercial capital) yield a higher percentage of 
average profit than industrial capital, then a portion of the latter would transform itself 
into merchant’s capital. Should it yield a lower average profit, then the converse would 
result…No species of capital changes its purpose, or function, with greater ease than 
merchant’s capital (i.e. commercial capital)” (Marx, 1959, p.190). 
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Therefore, it is argued that, in relation to the sale and resale of iron ore, the small and 
medium enterprises are considered as commercial capitalists. Moreover, also shown from the 
above quote is that these firms choose to operate in the circuit of commercial, rather than 
productive, capital because of higher profit they could achieve by selling iron ore than they 
would have otherwise realised from consuming  the mineral product in steel production. 
However, what is still not certain here is whether or not there exists any limit on the selling 
price of iron ore (M’) which encourages or discourages the productive and / or commercial 
activities in question. Recall from the discussion in section 6.4.3.3. regarding the price of iron 
ore, it has been illustrated that the Chinese small and medium firms follow whatever price 
offered by the Big Three, including the long term benchmark price at first, the spot market 
price latter, and the index price at last. Now the concern becomes to what extent the Big 
Three influence the commercial capitalists on the selling price of iron ore (M’).  
 
6.5.3. Mode of production by Big Three 
First of all, it is relatively easy to discern that, as the world’s major manufacturer and supplier 
of iron ore, the Big Three play the role of industrial capitalists comprising both productive 
and commercial activities, which is depicted in Figure 6.9 below. 
 
While seemingly combing the circuit of capital from the production and commerce 
demonstrated above (in Figures 6.7 and 6.8), it is noteworthy that, unlike the CISA (in Figure 
6.7) which treats iron ore as the means of production, the Big Three here being the industrial 
capitalist (as in Figure 6.9) regard iron ore as the finish goods manufactured and available for 
sale. That is, the three major iron ore suppliers spend the initial capital (M) to purchase 
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commodity (C) including human labour (L) and the relevant production means (MP) for the 
production (P) of iron ore (C’), which will then be sold at the price of M’. Having described 
the circuit of industrial capital on the part of the Big Three, however, attention should now 
return to the different types of capital movement between the Big Three and the Chinese 
small and medium enterprises. This is because while, by simply judging from Figures 6.8 and 
6.9, both groups do act the same role of the commercial capitalist who makes profit by selling 
iron ore,  there does exist, as discussed earlier, the distinction in the pricing mechanism of 
iron ore. 
 
Recall from the broader circulation of productive, commercial, and financial capital outlined 
in chapter four, it is argued that the participation of financial capitals will affect, and thus to 
some extent limit, the way in which the surplus value (i.e. unpaid labour) is distributed. Then 
the question becomes whether or not the pricing mechanism promoted by the Big Three falls 
into the category of the financial capital that confines the profitability of the commercial 
capital. To this end, there is a need to revisit the concept of index pricing initially proposed 
by the Big Three. 
 
While there were three types of iron ore index including Metal Bulletin Iron Ore Index 
(MBIO index), The Steel Index (TSI index), and Platts IODEX (Platts index) when BHP 
Billiton raised the idea of index pricing in 2009, it is the Platts index that has been adopted by 
the Big Three as a result of the 2010 negotiation. According to Platts, the index serves as a 
“benchmark assessment of the spot price of physical iron ore” (Platts, 2015a). In particular, 
acquired through instant messaging software, telephone, email, and fax, the data assessment 
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of Platts index involves a wide range of real time market information on a daily basis 
including  
“confirmed trades, firms bids that are open to the marketplace as a whole… firm offers 
that are open to the market place as a whole… expression of interest to trade with 
published bids and offers… indicative values… reported transactional activity heard 
across the market… (and) other data that may be relevant to Platts assessments, such as 
supply/demand fundamentals and other factors affecting the price of a particular 
commodity” (Platts, 2015b, p.3). 
Noticeable here is Platts’ inclusion of bids, offers and expression of interest to trade which 
are by no means the actual transactions in the physical iron ore market, but exhibit 
considerable resemblance to those of the financial market. Furthermore, rather than giving 
priority to the physical market transactions over the bids and offers in the calculation of the 
index, Platts in fact adopts the opposite treatment. That is,  
“(f)irm bids and offers that are available to the entire market take precedence over trades 
that have been concluded earlier in the assessment process when establishing the value of 
the market… firms bids and offers that are available to the entire market take precedence 
over transactional activity reported to Platts after the fact” (Platts, 2015b, p.5). 
This is where the distinction in the so called market based pricing between the Chinese small 
and medium enterprises and the Big Three manifests itself: while the former operate in a 
commercial market where iron ore price is determined via spot transactions (as in Figure 6.8), 
the latter in reality price the steelmaking ingredient largely in accordance with the virtual 
transactions through bids and offers. Therefore, unlike the Chinese commercial capitalists 
who first use money (M) to purchase iron ore (C) in order to sell it later at a higher price 
(M’), the index price promoted by the Big Three acts more in the nature of a financial 
capitalist who does not necessary engage in the actual trade of iron ore but simply invests a 
certain amount of money (M) with the expectation of higher returns (M”) afterwards. 
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The identity of financial capital as such is further confirmed through an array of financial 
derivatives which derive their value from the Platts index as the underlying instrument. These 
include the forward contracts traded by investment banks, equity funds, trading companies, 
and private investors (Chen SS, 2009d), as well as the paper swaps offered by Platts itself. 
Assessed and published on monthly, quarterly and annual bases, the iron ore swaps are 
defined by Platts as “risk management tools which allow users to lock in values by 
transforming floating price risk to fixed or fixed to floating… trade(d) freely in an over the 
counter market … at any time” (Platts, 2015b, p.11). Moreover, Platts also points out the 
distinction between physically-settled transactions and the financially-settled (through swaps) 
ones: “in the first case the buyer would take delivery of a cargo of the product, while in the 
second case the buyer would pay (or be paid) the difference between the swap price and the 
average of Platts’ iron ore cargo assessments in (the period concerned)” (Platts, 2015b, p.11). 
This corresponds to the different capital movement between commerce and finance 
illuminated in the previous paragraph. While the circuit of commercial capital is illustrated in 
Figure 6.8, the financial capital counterpart is presented in Figure 6.10 below. 
 
Thus, the financial capitalists begin with bids, offers, contracts, swaps, or other financial 
derivatives at the price of M, as “risk management…(or) speculative tools” (Platts, 2015b, 
p.11), and sell the instruments later for M”, “hedged using positions in the financial 
derivative market” (Platts, 2015a). 
 
Having assigned the role of financial capital to the index pricing of iron ore promoted by the 
Big Three, the mining giants themselves in fact also exhibit substantial and close relationship 
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with the global financial capitalists. As illustrated in chapter four (see Tables 4.1-4.6), most 
of the top 20 shareholders at the Big Three come from financial markets. More specifically, 
more than 60% shares of BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto are in the hands of financial capitalists, 
some of whom hold the shares at both firms at the same time. These include HSBC as the 
largest shareholder of BHP Billiton as well as Rio Tinto, J.P. Morgan the second largest, and 
other financial institutions such as Citicorp, Sate Street, Capital Group Companies, and The 
Bank of New York Mellon Corporation which also hold significant amount of shares at the 
three mining companies.  
 
Taking the shareholding connection between the Big Three and the financial sector into 
consideration, the broad movement of financial capital emerges in Figure 6.11. 
Figure 6.11 Broad movement of financial capital reflected by Big Three 
 
In phase one, M – M, shareholders from the financial sector invest M in the Big Three which 
then in phase two utilise the money (M) as the productive capitalist to purchase labour force 
(L) and means of production (MP). When the manufacturing process (P) in phase three is 
completed and iron ore is subsequently sold in the fourth phase at the price of M’ realising 
the profit of ∆M, the profit is then either allocated as dividends (M”) that flow back to the 
financial capital or retained as the reinvestment (iM) in the mining corporations in phase six. 
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In addition, the entangled web does not stop within the Big Three but expand to the field of 
iron ore pricing. In fact, some of the major shareholders of the Big Three including the Union 
Bank of Switzerland and the Deutsche Bank were among the first to launch financial 
derivatives based on the price of iron ore back in 2008 (China Economic Times, 13 
November 2008). More importantly, there also exists close relationship between the financial 
sector and the publisher of the iron ore index price, Platts (see Figure 4.1). First, the parent 
entity of Platts, McGraw Hill Financial Inc., comes from the financial sector. And, 
surprisingly still, McGraw Hill also shares the same group of financial conglomerates with 
the Big Three, including Capital Group Companies, State Street, The Bank of New York, and 
so forth. Of particular interest to note is Black Rock. Not only is the company the second 
largest shareholder of McGraw Hill, the third largest shareholder of Rio Tinto Plc, and the 
fourth largest shareholder of Vale,  but it is also the largest shareholder of HSBC, J.P. 
Morgan, and Citigroup which are as well the top three shareholders at BHP Billiton and Rio 
Tinto.  
 
To summarise the two aspects of financial capital movement illustrated above, the financial 
sector has to a large extent penetrated the global iron ore market in relation to (1) the index 
pricing mechanism from which relevant financial derivatives derive; (2) the publisher of the 
index (i.e. Platts); and (3) even the Big Three themselves. It is therefore the role of financial 
capital which the Big Three have played, and in particular adopted as mode of production 
underlying their discourse, in negotiation the index price of iron ore with the CISA.  
 
With the modes of production identified respectively on the parts of (1) the CISA, (2) the 
small and medium enterprises in the Chinese iron and steel industry, and (3) the Big Three, 
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the concern becomes how the three modes of production interact with one another, in order to 
answer the research question as to why the CISA, as represented by the productive capital, 
failed in its attempt to resist the expansion of financial capital in the Chinese iron and steel 
sector. Specifically, considering such a high level of penetration of financial capital into the 
Big Three in particular and the global iron ore market at large in which the traditional 
productive and commercial capitalists operate, another issue remains unanswered is whether 
the financial sector will be the “driving force in its (capitalist) development to its highest and 
ultimate form” (Marx, 1959, p.433) or the “most potent means of driving capitalist 
production beyond its own limits, and one of the most effective vehicles of crises and 
swindle” (ibid). These shall be discussed in the next chapter.





Chapter 7 Shift to Financialisation of Iron Ore Price—Interaction 
among Modes of Production 
 
In chapter six, the accounting discourse as to the pricing mechanism of iron ore between the 
Chinese iron and steel industry and the Big Three are analysed. The corresponding modes of 
production underneath the discourse are identified with particular reference to respective 
groups. That is, in relation to how the iron ore price should be, the CISA defended the long 
term contract based price from the perspective of a productive capitalist; the small and 
medium enterprises in the Chinese iron and steel industry accepted whichever type of price 
offered in the spot market in which they operate as commercial capitalists; and the Big Three, 
with their intricate connection with the financial market and in particular with the publisher 
of the iron ore index, promoted the index price from the financial capitalist’s point of view.  
 
In this chapter, the investigation explores the inter-relationship between these three modes of 
production informed by Marx’s theoretical framework outlined in chapter four. In particular, 
the way in which the interaction among the three groups is analysed consistent with the 
second level of the analytical method illustrated in chapter five. In other words, if, say, 
chapter six has identified the corresponding modes of production for the CISA, the small and 
medium enterprises in the Chinese iron and steel industry, and the Big Three based on the 
respective discourse during the negotiations, the current chapter then examines the interaction 
among the three by situating them in the context of civil society where the movement of 
productive, commercial, and financial capital transcends the nations and states. From the 
perspective of the capitalist mode of production, the emergence of first the commercial and 





later the financial capitalists in the Chinese iron ore market is explored through the 
interaction of the three groups, bear in mind the research question of the thesis as to why the 
Chinese iron and steel sector failed in resisting the wave of financialisation. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The first section (7.1.) revisits Marx’s 
explanation of the interaction among production, commerce, and finance in the context of the 
global iron ore market. In particular, the inner connection among the productive, commercial, 
and financial capital is presented, and the question raised in the end of chapter six as to 
whether finance contributes or compromises production and commerce is addressed. At the 
same time, the contributing factor of the shifts in iron ore pricing from the long run contract 
based price, to the spot market price and ultimately the financialised quarterly price is 
discussed, consistent with Marx’s view that the change in mode of production originates from 
the conflict between productive forces and social relations. The second section (7.2.) 
compares CISA’s interpretation on financialisation with that of Marx, in order to appreciate 
why the Chinese association failed to resist the financialised pricing mechanism of iron ore. 
Specifically, CISA’s view on the proposed solution to financialisation in the Chinese iron and 
steel industry are explored, alongside the corresponding discussion of Marx’s opinion on the 
subject. A conclusion is drawn in the final section (7.3.). 
 
7.1. Interaction of production, commerce, and finance in the Chinese iron ore market 
As illustrated in chapter four, the capital movements of production, commerce, and finance 
are in fact interrelated where the financial capital flows first to the hands of the commercial 
capital, through to the productive capital which transforms labour and production means into 
commodity ready for sale, and finally returns back to finance from the profit realised by the 





commercial capital when the sale is made. In terms of the actual practice of such circuit of 
capital, the case of Big Three illuminated in chapter six accords with the capital movement 
here. Also mentioned in chapter four is the seemingly paradoxical relationship between the 
financial and the productive and commercial capitalists in that the higher the profit is 
extracted by one party, the less will be left with other parties. While this might be the case 
where a traditional industrial capitalist borrows money from a financial capitalist and pays 
interest expenses, as the reduction from total income, to the latter, however this is not quite 
the case with the Big Three. This is because the financial capital, which in such case refers to 
the international financial conglomerates including HSBC, J.P. Morgan, Citicorp, State 
Street, etc., have in fact become the major shareholders of the Big Three who are regarded as 
productive and commercial capitalists. Therefore, at the manifest level the reallocation of 
profits among them is no longer a result of the antagonistic relation among the industrial and 
the financial capitalists, but the natural outflow of dividends from the former to the latter.  
 
In other words, it is not even the conflict between different fractions within the capitalist 
class, considering the legitimised distribution of dividends to company shareholders. 
Moreover, the participation of financial capital in the index publishing organisation (i.e. 
Platts) (see Table 4.7) further aligns the interest of the global mining giants with that of the 
financial sector. Such an alliance between financial and non-financial capitalists effectively 
expands beyond the boundaries of any nation which is considered by Marx as the subordinate 
of capitalist mode of production (Marx & Engels, 1974, p.79). Thus, taking the global 
economy as a whole which the Big Three have always emphasised throughout their discourse 
of the iron ore price (see for example Xu YL, 2009e) and which the Platts index is claimed to 
be not origin specific (Platts, 2015a), capital, as Marx (1959, p.172) argued, will naturally 





flow to whichever sector that extracts the highest surplus value, which in this study points to 
the Chinese iron and steel industry. Indeed, as exemplified in chapter six, in supporting the 
price increase and promoting the index of iron ore, the Big Three kept referring to the strong 
potential of the Chinese steel market and the nation’s economy as a whole (see for example 
Chen, 2008a; Caijing, 27 April 2009; Gold Bull Information, 20 May 2009; Yan, 2009; 
Zhang C, 2009b; Miao, 2010; Ming, 2010; Sina Finance, 24 March 2010b, 8 May 2010). 
 
In fact, not only the Big Three, some of the financial capitalists including the major 
shareholders of the Big Three also expressed their optimism in the thriving iron ore market 
primarily boosted by the Chinese demand. For instance, in the beginning of the 2010 
negotiation (i.e. 2009 December), when the CISA found little room for mining companies to 
increase the iron ore price, Morgan Stanely, the top 10 shareholder of McGraw Hill Financial 
Inc. (i.e. the parent entity of Platts), already expected the price to go up by 20% in the 
forthcoming year and stay on the upward trend for the subsequent two years by 30% and 10% 
respectively (Chen SS, 2009c). In the early March of 2010 when the CISA refused to accept 
the potential 50% price increase proposed by the Big Three, Morgan Stanley report even 
adjusted its previously expected price increase to 60% (Jiao, 2010b). At about the same time, 
J.P. Morgan, the top 5 shareholder of BHP Billiton Limited and Rio Tinto Limited, and the 
top 20 shareholder of Vale S.A., estimated that the raw material cost of steel would be 
increased by more than 200% (Global Times, 9 March 2010). 
 
Similarly, the Union Bank of Switzerland, the top 10 shareholder at BHP Billiton Ltd, Rio 
Tinto Ltd and Rio Tinto Plc, also estimated a 20% price increase in early 2010 (Sina Finance, 
14 January 2010) and then raised the rate to 40%-50% a week later (Wang J, 2010b). 





Deutsche Bank, in the meantime, the top 20 shareholder of Rio Tinto Plc and McGraw Hill 
Financial, anticipated the price of iron ore to raise by 35%, on the basis that the global iron 
ore supply in 2010 would be less than the demand (DFdaily, 14 January 2010). Following 
other investment banks’ prediction, Goldman Sachs, the top 20 shareholder of Vale S.A., also 
adjusted the expected price rise to 35% in 2010 January (Wang J, 2010b). 
 
So far have been discussed the legitimised redistribution of profit from the productive and 
commercial to the financial capitalists, and the incentive of capital movement from the 
financial market to the conventional industrial sector. While these may be explained by 
Marx’s view on regulation that “the law has always been compelled to admit (the new forms 
of capitalist production) among the modes of acquiring property” (Marx & Engels, 1974, 
p.81), and his interpretation of the sole purpose of capital, what remains uncertain here is 
whether financialisation of the international iron ore market contributes or compromises the 
traditional iron and steel industry. That is, in chapter four, it is only illuminated in theory 
where Marx (1959) points out that finance could be either a driving force in (capitalistic) 
development” or “one of the most effective vehicles of crises and swindle” (p.433). The 
following section thus carries on the unfinished discussion in chapter four, coupled with the 
practicality of the global iron ore market, in order to flesh out the investigation in both theory 
and practice. 
 
7.1.1. Productive vs. Commercial Capital in the case of the Chinese iron ore market 
First of all, to illustrate how financial capital may assist and in itself become the capitalist 
mode of production, there is a need to revisit, in the context of the international iron ore 





market, the broad capital movement of production, commerce, and finance outlined in 
chapter 6 (see Figure 6.11).  
 
To begin with, commercial capitalists purchase iron ore (C’) as the finished goods from the 
productive capitalists, most of whom are in this case the Big Three. Admittedly, it has been 
recognised in both the extant literature (e.g. Stockhammer, 2004; Orhangazi, 2008) and 
previous chapters (four and six) that contemporary industrial capitalists such as the Big Three 
have been increasingly involved in not only productive but also commercial and financial 
activities. However, the discussion here concerns the interaction among different fractions of 
capital, rather than the relation between individual capitalists which has been in fact 
extensively explored in chapter four and six. Thus, it is decided to leave the multiple 
identities of the Big Three (as productive, commercial, and financial capitalists at the same 
time) out of consideration. To continue the discussion, as the iron ore is passed from 
productive to commercial capitalists, so is the duty of selling it. In this regard, the productive 
capitalist, as argued by Marx (1959), will function more efficiently in that the process of 
converting iron ore into cash can be shortened through the commercial capitalist serving as 
the intermediary selling the mineral product on the former’s behalf. As such, the producers of 
iron ore will be able to “constantly employ a larger portion of… capital in the actual process 
of production, and a smaller portion as money reserve (to purchase labour and the means of 
production)” (ibid, p.186). 
 
Moreover, when assisting one group of productive capital in becoming more efficient, the 
same commercial capital is also able to help other groups of manufacturers on the same 
industry chain in such a way as to “expedite the opposite phases of the metamorphosis of 





commodity-capital” (p.203). In the case of the global iron ore market, for instance, the iron 
ore trading companies best exemplified such a role. More specifically, the relationship among 
one commercial capitalist and two productive capitalists within the related industrial branch 
is depicted in Figure 7.1 below. On the one hand, these iron ore traders first purchase iron ore 
from the Big Three who are then enabled to realise their profit, that is, to complete the final 
phase of the movement of industrial capital C’ – M’ (as outlined in the phase 1). On the other 
hand, when the iron ore traders sell the steel making ingredients to the steel manufacturers, 
the former also promotes the latter to convert monetary capital into the means of production 
via M – C (MP) (as outlined in phase 2).  
 
 
While the relationship between production and commerce illuminated thus far indicates that 
the latter promotes the former in theory, in the actual practice of the Chinese iron ore market 
the attitude towards the commercial transactions of iron ore does vary among the Big Three, 
the small and medium enterprises, and the CISA. 
 





7.1.1.1. Big Three’s lean towards commercial capitalists 
First of all, consistent with their role as the financial capitalist identified in the end of chapter 
six, the Big Three took the initiative to trade with the commercial capitalist, which, in this 
case, purports to the small and medium size Chinese steel plants and trading companies. This 
was initiated by the conflict in the social relations between the Big Three and their Chinese 
customers. In the beginning of 2009, Vale withdrew from the iron ore price negotiation, on 
the ground that whilst it was the first of the Big Three to reach the annual price (which 
contained a 65%-71% price increase) during the 2008 negotiation, the ‘initial price’ was not 
followed by Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton which subsequently came with an even higher price 
(which contained a 85% price increase) (Wang J, 2009d; Cao, 2009c). Two days after Vale’s 
announcement, Rio Tinto also told the press that the firm would stop the negotiation until 
market conditions recovered (Cao, 2009c). This was partly because the plunged iron ore 
demand as a result of the GFC (He, 2008), and partly due to the fact that the 2008 long term 
price based contract was not implemented very well on the parts of the Chinese buyers who 
did not honour the contract but turned to the spot market at a lower price than the contract 
one instead (Caijing, 27 April 2009).  
 
Thus, in the absence of the agreement with the CISA on the new annual price, the traditional 
form of the social intercourse between the Big Three and their Chinese clients (i.e. the 
licensed steel plants and trading companies) was not implemented. Sam Walsh, the chief of 
Rio Tinto’s Iron Ore division, even indicated that, if the firm could not reach the annual price 
agreement with the CISA, the firm would, according to relevant terms and conditions, 
terminate the contract with its Chinese clients (Wang J, 2009a).Compared to Vale and Rio 
Tinto, BHP Billiton showed the least interest in the annual price negotiation, as the company 





kept promoting the index pricing since the beginning of the year (Liu, 2009). In the Chinese 
iron and steel industry, on the other hand, it was not only the major SOEs that needed to 
purchase iron ore, but also the small and medium steel plants which resumed and increased 
their level of production since the end of 2008 due to the Chinese government’s economic 
stimulus package (Chen, 2008b; Cao, 2009c; Li JL, 2009b).  
 
As such, from Marx’s perspective (Marx & Engels, 1974, p.87), there existed a contradiction 
between the traditional annual pricing mechanism (as the old form of social relation that was 
not working) and the increased iron ore demand from China’s steel plants (as then the current 
productive force). The conflict remained so until April when the Big Three began to use a 
temporary price (which contained a 20% discount) to satisfy the demand of the Chinese 
market. In May, Vale turned to the small and medium firms in the Chinese market in order to 
maintain and increase its level of production (Deng, 2009e). In June, the firm had already 
signed up sales contracts with 38 small and medium size firms for nearly 50 million tons of 
iron ore, which accounted for more than half of Vale’s annual sales in 2008 (i.e. 85 million 
tons) (Zhang Yi, 2009f). At about the same time, BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto also began to 
sign up contracts in private with the small players (Zhang Yi, 2009f; Chen SS, 2009e). As the 
2009 price negotiation reached a stalemate and did not finish by its traditional due date (i.e. 
30 June), the Big Three further opened their door to all Chinese buyers via the spot market 
since 2009 July (Cao, 2009a). That is, the mining giants all took the initiative to charter ships 
delivering iron ore to China, even before locating any specific buyers (Su, 2009). As such, 
iron ore was in effect no longer simply the raw material (MP) for steel manufacturing but 
became a commodity (C) also available for commercial transactions.  
 





Moreover, in addition to the traditional merchandise of iron ore, BHP Billiton also promoted 
the index pricing to the private steel plants in China (Wan, 2009a). Compared to the 
conventional annual pricing mechanism as the old form of social relations between the Big 
Three and their global clients, the index pricing was considered by the mining giant as the 
next solution, since it would be more transparent and thus deliver a smoother channel of 
communication to clients (Deng, 2009c; Tang, 2009). By the end of July, while Rio Tinto and 
Vale claimed to use either the newly settled annual price by the Japanese and Korean steel 
plants or the spot price in dealing with the Chinese market (Han, 2009a; Yue & Zhou, 2009; 
Li Q, 2009), BHP Billiton announced that 30% of the group’s total iron ore sales for the 2009 
financial year would be based on a mixed pricing model that combined quarterly, spot, and 
indexed prices (China News Service, 29 July 2009). The partial adoption of the index price, it 
is argued, heralded the era of the financialised pricing mechanism in the global iron ore 
market. Before proceeding to the discussion of the financial capital concerned in this case, it 
is necessary to also explore the attitude of China’s small and medium size enterprises on the 
interaction between production and commerce.  
 
7.1.1.2. Chinese small and medium enterprises’ shift to commercial capitalists 
In response to the opened door of the Big Three, the second group, that is, the small and 
medium firms, welcomed the offer. Specifically, they considered it as the opportunity to 
fairly compete with the SOEs which resold the imported iron ore to them at exhibitive prices 
in the domestic market and which were thus considered as ‘an exclusive club joined by the 
rich and wealthy’ in the Chinese iron and steel industry (Li RX, 2010a). 
“in the past, the long term contract price is always lower than the spot price, the large 
firms made huge profits from it (selling iron ore to small and medium enterprises), 





whereas the small firms did not share anything from that. This was particularly so last 
year (i.e. 2008) when the iron ore spot price increased to RMB 1590 / ton that was RMB 
400-500 / ton higher than the long term contract price. At that time those large size firms 
with long run contracts did not share any iron ore with us to support our development, 
and even sold their cheaply imported iron ore to us at higher prices… Now the market 
has changed, (small and medium size firms) wanted to grab this opportunity to join the 
‘long run price mechanism’” (Zhang Yi, 2009f). 
 
In other words, the emergence of the commercial transaction of iron ore in China’s spot 
market served as the solution to the conflict between: (1) the traditional form of social 
relation between the small and medium enterprises and their state-owned counterparts (where 
the latter, through political advantages, imposed higher raw material costs on the former); and 
(2) the potential productive force of the former. To state it simply, on the one hand, the 
licensed iron ore importing steel plants and trading companies (most of which were SOEs) 
had long been taking advantage of the exclusive access to the seaborn iron ore market by 
profiteering from reselling their import to the small and medium size players in China’s 
domestic market. On the other hand, under the pressure of being merged with their state-
owned counterparts, these small and medium enterprises needed to purchase an increasing 
number of iron ore so as to maintain their level of steel output and thus avoid the industry 
wide M&A (Wang J, 2009c). Thus, participating in the commercial trade of iron ore not only 
enabled these firms to purchase iron ore at cheaper prices but also gave them, fundamentally, 
an equal access to the market of seaborn iron ore. In Marx’s term (Marx & Engels, 1974, 
p.87), the mode of production in China’s iron ore market was thus advanced from traditional 
productive arrangement to commercial transactions.  
 





Gradually, even after Japan and Korea had settled the new annual price with the Big Three 
and the CISA had not, an increasing number of small and medium firms in the Chinese 
market adopted in private the newly agreed offer from the Big Three (Li XH, 2009). In the 
first place, for those small and medium size firms which did not have the contract based 
supply from the Big Three at the time, they would rather purchase from their peers (i.e. the 
small and medium companies which had bought iron ore from Big Three in private) at lower 
prices than from the licensed SOEs (Zhang C, 2009a). In the second place, not only the small 
and medium firms that bought iron ore from their peers, even some of the licensed SOEs, 
which could not meet the production demand by their own contracted amount, engaged in the 
trade of the secondary iron ore with the small players (Zhu, 2009; Zhang XD, 2009a). 
 
While this type of iron ore transactions among the small and medium enterprises was not 
officially approved by the CISA, the steel plants involved claimed that their production level 
was increased thanks to these iron ore trades. That is, consistent with Figure 7.1 which 
depicts the improved efficiency of the productive capitalists at both ends of the industrial 
chain facilitated by the involvement of commercial capital, the small and medium enterprises 
in the Chinese iron and steel sector for the first time served as commercial capitalists, thanks 
to the opened door of the Big Three, and thus contributed to the efficient operations of both 
iron ore suppliers on the upper stream and steel plants on the lower steam.  In 2009 July, Vale 
announced a 59 billion USD investment in iron ore mining programmes for the next five 
years (from 2010 to 2014), increasing the firm’s iron ore production capacity from 296 
million tons in 2007 to 422 million tons in 2012. While Brazil’s national iron ore output level 
was estimated to rise to 475 million tons by 2012, its Australian equivalent was expected to 
grow to 460 million tons (Dong, 2009c). At the same time, the Big Three also indicated that 





their iron ore production was at the full capacity (Xu YL, 2009e). At the other end of the 
industrial chain, the growth in the output level was also, if not more, evident. That is, China’s 
small and medium size steel plants were at full production capacity to take advantage of the 
newly available iron ore in the domestic market (Zhu, 2009) and to fundamentally maintain 
and even expand their market shares (Wang J, 2009c; Zhang HY, 2009b). According to the 
report published by China’s General Administration of Custom, for the first half of 2009 the 
small and medium steel plants and trading companies were able to import iron ore directly 
from the Big Three thanks to the lowered threshold of minimum purchase, and thus operated 
much better than those large size steel plants (Zhang Yan, 2009). 
 
As the number of companies entering into the commercial transactions of the secondary iron 
ore kept increasing, the establishment of Rizhao International Iron Ore Trading Centre 
symbolised perhaps the climax of the iron ore trade among the privately-owned small and 
medium companies in China’s domestic market. The centre was jointly founded in 2009 May 
by the five privately owned companies
59
 based in the city of Rizhao (China National Radio, 
26 June 2009), the largest iron ore importing city in China. It was aimed at providing third 
party intermediary services for iron ore transactions, financing, and so forth (China Business 
Times, 16 June 2009). More importantly, the centre would also launch the Chinese version of 
the iron ore price index, namely the Rizhao Index. However, within less than a month the 
centre was shut down and asked to undertake significant restructuring and to rename the 
organisation by the CISA. Thus, the attempt to shift to the financialised pricing mechanism 
by the country’s very own organisation, the Rizhao Centre, was stifled in its cradle. Before 
                                                          
59 These include Shandong Wanbao Group, Shandong Huaxin Group, and Rizhao Zhongrui Group, each of which holding 
30% of the centre’s shares, and two other companies each holding 5% shares of the centre (China National Radio, 26 June 
2009). 





discussing the rationale behind CISA’s suppression on the centre’s potential involvement 
with the financial sector, attention should now be given to the association’s attitude towards 
the emergence of iron ore commercial transactions.  
 
7.1.1.3. CISA’s repudiation of commercial capitalists 
While the Big Three turned towards the small and medium size companies which transferred 
the traditional role of iron ore from the raw material for steel production to a tradable 
commodity for resale, the CISA as the third group analysed from chapter six took a 
completely different point of view. That is, the industry organisation always opposed the idea 
of the secondary transaction of iron ore in China’s domestic market, and thus prohibited the 
unlicensed iron ore trading firms (most of which are small and medium enterprises) from 
importing and trading iron ore. For instance, in response to the private iron ore trade that first 
emerged in the beginning of 2009 between the Big Three and the small and medium firms, 
Shan Shanghua, the secretary general of CISA, formally declared that “these firms have 
neither the authority nor the qualification to sign the long term iron ore contract, even they 
had signed up the so called ‘contract’, it would not be able to go through custom, (and so) 
would be nothing but a piece of wastepaper” (Gold Bull Information, 12 June 2009).  
 
To stop the ‘unqualified’ trade as such, the CISA not only formed investigation team with the 
corresponding government departments such as the Ministry of Commerce to supervise the 
nation’s domestic market, but also introduced and attempted to impose relevant standards and 
regulations onto the Chinese iron and steel industry, in order to officially obliterate any 
commercial transactions of iron ore in China’s domestic market. Subsequently, the only 
channel in which the small and medium size firms could purchase iron ore was through a 





limited number of licensed importers, most of which were major SOEs, at the pre-designated 
agency fee of 3-5%. 
 
While dismissing the commercial transaction of iron ore in the domestic market, the CISA 
also disavowed the improved capacity of steel production, resulting from the iron ore trade as 
such, in the Chinese iron and steel sector. In 2009 July, the CISA revealed that China’s 
domestic steel production hit a record high in the first half of the year, which was nonetheless 
based on the overcapacity mostly at the small and medium steel plants nationwide (Xu YL, 
2009f). Thus, the increase in the level of steel output was considered as the obstacle to close 
down the obsolete production capacity as well as the contributing factor to the illusionary 
iron ore demand from the Chinese iron and steel industry (Xu YL, 2009c). Consistent with 
the CISA, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce also lambasted this type of production 
overcapacity (Han, 2009c) and asked that China’s steel enterprises not to launch any new 
projects within the next three years (from 2010 to 2012) (Yangcheng Evening News, 14 
August 2009). Similarly, the Ministry of Industry and Information also regarded the 
production capacity increase as one serious issue significantly impeding the healthy 
development of the Chinese steel sector (Zhou RX, 2009b). 
 
Having pointed out CISA’s refutation of both the newly emerged commercial market for iron 
ore and the resulting increased level of steel output, one wonders then why the CISA, in the 
mentality of a productive capitalist (i.e. manufacturing steel) as identified in chapter six, 
failed to adapt to the emergence of commercial capital whereas the Big Three, as another 
group of productive capitalist (i.e. manufacturing iron ore) on the same industrial chain, 
succeeded? Moreover, to lift up the regulatory veil of the CISA and take a closer look at the 





productive capitalists (i.e. the state-owned steel manufacturers) which were supposedly 
represented by the industry association, another question poses: given the sole purpose of 
capital, according to Marx (1959), as to extracting the highest profit wherever possible, what 
had made these steel plants stay within the purview of the productive capital? Before 
answering these questions, there is a need to first finish the discussion here on the interaction 
among production, commerce, and finance. Since the current section only concerns the 
relationship between the productive and the commercial capital in the context of the Chinese 
iron and steel sector, the following section is thus dedicated to explore the connection 
between the commercial and the financial capital. 
 
7.1.2. Commercial vs. Financial Capital in the case of the Chinese iron ore market 
While facilitating the sphere of productive capital, movement of the commercial capital per 
se can also be accelerated through the participation of financial capital. That is, the 
commercial capitalist does not have to first spend the actual money (M) to purchase iron ore 
(C) and sell it later at the price of M’ as per the conventional movement of commercial 
capital outlined in Figure 6.8. Instead, the traditional merchant can perform both activities 
simultaneously: she or he buys and sells the commodity at the same time. The capital 





                                                          
60 In the original formula, M” is used in Figure 6.10, rather than M’, in order to differentiate the income (M”) distributed to 
financial commercial to the one (M’) realised by commercial capital. However, to illustrate the shift from commercial to 
financial capital, the same M’ is used to represent the income obtained by the commercial capital which in effect evolves to 
financial capital.  





In the case of the financialised pricing mechanism of iron ore, the transition from commercial 
to financial capital is reflected in the assessment of the Platts index. That is, based on the 
“daily transaction value of seaborne iron ore sold in the spot market imported into China” 
(Platts, 2015c, p.1) which involves the actual trade of iron ore (i.e. the traditional M – C – 
M’), Platts also takes into account “bids that are open to the marketplace as a whole… offers 
that are open to the marketplace as a whole, (and) expressions of interest to trade” (Platts, 
2015b, p.3) which do not necessarily require the physical trade immediately but simply 
enables the nearly simultaneous purchase and sale of iron ore. That is, in the latter scenario, if 
the same party first takes the bid and then, before receiving the actual iron ore, sells the offer 
to other parties, the capital movement becomes M – M’.  
 
In the practice of the iron ore market, an evolved form of the M – M’ movement arises from 
the application of financial derivatives. For instance, iron ore swap contracts are developed 
and used by investment banks (Chen SS, 2009d; China Economic Times, 13 November 2008) 
and even Platts itself, which allows the counterparties to exchange a series of cash flows (M) 
at a certain point in time. Thus, the ex ante purchase and the ex post sale of the iron ore do 
not necessarily have to occur on the same day to complete the movement of financial capital 
(i.e. M – M’); the use of financial derivatives provides capital investors with longer time to 
receive their return (M’). As such, iron ore is viewed beyond a simple commodity but 
becomes an underlying item, equipped with the same self-expanding capacity of money, or 
rather, capital (M), from which M’ derives effortlessly. More importantly, since the iron ore 
is now characterised as money, and because the use value of money refers to its self-
expanding capacity (Marx, 1959, p.255; see also section 4.3.1.), the use value of iron ore can 
also be shifted from manufacturing steel to creating more money straightaway independently 





of the actual steel production. This is what Marx (1959) considered as the “meaningless form 
of capital, the perversion and objectification of production relations in their highest degree… 
(and) a mystification of capital in its most flagrant form” (ibid, p.256).  
 
Furthermore, to enable the continual purchase and sale of iron ore requires the sufficient 
amounts of market participants as well as the corresponding start-up capital, which might not 
have been possible, according to Marx (1959), were it not for the introduction of the credit 
system. That is, the fairy tale goes on and becomes better via the use of credit, even in the 
absence of the immediate commodity transactions, to the extent that, so long as the 
commodity is sold within the designated credit term, even the initial capital M is no longer 
needed. Functioning in such a way, the commercial capital will then be able to better perform 
its own duty as to “promote the productivity of industrial capital, and its accumulation” 
(Marx, 1959, p.189). Also, the shift from commercial to financial capital, in particular, has 
relieved the former from its reliance on the actual monetary amount with the help of the 
credit system that enables the latter to operate with the increasingly less portion of capital. In 
Marx’s (1959) own words, “(t)he more rapid the process of reproduction, and the more 
developed the function of money as a means of payment, i.e., the more developed the credit 
system, the smaller that portion is in relation to the total capital” (p.189). Consequently, 
regardless of how much the traditional industrial capital (i.e. production and commerce) 
accounts for within the total circuit of capital, financial capital may still operate and gradually 
take the precedence over the former.   
 





Having illustrated the evolved form of capital movement from the conventional commercial 
transaction to financial derivatives in the case of the iron ore pricing mechanism, what 
follows is how the three groups concerned in the case responded to such a shift. 
 
7.1.2.1. Big Three’s promotion and adoption of financialised price 
As discussed chapter six, BHP Billiton was the first among the Big Three to propose the idea 
of index pricing back to 2008 (Xu YL, 2008), which was said to provide the basis of the shift 
from long term contract pricing to flexible pricing and thus save time for both parties at the 
negotiation table (Chen SS, 2009d). Also mentioned in the previous section is that BHP 
Billiton achieved the partial application  of index price (i.e. 30% of its iron ore sales) as at the 
end of the 2009 price negotiation. In the beginning of 2010 the firm announced that, as a 
result of the unsettled iron ore negotiation between the Big Three and the CISA in 2009 
(Dong, 2009b), nearly half of the firm’s clients had turned to the short term based index price 
(Zhang Yi, 2010a). 
 
However, despite the partial adoption of index price as well as the emergence of the spot 
market for iron ore, the fundamental contradiction remained between Big Three’s social 
relation with the Chinese market and the corresponding productive force since the breakdown 
of the 2009 negotiation between the Big Three and the CISA. That is, in relation to the social 
relation between the mining giants and their Chinese buyers, on the one hand, there existed 
two types of market for mining companies to export iron ore—the long term contract based 
and the spot market, both of which encountered problems.  
 





First, in addition to the significant price difference between the two markets where the price 
of the former was much lower than that of the latter (Economic Information Daily, 10 
November 2009; Ma, 2010b; DFdaily, 11 February 2010), the Big Three had generally lost 
the interest in continuing the long term price based contract. Rio Tinto claimed that “for the 
past three to four years, the long term contract based price had already deviated from its spot 
market counterpart” (Zhou XY, 2010). Vale even argued that the traditional long term pricing 
mechanism had “completely failed” (Chen SS, 2010b). This was (1) partly because that their 
Chinese clients did not honour the long term price based contract in 2008 when the spot 
market was much cheaper than the long term one as a result of the GFC, and so those buyers 
would rather incur penalties for the breach of contract and traded in the spot market (Caijing, 
27 April 2009; Economic Information Daily, 29 December 2009; Yang LM, 2010b); and (2) 
partly because they did not even reach any annual price agreement with CISA for 2009, 
which prevented them, at least on the surface, from trading with China’s major SOEs. In 
particular, Rio Tinto may perhaps be the one out of the Big Three that was least likely to 
reach the annual price agreement with China, due to the industrial espionage event. That is, in 
2009 July, Stern Hu, Rio Tinto’s chief representative at the annual price negotiation, with 
three other employees at the firm’s Shanghai office, were under the arrest of the Chinese 
State Security Bureau, charged with bribing the internal staff of China’s steel plants, stealing 
China’s national secrecy, and thereby resulting in serious and substantial damages to China’s 
economic safety and national interests (Sun, 2009a). Consequently, the firm’s meeting with 
China’s major SOEs had to be cancelled and the general negotiation went into a stalemate 
(Zhang HY, 2009a). It was not until 2010 February that Rio Tinto appointed Ian Bauert as the 
new CEO at the firm’s China office, to replace the vacant positon of Stern Hu (Yuan, 2010b).  
 





Secondly, China’s spot market too was not without its issues. The CISA stepped in the spot 
market and announced to punish and disqualify those Chinese enterprises which privately 
signed up sales contract with the Big Three based on either the long term price or the spot 
price (Economic News, 30 June 2009; Xu YL, 2009i). While the association attempted to 
deter the Chinese buyers from trading in the spot market, it also to a certain extent contained 
the sales volume at the Big Three. Thirdly, in addition to the long run contract based as well 
as the spot markets, there was potentially another market which the CISA strongly promoted 
within China so as to regulate the ‘chaotic’ order in the Chinese iron and steel industry. This 
was called the ‘unified price’ exclusive to China’s domestic market, which was another form 
of the long term contract based price only attached with more stringent criteria to the Chinese 
buyers. In particular, the CISA specified that all Chinese firms, both state-owned and private, 
both large and small, and both steel plants and trading companies, must obey the Iron & Steel 
Industry Adjustment and Revitalisation Plan issued by the State Council and follow the 
unified price nationwide (Zhang Yi, 2009g; Yue & Zhou, 2009). However, considering the 
considerable difference between the long term price and the spot market one, as well as Big 
Three’s explicit apathy (Zhang C, 2009b, 2009d), the so called unified price was highly 
unlikely to be realised, not to mention the amount of time and effort involved in settling 
down first the conventional long run price.  
 
On the other hand, in relation to Big Three’s productive force, their level of iron ore 
production exhibited significant growth compared to last year, in the belief that China’s iron 
ore demand would increase substantially, and the rest of the world economy could recover 
gradually (Yang Y, 2009a; Beijing Business Today, 21 January 2010). For instance, Rio 
Tinto indicated that its iron ore production for the third quarter of 2009 hit a record high of 





47.5 million tons (Zhou & Zhang, 2009). At about the same time, BHP Billiton too showed in 
its quarterly first report that the firm’s iron ore output also hit the record high of 30.1 million 
tons for the third quarter of the year (Yang Y, 2009a), which was replaced by its own fourth 
quarter equivalent at 32.45 million tons (Lu, 2010). Vale pointed out in 2010 March that its 
iron ore sales volume in 2009 reached a record high of 140 million tons and the firm’s 
existing level of iron ore production could not meet the market demand (Wang J, 2010a). In 
fact, all of the Big Three held the view that the demand of iron ore from the Chinese market 
in particular would keep increasing at a fast pace, which was the main reason behind the 
increase in their level of iron ore output (Wan, 2010b; Chen SS, 2010a). However, standing 
in the violent contrast with the rising iron ore demand and the increased level of iron ore 
output was the time consuming long term price negotiation which had not been settled since 
2009. Thus, the Big Three argued that the present pricing mechanism which lacked of both 
transparency and flexibility needed to be changed to survive (Chen SS, 2010a; Yu L, 2010g; 
Global Times, 9 March 2010). 
 
Taking Big Three’s social intercourse with the Chinese market and their rising productive 
forces into account, the financialised quarterly index price came into existence as the solution 
to the conflict between the two, that is, the shift in the mode of production from commercial 
to financial activities. For one thing, in relation to the social intercourse between the buyers 
and sellers, the index pricing, according to the Big Three, would be more transparent and 
smoother so as to avoid the direct conflict and hostility between the buyer and the seller at the 
traditional closed door meeting every year such as Rio Tinto’s industrial espionage event 
(Deng, 2009c; Tang, 2009). This was pointed out by Clinton Dines, the former CEO at BHP 
Billiton China office, that 





“one thing which has always been ignored in iron ore price negotiation is that the intense 
argument and hostility between buyers and sellers do not exist in negotiations for other 
commodities. (This is because) the pricing mechanism for other commodities is more 
mature and transparent. While commodity prices have ups and downs of course, overall 
each party shows their trust and recognition in the global pricing mechanism. In the iron 
ore market, however, there is no any single party or organisation that totally trusts the 
benchmark pricing mechanism (i.e. long term contract based pricing). (Because) this 
mechanism lacks of both transparency and flexibility, and it is only treated as the tool to 
get a head start in the negotiation. Every year both the buyers and the sellers spend a lot 
of time and energy on negotiating iron ore price. As a result of the negotiation, both 
parties become upset and even angry, and correspondingly the international relations are 
negatively affected” (Yu L, 2010g). 
 
Jose Martins, the CEO of Vale, shared the similar view that 
“under the new pricing mechanism, the conflict between suppliers and purchasers could 
finally be avoided… There is no one criticising the price, (and) there is no disagreement 
either. It will be either buy or not buy, that is, transactions are made with freedom” (21st 
Century Business Herald, 1 June 2010). 
 
As such, the index pricing came as the remedy for the conflict, since it would be, as claimed 
by BHP Billiton, determined by the market, which is also consistent with natural laws of 
economics (Liu, 2009). Further, the use of index price leaves no room for both parties to 
break the contract which some Chinese buyers did in 2008 when the spot market was much 
lower than the long term contract based price (Deng, 2009c; Yang LM, 2010b). In fact, as 
argued by Vale, such type of distinction between the spot price and the long term contract 
price could be flexibly dealt with by the new pricing mechanism (Wang J, 2010a) in which 
the price changes according to the market change (Ye & Qin, 2010).  
 
For another, in terms of the change in productive forces, the index price, according to Rio 
Tinto, would serve as the determining factor for the firm’s future production scheme (Zhou 





XY, 2010). Rio Tinto further pointed out that, aside from iron ore suppliers, the buyers would 
also benefit from the predictability of the new pricing mechanism (Chen SS, 2010b). In a 
similar vein, Roger Agnelli, the global CEO of Vale, indicated that the quarterly index 
pricing model could provide both parties on the supply and demand chain with a certain level 
of transparency enabling everyone to perceive the future price movement. For steel plants in 
particular, the new mechanism would help cost control and inventory management (21st 
Century Business Herald, 1 June 2010). Looking at the productive force of the society in 
general, Vale argued that the quarterly index price was capable of providing continuous and 
important information to market participants including both mining companies and steel 
plants, facilitating the market equilibrium and contributing to the greater wellbeing of the 
global economy and social prosperity (China Business Network, 6 May 2010).  
 
It is against this background which the shift from traditional annual contract based price to 
the quarterly indexed one took place, with the emergence of spot market price playing a 
transitional role that dissolved the former. Prior to the 2010 annual price negotiation, in 
addition to BHP Billiton which announced to partially apply the index pricing, Vale also 
indicated that it was willing to shift to the spot index price in the following year (Xu YL, 
2009i; Yue, 2009). In a similar vein, Rio Tinto also expressed its interest in the short term 
based index price in the hope that the new price would become the real benchmark in the 
market if the entire industry were to adopt it (Sina Finance, 24 March 2010a). Subsequently, 
in the beginning of May 2010, the Platts IODEX was officially adopted by the Big Three and 
steel plants as the benchmark index for the third quarter of 2010 (Zhu, 2010c). 
 





Viewed from the perspective of capital movements as interpreted by Marx (1959), this can 
then be explained by (1) the Big Three’s opened door, in the first place, towards nearly all 
types of buyers, whether state-owned or privately invested, and whether large or medium and 
small, in the Chinese market, which shifted the previously productive capitalist to the 
commercial capitalists, and (2) in the second place the gradual adoption of index pricing that 
transformed the movement of commercial capital to that of financial capital.  
 
Further, while it is demonstrated earlier in Figure 7.1 that the movement of commercial 
capital facilitates the movements of different branches of productive capital on the same 
industrial chain, the involvement of financial capital, which shortens the M – C – M’ process 
to M – M’, seems to render its productive counterparts even more efficient. Thus, the 
interaction depicted in Figure 7.1 between the two productive capitalists via the same 
commercial capitalist (i.e. M – C – M’) can then be simplified as the one between the 
productive capitalists via their own financial activities (i.e. M – M’). This is presented in 
Figure 7.2 as follows. 
 





Unlike the movement of commercial capital depicted in Figure 7.1 which requires two phases 
to firstly purchase the commodity (C) from one productive capitalist as the finished goods 
(C’) and secondly sell to the other as the means of production (MP), the transfer of the 
commodity in Figure 7.2 facilitated by the involvement of financial capital only takes one 
step. That is, once the two productive capitalists reached the price agreement via the 
intermediary channel of the financial capital (i.e. M – M’), the commodity (C’) is soon 
shifted to the other end of the industrial chain as the raw material (MP). As such, the time 
consuming process that previously the commercial capitalist had to undertake is replaced by 
the immediate transfer of commodity among productive capitalists themselves. In the case of 
the new pricing mechanism of iron ore, this is rendered possible through the constantly 
updated index price which takes into account the bids and offers in real time (Chen SS, 
2009d). 
 
Similarly, the Big Three, in promoting and justifying the use of index price, reiterated, in line 
with the index publishers (Caijing, 27 April 2009), that the new price would be able to bring 
common interests to both mining firms themselves and steel plants (Zhang Yi, 2010a; China 
Business Network, 6 May 2010) in relation to continued investment and improved efficiency 
(Wan, 2010a). In particular, this would be achieved through the smoother communication 
(Tang, 2009) between buyers and sellers offered by the new pricing mechanism delivering 
bids, offers, and expression of interest to trade in real time. Moreover, as market data are 
constantly updated via the index price (China Business Network, 6 May 2010), the Big Three 
claimed that, compared to the traditional annual closed door price negotiation, the index 
pricing mechanism could reflect market changes in real time (Liu, 2009; Sina Finance, 24 





March 2010a) and is thus more transparent (Deng, 2009c; Gold Bull Information, 29 
September 2009; 21st Century Business Herald, 1 June 2010).  
 
So far it has been illuminated how the Big Three responded to the shift in iron ore 
transactions facilitated by the previous commercial to then the financial capital. 
Correspondingly, the mining conglomerates’ interpretation of market, supply and demand, 
and the identity of iron ore has also been added with the attribute of finance. This is because, 
since the movement of commercial capital (i.e. M – C – M’) is replaced by that of the 
financial capital (i.e. M – M’), while the latter does help shorten the process of the iron ore 
purchase and sale, and thus improve efficiencies at both end of the transaction, it also at the 
same time poses potential challenges which may disturb and distort the normal operation of 
productive capital. For instance, as the financial transactions increasingly take precedence 
over the actual transaction between productive capitalists in the financial market, the price of 
iron ore will no longer be based on the physical supply of and the production demand for iron 
ore, but highly likely be overstated by the supply and demand of financial capital. That is, in 
the absence of the actual transfer of commodity on the part of the financial capitalist, the 
purchase and sale of iron ore increasingly takes on an independent role which focuses on the 
seemingly self-expanding capacity of capital: the demand for iron ore depends less on the 
level of steel production from productive capitalists, but more on how much investment 
return it immediately generates and / or how much risk it mediates when it is sold to financial 
investors; accordingly the supply accounts for not only the physical inventory but also the 
offers and contracts available in financial market.  
 





Furthermore, the introduction of financial derivatives based on the index price of iron ore, as 
well as the lowered threshold to enter the market via the credit system would then attract 
more investors to the game of finance, divorced from the industrial chain of the iron and steel 
sector, exhibiting the mystified self-creating magic of capital (i.e. M – M’ which has been 
demystified in both chapter four based on the theoretical framework of Marx and chapters six 
and seven referring to the case of the index pricing mechanism of iron ore). Viewed in this 
way, the previously illustrated capital movement (in Figure 7.2) in which productive 
capitalists complete the immediate purchase and sale of commodity through the channel of 
financial capital would then be directed to the other way around where financial capital 
becomes the subject and productive capital the object. This is depicted in Figure 7.3 below. 
 
Unlike Figure 7.2 that presents the idealised scenario where the movement of financial capital 
(i.e. M – M’) serves as the intermediary in the interest of productive capital by enabling the 
continual purchase and sale of iron ore, Figure 7.3 delineates a different picture. After placing 
the purchase order to the iron ore suppliers in phase 1 at the price of M, the financial 
capitalist does not have to find any productive capitalists. Instead, he or she may simply 
transfer the right of receiving the commodity to other investors in the financial market at the 
price M’. Subsequently, the second investor may also sell the right to the next buyer with a 





higher price M”. The process of reselling goes on so long as someone in the financial market 
is willing to buy. Eventually, in phase n, steel manufacturers as the productive capitalist on 
the lower stream accept the final price (M
n
) of the iron ore which has been traded among 
financial capitalists for n times and the actual iron ore is then shipped to the physical 
manufacturing entity correspondingly. If the above scenario really is the case, the CISA’s 
resistance against financialisation is not without sound theoretical support. As iron ore would 
then be traded for the purpose of directly receiving greater capital afterwards, which Marx 
(1959) labelled as the “perversion and objectification of production relations in their highest 
degree” (p.256) independently of steel manufacturing.  
 
However, before discussing whether the shift to index price in the 2010 negotiation will 
contribute or compromise the global iron and steel industry, it is necessary to first fulfil the 
purpose of the current section (7.1.2.) as to explore the transition from commercial to 
financial capital in the case of the Chines iron ore market. Having illustrated how the Big 
Three justified their adoption of the index price, the following is thus concerned with the 
response to the new pricing mechanism on the parts of the small and medium enterprises in 
the Chinese iron and steel industry. 
 
7.1.2.2. Chinese small and medium enterprises’ acceptance of financialised price 
As a result of the unsettled annual price negotiation between the CISA and the Big Three in 
2009, the small and medium companies in the Chinese iron and steel industry began to sign 
up iron ore contracts in private with the Big Three using either the long term fixed price or 
the spot price. Once the iron ore were imported, the small and medium firms were able to sell 
their purchase to other parties in China’s domestic market, exhibiting the feature of a 





commercial capitalist. The movement of commercial capital on the parts of the small and 
medium firms climaxed near the end of the 2009 negotiation, attempting to merge itself with 
the financial market by establishing the Rizhao Centre and introducing the Rizhao iron ore 
index. While the centre was quickly shut down by the CISA with the assistance of the 
Ministry of Commerce and the CCCMC, the seed of financialisation nevertheless sprouted 
from the other end, serving as, in Marx’s terms (Marx & Engels, 1974), the solution to the 
conflict between the social relations and the corresponding productive force. 
 
On the one hand, regarding the form of social relations where the small and medium firms 
interacted with other market participants and the CISA in particular, despite that many 
Chinese companies began to enter in the commercial transactions of iron ore since 2009, the 
question of fairness remained in two aspects. The first refers to CISA’s attempt to eliminate 
spot transactions in China’s domestic market, which was not realised as planned by the 
association but turned towards the opposite end. That is, the fact that the regulatory control 
imposed by the CISA only suppressed both the iron ore trade and the index price on the 
surface has in reality provoked more participants to engage in the reselling of iron ore. This is 
because, as explained by the manager at one private trading company, 
“the result of the ‘tight regulation’ (in the domestic iron ore market) is that the import 
license is becoming increasingly valuable, and thus brings more profits deriving from 
rent-seeking… (companies) without the import license have to find a licensed importing 
firm as an agent when they need to import iron ore, and need to pay a significant amount 
of money as commissions. Normally, when the number of licensed firms is reduced (due 
to CISA’s tighter control), the amount of commission that the unlicensed firms have to 
pay is increased correspondingly… instead of calling it as the agency fee or commission 
expense, it is rather something from reselling. (This is because) when the iron ore was in 
a high demand, the price that they (i.e. licensed firms) sold us with was 1.5-2 times more 
expensive than the original price” (Deng, 2009c). 






Gradually, the increased number of iron ore trade in China’s domestic market, partly 
motivated by CISA’s proposed tighter regulation, became an obstacle to fair market 
competition in that while some firms were able to import and sell iron ore to make profits, 
others were not (Deng, 2009c). Therefore, the small or medium firms, and particularly those 
with no direct access to Big Three’s iron ore, felt unfair and called for the abolishment of the 
agency system. 
 
The second aspect of unfairness resided within other small and medium firms which did 
have, in private, the access to import iron ore from the Big Three. While being capable of 
selling the steel making ingredient in the spot market, they too faced with the issue of 
fairness. That is, as both the number of traders and the amount of iron ore kept increasing in 
China’s spot market, large size corporations, most of which were SOEs in the Chinese 
context, gradually dominated the commercial transactions. This later became conspicuous in 
the beginning of 2010 when iron ore price skyrocketed in China’s spot market. Sun Qijun, a 
private iron ore trader based in Qingdao revealed that “the biggest promoters behind the sharp 
increase of spot price are Sinosteel and China National Building Materials Group. These two 
SOEs imported tens of million tons on the one hand and then stockpiled the import on the 
other” (Deng Y, 2010a). Based on its stable source of iron ore supply and the close relation 
with other major steel plants in China, Sinosteel rationalised its import of iron ore in large 
quantity as to follow the overall market trend with the aim to achieve the cost leadership 
advantage. However, the private trader indicated that, as the bid price offered by Sinosteel 
and China National Building Materials was beyond the range that the small and medium 
enterprises could afford, a significant amount of iron ore  were ‘being accumulated’ by the 





two SOEs which then pushed up the spot market price accordingly (Deng Y, 2010a). As a 
consequence of the increased spot price, the newly opened door of the commercial market, 
insofar as the small and medium enterprises were concerned, seemed to gradually turned 
towards the SOEs which took advantage of their sufficient amount of capital to monopolise 
the purchase channel therein (Zhou XF, 2010a). As such, in addition to the unequal access to 
the contract based iron ore, what was also unfair was the potential monopoly of SOEs in the 
spot market, an area which the small and medium size firms frequently complained about. 
 
On the other hand, despite that these enterprises found it increasingly difficult to purchase 
iron ore from even the spot market, the corresponding productive forces were expected to 
increase. That is, for the small and medium size trading companies, even faced with the 
soaring spot price, the need for importing iron ore still kept increasing. Shang Wenyong, the 
manager at a private iron ore and steel trading firm, told the press that 
“from now onwards till the end of the negotiation, iron ore price will be even higher… 
now it is only a matter of by how much. Now it is another good opportunity to purchase 
and stockpile (iron ore), before the negotiation is concluded… (Because) the price hike 
in the future will be surprising” (Suo, 2010). 
 
In fact, unlike the CISA which considered the ‘excessive import of iron ore’ as the 
contributing factor that distorted the supply and demand relationship in the domestic market 
and distracted China’s negotiation with the Big Three, trading companies held that the less 
the number of iron ore trade took place, the higher the price would be (Suo, 2010; Wang & 
Xu, 2010). Therefore, these traders tried to purchase as many iron ore as they could, with the 
belief that its price would in any case keep increasing in the foreseeable future. For the steel 
plants in small and medium size, apart from those with the same intention (as their 
counterparts in the trading business) of keeping purchasing iron ore in the spot market, others 





expressed, at the most, the indifference towards the price movement of iron ore (Sina 
Finance, 22 March 2010). Thus, the focus for these plants was on improving the efficiency of 
steel production (Sina Finance, 22 March 2010); so long as the raw material purchase channel 
existed, they would keep manufacturing the end product accordingly. In other words, what 
worried them was the potential production shutdown due to the shortage of iron ore supply in 
spot market (Wang J, 2009e). 
 
Faced with the unfair competition in the country’s spot market where iron ore supply was 
limited by CISA’s attempted regulation and the potential monopoly of major SOEs, and the 
rising demand of iron ore for both trading and production purposes, the financialised index 
price promoted by the Big Three came into effect and solved the issue. That is, through 
accepting the index price, both compulsorily and otherwise, the small and medium companies 
were able to realise their intention of purchasing and reselling iron ore as well as the claim 
for fair competition, as the new pricing mechanism would grant everyone in the market the 
same access (i.e. the same index price) to seaborn iron ore. A small size steel plant in 
Tangshan indicated that while most of the small and medium steel plants in the city could 
only purchase iron ore from the spot market at higher prices and thus 
cannot compete with those large steel makers in terms of raw material costs. Therefore, 
the small and medium firms could only increase their profitability by improving cost 
control and management effectiveness. However, if the index price, which is more 
flexible, can be realised, these steel plants will be able to adapt to the new pricing 
mechanism much more quickly and efficiently than their large size counterparts (Sina 
Finance, 22 March 2010) (emphasis added). 
 
Since 2010 April, the small and medium enterprises began to take offers from BHP Billiton 
based on the average Platts index price from the first quarter of the year (Li RX, 2010c). 





Shagang, the largest private steel plant in China, also indicated that the group had begun to 
study the Platts index. “Since it is a product of market economy, we could not judge whether 
it is good or bad but only learn how to accept it”, said Shen Wenrong, the chairman of 
Shagang group (Li RX, 2010b). In the following month, some private steel plants and trading 
companies already engaged in the iron ore swap transactions at Singapore Exchange, whereas 
their state-owned counterparts did not (Yang Y, 2010).  
 
Consistent with the broad movement of capital as illustrated in Figures 7.1 and 7.2, the 
participation of commercial and financial capital, insofar as the small and medium size 
enterprises in the Chinese iron and steel industry were concerned, did contribute to their 
improved business performance. Liu Haimin, the vice president of China Steel Development 
& Research Institute, revealed that while the average profit margin of the industry was only 
2.5% for 2009, and 3% for the first two months in 2010, most of the firms showing negative 
ratios were SOEs which lowered down the industry average ratio (Li Y, 2010b). For the first 
quarter of 2010, even the CISA showed that there were 10 enterprises among the 
association’s 77 member firms (all of which were large size companies) suffering from 
losses. Overall, the profit margin of large size enterprises for the period was only 3.25% 
which was below the average ratio of the Chinese industry (CISA, 2010). In other words, the 
corresponding ratio which the small and medium enterprises exhibited must be higher than its 
SOE counterpart, and most likely to be above the industry average. This is because, 
according to Liu Haimin (Li Y, 2010b), while the SOEs lost their cost leadership advantage 
in terms of iron ore price, their disadvantage nonetheless remained; while the average 
management cost at SOEs was 5.1% for the past year, the equivalent figure of private 
enterprises was only 1.2%. 





While the small and medium firms welcomed and enjoyed the advent of the index pricing 
mechanism, what remains a moot point is whether the index price will also be subject to, in a 
similar fashion as the spot price experienced in China’s domestic market, the potential 
monopolies by larger size capitalists. In particular, as illustrated in Figure 7.3, investors from 
the financial market might overwhelm those operating in the industrial economy, namely the 
productive and commercial capitalists. Consequently, there might exist the danger that 
physical transactions of iron ore could be increasingly replaced and overshadowed by virtual 
trades of financial derivatives which would then increase, both intentionally and otherwise, 
the final price of iron ore. However, before proceeding to this potential threat, attention 
should now be turned to how the CISA responded to the shift to the index pricing 
mechanism. 
 
7.1.2.3. CISA’s resistance to financialised price 
In the similar way as, and perhaps to a greater extent than, it disavowed the iron ore trade in 
China’s domestic market by commercial capital, the CISA rejected the idea of index pricing 
since 2008. In the beginning of the 2009 annual price negotiation, Shan Shanghua, the 
secretary general of the association, indicated the ‘zero tolerance’ approach to the index price 
of iron ore initially proposed by BHP Billiton (Chen, 2008b). Therefore, any Chinese 
company that used the index price to purchase from iron ore suppliers shall be disqualified 
from importing (Xu YL, 2008; Li JL, 2009a). Also, Shan planned to introduce new standards 
and regulations that legally prohibit the iron ore transactions in the domestic market (Chen, 
2008b). While this may not seem to be surprising, as the CISA adopted the mentality of the 
productive capitalist throughout the two annual negotiations (from 2009 to 2010), what does 
set the Chinese association apart from the conventional role of capitalists is that the former 





refused to adapt to commercial and financial markets whereas the latter would have. This is 
because, from CISA’s perspective, production, commerce, and finance were independent of 
one another. Thus, the Chinese iron and steel industry, as represented by the productive 
capital in CISA’s point of view, should never be involved with commerce and finance. This 
is also reflected in the association’s argument that steel plants should stay away from the 
index price based on financial market. 
 
For instance, in 2009 April when the annual negotiation between the CISA and the Big Three 
went into a stalemate, Shan Shanghua reiterated that China would definitely not accept index 
pricing, as it would mean that while steel plants promised a fixed procurement amount in the 
long term, they could not have a settled price on that amount. Instead, the steel plants would 
have to bear all risks of the market index (Liu, 2009). Here, the assumption underlying 
CISA’s statement is that steel plants should always, as traditional productive capitalists, 
concentrate on manufacturing, since they could not benefit from the financial market. While 
this was the view held by the CISA, many, if not most, steel plants and trading companies 
and especially the small and medium size firms believed otherwise. Already discussed were 
the iron ore trade, in private, in China’s domestic market by not only the small and medium 
firms but even some major SOEs which ignored the CISA’s principles. Nonetheless, in 
extreme scenarios, the association were able to use political means and administrative 
procedures to regulate the industry of which the case of Rizhao Centre may best serve as the 
example. In particular, with less than a month after the trading centre was established in mid-
2009 with the aim of providing intermediary services for iron ore transactions and launching 
the Chinese iron ore price index, the CISA, together with the Ministry of Commerce and the 
CCCMC, called for an immediate disqualification of the centre (Xu YL, 2009g).  





Moreover, the CISA’s attitude towards finance was also clear in its announcement regarding 
the closure of Rizhao Centre: 
“(the city of Rizhao) established the iron ore trading centre, which already breach the 
policies of the Iron & Steel Industry Adjustment and Revitalisation Plan, as they are 
clearly speculative in nature which will bring market disorder, and (thus) must be 
stopped at once” (China Business Times, 16 June 2009). 
 
Consistent with the association’s historical view on finance, any type of financial activities, 
carried out by either foreign or Chinese institutions, were deemed speculative and toxic to the 
traditional operation of productive capital in the iron and steel sector. This was also the point 
shared by the Ministry of Industry and Information that specified 
“(the ministry) does not support (China’s) enterprises to participate in the transaction of 
iron ore financial derivatives…(because) the so called iron ore index is in fact the 
financial derivative, and the global financial crisis (i.e. the subprime mortgage crisis 
originated from the US housing market) was exactly caused by financial derivatives” (Li 
RX, 2010d). 
Obviously, the Chinese government too considered the index price as harmful to the 
conventional iron and steel sector. 
 
Furthermore, it was not only the CISA and relevant government departments which opposed 
the index price; the major SOEs which were the association’s key members also rejected the 
new pricing mechanism. However, in addition to the CISA’s argument which simply 
reiterated the potential threat deriving from the financialised index price, the SOEs also 
emphasised that they would be disadvantaged in competing with other market participants in 
terms of the raw material cost. For instance, in 2010 March, one month before the quarterly 
index price was officially adopted, one large state-owned steel plant pointed out that “once 
the traditional annual benchmark pricing mechanism is cancelled and replaced by the 





quarterly index pricing model, large size steel plants will have no cost leadership advantage. 
By then, the larger the production scale, the more difficult it is to control the operation and 
profitability. Then steel enterprises could only transfer the cost pressure, through increasing 
(steel product) prices, onto the automobile, home appliance, machinery, and real estate 
sectors in the lower stream” (Sina Finance, 22 March 2010) (emphasis added). Standing in 
violent contrast here is the view of the small and medium enterprises which, as mentioned 
earlier, welcomed the change to the index price. However, the SOEs believed that adopting 
index price would certainly be unfavourable to the development of the nation’s entire iron 
and steel industry and so the Chinese steel plants could not accept this result (Zhang GD, 
2010). 
 
To resist the impending adoption of index price, the CISA initiated the boycott of Big Three 
in the beginning of April at the Iron Ore Market Regulation Conference in Beijing, asking all 
steel plants and trading companies in China to stop importing iron ore from the Big Three for 
the following two months (i.e. April and May). The rationale behind the proposed campaign 
against the financialised price of iron ore was still confined to the mentality of productive 
capital to which the CISA’s perspective was assigned in chapter six. That is, the secretary 
general Shan Shanghua explained three reasons behind the boycott as 
“(firstly,) the current iron ore inventory held by our nation’s steel plants is sufficient to 
maintain their normal productions for the next two months. (Secondly,) there is still 75 
million tons of iron ore stock at our nation’s ports. (Thirdly,) at the same time, affected 
by the increasing price of iron ore, the output level of the iron ore made in our nation 
exhibits an 18% increase compared to the same period last year.” (China Business 
Network, 2 April 2010). 
 





Here, while both the Big Three and the Chinese small and medium companies considered 
iron ore as a globally tradable commodity, the CISA still thought of it as the raw material for 
steel manufacturing, which the domestically made iron ore could easily replace the 
counterpart from the Big Three. As such, iron ore market was only related to China’s 
domestic steel sector. In fact, it was not that the CISA had not realised the changed nature of 
iron ore, but rather that the association wanted to maintain the traditional role of the mineral 
product. When the Big Three ceased the negotiation and simply offered the quarterly index 
price to the Chinese buyers, Luo Bingsheng, CISA’s executive vice chairman, chastised such 
an ‘ultimatum’ way of communication on the ground that, since iron ore as a commodity had 
a very specific purpose (i.e. as the raw material for steel manufacturing), both parties on the 
supply and demand chain should work together in the long term (Zhou Y, 2010). More 
specifically, he explained that  
“the specific characteristic of iron ore means that it can only be sold to steel plants… 
(Thus,) the relationship between mining companies and steel plants should be an 
interdependent and reciprocal one. However, as the Big Three are now under the control 
of the financial capital… iron ore has now been equipped with the nature of capital; 
mining companies do not consider the long term interests of corporate growth, and have 
abandoned the basic win-win principle for both parties on the supply and demand chain” 
(Chen YM, 2010) (emphases added). 
 
Obviously, while the CISA at this point began to realise the participation of the financial 
capital from the rest of the world in the global iron ore market where iron ore had been 
‘equipped with the nature of capital’, the association still wanted to maintain the status of the 
traditional productive capital. To this end, it turned to regulatory and administrative 
measures. 
 





To assist the proposed industry wide boycott against the quarterly index price, the CISA also 
introduced relevant industry polices and legal principles to resist the new pricing mechanism. 
Within the industry, the association, together with the CCCMC, jointly issued three self-
discipline policies including The 2010 Iron Ore Importing Enterprise Assessment Criteria 
and Application Procedure, Details on the Implementation of Iron Ore Import Agency 
System, and The Record Tracking Standards on Iron Ore Import Contract
61
. As suggested by 
their name, the three policies were aimed at (1) imposing the minimum import threshold onto 
steel plants and trading companies, (2) ensuring that only large size companies redistribute 
iron ore in the domestic market, and (3) establishing the audit system to supervise the 
allocation of the iron ore import within the country, respectively. 
 
Furthermore, the issue of iron ore price was brought to the national level. Luo Bingsheng, 
CISA’s executive vice chairman, suggested that the Chinese government consider iron ore as 
a strategic issue and bring it up to the national level for further investigation, in order to 
ensure the strategic safety of China’s national economy (Yu L, 2010e). To this end, the 
association, on the one hand, advised the Ministry of Finance, the NDRC, and other relevant 
departments to reduce the tax rate of the domestic iron ore manufacturers which were then 
expected to be able to compete with the Big Three (Zhang XD, 2010a). On the other hand, in 
mid-April, CISA also worked with the Ministry of Commerce on the anti-monopoly 
investigation of the quarterly pricing mechanism proposed by the Big Three, drawing 
relevant legal standards from China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (Xue, 2010c; Zhang XD, 2010b). 
The Ministry of Industry and Information also announced that it would introduce a new 
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management mechanism for iron ore import which would be favourable to the regulatory 
adjustment of China’s iron ore market (Deng, 2010a). 
 
Responding to the boycott proposed by the CISA, however, only a few major SOEs 
expressed their willingness to cooperate. At the International Iron Ore market Symposium on 
April 9, Wuhan Iron and Steel (the fourth largest steel plant in China) told the press that 
“although the Big Three have officially sent us the request of adopting the quarterly 
index based price, we have not accepted it. As a central-government controlled 
enterprise, (we) must consider the broad picture and firmly resist the prohibitive price 
asked by the Big Three… Wuhan Iron and Steel will utilise its own iron ore inventory 
which would help the steel plant maintain its normal production for three months” (Zhu, 
2010a). 
 
Hunan Valin Steel (the parent entity of three top 100 steel plants
62
 in China) also did not 
accept the quarterly index price by the Big Three (Li RX, 2010c). Angang Steel (the third 
largest steel plant in China) indicated at the press conference that (China’s) domestic steel 
enterprises should unite together to boycott the soaring price of iron ore from the Big Three 
(Wang F, 2010). 
 
Except these top steel conglomerates in the country, other SOEs at the same time confessed 
that they had already accepted the quarterly price to maintain their operations. For instance, 
one top 10 steel plant explained that  
“the amount of raw material inventory varied at different domestic factories. Thus, many 
plants do not have the same level of iron ore stock as those conglomerates. Because of 
this, the boycott against the Big Three may have been some Dutch courage. Instead, what 
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would be waiting for us may be the soaring spot price of iron ore and the withdrawal of 
the long term price based contract (by the Big Three)” (Sina Finance, 11 April 2010). 
 
In a similar vein, Nanjing Iron and Steel (the 14th largest steel plant) admitted that it too had 
adopted the quarterly price for the second quarter of 2010 (Li RX, 2010c). In fact, a medium 
size state-owned steel plant even admitted that it had already followed Big Three’s price 
since 2009. Regarding CISA’s boycott, the manager commented that “if I stop declaring the 
iron ore import at the custom today, the price will soon be increased to RMB 300 / ton” 
(Wang & Xu, 2010). In mid-May, even Baosteel (the largest steel plant in China) and 
Shagang (the fifth largest steel plant) admitted at the Sixth China International Steel 
Conference that all Chinese steel plants had signed up the ‘temporary price agreement’ with 
the Big Three (Wang & Zhang, 2010). 
 
With the SOEs giving in to the Big Three, it was hardly surprising on the other hand that the 
small and medium enterprises did not follow CISA’s call but accepted the quarterly index 
price. Trading companies commented on the proposed boycott that while there still existed 
iron ore demand in the domestic market, stopping iron ore import to resist the mining firms 
was against the market. They further argued that “even suppose (the CISA) would be able to 
really cease the iron ore import for two months, it could not reverse the negotiation outcome, 
but rather result in chaos in (China’s) domestic iron ore market” (Zhu, 2010a). For this 
reason, the small and medium enterprises in the Chinese iron and steel sector, as mentioned 
earlier, began to adopt the index price since 2010 April. Eventually, as more and more steel 
plants accepted the new price, even the CISA had to acquiesce in the end of April that 
Chinese firms could use the price temporarily (Yu L, 2010e). Shan Shanghua, the secretary 
general, justified this decision that “we had to import iron ore during the past two months (i.e. 





April and May), and thus needed a temporary price to issue the letter of credit” (Zhou XF, 
2010b). Ironically, the association’s own confession that Chinese buyers kept purchasing iron 
ore for the same period (i.e. 2010 April and May) on which it previously initiated the boycott 
demonstrates that the campaign against the financialised index price had in effect come to an 
end.  
 
Here, CISA’s failed boycott and the corresponding response from both SOEs and the small 
and medium enterprises exhibit a certain level of relevance to Marx’s antithesis between the 
industrial economy (that consists of productive and commercial capital) and the financial 
capital.  That is, when the CISA and some SOEs realised that iron ore had been equipped 
with the nature of capital (Chen YM, 2010), and the pricing right of iron ore were being 
shifted towards financial capital (Li RX, 2010e), the association still attempted to insulate the 
Chinese iron and steel industry from the financial capital operating in the rest of the world. 
However, as demonstrated earlier, the participation of commercial capital and later the 
financial capital, consistent with Marx (1959), did help promote the productivity of the Big 
Three as well as the Chinese steel plants, leading to the outcome that “(t)he more rapid the 
process of reproduction, and the more developed the function of money as a means of 
payment, i.e., the more developed the credit system, the smaller that portion is in relation to 
the total capital” (Marx, 1959, p.189). In other words, despite China’s temporary boycott, 
which in the above scenario purports to the absence of the industrial capital, against Big 
Three’s iron ore, financial capital may operate as usual and take the lead in the virtual 
transaction of iron ore and also the associated derivatives, thereby pushing up the index price. 
This is echoed by the response of SOEs and small and medium firms behind their 
compromise. For instance, many argued that, even suppose the boycott could succeed 





temporarily, the resulting price afterwards would have been skyrocketed (Sina Finance, 11 
April 2010; Wang & Xu, 2010). In other words, even though the CISA could unite everyone 
in the industry and cease the import of iron ore, the commodity would have still been traded 
in the financial market. 
 
It may also explain, at least in part, the reason behind CISA’s failure to resist the 
financialised price of iron ore in general, on the ground that, however large the scale of 
China’s industrial capital might be, the operation of financial capital continues, running 
independently of the physical consumption of iron ore for steel manufacturing. As such, it 
becomes understandable that why the CISA used the same strategy of ceasing China’s iron 
ore import in the 2009 and 2010 price negotiations and failed both times. From 2009 May to 
June, as the traditional due date (i.e. 30 June) of the negotiation was approaching, Shan 
Shanghua, the secretary general, indicated that “at the moment our country’s port there are 70 
million tons of iron ore inventory, accounting for twice the normal monthly level of iron ore 
consumption. (Thus,) we can stop importing iron ore for two months, but they (the Big 
Three) cannot stop producing or exporting (for the same period of time)” (Miao, 2009; Gold 
Bull Information, 12 June 2009). The rationale behind Shan’s discourse here comes from 
CISA’s mentality as the productive capitalist (as discussed in chapter six) that treated iron ore 
only as the raw material for steel manufacturing, and the iron ore market as a market solely 
related to the steel market where only the physical transaction of iron ore took place. Thus, 
once China, as the world’s largest iron ore purchaser (an argument that the CISA always 
emphasised) had stopped the purchase and import, it would have been reasonable to believe 
that the Big Three would compromise and give in.  
 





The reality, however, was that the Big Three did not follow CISA’s will and so their price did 
not drop by 40% as per the association’s request but rather skyrocketed by 99.7% in next 
April. This is because the Big Three and particular BHP Billiton at that time (in 2009) were 
in the mentality of the financial capital (as discussed in chapter six), referring to iron ore as a 
global commodity tradable in both physical as well as financial markets globally. Therefore, 
from the perspective of the Big Three which conceives of iron ore in “the meaningless form 
of capital, the perversion and objectification of production relations in their highest degree” 
(Marx, 1959, p.256), the limit upon the accumulation of capital, which in this case refers to 
CISA’s boycott, becomes “merely quantitative and defies all fantasy” (ibid, p.261). 
Potentially, the financial market, as argued by Marx (1959), will grow even faster than its 
physical counterpart, “driving capitalist production beyond its own limits” (p.433). 
 
7.1.3. Conclusion and discussion of the emergence of commerce and finance in the 
Chinese iron ore market 
 
So far it has been illustrated in this section (7.1) that the emergence of commercial capital 
and later the financial capital in the iron ore market with particular reference to the Chinese 
iron and steel industry. In 2009, alongside the breakdown of the 2009 annual price 
negotiation between the Big Three and the CISA, the mining companies began to, for the first 
time in the history of long run price based iron ore transactions, offer iron ore in China’s spot 
market. This attracted the participation of commercial capital, which in this scenario referred 
to the commercial activities from both the Big Three and the small and medium enterprises in 
the Chinese iron and steel sector. Consequently, the productive efficiency at both parties 
exhibited a certain level of improvement which was consistent with Marx’s demonstration of 





the interaction between productive and commercial capital (as shown in Figure 7.1). On the 
other hand, the CISA, however, chastised and disavowed in the first place the ‘private’ iron 
ore trade between the first two parties, and subsequently the resulting improved efficiency of 
the small and medium enterprises concerned. Rather, the association, together with relevant 
departments, formed the investigation team in an attempt to obliterate iron ore transactions in 
the domestic spot market. While the team’s attempt failed and the trade of iron ore continued 
between the Big Three and the small and medium firms as well as among companies within 
the Chinese market, it did shut down the Rizhao Centre which was aimed at launching 
China’s own iron ore index price.  
 
Nevertheless, even though the attempt to financialise the price of iron ore was suppressed 
within the country, the new pricing mechanism became realised from the other hand in the 
following year. That is, in 2010, the Big Three gradually adopted the index price which the 
Chinese small and medium enterprises accepted straightaway, heralding the era of the 
financialised iron ore price facilitated by not only the movement of the commercial but also 
the financial capital. This is illustrated in Figure 7.2 where the commercial transaction of iron 
ore was being increasingly replaced by the corresponding financial activities. While the small 
and medium firms welcomed the new pricing mechanism, the CISA strongly opposed it and 
attempted to resist such a trend of financialisation. To this end, not only did the association 
initiate the nationwide boycott of the quarterly index price required by the Big Three, but it 
also issued self-disciplinary industry policies, and brought the issue to the national level by 
seeking political and legal assistance from the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of 
Finance, the Ministry of Industry and Information, and other government departments. 
However, despite CISA’s administrative and political effort, the association failed in its 





attempt to resist the financialised index price of iron ore by eventually permitting the 
‘temporary’ adoption of the price. The reason behind the failure of CISA’s boycott is 
discussed with reference to Marx’s view of financial capital. In particular, the quantitative 
limit that the productive capital, as represented by the CISA, imposed on the financial capital 
comprised of the Big Three did not render the former defeat the latter. On the contrary, it was 
the qualitative distinction between the two that lent the advantage to the financial capital 
running independently of the actual steel production. Iron ore is equipped with the same self-
expanding capacity as capital, becoming a “meaningless form of capital, the perversion and 
objectification of production relations in their highest degree” (Marx, 1959, p.256). Thus, 
without the Chinese iron and steel industry purchasing and importing iron ore, the commodity 
could still be actively traded in the financial market which would subsequently push up the 
price. This explains, at least in part, why the CISA failed in its attempt to resist 
financialisation. However, a more comprehensive analysis is needed to examine the general 
context in which the CISA was forced to undertake the index price. 
 
To address this issue, questions raised earlier in the current chapter alongside the story of 
financialisation need to be answered first, including (1) the association’s view on the nature 
of financialisation: whether the shift to index price will contribute or compromise the iron 
and steel sector both globally and within China; (2) its own role in the Chinese iron and steel 
industry: why the CISA, in the mentality of a productive capitalist, failed to adapt to the 
emergence of commercial and financial capital in the Chinese iron ore market; and (3) the 
approaches it adopted in resisting the financialised price of iron ore: why relevant regulations 
imposed by the CISA upon the Chinese iron and steel sector failed. The next section is 
directed towards these issues. 





7.2. CISA’s failed attempt to resist financialisation 
To explore CISA’s failure, this section examines, as outlined in the paragraph above, firstly 
the reason behind the association’s attempt, secondly the identity of the association, and 
thirdly its attempted solutions to financialisation which eventually turned out to be 
ineffective. Alongside the investigation, equally important is that Marx’s interpretation of 
finance (as discussed in chapter four) as well as the power of discourse underpinned by the 
corresponding mode of production (as discussed in chapter five) is used not only as the 
theoretical framework in which the analysis is carried out, but also as the benchmark against 
which the CISA’s thoughts and activities are compared. In other words, both the 
financialisation framework and the discourse analysis informed by Marx’s work are not 
simply used as the theoretical and methodological tools in this thesis, but in themselves serve 
as part of Chinese context in which the investigation is accomplished, since the Chinese 
communist government per se is initially inspired by Marxism (Deng, 1993; Jiang, 2006b, 
2006c). 
 
7.2.1. CISA’s view on financialisation 
As illustrated earlier, while the Big Three and the small and medium firms in the Chinese 
iron and steel industry engaged in the commercial trade of iron ore in 2009 and began to rely 
on the financialised index price in 2010, the CISA always opposed the change and wanted to 
maintain the traditional status of the industry where only the productive capitalists operate. 
Therefore, what is certain at this stage is that the CISA did not accept the financialised price 
of iron ore. The next question then becomes if the association understood finance and then 
disapproved the emergence of financialisation in iron ore market or if it was simply against 
anything related to finance and wanted to separate the Chinese iron and steel industry from 





financial market. A closer look at CISA’s discourse suggests a combination of both, based on 
the following four aspects. 
 
7.2.1.1. Immediate closure of Rizhao Centre 
First and foremost, the case of Rizhao centre demonstrates that the CISA did not allow any 
type of financial activities, even those undertaken by the Chinese institutions, in the domestic 
iron ore market. If, say, CISA’s opposition to the index price initially promoted by BHP 
Billiton and published by Platts in 2008 was based on the fact that the index publishers were 
foreign institutions such as Metal Bulletin, Steel Business Briefing, and McGraw Hill 
Financial, it would then be hardly convincing that the association shut down the Rizhao iron 
ore index for the same reason. In fact, in its announcement regarding the centre, the CISA 
commented that the establishment of Rizhao Centre “already breached the policies of the Iron 
& Steel Industry Adjustment and Revitalisation Plan, as they (i.e. business activities of the 
centre) are clearly speculative in nature which will artificially push up the iron ore price and 
result in market disorder” (China Business Times, 16 June 2009). Viewed in this way, it is 
argued that the CISA opposed any form of index price regardless of the publishers. Such an 
attitude toward finance was carried forward to the 2010 iron ore price negotiation, as the 
association and the major SOEs reiterated that the financialised index price was always 
speculative and could be easily manipulated (Deng, 2009c; Chen SS, 2009f; Li RX, 2010d, 
2010e). Thus, it is highly likely that the association simply considered the finance as 
something harmful and toxic to the Chinese iron and steel industry.  
 
However, as illustrated earlier (in section 7.1.2.1.), the participation of financial capital does 
help facilitate the traditional circuit of productive capital (as shown in Figure 7.2), by 





enabling the immediate and continual purchase and sale of iron ore between mining 
companies and steel plants. The improved financial performance of the small and medium 
enterprises, vis-à-vis their state-own counterparts, in the Chinese iron and steel industry is 
also demonstrated in section 7.1.2.2. While turning a blind eye to such an improved 
profitability, the CISA chastised the increased efficiency at the small and medium enterprises 
which allegedly gave rise to the chaotic steel market (Xu YL, 2009f). In other words, the 
association chose to downplay the advantages of the financialised index price, at least from 
the perspective of small and medium firms, on the one hand, and emphasised its potential 
disadvantages on the other.  
 
7.2.1.2. Reluctance to accept and study index price 
Nonetheless, it is still not certain if the CISA really understood the inner mechanism of the 
expanded capital movement as outlined in Figure 7.2 and then concluded with the potential 
threat of financialisation as outlined in Figure 7.3, or the association simply rejected any form 
of finance. Stepping outside the case of Rizhao centre, the analysis of CISA’s discourse 
suggested the latter. For instance, after the index price was officially adopted by the Big 
Three and most small and medium enterprises in 2010 April, the association and its key 
members, namely the major SOEs, showed their reluctance to learn about the new pricing 
mechanism (He, 2010a). Zou Jinhong, the managing director of the marketing department at 
Minmetal Co., Ltd, China’s largest state-owned steel trading company, indicated that his firm 
would not take part in transactions based on the index price, as he did not understand the so 
called iron ore index price (Li RX, 2010d). In the subsequent month, while some private steel 
plants began to engage in iron ore swap transactions at Singapore Exchange, their state-
owned counterparts did not, on the ground that entering into the iron ore swaps for the 





purpose of risk avoidance was in itself a huge risk. Even suppose that SOEs were to “try” the 
swaps, it would have to be audited and approved by various government departments at 
different levels, which in short would be very difficult (Yang Y, 2010). 
 
7.2.1.3. Omission of other financial derivatives on the industrial chain 
In fact, it was not only the financialised index price which the CISA chose to ignore; the 
association also did not to recognise other financial products and derivatives on the same 
industrial chain. Steel futures, for instance, began to be traded in Shanghai Futures Exchange 
since 2009 March (Economic News, 27 March 2009). While locating at the lower stream of 
the iron ore market, the demand and price of steel were intimately related to those of iron ore 
which even the CISA admitted and emphasised throughout the 2009 and 2010 negotiations 
(as demonstrated in the end of chapter six). Moreover, the point at which steel futures became 
tradable was within the period of the 2009 iron ore negotiation. Despite the close relevance 
mentioned above, however, the association made no mention of steel futures, to say nothing 
about the possible iron ore derivatives.  
 
Another type of financial derivative which was also closely related to the price of iron ore 
was the Forward Freight Agreements (FFA hereafter), a forward contract which provides a 
“means of hedging exposure to freight market risk through the trading of specified time 
charter and voyage rates for forward positions” (The Baltic Exchange, 2015b). Facing the 
fluctuations of the BDI index in the international shipping market, FFA has been applied 
since 2002, serving as a tool for price discovery, risk management, and speculations 
(Kavussanos et al., 2004; Kavussanos & Visvikis, 2004; Yu & Zhu, 2009). In terms of the 
Big Three, BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto already actively engaged in the FFA transactions even 





before the 2009 negotiation (China Business Journal, 20 January 2008; Xu YL, 2009f), 
whereas Vale, during the 2009 negotiation, attempted to stabilise the shipping cost between 
China and Brazil by establishing its own fleet, in order to expand its client base in the 
Chinese market (Deng, 2009e; Zhou Y, 2009b). In the beginning of the 2010 negotiation, the 
Brazilian company even proposed to establish the iron ore distribution centres in a few 
regions across Asia to avoid fluctuations in shipping costs (Zhang C, 2009c). 
 
On the other hand, in relation to the Chinese iron ore market, although both academics 
(Zhang & Yang, 2006; Yang, 2007; Li & Lu, 2008) and market participants (Li LX, 2009; 
Chen YM, 2010) paid sufficient amount of attention to this tool and suggested the Chinese 
ship owners and charters to take advantage of it, the CISA seemed to be only concerned with 
the long term based fixed price of iron ore. As most Chinese iron ore buyers
63
 had neither the 
long term charter agreement nor the FFA in the futures market, the only option for shipping 
costs they had was the spot price. Under this scenario, China National Chartering Co., Ltd 
commented that 
“the shipping right is in the hands of the consignors (i.e. iron ore suppliers in this case) 
who charter ships at any prices they prefer, and so the Chinese steel plants have to accept 
the price however expensive it may be… This is the most important problem that the 
Chinese side should solve, rather than simply focusing on a few US dollars that the iron 
ore price could be reduced by” (Suo, 2009a). 
Wu Minghua, the director at the Shanghai branch of China Ocean Shipping Company, 
indicated that  
from January to November this year (i.e. 2009), iron ore shipping costs from Brazil to 
China and from Australia to China have increased by more than 40 USD / ton and 10 
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USD / ton respectively. The changes in shipping costs have already exceeded the 
changes in iron ore prices…some argued that instead of struggling to lower down the 
iron ore price in the negotiation, it is more practical to try to lower down the shipping 
cost” (Zhou Y, 2009b). 
The CISA, however, did not consider the shipping cost as yet another form of financial 
derivative which in its own constituted a futures market, but simply took it as something that 
passively reacted to changes in the physical demand of iron ore shipping (Yu L, 2009a). This 
is not surprising, given that, as illustrated in chapter six, the association did not take the BDI 
index into account throughout its discourse regarding the price of iron ore during the 
negotiations. Rather, in a similar vein as how the association attempted to link the iron ore 
market with the steel market, the vice chairman of the CISA and the chairman of Baosteel 
(China’s largest steel plant), Xu Lejiang, indicated at the Shanghai International Shipping 
Forum that steel plants, iron ore suppliers, and shipping companies should establish a stable 
and long lasting cooperative relationship contributing to the prosperity and stability of the 
industrial chain (Chen SS, 2010c). Viewed in this way, similar to its discourse of iron ore 
market discussed in chapter six, the concept of shipping market was also confined to the 
traditional industrial economy which, according to Marx (1959), concerns productive and 
commercial capital. In other words, the influence of financial market on both the shipping 
cost in general and the FFA in particular, which in itself is one form of financial derivative, 
was omitted by the CISA. 
 
In the beginning of May 2010 when the Platts index was officially acknowledged as the 
benchmark assessment of the newly adopted quarterly index price of iron ore, shipping costs 
also became part of the price as the index was measured on a CIF basis in the spot market of 
Qingdao (North China), instead of the traditional reference to FOB (Zhu, 2010c). In its 





response to the quarterly pricing mechanism, the CISA did not address the shift from FOB to 
CIF, but simply rejected the price on the ground that the iron ore supply was higher than the 
demand (Zhou XF, 2010b). As such, from CISA’s discourse both before and after the initial 
adoption of the quarterly index price, neither the BDI index nor the FFA was taken into 
consideration. It thus poses a subsequent question as to whether the association really 
believed that, as discussed in chapter four and shown in Figure 4.1, finance in general has 
become increasingly intertwined with the industrial economy in modern society. 
 
7.2.1.4. Separation of financial from productive and commercial capital in China’s iron and 
steel sector 
The outcome of the 2009 iron ore price negotiation between the CISA and FMG answers this 
question. That is, when the association released the Result Announcement of China’s 2009 
Iron Ore Price Negotiation on 2009 August 17, only the price of iron ore and the period to 
which it applied were revealed by the Chinese side (CISA, 2009a). On the same day, 
however, Andrew Forrest, the CEO of FMG, announced at the global video press conference 
that the agreement ensured the firm’s cashflow in the short to medium term, partly due to 
CISA’s promise that Chinese financial institutions would provide 5.5 to 6 billion USD debt 
financing to FMG, under the terms and conditions acceptable to the latter, before 2009 
September 30 (Dong, 2009a; Zhang XD, 2009b). In particular, the interest rate on the 
proposed financing would be 1.5% to 2% lower than the market rate, which alone was 
estimated to help FMG save about 80 to 120 million USD interest expense (Suo, 2009a). On 
the other hand, when asked about the additional condition regarding financing FMG, Shan 
Shanghua, the secretary general of CISA, replied that “financing is something carried out by 
financial institutions. The CISA simply promotes the proposal (i.e. 5.5-6 billion USD debt 





financing), with the purpose of increasing FMG’s iron ore production capacity” (Xiao, 2009). 
Again, the association separated finance from operations of the conventional iron and steel 
industry. 
 
The separation of the financial and the industrial (i.e. production and commerce) capital was 
also evident in the association’s response to the tightened credit environment in the Chinese 
iron and steel sector. Wu Xichun, CISA’s honorary chairman and the former deputy minister 
of the former Ministry of Metallurgical Industry, commented that the influence of credit 
crunch on large size steel manufacturers was limited, as the “iron and steel industry is not 
short of money” (Deng Y, 2010b). This was also echoed by Nanjing Iron and Steel (top 20 
steel plant in China), Baogang (top 20 steel plant in China), and the vice chairman of the 
CISA (Deng Y, 2010b). If, say, CISA’s opinion that the major SOEs would remain relatively 
unaffected by the tightened credit environment demonstrates the divide between China’s iron 
and steel sector and finance, then its view on the small and medium enterprises further 
confirms such separation. That is, rather than concerning the potential shortage of capital on 
the parts of the small and medium enterprises, the CISA welcomed and encouraged the credit 
crunch which would then create a better environment for the industry wide M&A proposed 
by the State Council (Tan, 2010).  
 
In fact, the proposal for M&A in the industry has long been on the agenda of the CISA and 
relevant government departments (Deng & Gao, 2008). This was rationalised based on the 
argument of the CISA, major SOEs, the Ministry of Commerce, and the Ministry of Industry 
and Information that the level of concentration in the Chinese iron and steel sector was not 
significant enough and thus possessed less discourse power compared with the Big Three 





(Zhai, 2009; Mei, 2009; Shanghai Securities News, 11 March 2010; Xu KX, 2010; Zhang 
GD, 2010). Furthermore, this view was based on the experience of the Japanese steel sector 
where the industry concentration level was high and so able to unite all enterprises within the 
country to negotiate with iron ore suppliers.  
 
However, there did exist fundamental distinction between the ‘Japanese model’ and the 
M&A plan proposed by the CISA and the Chinese government, indicating the third area 
which the CISA ignored the significance of financial capital. In relation to the way in which 
the Japanese steel plants unite together, a triangle among steel plants, sogo shosha (i.e. 
general trading companies
64
), and banks is formed, in which steel plants on the one hand use 
bank loans to invest in mining companies overseas and on the other hand delegate the 
responsibility of iron ore price negotiation to sogo shosha (Wang & Qin, 2009). As a special 
form of corporation unique to Japan, sogo shosha trades a wide variety of commodities across 
different markets around the globe. While serving as the intermediaries for commercial 
transactions, they also offer financial services including debt and equity financing in various 
sectors (Dziubla, 1982). In the case of the global iron ore market, Mitsui, one of the largest 
sogo shosha in Japan, also owns 18.24% shares of Valepar (the largest shareholder of Vale), 
indirectly holding 9.6% shares of Vale as the third largest shareholder. Under such scenario, 
sogo shosha is able to not only provide capital to the Japanese iron and steel industry in 
general, but also compensate the steel plants in the case of rising iron ore prices by obtaining 
its share of profit from the Big Three, as well as be compensated by the steel plants for the 
reduction in the share of profits from mining companies in the case of decreasing iron ore 
prices. As such, the broad movement of capital among production, commerce, and finance 
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could be established: steel plants play the role of productive capital, banks and other financial 
institutions the role of financial capital, and sogo shosha the role of both commercial and 
financial capital. 
 
Standing in sharp contrast to the ‘Japanese model’ described above is the M&A proposal in 
the Chinese iron and steel industry. That is, instead of building the alliance among steel 
plants, trading companies, and financial institutions, the Chinese side foresaw a production 
oriented M&A in which large size state owned steel plants take over their small and medium 
size counterparts. For instance, the State Council (2009) published the Iron & Steel Industry 
Adjustments and Revitalisation Plan
65
 on 2009 March 20, suggesting that major SOEs take 
the lead to reorganise and integrate the domestic industry
66
 to establish by 2011 extra-large 
steel conglomerates including Baosteel group (i.e. the no.1 largest steel plant), Anben group 
(i.e. Anshan Iron & Steel as no.3, and Benxi Iron & Steel as no.13), and Wuhan Iron & Steel 
group (no.4). Here, commerce is not needed as the CISA had long been promoting the iron 
ore import agency system asking the licensed firms to resell their import to those unlicensed 
ones at 3%-5% premiums (Economy 30 Minutes, 23 June 2009). As for other commercial 
transactions of iron ore that small and medium enterprises entered into, the association 
strongly opposed and promised to investigate and punish the participants involved. In 
addition to commerce, finance too was not the essential part of the M&A process in the 
Chinese iron and steel sector. As mentioned earlier, the association almost omitted the 
                                                          
65 The original name of this document in Chinese is 钢铁产业调整和振兴规划. The translation is done by the author of the 
thesis. 
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The proposed M&As include those between Baosteel (China’s no.1 largest steel plant), Baogang (no.17), and Ningbosteel; 
between Anshan Iron & Steel (no.3), Benxi iron & Steel (no.13), Baogang (no.17), and Panzhihua Iron & Steel (no.11); 
between Tiantie (no.18), Tianjin Pipe (no.23), and Tgsteel (no.32), and; between Taiyuan Iron & Steel (no.7) and other steel 
plants within Taiyuan province (State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2009). 
 





influence of the tightened credit environment on the industry, since “our iron and steel 
industry is not short of money”, said Wu Xichun, the honorary chairman of the CISA (Deng 
Y, 2010b). Moreover, on the parts of the small and medium firms, finance was even 
something that the CISA would rather take away from them (Tan, 2010). This was justified 
on the ground that, without financial support, small and medium enterprises would soon be 
acquired by large size SOEs, facilitating the industry wide M&A process. Viewed in this 
way, neither commerce nor finance was needed to increase the industry’s concentration level 
and correspondingly improve its discourse power. 
 
7.2.1.5. Conclusion of CISA’s view and comparison with Marx 
Summarising the discussion so far, the analysis in the present section (7.2.1.) firstly begins 
with the specific case of Rizhao Centre which indicates CISA’s ex ante resistance to the 
indexed iron ore price published by Chinese institutions; secondly illustrates the association’s 
ex post reluctance, after the Platts IODEX was officially adopted globally, to study the index 
and the corresponding financial derivatives such as iron ore swaps; thirdly, stepping outside 
the price of iron ore, explores other financial products alongside the same industrial chain 
including steel futures and FFA contracts which further confirm CISA’s omission of the 
financial products participating in the iron ore market, and; fourthly, examining the industrial 
structure in general, demonstrates CISA’s separation of finance from the Chinese iron and 
steel industry. If, say, the Rizhao case leaves the question whether it was because the CISA 
understood the mechanism of the broad capital movement among production, commerce, and 
finance (as illustrated in Figure 4.1) and thus foresaw the potential crisis deriving from 
financial market, or it was due to the fact that the association was simply against anything 
related to finance, then its ignorance regarding the iron ore index and the omission of steel 





futures and FFA point the answer to the latter. The M&A proposed by the CISA and relevant 
government departments further confirms this point at the industrial level. That is, the 
association did not recognise the fact that finance has become in general increasingly 
intertwined with the conventional industrial economy in the contemporary business world; in 
other words, the CISA failed to understand the broad movement of productive, commercial 
and financial capital which has been illustrated in theory in chapter four and in the case of the 
iron ore market in the first part (section 7.1) of the current chapter.  
 
Thus, it can be concluded, at this stage, that although the association emphasised the potential 
threat posed by the participation of financial capital in the iron ore market which to some 
extent corresponds to Marx’s interpretation (outlined in Figure 7.3), it did not acknowledge 
his view of the interconnectedness of production, commerce, and finance. As mentioned 
earlier in this section, while analysing CISA’s failure to resist the financialised price of iron 
ore, Marx’s investigation of finance and capitalism in general are also discussed and 
compared with the Chinese iron and steel industry. The next section is directed towards this 
end. 
 
7.2.2. Comparing Marx’s view with that of CISA 
Thus far it has been illuminated that the potential threat, alongside the expanded movement 
of financial capital, may arise from the deviation of the financial market from the traditional 
industry chain, where transactions of financial products take precedence over the physical 
transactions of iron ore (as shown in Figure 7.3). This is to a certain degree consistent with 
the discourse of the CISA and the major SOEs in an attempt to resist the index price. For 
instance, Sheng Zhicheng, the deputy secretary general of China Federation of Logistics & 





Purchasing (CFLP hereafter)’s Iron and Steel Committee at, pointed out that the price 
difference in the physical transaction of iron ore as the data collection process on which the 
index was based would work in favour of mining firms. This is because, 
“since those buyers who are able to reach a lower price are certainly not going to take the 
initiative to publicise their purchase price, (and nor will the seller)… (as such,) while the 
information from the seller’s will always be a mixture of truth and falsehood, the 
information provided by the buyers are in general transparent. This makes it easier for 
the seller to gather the specific production capacity of most steel plants, and (then) apply 
corresponding tactics to different buyers, placing the former in a more active and 
advantageous position (compared to the latter)” (Lang & Zhang, 2010). 
 
Even suppose information regarding the physical market could be transparent on both sides, 
the involvement of financial market adds another type of instability to the formation of index. 
Zou Jinhong, director at Minmetal Co., Ltd (China’s largest state-owned steel trading firm), 
claimed that “as the iron ore index is not based on the actual transaction between buyers and 
sellers in the real world, how can this index reflect the spot market and discover the proper 
price?” (Li RX, 2010a). In other words, as financial capital enters into transactions of iron ore 
and also the associated financial derivatives in particular, the resulting index, many SOEs 
argued, could be easily pushed up by market speculations (Chen SS, 2009f; Li RX, 2010d, 
2010e). In relation to Figure 7.3, this view corresponds to the capital movement from phase 1 
to phase n where the right (M) of purchasing iron ore and its associated derivatives (m) are 
traded for n times in financial market before the actual iron ore (C’) can be shipped over at 
the price of M
n
 to steel plant (i.e. productive capitalists) as the raw material (MP) for steel 
manufacturing on the lower stream of the industrial chain. In Marx’s own words, iron ore has 
become a “meaningless form of capital, the perversion and objectification of production 
relations in their highest degrees” (Marx, 1959, p.433). 
 





However, it is yet to conclude that, in terms of the potential drawback of the index price 
formation, the CISA was literally in an agreement with Marx (1959). For one thing, as 
demonstrated earlier, the former did not understand the interconnectedness among 
production, commerce, and finance. From CISA’s perspective, index price simply rose from 
the Big Three turning towards financial market; the commercial transaction of iron ore 
among mining companies, small and medium enterprises in the Chinese iron and steel sector, 
and even the SOEs was disavowed and thus not acknowledged. Marx (1959), in contrast, 
developed the broad capital movement among production, commerce, and finance evolving 
from the interaction between the first and second (see Figure 7.1), and subsequently the 
participation of the third (see Figures 7.2 and 7.3). For another, confining the comparison to 
the financial market threat alone, the inconsistency remains as to the stage in which the 
financialisation of iron ore price had progressed. While the CISA straightaway jumped to the 
conclusion that financialisation would attract fluctuations and speculations, increasing the 
level of instability in the iron and steel industry, Marx (1887) examined different stages of 
development for the subject matter. He emphasised that 
“(a)s a matter of principle in political economy… (o)ne must always take… a period of 
time during which modern industry passes through the various phases of prosperity, 
overproduction, stagnation, crisis, and completes its inevitable cycle” (Marx, 1973, 
p.214).  
 
Viewed in this way, what the CISA had argued was primarily the potential stagnation 
resulting from the soaring index price of iron ore, leaving the prosperity (i.e. the improved 
efficiency and productive force at the Big Three and the Chinese small and medium 
enterprises) unrecognised, and overproduction and crisis undiscussed. In earlier sections (i.e. 
7.1.1.2., 7.1.2.1, and 7.1.2.2.) of the current chapter, the improved efficiency resulting from 





the emergence of commercial and financial capital in China’s iron ore market are 
demonstrated with the associated discourse from the Big Three and the small and medium 
size companies, and illustrated in Figures 7.1 and 7.2. The overproduction and crisis, as a 
consequence of financialisation and of capitalism in general, are illuminated next alongside 
the case of the Chinese iron ore market, drawing from Marx’s Capital. 
 
7.2.2.1. Overproduction 
First, to illustrate overproduction, there is a need to revisit the broad capital movement among 
production, commerce, and finance. As shown in Figure 7.1, the initial participation of iron 
ore traders as the commercial capital in between the two groups of productive capital 
(including the iron ore suppliers on the upper stream and the steel manufacturers on the lower 
stream) serves as the intermediary to promote the productive efficiency at both ends. This is 
because each group of capital is now assigned with their own individual task: the productive 
capital focuses on production and the commercial concentrates on sales. However, while they 
are given individual missions respectively, the turnover of commercial capital is limited by 
that of productive capital:  
“(commercial capital) has no direct influence on the time of production… This is the first 
barrier for the turnover of commercial capital. Secondly, aside from the barrier formed 
by reproductive consumption, the turnover of (commercial capital) is ultimately limited 
by the velocity and volume of the total individual consumption” (Marx, 1959, p.203). 
 
To state it simply in the case of the Chinese iron ore market, the first limit is that the sale of 
iron ore must keep the same pace with Big Three’s production level on the upper stream and 
the output level at China’s steel plants. The second is that, even suppose the production 
process could coincide with the corresponding commercial transaction, the sale of iron ore 
must reach its end user, whether it be the Chinese steel plants for the purpose of reproductive 





consumption, or the ordinary people in China for their own individual consumption of the 
resulting steel products such as automobiles, home appliances, office blocks, private 
residences, and so forth.  
 
Failure in meeting the above criteria, according to Marx (1959), leads to overproduction. 
First, once the turnover of commercial capital exceeds that of the productive capital, the 
former can “repeat its purchases even before it has definitely sold what has previously been 
purchased” (p.203). As a result, the commercial capitalist will place more orders on the 
productive capitalist, without delivering its previous purchase to the end user. This then 
creates a form of fictitious demand that is based on, not the overall level of individual 
consumption, but the purpose of the commercial capital as to maximising profits. Thus, 
despite that the actual reproduction process (including production and consumption) can be 
slower than the commercial capital movement, the externally independent form of the latter 
(i.e. M – C – M’) enables “it (to) move, within certain limits, independently of the bounds of 
the reproduction process and thereby even drives the (productive capital) beyond its bounds” 
(Marx, 1959, p.203). In other words, the level of production may potentially go beyond the 
actual demand, leaning towards overproduction. 
 
At this point, one might argue that, even if the first limit no longer exists, the second 
criterion, the “velocity and volume of the total individual consumption”, still remains, so long 
as the commercial capitalist needs to purchase iron ore from steel plants, and to sell them to 
willing buyers, whether it be iron ore traders as other intermediate commercial capital 
between the Big Three and steel plants, or directly the steel plants themselves. That is, on the 
one hand, even with the problem of overproduction, the productive capital would have a 





physical maximum limit on which the commercial capital could purchase. On the other hand, 
suppose the productive capital on the upper stream could manufacture as many as demanded 
by its commercial counterpart, it would still be unrealistic that the actual consumption of 
commodity on the lower stream could match with what the commercial capitalist offers in the 
market. This is where financial capital comes into existence, which renders commercial 
capital reach beyond the second limit. For one thing, owing to the participation of financial 
capital and in particular the emergence of relevant financial products, the commercial capital 
will then be able to purchase not only the actual iron ore, but, more significantly, the 
associated derivatives such as swaps and futures which do not require the immediate delivery 
of the commodity. As the actual delivery of finished goods is not necessary, the term 
‘overproduction’ becomes, so to speak, the infinite production. For another, alongside the 
involvement of financial capital, the demand for iron ore also contains two components: first 
the physical demand of iron ore on the parts of steel plants, and; second the non-physical 
demand on the parts of financial market investors. As such, similar to the shift in the meaning 
of ‘overproduction’, the term ‘consumption’ on the lower stream also turns into an endless 
circle where both the supply and the consumption are based on financial derivatives, driving 
productive as well as commercial capital further beyond their limits. 
 
The introduction of the credit system exacerbates this scenario in terms of enabling the 
production, purchase, and sale of commodities without paying the actual cash before they fall 
due. In other words, aside from the limitless supply and demand, the physical cash payment 
also becomes virtual and nearly infinite, as “it places all the available and even potential 
capital of society that is not already actively employed at the disposal of the industrial and 
commercial capitalists so that neither the lenders nor users of this capital are its real owners 





or producers” (Marx, 1959, p.433). In this sense, the credit and banking system, or generally 
speaking, the financial capital, is thus an “immanent form of the capitalist mode of 
production, and… a driving force in its development to its highest and ultimate form” (ibid, 
p.433). 
 
Perhaps too far that financial capital would “become the most potent means of driving 
capitalist production beyond its own limits, and one of the most effective vehicles of crises 
and swindle” (ibid, p.433). This is due to the imbalance between the internal dependence and 
the external independence among production, commerce, and finance. On the one hand, the 
internal dependence refers to the principle that: the movement of commercial capital is, as 
mentioned above, limited by the process of production and the velocity and volume of overall 
individual consumption, and; financial capital is also subordinated to the capitalist mode of 
production (Marx, 1959, p.428). The inter-dependent relationship is illustrated in Figure 4.1, 
where the surplus value (i.e. profit) is first extracted from the production process, realised by 
the commercial capitalist at the point of sale, and shared by the financial capitalist in the form 
of interest income. On the other hand, the external independence purports to the outward 
individual movement of the three types of capital: the productive capital as C (L, MP) … P 
… C’; the commercial capital M – C – M’, and; the financial capital M – M’. The 
overproduction stimulated by the commercial as well as the financial capital (Marx, 1959, 
p.306) will push the external independence to the extreme while leaving the internal 
dependence far behind, until the point at which “the internal connection is violently restored 
through a crisis” (Marx, 1959, p.203). 
 





Turning to the case of the Chinese iron ore market, the next concern is whether the Chinese 
market went beyond the two types of limit mentioned above and reached the stage of 
overproduction. The distinction in the discourse of market interpreted by the Big Three vis-à-
vis the CISA (discussed in chapter six) may perhaps be related to this question. That is, the 
Big Three rationalised their decisions by referring to the macro-economic environment and 
government policies (see Chen, 2008a; Caijing, 27 April 2009; Wang J, 2009a), as well as 
some other particular factors than the Chinese steel market such as shipping costs (see Suo, 
2009a). These can then be understood as the overall level of consumption, on which the 
production and sale of iron ore are based. The CISA, on the contrary, mainly confined its 
argument within China’s domestic steel market (see Sina Finance, 9 December 2008; Zhang 
Yi, 2009d; Deng, 2009d), which, in Marx’s terms, purports to the reproductive consumption 
of iron ore itself. Therefore, even though the association claimed that the supply of iron ore 
was more than its demand, which might be considered as overproduction, the fact that the 
small and medium enterprises as well as SOEs in the Chinese industry kept purchasing iron 
ore even during CISA’s industry wide boycott against the Big Three demonstrates that iron 
ore supply was, at a minimum, equal to (if not less than) its demand. The other factor which 
might cause the overproduction of iron ore is, as discussed above, that the commercial 
capitalist sells iron ore to, not the steel plant as the end user of the commodity, but another 
commercial capitalist, contributing to the fictitious prosperity in the market (Marx, 1959, 
p.203). This is yet another area of controversy. From CISA’s perspective, China’s iron ore 
import was excessive and not based on the actual demand for steel production (Li JL, 2009b; 
Ruan, 2009b). The CCCMC, on the contrary, presented the counterargument that “the 
excessive import of iron ore does not exist… (and) iron ore stockpiling does not exist… the 





reason behind the sharp increase in iron ore demand was the expansion of our country’s crude 
steel production capacity in 2009” (Wang J, 2010c). 
 
In fact, the level of steel output was indeed another area of overproduction claimed by the 
CISA. However, arguments too were presented on both sides. For instance, in mid-2009, 
while the Ministry of Industry and Information predicted that the level of overproduction in 
the Chinese steel market for the year (i.e. 2009) would reach 20%-30% (Zhou Y, 2009c), the 
Shanxi province iron and steel association at the same time told the press that, 
“despite the potential overcapacity shown in statistics, steel plants did not feel the 
corresponding slowed sales in the actual market. Although the (steel) price might have 
been lowered down (due to the increase in steel output), everyone can still sell their 
products. As such, the small and medium steel plants would keep purchasing the raw 
material (i.e. iron ore) for production” (Zhai, 2009). 
 
Fu Ziying, the deputy minister of the Ministry of Commerce, emphasised the overcapacity in 
China’s steel output as one of the contributing factors behind the excessive import of iron ore 
(Han, 2009c). Li Yizhong, the minister of the Ministry of Industry and Information even 
claimed that, given the serious overcapacity in China’s domestic market, steel plants should 
not launch any new projects in the following three years (i.e. 2010-2012) (Yangcheng 
Evening News, 14 August 2009). The main reason for the overcapacity, Li Yizhong pointed 
out at the World Steel Conference in 2009 October, was that while large steel plants generally 
reduced the output level, some small size factories by contrast dramatically increased their 
production (Zhou R.X., 2009b). This was also echoed by CISA’s data that while all of the 
association’s 72 member firms had been reducing the steel output level since 2009 March, 
other steel plants kept increasing the production (Xu YL, 2009f). 
 





On the other hand, Li Zhao, the vice president of the information management division at 
Lange Steel (a leading portal in China’s iron and steel sector), commented that “China’s iron 
ore demand is still far from the peak. Despite that China (the Chinese government) keeps 
emphasising the overcapacity in the (domestic) steel industry, the actual usage of steel 
products however reaches 96%” (Sun, 2009b). Furthermore, in the view of the small and 
medium enterprises, the concept of overproduction was even regarded as the excuse to fulfil 
the government’s real purpose as “the state advances, and the private retreats” (Deng Y, 
2010d). In fact, some small and medium steel plants rationalised their increased output level 
on the basis that they needed to generate the certain amount of cashflow to maintain the 
extant market share and thus to avoid the potential M&A threat from the major SOEs (Wang 
J, 2009c; Xu YL, 2009f).   
 
Faced with the competing discourse put forward by the CISA and relevant government 
departments versus the privately owned small and medium size enterprises in the industry, a 
closer examination of the underlying mode of production from which the discourse derives is, 
consistent with Marx’s methodology (in chapter five), needed. It has been demonstrated in 
the end of chapter six that, throughout their respective discourse of market, supply and 
demand, and the role of iron ore, the CISA argued from the perspective of a productive 
capitalist, whereas the small and medium enterprises in the same industry interpreted were in 
the mentality of a commercial capitalist. As such, the so called ‘excessive import of iron ore’ 
and the overproduction of steel in China’s domestic market can be explained as the improved 
productive force resulting from the shift in the mode of production. That is, prior to 2009, 
only the licensed firms (most of which were SOEs) had the right to import iron ore from 
overseas and subsequently resold part of their purchase, at higher prices, to those unlicensed 





enterprises primarily comprised of the small and medium size privately owned steel plants 
and trading companies (see Deng, 2009c; Zhang Yi, 2009f). The redistribution of iron ore 
within the Chinese market was carried out through a mixture of planned economy (as 
reflected by the industry policies and regulations
67
 promoted by the CISA) and monopolised 
transactions (as reflected by the SOEs reselling iron ore to private firms). In other words, the 
older form of social relations in which iron ore was redistributed became a fetter upon then 
the existing productive force at the small and medium size steel plants in the Chinese market. 
However, since the Big Three had opened their door to the small and medium size companies 
in 2009 (see Cao, 2009a; Chen SS, 2009e) via the spot market in China, iron ore import was 
no longer the privilege exclusive to the SOEs, and thereafter small and medium size firms 
were able to purchase the steel making ingredient at nearly the same price as their state-
owned counterparts; the conflict between the older social relations and the productive forces 
was solved by the advent of  the commercial capitalists engaged in iron ore spot market 
transactions. However, the spot market transaction too was not without its problems. After 
all, there were still some small and medium firms that were unable to purchase iron ore 
(Deng, 2009c). The situation deteriorated in the beginning of 2010 when the major SOEs 
such as Sinosteel and China National Building Materials Group also engaged in the 
commercial trade of iron ore and thereafter significantly pushed up the spot price (Deng Y, 
2010a). 
 
If, say, the emergence of China’s iron ore spot market in 2009 enabled some small and 
medium enterprises to directly purchase iron ore at spot price from the Big Three when their 
                                                          
67  These include the Steel Industry Self-discipline Agreement on Standardising the Trade Order of Iron Ore Import, 
Suggestions On the Promotion of the Iron Ore Import Agency System, Details on the Implementation of Iron Ore Import 
Agency System, and The Record Tracking Standards on Iron Ore Import Contract. A detailed discussion regarding these 
standards and policies is provided in chapter eight. 





state owned counterparts either continued to use the long term contract based price or began 
to monopolise the spot market, then the adoption of the quarterly index based price since 
2010 April simply gave everyone in the market the same access (i.e. same index price) to the 
seaborn iron ore. In Marx’s view (Marx & Engels, 1974, p.87), the introduction of financial 
capital disintegrated the traditional long term pricing mechanism which had long been 
applied to the international iron ore market since the late 1960s, resulting in the further 
increase in the productive forces of the market. For instance, owing to their flexibility and 
management effectiveness, the small and medium enterprises were able to adapt to the new 
pricing mechanism more quickly and efficiently than the SOEs (Sina Finance, 22 March 
2010; He, 2010a; Yang Y, 2010). Thereafter, with the fairer price of iron ore and the efficient 
operation (see Zhang Yan, 2009), small and medium enterprises increased their production 
capacity accordingly (Zhu, 2009) and achieved better performance (Li Y, 2010b). The SOEs, 
however, lost their cost leadership advantage over the price of iron ore on the one hand and 
still bore the relatively high management cost on the other, thereby exhibiting lower level of 
profitability compared to the private plants (CISA, 2010; Li Y, 2010b). 
 
Viewed in this way, the overproduction claimed by the CISA can be interpreted as the 
increase in the productive forces (mainly at the small and medium steel plants), owing to the 
evolved modes of production from first a mixture of planned economy and SOE monopolies, 
then the emergence of commercial activities, and finally the adoption of the financialised 
index price. On the other hand, Marx’s notion of overproduction, which derives from the 
imbalance between the internal dependence and the external independence among 
production, commerce, and finance, is yet to manifest during the period (2009-2010) 
concerned in this study, given that the Chinese market had only been forced to adopt the 





financialised price in 2010. Moreover, stepping outside the iron and steel sector, the CISA 
made no mention of other categories of consumption in China’s overall economy, which cast 
further doubts on the association’s claim of overproduction.  
 
7.2.2.2. Crisis projected by Marx 
As discussed earlier, when the overproduction is pushed by speculations of both commercial 
and financial capital to an extreme, the external independence among production, commerce, 
and finance continually goes beyond the limit of capitalist production and thus the internal 
dependence needs to be violently restored through a crisis. For Marx (1959), because 
financial capital is one factor which operates “as the main lever of over-production and over-
speculation” (p.306), the crisis first originates from the financial market. 
“Hence the phenomenon that crises do not come to the surface, do not break out, in the 
retail business first, which deals with direct consumption, but in the spheres of wholesale 
trade, and of banking, which places the money-capital of society at the disposal of the 
former” (p.203). 
 
Specifically, the crisis will become society wide as what the financial capital is able to deploy 
is the capital of society, “neither the lenders nor users of this capital are its real owners or 
producers” (p.433). However, also because of the use of social property, financial capital 
“accelerates the material development of the productive forces and the establishment of the 
world-market… (as) the historical mission of the capitalist system of production… (and at the 
same time) accelerates… the disintegration of the old mode of production” (p.306). Two 
points can be drawn from the above quotation. First, while financial capital ultimately 
contributes to the crisis of capitalism, it does so to dissolve and replace the old mode of 
production with a new one. As mentioned in chapter five, it is this type of contradiction 





which moves society forward (Marx & Engels, 1974, p.87). Second, as capitalism and the 
capitalist mode of production are “merely historical (and) transitory” (Marx, 1959, p.166), the 
participation of financial capital may be benevolent to the extent that, in the first place, 
capitalism will be able to constantly break the temporary limit upon the existing mode of 
production and, subsequently, the class struggle will rise to such prominence that changes the 
status quo. Thus, based on the two points, financialisation is necessary, as we  
“can neither clear by bold leaps, nor remove by legal enactments, the obstacles offered 
by the successive phases (i.e. financialisation) of its (i.e. capitalism) normal 
development” (Marx, 1887, p.7). 
Instead, what can be accomplished is to “shorten and lessen the birth-pangs” (ibid, p.7).  
 
In the case of the shift in the pricing mechanism of iron ore, the Chinese iron ore market has 
yet to reach the stage of crisis during the period with which this thesis is concerned (i.e. 
2008-2010). On the one hand, from the perspective of the small and medium enterprises in 
the industry and the mode of production underlying their discourse, the advent of the 
financialised quarterly index price has replaced the old form of social intercourse between 
these firms and their state-owned counterparts with a new one. That is, they no longer need to 
purchase the second hand iron ore at exhibitive prices from the major SOEs that held the iron 
ore import license; everyone in the Chinese iron and steel industry has the same access to the 
global iron ore market. As a consequence, the productive force at these firms has been 
improved (see Li Y, 2010b). 
 
On the other hand, it can also be explained from Big Three’s point of view that the conflict 
between their social intercourse with the Chinese clients and the rising productive forces was 
solved too by first the emergence of iron ore spot market transactions (as the commercial 





activity) and later the adoption of financialised quarterly index price. That is, in 2009 when 
the Big Three for the first time in the 40 year long history of annual iron ore price negotiation 
did not reach any price agreement with China, the emergence of spot market transactions 
helped the Big Three sell iron ore to meet China’s iron ore demand. In 2010 when the long 
term contract price and the spot price both exhibited a certain level of uncertainties due to the 
unsettled annual negotiation and CISA’s attempted regulation, the increased amount of iron 
ore output at the Big Three may also be influenced accordingly. Thus, the adoption of the 
financialised quarterly index price came as the remedy to replace the time consuming and 
sometimes hostile annual price negotiation and thus improve the market efficiency in terms 
of both facilitating iron ore transactions and determining future production schedules. 
 
Thus, at the stage where the financialised price was just accepted and adopted by both parties 
on the supply and demand chain in the global market in 2010, it was primarily the benevolent 
side of financialisation which manifested from the perspectives of the Big Three and the 
Chinese small and medium firms. The quantitative constraint on the productive capital (i.e. 
the steel plants and iron ore suppliers) including CISA’s attempted boycott and relevant 
regulations and industry policies failed, as a result of the introduction and participation of 
commercial and financial capital that extended CISA’s concepts of market and supply and 
demand to the financial sector. 
 
While recognising the benevolent side of financialisation in its early stage, its malevolent 
consequence should not be ignored. It has been demonstrated from the discussion above that 
the shift in the mode of production from productive capital to financial capital increased 
productive forces of mining companies, trading firms, and steel plants, by freeing them from 





the limit of the political obstacles set up by the CISA and other government departments. To 
state it simply, financialisation facilitated the freedom of transaction in the Chinese iron ore 
market. Marx also acknowledged that “(f)ree trade increases productive forces” (Marx, 1973, 
p.215). However, when it has reached the stage of overproduction where “the more 
production precedes consumption, the more supply tries to force demand… consequently 
crises increase in frequency and in intensity” (ibid, p.216). In chapter 18 of Capital Volume 
III, Marx (1959) described the entire story which fits in the case studied here where the 
manufacturers are the mining companies and steel plants, and the exporters and importers are 
trading firms. 
“The manufacturer may actually sell to the exporter, and the exporter, in his turn, to his 
foreign customer; the importer may sell his raw materials to the manufacturer, and the 
latter may sell his products to the wholesale merchant, etc. But at some particular 
imperceptible point the goods lie unsold, or else, again, all producers and middlemen 
may gradually become overstocked… The crisis occurs when the returns of merchants 
who sell in distant markets (or whose supplies have also accumulated on the home 
market) become so slow and meagre that the banks press for payment, or promissory 
notes for purchased commodities become due before the latter have been resold. Then 
forced sales take place, sales in order to meet payments. Then comes the crash, which 
brings the illusory prosperity to an abrupt end” (ibid, p.203). 
 
Applying the above example to the Chinese iron ore market, it can be interpreted that the 
crisis will come at the point where the actual consumption of iron ore by China’s steel plants 
cannot keep the same pace with the production level of the Big Three, then the iron ore 
trading companies will soon be in an urgent need of money and, as their repayments fall due, 
be forced to liquidate by banks, finally resulting in the crash of the market.    
 
Although Marx, in his original work—including Capital and ‘On the Question of Free Trade’ 
in The Poverty of Philosophy— discussed primarily how crises originated from the industrial 





economy comprised of productive and commercial capital and led to stagnation in the 
physical market, he too pointed out elsewhere how finance might trigger the structural crisis 
of capitalism (e.g. Chapter 27 in Capital Volume III). That is, as crisis repeats in both 
frequency and intensity in the traditional industrialist economy, it also “hastens the 
centralisation of capital” (Marx, 1973, p.216) where “competition has been replaced by 
monopoly… and the road has been paved, most gratifyingly, for future expropriation by the 
whole of society” (Marx, 1959, p.304) (emphasis added). Alongside the shift from 
competition to monopoly, also was born  
“a new financial aristocracy, a new variety of parasites in the shape of promoters, 
speculators and simply nominal directors; a whole system of swindling and cheating by 
means of corporation promotion, stock issuance, and stock speculation… (based on the) 
private production without the control of private property” (ibid, p.304). 
 
To put it simply, as overproduction and stagnation occur more often in productive and 
commercial sectors, finance, as a new form of the capitalist mode of production, comes to 
suspend the crisis of capitalism. Through the access to the social capital where the actual 
users and speculators of capital are no longer its legal owners (i.e. the general public) but the 
financial capitalists, finance obtains the control over the social labour and aims at the 
exploitation of the means of production to a greater extent “from the direct producers (i.e. 
ordinary workers) to the smaller and the medium-sized capitalists themselves” (ibid, p.305). 
Here the term society, recall from the concept of civil society in chapter five, “transcends the 
State and the nation” (Marx & Engels, 1974, p.57). Therefore, the free flow of financial 
capital across the globe helps capitalists in the developed economy tap the potential of and 
exploit the developing world which postpones the eruption of capitalist crisis, albeit only 
temporarily. Gradually, as the movement of financial capital simultaneously promotes the 





movement of commercial and productive capital on a global scale, the interconnectedness 
therein eventually accelerates the worldwide crisis. 
 
Viewed in this way, the potential crisis in the case of the global iron ore market will be that 
the penetration of financial capitalists (as shown in Figure 4.1) such as Blackrock, HSBC, 
J.P. Morgan, and Citicorp into both the major mining corporations (i.e. the Big Three) as well 
as the index price publisher (i.e. McGraw Hill Financial) has closely aligned the interest of 
financial market in advanced capitalist countries together with the growth potential of 
China’s industrial economy (i.e. the Chinese iron and steel industry). Under such 
circumstances, the financial sector in the western world lives on the industrial development of 
China, as the one of the world’s most up and coming emerging markets, in two aspects.  First 
of all, at the micro level, while Marx (1959) primarily referred to company shares and private 
savings as the tool that grants financial capitalists the access to the property of society, the 
indexed iron ore price and its associated financial derivatives such as swaps and forward 
contracts have opened the door of the global iron ore market to financial investors (as shown 
in Figure 7.3), whereby iron ore becomes a “meaningless form of capital… (and) a 
mystification of capital in its most flagrant form” (Marx, 1959, p.256) capable of breaking 
the limit upon capital accumulation and centralisation and ultimately accelerating the crisis of 
capitalism. Secondly, at the macro level, through holding significant portions of shares at the 
Big Three and McGraw Hill Financial, the financial institutions and major investment banks 
have converted their access to social capital into the entitlement of sharing the profit as both 
the player and the price setter in the conventional physical market of iron ore, equipped with 
the “pleasant character mixture of swindler and prophet” (Marx, 1959, p.306). In addition to 
the financial sector that has been increasingly involved in the physical market, crisis could 





also arise from the overproduction and stagnation in the Chines iron and steel industry, once 
the level of individual consumption could not keep the same pace with the physical 
production of iron ore as well as the virtual transaction of financial derivatives.  
 
7.2.2.3. Solution to financialisation 
Having discussed the crisis resulting from financialisation both in theory and practice, the 
next concern is to explore the solution proposed by Marx and the CISA respectively. First, as 
mentioned earlier, Marx (1887) pointed out in the preface to the first German Edition of 
Capital that the purpose of his work was to discover “the economic law of motion of modern 
society” (p.7).  The downside of capitalist development, or in his own words, the “obstacles 
offered by the successive phases of its normal development”, cannot be sidestepped or 
removed by “bold leaps” or “legal enactments” (ibid, p.7). Thus, it is reasonable to argue that 
Marx would not entirely reject the wave of financialisation today. In fact, considering the 
accelerating effect that financialisation has on fundamental contradiction between the 
capitalist and the working class and hence the pending crisis of capitalism, his solution may 
well be, to paraphrase his view on free trade, that 
“(i)n a word, (financialisation) hastens the social revolution. It is in this revolutionary 
sense alone, (ladies and) gentlemen, that I vote in favour of (it)” (Marx, 1973, p.224). 
 
Turning to the practice of the Chinese iron and steel sector and the CISA in particular, what 
stands in vivid contrast with Marx’s opinion above is the association’s attempt to stifle the 
concept of financialisation in its Chinese cradle, through introducing and implementing 
compulsorily a number of industry regulations and policies. This is not surprising, 
considering CISA’s separation of the financial from the productive and commercial capital 





demonstrated earlier (from 7.2.1.1 to 7.2.1.5). That is, the association took the Chinese iron 
and steel industry as one traditional productive economy where only the productive capital 
and productive activities were needed and allowed. On the other hand, while Marx 
considered the class conflict as the ultimate solution to crisis of capitalism and thus 
financialisation, the CISA rarely argued from the class perspective throughout its discourse in 
iron ore negotiations. As the industry’s leading organisation, CISA’s management team 
consists mostly of former government officials and senior executives from major SOEs (as 
shown in Table 6.2), and its member firms are primarily comprised of large size steel plants 
and trading companies, most of which are also SOEs. As such, given the affinity between the 
CISA, the major SOEs, and the government, the fact that the association made little mention 
of the working class interest in its argument against financialisation casts doubt on the 
accountability of the CISA. 
 
Taking the above factors into account, the question arises: while chapter six concludes that 
the CISA was in the mentality of a productive capitalist throughout its discourse in iron ore 
negotiations, the early sections in the current chapter (7.1.1.3., 7.1.2.3. and 7.2.1.) show the 
association’s refusal to adapt the new modes of capitalist production (i.e. the commercial 
trade of iron ore in the Chinese spot market and the adoption of financialised quarterly index 
price), the political background of CISA’s senior management further casts doubt on the 
nature of the association. Then what really is the role of the CISA? This question is addressed 
in the next chapter, considering the purpose and scope of the current chapter that deal with 
the rise of financialisation from the interaction among the three groups concerned.
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In chapter seven, the emergence of financialisation is investigated and perceived through the 
interaction among the Big Three, the small and medium size firms in the Chinese iron and 
steel industry, and the CISA. The inner connections among the productive, commercial, and 
financial capital is presented and discussed in Marx’s concept of civil society where different 
modes of capitalist production coordinate and / or conflict with one another beyond the 
national boundaries. The change in iron ore pricing mechanisms from the traditional long run 
contract based price, to first the spot market price and finally the financialised quarterly price 
is analysed through Marx’s interpretation of advancement in capitalist modes of production. 
Alongside the analysis, the research question of the thesis as to why the CISA failed in its 
attempt to resist the financialised index price of iron ore is addressed in two aspects: first, 
financialisation is the structurally inevitable trend in the global iron ore market as the solution 
to the conflict between the social relations among the three groups and the corresponding 
productive forces; second, the CISA, as the leading association of the Chinese iron and steel 
sector, did not recognise the inner connection among production, commerce, and finance, and 
thus failed to adapt to the advanced mode of production therein. The end of chapter seven 
also poses another factor behind CISA’s failure: the association’s omission of the working 
class interest in its argument against financialisation.  
 
Thus, the current chapter examines the role of the CISA from a class perspective, to further 
answer the research question as for the reasons behind the association’s failed attempt to 
resist financialisation. In particular, CISA’s discourse is analysed from the perspectives of a 
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capitalist and of the working class, respectively. In addition, the association’s role as a semi-
government department is also explored for two reasons. First, the political profile of CISA’s 
senior management as outlined in Table 6.2 suggests the intimate relationship between the 
association and the Chinese government which merits further examination. Second, as the 
Chinese government claims to base its political ideology on Marxism (Deng, 1993; Jiang, 
2006b, 2006c), Marx’s theory in this thesis, as mentioned in chapter seven, not only serves as 
the theoretical framework for financialisation and the methodological tool for discourse 
analysis, but also forms part of the Chinese context in which this study is situated and 
accomplished. Therefore, the class analysis in the current chapter is threefold, comparing 
CISA’s mindset with the perspectives of, first a capitalist, then a proletarian government, and 
finally the working class. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The first section (8.1.) analyses to what 
extent the CISA resembles a productive capitalist. As concluded in the end of chapter six, the 
association did exhibit to a certain degree the characteristics of productive capital in its 
discourse of iron ore price. While such a conclusion is drawn through comparing the CISA 
with the other two groups of corporations including the Big Three and the small and medium 
enterprises in the Chinese iron and steel industry, the analysis in 8.1. is undertaken from a 
class perspective to see if the association really acted as a productive capitalist during the iron 
ore negotiations. In addition to the productive capitalist, the political connection between 
CISA’s senior management and the Chinese government as shown in Table 6.2 suggests the 
nature of the association as a form of government. Thus, section 8.2. compares the CISA with 
other government organisations involved in the negotiation. In particular, CISA’s discourse is 
traced back to the ideas and proposals made by the State Council, in order to determine 
whether the association wholeheartedly followed the central government’s advice or it 
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worked as the industry representative on behalf of the corporations. In either case, an analysis 
of CISA’s discourse from the working class perspective is needed: if the CISA was a type of 
government department, and since both the Chinese government (Deng, 1993; Jiang, 2006b) 
and the association (CISA, 2011b, 2013b; Liu, 2013) claim to be informed by Marxism, the 
question becomes why the CISA still failed in resisting the participation of financial capital in 
China’s iron ore market, standing in violent contrast to what Marx projected in The 
Communist Manifesto, or; if the CISA served the interest of the corporations in the industry, 
it is too worth exploring to what extent the association deviated from Marx’s emphasis on the 
proletarian interest. Therefore, the third section (8.3.) investigates CISA’s concern with the 
working class interest. In the final section (8.4.), a conclusion is drawn. 
 
8.1. Comparison between CISA and productive capitalist 
CISA’s role in the Chinese iron and steel industry in general and the annual iron ore price 
negotiation in particular has often been questionable and controversial, as illustrated in 
chapters six and seven. While the association was in the mentality of a productive capitalist in 
defending the long run contract based price (see section 6.5.1.), it lacked the ability to adapt 
to the change in the mode of production as did any other market participants (see sections 
7.1.1.3., 7.1.2.3. and 7.2.1.). Moreover, its political background and affinity (see Table 6.2) 
with the Chinese government and the major SOEs in the Chinese iron and steel industry 
further cast doubt on its identity. However, unlike the analyses in the previous chapters which 
compare the CISA with other corporations as different groups of capital, the present section 
examines the role of the association from a class perspective by contrasting CISA’s discourse 
with the characteristics of a capitalist described by Marx in Capital and The Communist 
Manifesto. 
Chapter 8 Financialisation vs. State—A Class Analysis 
308 
 
As discussed in chapter five, Marx’s ontological view is dialectical materialism constitutes 
the “unifying truth of both (idealism and materialism)” (Marx, 1974, p.135), a constantly 
changing process where “circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances” 
(Marx & Engels, 1974, p.59). Seeing in this way, capital too is not in its steady state or 
equilibrium, but rather in a continual movement which not only (re)generates the monetary 
form of capital but also reinforces the dominant social position of capital and the exploited 
status of the working class. Thus, Marx considered capital in its form of movement, 
constantly metamorphosing itself throughout the capitalist mode of production. In relation to 
productive capital, its movement is, as discussed in chapter four and shown in Figure 8.1 
below, that the initial capital (M) is spent on the purchase of human labour (L) and raw 
material (MP), which, through the process of production (P), will be converted into the 
finished product (C’) ready for sale at the price of M’ (Marx, 1956). 
 
Turning to the case of the CISA, it has been demonstrated and concluded in chapter six 
(section 6.5.1.) that, in defending the annual negotiation based price of iron ore, the 
association’s discourse was constructed in the mentality of a productive capitalist. More 
specifically, as shown in Figure 6.7, iron ore is regarded as the means of production (MP), i.e. 
the raw material for steel products (C’). As such, China’s steel plants could only purchase 
iron ore for the purpose of manufacturing steel, and, subsequent to the fulfilment of 
production (P), sell the finished steel product (C’) for M’. 
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In fact, it was not just the CISA who considered the iron ore price from the view of 
productive capital, the Big Three and the small and medium size steel plants in China were 
also in the first place the productive capitalists. More specifically, while the Big Three and 
the Chinese steel plants were also productive capitalists in that they produce either iron ore or 
steel as the finished product ready for sale, they had also, following the breakdown of the 
traditional annual price negotiation between the Big Three and the CISA, adopted the spot 
market price and later the financialised quarterly index price. In fact, from Marx’s 
perspective, such changes in the iron ore pricing mechanism were not superimposed by any 
single party, but as a consequence of the conflict between social relations and the 
corresponding productive forces, resulting in the advanced modes of production. The Big 
Three, when faced with China’s recovered iron ore demand in the aftermath of the GFC, as 
well as the unfinished price negotiation with the CISA, opened their door to China’s spot 
market in 2009; and in 2010 when the negotiation still remained unsettled and the CISA 
promised to legally eliminate spot market transactions, adopted the quarterly index price 
applicable to all participants in the global market. Correspondingly, the acceptance and 
adoption of the spot market price and the quarterly index price by the small and medium size 
firms in the Chinese iron and steel industry were also a result of the conflict among their 
increased iron ore demand, the exhibitive price of the second hand iron ore sold at the major 
SOEs, and CISA’s stringent assessment criteria for the official license of iron ore import.  
 
While such shifts in iron ore pricing are discussed and analysed extensively in both theory 
and practice in chapters four and seven as the natural development of the capitalist mode of 
production, and necessary trend of capital movement that flows to whichever sector that 
produces the highest profit, the CISA nevertheless attempted to maintain its perspective as 
the productive capitalist. Thus, the significant distinction between the CISA and other 
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productive capitalists such as the Big Three that can be drawn here is that the former refused 
to adapt to the changed modes of production (i.e. the spot market price and the quarterly 
index price). On the surface, the main contributing factor to the refusal is, as illuminated 
earlier in 7.2.1., CISA’s omission that finance shall be part of the Chinese iron and steel 
industry. In terms of the broad capital movement, it is argued in chapter seven that the CISA 
failed to understand the inner connection among production, commerce, and finance. 
However, insofar as the current section is concerned, CISA’s rejection of finance can also be 
interpreted as the association’s questionable intention to maximise profit. That is, as Marx 
(1959) stated that capital’s sole purpose of existence is to expand itself, then the movement 
towards financial capital in the cases of the Rizhao Centre, the index price of iron ore, other 
financial derivatives associated with iron ore price, and FMG’s request for the 5.5-6 billion 
USD financing can too be justified by the same motive. This at the same time casts doubt on 
the intention of the CISA, posing the question that whether the association also exhibited its 
sole pursuit of profit throughout its discourse in the price negotiation. The following analysis 
is thus dedicated towards this end. 
 
8.1.1. CISA as the productive capitalist 
Since its appointment under the authority of the State Council and the support from the 
Ministry of Commerce (Cao, 2009c) and the Ministry of Industry and Information (Yuan, 
2009b) as China’s representative at the iron ore price negotiation table, the association 
claimed to represent the interest of the Chinese iron and steel industry as a whole including 
both the SOEs and the privately owned small and medium enterprises (Xinhuanet, 17 August 
2009). Liu Zhenjiang, the vice chairman and the secretary of the CPC Committee at the 
CISA, explained the role of the CISA in the negotiation that, 
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“there exists many difficulties in letting an individual enterprises negotiate the national 
price. (For instance,) what are the opinions of other firms? What is the opinion of the 
small and medium enterprises? What is the opinion of the private enterprises? (In 
addition,) it is not convenient for one firm to collect views and information from other 
firms, not to mention to unifying different views. It is easy to represent your own firm, 
but not easy to represent other firms. Even after the negotiation is concluded, there too 
exist difficulties in fulfilling the long term contract (by all Chinese companies). 
Therefore, letting the industry organisation (i.e. CISA) coordinate the negotiation is more 
convenient than delegating one firm with the same duty.” (Xinhuanet, 17 August 2009). 
However, as shown in the political and professional background of CISA’s senior 
management which mostly consists of former government officials and directors at major 
SOEs, and the association’s entry criterion that requires the minimum steel output of 1 
million tons per year (CISA, 2011a), the small and medium size enterprises are somehow 
underrepresented. Then the productive capitalist which the CISA was assumed to represent 
may have no intention to maximise the profit of the small and medium firms.  
 
8.1.1.1. Suppression of the private transactions in iron ore spot market  
This was particularly the case where the CISA disapproved these firms’ ‘private’ purchase 
and import from the foreign mining companies. When the iron ore negotiation reached the 
stalemate in 2009 and the Big Three first opened their door to other players than the major 
SOEs in China’s spot market, the small and medium steel plants and trading companies took 
it as the opportunity for fair competition through purchasing the raw material at the same 
price as the SOEs. The CISA however criticised the move, and emphasised that 
“the small and medium enterprises have neither the power nor the qualification to sign up 
the long term iron ore contract. For those who had already signed on the so called 
contract, (it) would not be able to go through the custom, (and so) would be nothing but a 
piece of wastepaper” (Gold Bull Information, 12 June 2009). 
Shan Shanghua, the secretary general of CISA, told the press that 
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“have those iron ore import gone to proper buyers with the approved contract? Are the 
buyers the manufacturing enterprises which operate according to the country’s industry 
policy?... it is not that we did not know about the excessive iron ore import in the first 
half of this year (i.e. 2009) by the trading companies. Now (we) first check which one of 
them exceeded the (import) quota the most, and then punish whoever violates the 
national regulation” (Wang J, 2009c). 
 
Consequently, the association announced to form the iron ore coordination team, together 
with relevant government departments including the Ministry of Commerce and the CCCMC, 
to investigate the transaction and distribution of iron ore from its origin, and then disqualify 
those that breach the regulation (i.e. privately purchase from overseas) as the punishment 
(Gold Bull Information, 12 June 2009; Zhang Yi, 2009g; Economy 30 Minutes, 23 June 
2009). The immediate closure of the Rizhao Centre best served as the example here, where 
five privately owned companies attempted to establish the online iron ore trading platform 
and launch the Chinese iron ore index price, which was then shut down within two weeks by 
the association. In the meantime, the small and medium firms expressed different opinion that 
“in the past because we did not have the license to buy the long term priced iron ore, and 
had to purchase from the domestic market with high prices; at present the spot market 
price is lower than its long term contract based counterpart, but we are still under 
restrictions. In fact, according to normal business logic, as long as I have the money, why 
cannot I purchase as much as I can for the rest of the year when the price is low?” (Wang 
J, 2009c). 
 
Behind their private purchase from overseas was the purpose of maintaining the current 
market share so as to avoid being merged with the major SOEs (Wang J, 2009c). However, in 
this regard, the CISA obviously had no intention to help the small and medium size 
companies maximise their profits by allowing them to use the spot market price. Thus, it is 
most likely that the association, in its mentality of a productive capitalist, did not represent 
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the interest of these firms. However, this is not to say that the CISA acted its capitalist role 
for the major SOEs; the profit maximisation of SOEs was also curtailed by the association. 
 
At about the same time when the small and medium firms began to directly purchase iron ore 
from overseas resources, SOEs too participated in, rather than the traditional long term 
contract based channel, but the spot market transactions (Zhu, 2009), for two main reasons. 
First, the availability of iron ore in China’s spot market, as a result of the unsettled price 
negotiation in 2009, stimulated not only the small and medium players but also the major 
SOEs to take part for both meeting their own production demand and reselling the purchase 
to other firms (Wang J, 2009c). This was particular the case at that time when the spot price 
was much lower than the long term contract based price (Economic Information Daily, 10 
November 2009; Ma, 2010b). Second, also because of such significant price difference, many 
of the licensed buyers did not even fulfil their annual iron ore contract for 2008. That is, they 
would rather pay the penalty for breaking the long term iron ore supply contract, and 
purchased from the spot market (Caijing, 27 April 2009; Economic Information Daily, 29 
December 2009; Yang LM, 2010b). The participation in spot market transactions by the 
SOEs however was lambasted by the CISA. In 2009 June, the association officially 
announced that the nation would significantly chastise the domestic trading companies that 
kept importing iron ore against the normal market order. The focus of the punishment would 
primarily be on the top 10 iron ore importing SOEs (Li XL, 2009).Consequently, when 
Japan’s Nippon Steel, Korea’s Posco Steel, and Europe’s ArcelorMittal had, one after 
another, reached the annual price agreement with the Big Three, China’s top steel plants such 
as Baosteel and Wuhan iron & steel could neither import from overseas nor purchase from 
domestic spot market, but only from CISA’s designated trading firms (i.e. Sinosteel and 
Ruiganglian) (Zhang XD, 2009a). 
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8.1.1.2. Opposition to the steel price increase proposed by major SOEs 
Aside from the spot market transaction, another part of the major SOEs’ operation which the 
CISA too attempted to restrain was their proposed price increase in steel products. That is, in 
mid-2009 when major SOEs, starting with Baosteel, announced to raise the steel price (Gao, 
2009), Shan Shanghua, CISA’s secretary general, went to Baosteel in person to discuss the 
company’s forthcoming price increase. He expressed the concern that “the association wants 
to see each major steel plant could hold on for a while and not increase steel price at this 
important moment. (Because) once the steel price goes up, there will be obviously less space 
for the price reduction to be achieved in the iron ore negotiation” (Deng, 2009d). In response, 
Xu Lejiang, the chairman of Baosteel, argued that 
(the price raise) was entirely a market behaviour, and a decision based on the steel 
market demand… You can see how prosperous these days the car manufacturing and the 
home appliance sectors are. While the raw material demand from these industries has 
gone up, naturally the steel price will correspondingly increase. If you asked me to raise 
the steel price for the shipbuilding industry (where the demand for steel is not high), I 
would not dare to do so.” (Deng, 2009d). 
Thus, while the major SOEs proposed the price raise of their product as a corporate matter 
responding to the favourable market condition (Dong, 2009d), the CISA however was not 
willing to accept the change. In other words, profit maximisation on the parts of the SOEs too 
was not the top priority of the association. 
 
8.1.1.3. Restriction on the level of steel output 
In addition to the profit making activities such as reselling imported iron ore in the domestic 
market and raising prices of steel products which upset the CISA, the increased level of steel 
output at the Chinese steel plants is another area which the association did not approve. 
Following its repudiation of the private purchase of iron ore from the Big Three, the CISA 
Chapter 8 Financialisation vs. State—A Class Analysis 
315 
 
attributed the excessive iron ore demand of the small and medium firms to their production 
overcapacity (Chen SS, 2009e). 
“Behind the illusionary demand for iron ore, which made this year’s (i.e. 2009) iron ore 
negotiation exceptionally difficulty, were the large stockpile of iron ore by trading 
companies and the overproduction at small and medium steel plants”, said Shan 
Shanghua (Yue & Zhou, 2009). 
At the association’s 2009 director meeting, Deng Qilin, CISA’s chairman and the president of 
Wuhan Iron & Steel, emphasised that all steel plants in China must base the production 
scheme on sales orders, the strictly follow the principle that no production could be carried 
out when the product price was lower than its cost. Whichever enterprises that breach this 
principle shall be exposed and criticised (Zuo, 2009). However, whilst the CISA urged the 
entire industry to lower down the level of steel production (CISA, 2009b), counter argument 
was also presented. For instance, Zhu Fengliang, the secretary general at the iron and steel 
association of Shangxi province, indicated that although there might exist overcapacity (in 
CISA’s statistics), steel plants however did not feel the corresponding sales stagnation in the 
steel market; while the steel price might have been lower than before, but everyone could still 
sell the products as usual, meaning that the small and medium size plants would purchase the 
raw material for production more proactively (Zhai, 2009). Here, regardless of whether the 
alleged overcapacity existed or not, one thing which can be certain is that the profit making 
activity through manufacturing and selling steel products was again suppressed by the CISA. 
 
8.1.1.4. Imposition of M&A in the Chinese iron and steel industry 
Furthermore, the industry wide M&A on CISA’s agenda (Deng & Gao, 2008; Chen JS, 2010) 
is another area where most steel plants interests were affected. On the one hand, from the 
perspective of the privately owned steel enterprises, their production capacity and the access 
Chapter 8 Financialisation vs. State—A Class Analysis 
316 
 
to bank loans were curtailed and restricted by the CISA in the name of the M&A proposed by 
the State Council (Deng Y, 2010b; Tan, 2010). The executive vice president of Hebei Jinxi 
Group (top 10 private steel plants in China) pointed out that the M&A should not be about 
‘the state advances and the private retreats’ where major SOEs merge with private companies 
in the name of shutting down the obsolete production (Deng Y, 2010d). Thus, to avoid being 
merged with the major SOEs, small and medium size steel plants continued their production 
and the purchase of iron ore (Wang J, 2009c; Xu YL, 2009f). For the SOEs, on the other 
hand, the proposed M&A too was not something that they were willing to carry out. Ansteel 
indicated that, in relation to the steel sector M&A,  
“enterprises have no right to act free (of government intervention). Currently, most of the 
M&A taken place among China’s domestic steel enterprises reflect the will of the 
government, whereas the real market oriented M&A cases have been sparse. When the 
director of the SASAC asks you to acquire, you will have to do it even when you do not 
want to” (Deng Y, 2010d). 
Also, the vice president of Chongqing Steel shared the similar view. 
“the first issue to be solved before the M&A is the problem of the government (which 
does not consider the interest of corporations). Problems within steel enterprises are easy 
to fix… for example, when the government asked Chongqing Steel to acquire Chongqing 
Special Steel, the general opinion in the industry regarded the event as ‘the sick carrying 
the dead’, that is, while having so many difficulties on its own already, Chongqing Steel 
had to acquire another enterprise that had even worse financial performance… (Thus,) 
regarding M&A, we have suffered a lot, and learnt the lesson” (Deng Y, 2010d). 
 
However, while recognising that steel enterprises might be able to adjust their corporate 
structure within, the CISA emphasised that the layout of the iron and steel sector and the 
level of industry concentration still needed government adjustment (via the M&A) (Deng Y, 
2010b). Thus, in this aspect, it is more likely that the association played the role of 
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government, rather than on behalf of any single steel plants, or, in Marx’s terms, any 
productive capitalists. 
 
8.1.2. CISA as the industry regulator 
So far it has been demonstrated that the association did not exhibit, as would any other 
productive capitalists, the sole intention to maximise the profit of the Chinese steel plants and 
trading firms, in terms of the unofficial purchase of iron ore in China’s domestic market, the 
proposed price raise of steel products, the increased level of steel output, and the industry 
wide M&A proposed by the State Council. It is then highly unlikely that the CISA really 
played the role of a productive capitalist. In fact, in order to constrain the profit making 
activities mentioned above, the association took the initiative to introduce a number of 
industry policies which were supposed to be either implemented through self-discipline or 
enforced by the law.         
 
8.1.2.1. Introduction of a unified iron ore price and relevant industry policies 
First, in relation to the private transactions of iron ore among the Big Three, the SOEs, and 
the small and medium firms, the association in 2009 July proposed to the Ministry of Industry 
and Information that the government should completely abolish the spot market transactions 
in the country (Xu YL, 2009h). At the same time the association promoted a unified price 
exclusive to China’s domestic market. This was to “gradually terminate the chaotic situation 
of our nation’s iron ore import market” (Yue & Zhou, 2009), said Shan Shanghua, as the new 
price, once  adopted, would be able to replace both the long term contract based price and the 
spot market price. Then, the profiteering opportunity of reselling iron ore to other participants 
in the domestic market, motivated by the significant difference among different prices, would 
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come to an end. This has again confirmed that the association was not simply aimed at 
maximising profit of any particular firms. For the major SOEs, on the one hand, unifying iron 
ore price nationwide would mean that they could no longer resell iron ore to other firms at 
prohibitive prices, the profit made from which “even exceeded far beyond their steel making 
business” (Wang J, 2009e). On the other hand, for those small and medium companies 
already accustomed to the private channel of purchasing iron ore, having another new system 
for their procurement may render them more dependent on others (Wang J, 2009e). A small 
size steel plant based in the city of Tangshan indicated that 
“while the fluctuations in iron ore price do make us worried, what is going to make us 
more worried however is the case that (we) could not have the direct access to the import 
(once the unified system applies)”(Wang J, 2009e). 
Even suppose the access to iron ore could be guaranteed, another question would be 
that 
“since there will be a stage of iron ore redistribution, it must mean that there will also be 
plenty room for profiteering and corruption. Then who can take the lead (in the 
redistribution process) to maintain our confidence?” (Wang J, 2009e). 
Further doubt was cast on the question that whether major SOEs such as Baosteel would be 
willing to share the same price with the small and medium enterprises (Economy 30 Minutes, 
2009; Zhang Yi, 2009f). Thus, at its early stage, the proposal for the unified price did not 
receive much support from both the SOEs and the small and medium firms (Li & Liu, 2009; 
Wang J, 2009e). 
 
8.1.2.2. Proposed abolition of spot market transactions and relevant industry policies 
Secondly, to help realise the unified pricing mechanism, the CISA introduce a number of 
industry policies to help prevent iron ore spot market transactions. That is, in 2010 April 
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when the quarterly index price was officially adopted by the Big Three in the global market 
and privately accepted by the small and medium firms in the Chinese market, the association 
put forward The 2010 Iron Ore Importing Enterprise Assessment Criteria and Application 
Procedure (i.e. Procedure hereafter), Details on the Implementation of Iron Ore Import 
Agency System (i.e. Details), and The Record Tracking Standards on Iron Ore Import 
Contract (i.e. Trading Standards). The Procedure effectively prevented the small and 
medium firms from directly purchasing iron ore from overseas. That is, the stringent 
qualification criteria only grant the access to those enterprises with (1) registered assets no 
less than RMB 50 million
68
; (2) credit rating at 2A or above; (3) bank credit level at RMB 
400 million
69
 or above; and (4) annual amount of iron ore import at 1 million tons or above 
(Li RX, 2010f). 
 
If, say, the Procedure was aimed at ruling out the possibility of small and medium firms 
purchasing iron ore at a cheaper price as their state owned counterparts, then the Details was 
to forbid the licensed firms (mostly SOEs) from making profits by reselling their first hand 
import to the domestic market. In particular, it stated that China’s iron ore importing 
enterprises must strictly implement the agency system where the licensed importers first 
purchase iron ore from overseas and then resell the purchase, in addition to their own 
consumption amount, to those unlicensed companies with only 3%-5% surcharges (Li RX, 
2010f). As such, it was argued that the profiteering activity by the major SOEs through 
reselling iron ore to small and medium firms at prohibitive prices would come to an end. 
Also, as for those clients of the second hand iron ore who might even resell their purchase to 
                                                          
68 This is equivalent to AUD$ 8.33 million, assuming the exchange rate between Chinese RMB and Australian dollar is 6:1. 
69 This is equivalent to AUD$ 66.67 million, assuming the exchange rate between Chinese RMB and Australian dollar is 6:1. 
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the third and fourth hand buyers, the Details emphasised that “buyers (of the second hand 
iron ore) can only use the steel making ingredient for their own production. That is, the 
buyers are forbidden from selling iron ore back to the market (Li RX, 2010f). To ensure the 
implementation of Details, the Tracking Standards was introduced and imposed upon the 
licensed importing firms which were asked to report, on a monthly basis, the content of their 
import contract including the quantity, grade, origin, and destination to the ‘joint office for 
iron ore import’ co-established by the CISA and the CCCMC under the guidance of the 
Ministry of Commerce (Li RX, 2010f). 
 
8.1.2.3. Production overcapacity and relevant industry policies 
Thirdly, in relation to the production overcapacity in the industry, the CISA issued the Steel 
Industry Self-discipline Agreement on Standardising the Trade Order of Iron Ore Import (i.e. 
Agreement on Iron Ore Import) and the Steel Industry Self-discipline Agreement on 
Standardising the Order of Domestic Steel Market (i.e. Agreement on Domestic Steel 
Market). The Agreement on Iron Ore Import forbade the imported iron ore from being 
distributed to those steel plants whose steel production capacity was deemed obsolete (CISA, 
2009c). The Agreement on Domestic Steel Market stated that steel enterprises should 
schedule their production based on the market demand, and obey the principle that plants do 
not begin the production without receiving the sales contract in the first place (CISA, 2009d). 
 
Summarising the discussions above, it has been demonstrated in 8.1.1.1. that the CISA was 
not really in the mentality of a capitalist, as the association did not consider profit 
maximisation as the sole purpose of the existence of either the major SOEs or the small and 
medium firms. In particular, the private purchase and sale of iron ore in China’s domestic 
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market, which helped the Chinese companies make profits, was not approved by the 
association. Nor did it allow steel plants, both state and privately owned, to carry out 
production at their will. To reinforce such guidelines, the CISA introduced a number of 
industry policies which required self-discipline of the industry. These are discussed in 
8.1.1.2., suggesting the regulatory role of the association. Then the next question is whether 
the CISA can be regarded as a government organisation serving in the interest of the 
government, rather than that of the market. The follow section is directed towards this end. 
 
8.2. Comparison between CISA and government organisation 
While the political and professional background of CISA’s management team shown in Table 
6.2 exhibits the intimate relationship between the association and the Chinese government, 
and the previous section indicates the role of the CISA as a regulator in the industry, the 
current section investigates CISA’s attitude towards the government, in an attempt to answer 
the question that whom the association was held accountable to. 
 
In comparison with the major SOEs and in particular the small and medium size enterprises 
whose profit making activities, at least in part, were suppressed by the CISA, the Chinese 
government received significant support from the association. While the CISA took the 
initiative to forbid the iron ore spot market transaction, promote the import agency system 
and the industry wide M&A, and introduce the corresponding industry policies, these ideas 
were in fact put forward by the State Council in the Iron & Steel Industry Adjustment and 
Revitalisation Plan (i.e. Plan hereafter). 
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For instance, in relation to the iron ore import agency system, the Plan stated that 
“industry association / chamber of commerce should, through the coordination and the 
reinforced self-discipline within the industry, standardise the market order of iron ore 
import, and explore and promote the agency system. To grasp the current market 
opportunity, coordinate (China’s) domestic buyers with iron ore suppliers, establish the 
reciprocal pricing mechanism for iron ore import and the long term stable cooperation 
(between China’s buyers and foreign suppliers)”(State Council, 2009) (Emphases added). 
Correspondingly, in promoting the agency system, the CISA kept referring to the Plan as the 
guideline to the association (Zhang Yi, 2009g; Xu YL, 2009c; CISA, 2009b). Also of 
particular interest to note from the above quote is the requirement to establish the long term 
reciprocal relationship between iron ore buyers and suppliers. This too is consistent with 
CISA’s emphasis on the long run win-win relationship between China’s steel plants and the 
Big Three throughout its discourse of market discussed in chapter six. In fact, Shan 
Shanghua, the secretary general of the association, specifically pointed out the balanced 
interest sharing relationship between the sellers and buyers as the key principle on which the 
Chinese side would always insist in the negotiation (Zhou Y, 2009a). While CISA’s emphasis 
on the reciprocal relationship can be explained by the mode of production which the 
association adopted and exhibited in its discourse throughout the negotiation, relevance can 
also be drawn to the close relationship between the CISA and the State Council. That is, on 
the one hand, it has been illustrated in chapter six and seven that the association simply 
considered steel plants and mining companies as the only two types of players in the global 
iron ore market, a physical market from the perspective of a productive capitalist, thereby 
emphasising the interest sharing relationship between the only two groups of market 
participants, and ignoring the tendency that many other participants from the financial sector 
had also took part in iron ore transactions. On the other hand, however, since CISA’s role as 
the productive capitalist has been questioned earlier in the current chapter (i.e. 8.1.1.1.) which 
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subsequently points the association’s identity to a regulator of the industry (i.e. 8.1.1.2.), the 
so called reciprocal relationship between China’s steel plants and the Big Three can then be 
traced to the State Council. In other words, the CISA might not in itself act the role of a 
productive capitalist, but simply as a government organisation following the Plan put forward 
by the State Council, or alternatively a combination of both. 
 
Secondly, in relation to the production overcapacity of the Chinese steel plants, relevance can 
also be found between the CISA and the State Council. For instance, Plan regarded the 
elimination of production overcapacity as one of its key objective (State Council, 2009). In 
particular, the State Council indicated in the Plan that 
“(a)ny blast furnaces under 300 cubic metres, and converters and electronic furnaces 
under 20 tons shall be considered as obsolete and must be phased out with the 
corresponding overcapacity reduced by 53.4 million tons and 3.2 million tons 
respectively before the end of 2010.Any blast furnaces under 400 cubic metres, and 
converters and electronic furnaces under 20 tons shall be considered as obsolete  (by the 
2011 standards) and must be phased out with the corresponding overcapacity reduced by 
53.4 million tons and 3.2 million tons respectively before the end of 2011” (State 
Council, 2009). 
 
Corresponding to the criteria above, the CISA (2009c) stated in the Agreement on Iron Ore 
Import that China’s iron ore importing companies were not permitted to sell their import to 
those steel plants whose production capacity was deemed outdated by the Plan. Similarly, 
while the Plan stated the general guideline that “(steel plants shall) strictly control the 
increase in production capacity, (government) will no longer approve or support any 
programme that simply increases or expands steel production capacity” (State Council, 
2009), the CISA (2009d) put forward the specific requirement in the Agreement on Domestic 
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Steel Market that steel plants must base their steel production schedule on the sales contract 
which they must have received before commencing the production. In fact, the Ministry of 
Industry and Information also called for the strict control on the production expansion of the 
domestic steel plants that any new programmes involved with the increase and / or innovation 
of production capacity must be based on the pre-condition that the equal amount of obsolete 
production capacity will be phased out first (Zhou RX, 2009b). 
 
Thirdly, in relation to the industry wide M&A promoted by the CISA, the State Council also 
considered it as the key objective of the Plan that 
“(the government) promotes the M&As cross different regions including those between 
Anben group  (comprised of Anshan Iron & Steel as 3rd largest, and Benxi Iron & Steel 
as no.13th largest steel plant), Panzhihua Iron & Steel group (the 11th largest steel plant), 
and Dongbei Special Steel group (the 39th largest steel plant), between Baosteel group 
(the largest steel plant), Baogang group (the 17th largest steel plant), and Ningbosteel 
group, and also the regional M&As including those between Tianjin Pipe group (the 23rd 
largest steel plant),Tianjin Tiantie Metallurgy group (the 18th largest steel plant), Tianjin 
Iron & Steel group (the 32nd largest steel plant), and Tianjin Metallurgy group, and 
between Taiyuan Iron & Steel group and other steel plants within Shanxi province. By 
2011, there will be several internationally competitive extra-large steel conglomerates in 
the country including Baosteel group, Anben group, and Wuhan Iron & Steel group, each 
of which will be equipped with the production capacity at more than 50 million tons; and 
a few large steel enterprises with the production capacity ranging from 10 to 30 million 
tons” (State Council, 2009). 
Similar to the issue of production capacity, the State Council was not the only government 
department that encouraged the M&A mentioned above, the Ministry of Industry and 
Information was also working on the Steel Industry Mergers and Acquisitions Principles 
(Gold Bull Information, 23 July 2009) and the Guidelines on the Promotion of the Mergers 
and Acquisitions of Steel Enterprises (Zhang GD, 2010). The minister, Li Yizhong, also 
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mentioned at the World Steel Conference in 2009 that government departments should 
facilitate the industry wide M&A by introducing the corresponding accounting, taxation, 
finance, and industry policies (Zhou RX, 2009b). 
 
To summarise the discussion so far, the views and policies proposed by the CISA can be 
traced back to relevant government departments including the State Council and the Ministry 
of Industry and Information. This is not surprising given the political background of CISA’s 
senior management team shown in Table 6.2. While it remains as a moot point whether it was 
the CISA or government organisations which initially introduce those ideas and concepts, 
what is certain on the other hand at this stage is that the CISA took the role of a semi-
regulatory body in the Chinese iron and steel industry to assist the implementation of 
government regulations. In other words, the association was in fact accountable to the 
government, rather than to any iron and steel enterprises. 
 
However, this leads to yet another question: since the CISA was in fact acting as an unofficial 
government department, and considering that the Chinese government claimed itself to be a 
socialist political regime based on Marxism (Deng, 1993, p.62; Jiang, 2006b, p.8), why did 
the association still fail to resist and / or overthrow the financialised index price of iron ore? 
Or, from Marx’s perspective in The Communist Manifesto, why was it not the “fall (of the 
financial capitalist) and the victory of the proletariat (represented by the CPC government)” 
(Marx & Engels, 2008, p.51)? This becomes particularly obvious in the case of the 
financialisation in the global iron ore market where one side of the story corresponds to 
Marx’s projection of capitalism: 





cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of 
production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of 
society … All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable 
prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before 
they can ossify” (Marx & Engels, 2008, p.38). 
Here, the changes in the instruments and relations of production have been explored in 
chapter seven, where the shifts in the mode of production, from production to commerce and 
finance, are illustrated in the context of the Chinese iron ore market. More specifically, the 
traditional annual contract based practicing mechanism which had been adopted for nearly 
four decades was abandoned by the Big Three in 2009 as both result of and the solution to the 
conflict between their unsettled iron ore price negotiation with the CISA and the growth in 
the iron ore supply and demand. Before very long, the newly adopted spot market price had 
become ‘antiquated before (it) can ossify’ in that the quarterly index price was then accepted 
by the global market in 2010 April, serving as the solution to China’s promised regulation 
and intervention of its domestic spot market, the outdated annual price negotiation, and the 
recovered global market demand of iron ore. In fact, the rising demand for iron ore in the 
world market was also pictured by Marx that  
“(t)he need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the  
bourgeoisie
71
over the entire surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle 
everywhere, establish connections everywhere” (ibid, p.38). 
 
The other side of the scenario concerns the CISA and the Chinese government in general, 
exhibiting a different picture from Marx’s illumination. That is, While Marx was right about 
the CPC that “(the) organisation of the proletarians into a class, and consequently into a 
                                                          
70 Here, Engels further explained that bourgeoisie refers to “the class of modern capitalists, owners of the means of social 
production and employers of wage labour” (Marx & Engels, 2008, p.33). 
71 As mentioned in the previous footnote, bourgeoisie purports to the capitalist class. 
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political party” (Marx & Engels, 2008, p.47) has been achieved in the context of China, the 
promised “overthrow of the bourgeois supremacy” (ibid, p53) and the “(a)bolition of private 
property” (ibid, p.54) however are not as expected by Marx. In the context of the Chinese 
iron and steel industry, although the CISA considers Marxism as one of the import theoretical 
guidance of the association
72
 (CISA, 2011b, 2013b; Liu, 2013), there are also private 
enterprises in the domestic market, not to mention the Big Three from overseas. Granted, it 
can be argued that, in terms of the government control over the iron and steel industry, the 
industry policies and regulations (discussed above) introduced by the State Council and the 
CISA may to some extent correspond to Marx’s suggestion that 
“(t)he proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degree, all capital from the 
bourgeoisie, to centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the state, i.e., of 
the proletariat organised as the ruling class; and to increase the total productive forces as 
rapidly as possible” (Marx & Engels, 2008, pp.63-4). 
This is particularly the case for the industry wide M&A in the Plan. That is, despite the 
complaint expressed by both private and state-owned corporations regarding the compulsory 
government control over market intentions (see Deng Y, 2010b, 2010d), the top five state-
owned steel plants were required to acquire other enterprises to form five extra-large 
conglomerates. While this emphasis on government control may perhaps be consistent with 
Marx’s proposal, what is not contained in the discourse of the CISA, but should have been 
from Marx’s perspective, is, as mentioned in section 7.2.2.3., the working class interest. 
                                                          
72 The theoretical guidance of the CISA is emphasised by the CPC committee at the association in different occasions 
(CISA, 2011b, 2013b; Liu, 2013). More specifically, the CISA (2011b)stated in 2011 that its operation and development 
must always follow Marxism, Mao Zedong Thought (based on the works of Mao Zedong, the first generation national leader 
of the CPC), Deng Xiaoping Theory (based on the works of Deng Xiaoping, the second generation national leader), the 
Three Represents (based on the works of Jiang Zemin, the third generation national leader), and the Scientific Outlook on 
Development (based on the works of Hu Jintao, the fourth generation national leader). Also, the former president Jiang 
Zemin (2006b) claimed that Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, and the Three Represents are all based on the 
application of Marxism into the Chinese context. In 2013 when Xi Jinping became the president of China and the party 
secretary of the CPC, his new slogan “Zhao Jingzi, Zheng Yiguan, Xixizao, Zhizhibing” (i.e. look into mirror, dress up with 
proper hat and clothes, take a shower, and cure disease) (this is translated by the author of the thesis) was introduced and 
subsequently installed in CISA’s official document (see CISA, 2013b; Liu, 2013).  
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8.3. CISA’s concern with the working class interest 
The analysis of the working class interest in the case study here is necessary both 
theoretically and methodologically. First, in relation to Marx’s theory, communists “have no 
interests separate and apart from those of the proletariat as a whole” (Marx & Engels, 2008, 
p.52), and “fight for the enforcement of the momentary interests of the working class” (ibid, 
p.82). Thus, as an organisation based on Marx’s theoretical work, how the CISA elaborated 
on the interest of the working class is worth exploring. Particularly in the case of 
financialisation, it has been demonstrated in chapter four (section 4.3.4.) that the class 
conflict between financial capital and the working class does exist where the ‘secondary 
exploitation’ is superimposed by the former onto the latter. Moreover, as discussed in 
chapters four (section 4.3.5.) and seven (section 7.2.2.3.), the solution to financialisation and 
the fundamental crisis of capitalism, according to Marx, concerns the class struggle of the 
proletariat. Therefore, the analysis of the working class interest is addressed in the debate of 
financialisation is needed. Secondly, in relation to methodology, the thesis adopts a Marx-
informed PEA framework. Class relations are thus one key area to address insofar as the 
extant PEA literature is concerned (Cooper & Sherer, 1984; Tinker & Neimark, 1987) as well 
as from Marx’s methodological perspective (Cooper, 1997). While CISA’s identity and role 
have been extensively discussed earlier in the current chapter (sections 8.1.1. and 8.1.2.) to 
explore the extent to which the association resembles a productive capitalist and / or a 
government organisation, what is yet to be analysed is to what extent the CISA considered 
the interest of the working class throughout its discourse against financialisation. To this end, 
the following section investigates how the interest of the working class was considered in 
CISA’s ex ante and ex post resistance against the quarterly index price of iron ore. More 
specifically, capital movement and the class conflict therein are analysed. 
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8.3.1. CISA as the productive capitalist and the working class 
Although it has been illustrated in chapter six that, in the debate over the pricing mechanism 
of iron ore between China and the Big Three, the identity of iron ore was one specific area 
where different opinions were presented, the role of human labour was nevertheless omitted 
from the negotiation. In particular, whilst the CISA defended the annual contract based price 
in the mentality of a productive capitalist (as shown in Figure 6.7) which considered iron ore 
as only the raw material (MP) to produce steel (C’), the Big Three, as the commercial and 
financial capitalists, viewed iron ore as a commodity for not only manufacturing steel 
products and but also trading in the global market. However, regardless of whether the 
productive capitalist perspective or a financial capitalist view should apply, human labour 
(L), as another indispensable component in the production process (P), was not discussed by 
any party. 
 
Furthermore, it was not just the human labour as one factor / symbol in the movement of 
productive capital that had been ignored, what is more theoretically significant is the class 
relation reflected in the circuit of capital. That is, consistent with Marx (1956), the “class 
relation between capitalist and wage-laborer… is presupposed from the moment the two face 
each other in the act of  M – L” (p.18).When the production is accomplished, the resulting 
product is “not only a commodity, but a commodity pregnant with surplus-value (including 
the value of the productive capital P consumed in the production and the gratuitous labour 
performed for the capital)” (p.22).Thus, in the case of the iron and steel industry, what steel 
plants produce is not only the steel products therein but also “reproduce to an ever increasing 
extent the class of wage-labourers, into whom it transforms the vast majority of direct 
producers” (p.20).Viewed in this way, throughout its discourse as a productive capitalist in 
supporting the traditional long run based iron ore pricing mechanism, not only did the CISA 
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neglect the human labour factor, but it also omitted the implications of the corresponding 
class relations. This is not surprising, given that CISA’s participation in the iron ore 
negotiation was, as indicated by the association itself (Xinhuanet, 17 August 2009), as well as 
the Ministry of Commerce (Gong & He, 2009) and the Ministry of Industry and Information 
(China News Service, 13 August 2009; Wang J, 2009f; Jiao, 2010c), a corporate matter free 
of government interventions. In other words, the association identified itself, at least on 
surface, with all enterprises in the Chinese iron and steel industry. Thus, the iron ore 
negotiation was simply considered as the behaviour of corporations; the concern with the 
working class, as reflected in the circuit of productive capital (discussed above), was 
neglected. 
 
Stepping outside the discourse of iron ore pricing, the association exhibited the similar 
emphasis on corporations and market in suggesting the pricing policies for China’s domestic 
steel products. This is also where CISA’s view differs from Marx’s interpretation in terms of 
the movement of capital. On the one hand, according to Marx (1956), when the steel product 
is sold for the price of M’, it represents not only the quantitative increase from M to M’ (i.e. 
the difference is the profit ∆M), but also connotes “at the same time a qualitative relation… a 
capital-relation” (p.26) capable of self-expanding by producing surplus value from unpaid 
labour. On the other hand, however, judging from CISA’s policies and suggestions on the 
steel price, such relation is not considered. Instead, similar to its role suggested by the 
Chinese government during the iron ore price negotiation, the association set out the policy 
more from a corporation’s perspective. More specifically, it stated in Agreement on Domestic 
Steel Market section two that “(steel) products should reflect not only market supply and 
demand, but also their own quality” (CISA, 2009d), and in section seven that “(steel) 
enterprises should establish an information analysis system that timely and accurately collects 
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and analyses market price, a scientific and effective price setting mechanism, and a decision 
management system that standardises companies’ internal pricing procedure” (CISA, 
2009d).Viewed in this way, the capital-labour class relation was again neglected, since the 
price of steel was primarily a result of the market supply and demand mechanism. Moreover, 
as demonstrated in chapter six (section 6.4.1.), CISA’s concept of market was confined to 
transactions in a highly regulated physical market, with no consideration of the commercial 
and financial capital. However, insofar as the index pricing mechanism is concerned, the 
participation of financial capital is inevitable and thus the discussion of the relation between 
the working class and the financial capital in the global iron ore market is necessary. 
 
8.3.2. Financial capitalist and the working class in the Chinese iron ore market 
As demonstrated in chapter four, there does exist the class conflict between financial 
capitalists and the working class. On the one hand, in the case of the direct relation between 
the two, this is referred to as the “secondary exploitation which runs parallel to the primary 
exploitation taking place in the production process itself” (Marx, 1959, p.435): when the 
ordinary worker “does any money borrowing, he does so, for instance, at the pawnshop to 
secure personal necessities” (ibid, p.425); and when the worker entrusts his or her savings 
and pension funds into the hands of bankers and financial investors, the investment returns 
received is an implicit form of wages for the regeneration of the working class (Marx, 1974, 
p.21; Marx & Engels, 2008, p.43). On the other hand, in the case of the indirect relation 
between proletariats and financial capitalists, the invisible exploitation by the latter has also 
been illustrated in section 4.3.2. Through demystifying the movement of financial capital M –
M” in Figure 4.1, it has been demonstrated that the surplus value is first extracted from the 
production process by productive capitalists and then transferred, in part, to financial 
capitalists. 




In relation to the case studied in the thesis, it is the second scenario that corresponds to the 
context of the global iron ore market and the debate over the iron ore pricing mechanism in 
particular. While the relationship between steel plants as productive capital and traders of 
iron ore and of the associated derivatives as financial capital is illustrated in Figure 7.3, the 
role of the working class is yet to be discussed. Thus, through incorporating the invisible 
exploitation by the financial capital in Figure 4.1 with the expanded capital movement 
exhibited in Figure 7.3, it shows that while charging the Chinese steel manufacturers higher 
prices on the imported iron ore, the financial capitalists will also be able to take the lion’s 
share of the surplus value extracted from the labour force at those steel plants, since the 
Chinese steel industry was suffering from losses primarily due to, as claimed by the CISA, 
the increased raw material costs (Yao, 2008; Gold Bull Information, 15 May 2009; Jiao, 
2009a; Yu X, 2009; Zhang Q, 2009; Zhang XM, 2009; DFdaily, 8 March 2010; Zhang Yi, 
2010c). 
 
Although the invisible exploitation as such is pointed out by Marx, it is hardly mentioned by 
the CISA. Instead, the association simply attributed the predicament of the Chinese steel 
plants to the monopolistic position of the Big Three. In particular, from the perspective of a 
productive capitalist, the CISA kept emphasising the interdependent relationship between 
steel plants and mining firms, with no consideration of other participants such as those in the 
spot market and those from the financial sector. For instance, Qi Xiangdong, CISA’s deputy 
secretary general, commented on the 2009 iron ore price negotiation that 
“the biggest focus is on a reasonable price relations between steel prices and all other 
product prices on the same industrial chain… We want to ensure a reasonable allocation 
of interests on the same industrial chain. Last year iron ore suppliers made huge profits, 
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whereas steel plants incurred significant losses. This is unreasonable and cannot last long” 
(Zhang Yi, 2009d) (emphases added). 
Wu Xichun, the honorary chairman of the association, also pointed out such relationship that 
“if iron ore suppliers still do not consider a reasonable drop (in iron ore price), there will 
be no room for steel plants to survive. If so, the suppliers will also have no place to make 
profits from… China does not want to see the further intensified conflict in iron ore 
negotiation, after all, our fundamental interests are the same” (Securities Times, 20 
March 2009) (emphases added). 
 
Here, both officials hold the same view that the Big Three should decrease iron ore price 
dramatically so that steel plants, as the only purchaser of iron ore, could cut their steel 
production cost and break even. Consistent with chapter six, this is not surprising, since the 
CISA, in the mentality of a productive capitalist, only considered the purpose of iron ore as 
the raw material for steel manufacturing throughout its discourses. What is not discussed in 
chapter six but of particular interest to note here is the omission of the working class interest. 
More specifically, the use of the word ‘interest’ in the above quotes merits special attention. 
When Qi Xiangdong argued that the CISA wanted a ‘reasonable allocation of interest’ on the 
same industrial chain, the interest was later explained by him as the ‘profits’ made by the Big 
Three who did not share the earnings fairly with China’s steel plants. Similarly, Wu Xichun 
also pointed out that steel plants and mining companies have the same ‘fundamental interests’ 
in making profits. 
 
This emphasis on the profit sharing relationship was further used by the association as the 
main argument against then the newly agreed annual price reached by the Japanese steel 
enterprises in 2009. Shan Shanghua, the secretary general, explained CISA’s refusal of the 
price that “because this price agreement does not reflect the interest-sharing and reciprocal 
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relationship between steel manufacturers and iron ore suppliers, it will still leave most (steel) 
enterprises suffering from losses” (Chen JS, 2009). The same spirit was carried forward in the 
2010 price negotiation (Xu YL, 2009j). “How could China not even get a sip of the huge 
profits that foreign mining corporations have been making? This is not fair and not moral” 
(DFdaily, 8 March 2010) (emphasis added), said Deng Qilin, the chairman of the CISA and 
the president of Wuhan Iron and Steel group. Here, the sense of fairness and morality seems 
to be only related to a reasonable allocation of profits among steel plants and mining 
companies, again leaving the interest of the working class undiscussed. 
 
In addition to the interest as the financial profit discussed above, the other type of interest 
emphasised by the CISA is the national interest which might be impaired by the quarterly 
index pricing mechanism of iron ore in China’s iron and steel industry. During the 2009 price 
negotiation when the small and medium steel plants and trading companies began to trade 
with the Big Three in private, the CISA pointed out that all firms in the domestic iron and 
steel industry should unite, rather than compete with one another, to protect the national 
interest (Tie, 2009). In response, while the small and medium firms commented that the so 
called nation-wide unification would be another chance for the major SOEs to profiteer (from 
selling the second hand iron ore in the domestic market) (Li RX, 2010a), some licensed SOEs 
also disobeyed CISA’s call for unification and turned to the private import of iron ore (Zhang 
XD, 2009a). Among those firms, Sinosteel and China National Building Materials Group, 
two of China’s largest iron ore importer under the direct supervision of the central 
government, were the biggest promoters behind the soaring price in iron ore spot market, 
which, according to a private iron ore trader, rendered the marketplace nothing but a joke 
(Deng Y, 2010a). Then the question becomes how the CISA would define the ‘national 
interest’. The balance seems to lean towards the interests of SOEs and government. This 
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becomes most evident in the 2010 negotiation. Whilst the call for unification remained in the 
subsequent year, during a vice chairmen’s meeting at the CISA, the association together with 
the major SOEs submitted a petition letter to the State Council asking the government to raise 
the issue of iron ore negotiation to a national level (21st Century Business Herald, 16 March 
2010). “If this issue could not be solved properly, it will damage the national interest”, said 
Qi Xiangdong, CISA’s deputy secretary general (Zhang XD, 2010a) (emphasis added). The 
vice chairman of the association, Luo Bingsheng, further explained the term national interest 
as the “strategic safety of the national economy” (Yu L, 2010e). Specifically, he indicated at 
CISA’s industry information press conference for the second quarter of 2010 in Beijing that 
“The CISA will consider iron ore import as a strategic issue, and bring it up to the 
national level. It aims to fundamentally solve this problem at the strategic level for the 
safety of China’s national economic development” (Ruan, 2010). 
Another interpretation of the national interest is from Hebei Iron & Steel Group
73
, which 
received support from the CISA (Zhang Yi, 2010c; Yu L, 2010h). According to the group, 
since Chinese enterprises were suffering from losses as a result of the soaring price of iron 
ore set by the Big Three, it became a significant matter of national interest that the nation 
should introduce some measures to intervene the market. Therefore, the group suggested to 
the Ministry of Industry and Information to establish a national mining joint stock company 
co-founded by China’s top 16 largest steel plants which would unify the country’s 
procurement, investment, and redistribution of iron ore. However, counterarguments were 
also presented. First, a private iron ore trader did not believe in the unified import channel, 
“since there will still be a stage of iron ore redistribution, it must mean that there will also be 
plenty room for profiteering and corruption. Then who can take the lead to maintain 
                                                          
73 The group is the parent entity of three top 50 steel plants in China, including Handan Iron & Steel Group, Tangshan Iron 
& Steel, and Chengde Iron & Steel, which were ranked number 10, 12, and 41 of the top 50 steel plants respectively in 2009 
(CISA, 2009e). 
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everyone’s confidence?” (Wang J, 2009e). Second, the small and medium enterprises did not 
even show any interest in the unsettled annual price of iron ore. On the one hand, for those 
who already had their own private purchase channel, changes in the annual price did not 
really matter (Sina Finance, 22 March 2010; Wang & Xu, 2010). On the other hand, those 
who welcomed the index price considered it as a good opportunity to quickly adapt to the 
new pricing mechanism and would then be able to compete fairly with their state-owned 
competitors (Sina Finance, 22 March 2010). Viewed in this way, national interest does not 
necessarily refer to that of the small and medium firms. To sum up, having discussed the 
twofold meanings of the term ‘national interest’, an emphasis on the interest of the working 
class still remains absent from the discourse of the CISA. 
 
8.3.3. Global iron ore market and the working class 
Moreover, the overall capital movement among productive, commercial, and financial 
capitalists in the global iron ore market has, according to Marx (1973), further exacerbated 
the exploitation of the working class. Specifically, the Chinese iron ore market has been 
increasingly interweaved with the free flow of financial capital on a global scale due to (1) 
Big Three’s opened door towards China’s small and medium size steel plants and trading 
firms and (2) the adoption of the quarterly indexed iron ore price which enables the 
participation of financial capital in the traditional iron and steel sector. The result is thus that  
“(f)ree trade increases productive forces… (which) implies the accumulation and the 
concentration of capital (that)… involves a greater division of labour… The greater 
division of labour destroys the special skill of the labourer; and by putting in the place of 
this skilled work labour which any one can perform, it increases competition among the 
workers. This competition becomes fiercer as the division of labour enables a single 
worker to do the work of three… The reward of labour diminishes for all, and the burden 
of labour increases for some” (Marx, 1973, pp.215-6). 
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The intensified exploitation is, for Marx, “cosmopolitan” (ibid, p.222), since the competition 
of labour will invite capital to those areas where labour cost is at its lowest. While it has been 
illuminated in sections 7.1.1.2., 7.1.2.1.and 7.1.2.2. that the financialisation of the iron ore 
pricing mechanism did improve the productive force at the Big Three as well as the Chinese 
small and medium size steel plants, what was not discussed is the corresponding increased 
level of competition within China’s labour market. In particular, while the productive force at 
those small and medium enterprises were able to operate at full production capacity (Zhu, 
2009), the CISA did not mention the deteriorated labour conditions therein as a consequence 
of the exacerbated competition in the local job market, but, in the same view as other 
government departments (Han, 2009c; Zhou RX, 2009b), lambasted the increase in steel 
output as the obstacle to the healthy development of the nation’s industry in general (Xu YL, 
2009c). In other words, the association did not take the working class interest as the top 
priority in its agenda here; it was concerned with the industry from the perspective of a 
regulator. 
 
Having demonstrated CISA’s omission of the working class interest in relation to the circuit 
of productive capital and the overall movement of the productive, commercial, and financial 
capital in the global iron ore market, it can be concluded that whilst the association claimed 
to follow Marxism as its theoretical guidance (CISA, 2011b, 2013b; Liu, 2013), it did not 
consider the class relations throughout the discourse against financialisation. In other words, 
the working class interest was ignored by the association. Then in whose interest did the 
CISA operate? Already illustrated in section 8.1.1.is that the association did not act purely as 
a productive capitalist but more in the nature of an industry regulator. Subsequently the 
problem surfaces itself: while acting as a semi-government organisation, the CISA did not 
take the interests of the proletariats into account, as projected by Marx (Marx & Engels, 
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2008). Then to whom is the association held accountable? The answer is, as demonstrated in 
section 8.1.2., the Chinese government, yet a government beyond Marx’s depiction of the 
proletarian class government as outlined in The Communist Manifesto as per the analysis in 
section 8.1.3. More specifically, while acting as a semi government organisation formed by 
the CPC and trying to “centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the state” 
(Marx & Engels, 2008, p.64), the association did exhibit interests that were “separate and 
apart from those of the proletariat as a whole” (ibid, p.52). That is, rather than focusing on the 
working class interest which the CISA was supposed to serve according to Marx, the 
association only emphasised the interests of the iron and steel industry in particular and of the 
nation as a whole (see e.g. Jiao, 2009c; Li XL, 2009; Zhang XD, 2010a). Thus, it can be 
concluded that the association was accountable to the state, or, the stateholder, standing in 
violent contrast to the Big Three who claimed to serve the interests of shareholders (see e.g 
Zhang Yi, 2009d; Wang J, 2009g). 
 
The discrepancy between the discourse of CISA and Marx’s projection of a communist 
society can be explained by Marx’s own words in the preface to the Manifesto’s German 
Edition that 
“(t)he practical application of the principles will depend, as the Manifesto itself states, 
everywhere and at all times, on the historical conditions for the time being existing, and, 
for that reason, no special stress is laid on the revolutionary measures proposed at the end 
of Section II (in the Manifesto). That passage would, in many respects, be very 
differently worded today” (Marx & Engels, 2008, p.86). 
He further explained the reason for different interpretations of communism in Manifesto that 
“(t)he theoretical conclusions of the communists are in no way based on ideas or 
principles that have been invented, or discovered, by this or that would-be universal 
reformer. They merely express, in general terms, actual relations springing from an 
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existing class struggle, from a historical movement going on under our every eyes” (ibid, 
p.53). 
Viewed in this way, the deviation of CISA’s discourse from Marx’s theory is justifiable. 
Indeed, the CPC government also emphasises that its political foundation has drawn heavily 
from Marxism, and in itself is the application of Marx’s theory in the Chinese context (see 
Deng, 1993; Jiang, 2006b, 2006c). Thus, while it is not the purpose of the thesis to comment 
on the extent to which the contemporary Chinese government and the CISA in particular have 
followed Marx’s theory, what is of relevance and certainty here is that the discourse of the 
association exhibits a form of state capitalism that takes into account the interests of the 
Chinese iron and steel industry and China’s national interest, whereas leaving the working 
class interest unrepresented. This also answers in part the research question of the thesis as to 
the reasons behind CISA’s failed attempt to resist financialisation in the Chinese iron ore 
market: the omission of the working class interest in the association’s ex ante and ex post 
discourse against the quarterly indexed price renders the “fall (of the financial capitalist) and 




In this chapter, a class analysis of CISA’s role is undertaken in the context of the annual iron 
ore price negotiation in particular and the Chinese iron and steel industry in general. Starting 
with the comparison between CISA’s interpretation of capital movement and Marx’s 
explanation outlined in Capital, the first section 8.1. examines if the association really acted 
as a productive capitalist in the Chinese industry from four aspects: (1) the attitude towards 
the private purchase and sale of iron ore in China’s domestic market; (2) the increase in steel 
product prices by the country’s major steel plants; (3) the increase in the level of steel output 
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in the industry; and (4) the industry wide M&A proposed by the CISA. The analysis based on 
these respects has demonstrated that CISA’s discourse suggested the opposite to the very 
purpose of existence for a capitalist: the association did not operate to help corporations 
maximise profits according to Capital, but acted more like an industry regulator.  
 
This then turns the attention to CISA’s identity as a semi-formal government organisation in 
section 8.2. By comparing CISA’s discourse with that of the government and in particular 
State Council’s Plan, the views and proposals of the association are traced back to relevant 
government departments and national policies. Thus, it is concluded in 8.2. that the CISA was 
in fact a semi-government organisation regulating the Chinese iron and steel industry. This 
has at the same time led to another question that why the association, if acting as the agent of 
the CPC government based on Marx’s theory, did not succeed, as predicted by Marx in 
Manifesto, in resisting the participation of the financial capital in the iron ore pricing 
mechanism.  
 
Since Marx (Marx & Engels, 2008) considered class struggle as the solution to capitalism, 
and both the Chinese government (Deng, 1993; Jiang, 2006b, 2006c) and the CISA (CISA, 
2011b; Liu, 2013) claimed to follow the theoretical guidance of Marx, the third section (8.3.) 
analyses to what extent the CISA considered the interest of the working class throughout its 
discourse against financialisation. Through Marx’s interpretation of the capital-labour 
relation regarding the movement of productive capital as well as the overall interaction 
among production, commerce, and finance in the global iron ore market, it has been 
demonstrated that the proletarian interest was not taken into account by any party in iron ore 
price negotiations. Instead, the interests which the CISA kept emphasising were (1) the 
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financial profit which was supposed to be shared fairly between China’s steel plants and the 
Big Three; and (2) the national interest behind a healthy market environment of China’s iron 
and steel industry. While this explains in part the reason that the CISA failed in its attempt to 
resist financialisation since it did not consider the issue from the class perspective, it also 
points the accountability of the CISA towards the central government of CPC.
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Chapter 9 Discussions and Conclusion 
 
In the previous chapter, a class analysis is undertaken to examine the extent to which the 
CISA considered the interests of a productive capitalist, the working class, and the central 
government. Through analysing and comparing CISA’s discourse with Marx’s interpretation 
of capitalists and the proletarian government described in Capital and Manifesto, it has been 
demonstrated that the association was primarily accountable to the interests of the state and of 
the national economy, while leaving the working class interest unrepresented. This also 
answers partly the research question of the thesis as for the reasons behind CISA’s failure in 
resisting financialisation. To summarise the analyses thus far from chapters six, seven, and 
eight, the current chapter pulls the argument together and presents a comprehensive answer to 
the research question.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The first section (9.1.) draws from the 
findings of the analyses in chapters six to eight and depicts a comprehensive story of 
financialisation in the global iron ore pricing mechanism with particular reference to the 
Chinese context. In so doing, it answers the research question that why the CISA failed in its 
attempt to resist the financialised quarterly index price of iron ore. As the analysis in this 
thesis concerns and begins with the accounting discourse regarding iron ore price, the 
implication of accounting and accounting discourse in the Chinese context is then discussed 
in the second section (9.2.). While the general implication of the current thesis for the extant 
accounting literature is discussed in 9.2.1., the specific comparison between the iron ore 
pricing mechanisms and the corresponding accounting standards is put forward subsequently. 
In particular, the relevant concepts discussed include fair value measurement, historical cost 
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accounting, inventory valuation, and concepts of income and capital maintenance. In sections 
three (9.3.) and four (9.4.), the suggestions for further research and the contribution of the 
study are outlined.  
 
9.1. Reasons behind CISA’s failure in resisting financialisation 
As illustrated in the methodology chapter (chapter five), the analysis of this study concerns 
three different perspectives: the first refers to the underlying mode of production behind the 
debate over the pricing mechanism of iron ore by the CISA and the Big Three; the second 
purports to the context of civil society in which different modes of production coordinate and 
/ or conflict with one another; and, the third involves a class analysis on the role of the CISA. 
Thus, chapters six, seven, and eight have analysed the three perspectives respectively. In so 
doing, the research question that concerns the reasons behind CISA’s failed attempt in 
resisting the financialised quarterly indexed iron ore price are answered in each chapter 
according to the assigned perspectives. The current section is thus dedicated to present a 
comprehensive answer to the research question by summarising from the previous three 
chapters. 
 
9.1.1. Identifying relevant modes of production underlying the accounting discourse 
In chapter six, after introducing the main producers of discourse, the analysis presents the 
controversy over the price of iron ore between the CISA and the Big Three. In particular, 
there three major areas in the debate which both parties emphasised on the one hand and also 
disagreed with one another on the other hand. That is, while the Big Three promoted the 
quarterly index price on the ground that the new pricing mechanism was transparent and fair, 
and also able to objectively reflect market conditions, the CISA stressed the exactly same 
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aspects but only to support the traditional annual contract based price. Faced with the 
competing connotations of the same concepts (i.e. reflection of market, transparency, 
fairness), the analysis goes further to explore how the price of iron ore is determined. 
Specifically, since both parties emphasised the market conditions on which a fair price of iron 
ore is based, discourses concerning (1) market, (2) supply and demand relationship, and (3) 
the role of iron ore are analysed respectively for the three major groups affected by the iron 
ore pricing mechanism in the Chinese iron and steel industry. These include (1) the CISA and 
the major SOEs represented by the former; (2) the small and medium enterprises in the 
Chinese iron and steel industry; and (3)the Big Three (i.e. BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, and 
Vale).In so doing, the focus of the analysis is on the underlying modes of production of the 
three groups. This is because, according to Marx (Marx & Engels, 1974), “production of 
ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material 
activity and the material intercourse of men… (which are) conditioned by a definite 
development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these” (ibid, 
p.47), and also that the mode of production is the result of the productive forces and the 
social intercourse therein. Thus, identifying the relevant modes of production
74
 for the three 
groups, which constitute their respective discourse, contributes to the understanding of their 
accounting discourse regarding the price of iron ore.  
 
First, the CISA regarded iron ore simply as the raw material for manufacturing steels, and 
thus confined the demand, as well as the resulting supply, of iron ore to the level of steel 
output. In addition, the association depicted the iron ore market primarily influenced by the 
                                                          
74
Also worth mentioning here is that it is of course unrealistic to narrowly confine any of the enterprises 
represented by the three groups above as purely productive, commercial, or financial capitalists, given the 
increasingly intricate relationship between financial and non-financial sectors in modern corporations 
(Orhangazi, 2008). What has been demonstrated is that the modes of production illuminated above are the bases 
of the three group’s discourse regarding iron ore price. 
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Chinese consumers and, since iron ore could only be consumed for steel production, the 
market was thus based on China’s domestic steel sector. This perspective is interpreted by 
Marx as the mindset of a productive capitalist. As shown in Figure 6.7, iron ore is the means 
of production (MP), purchased only by steel manufacturers at the price of M, and, when the 
production process is accomplished, will become steel products (C’) available for sale at the 
price of M’. 
 
Second, the small and medium firms in the Chinese iron and steel industry considered iron 
ore not only as the raw material for steel manufacturing but also a tradable commodity for 
resale in China’s domestic iron ore market. Thus, apart from its attribute as the means of 
production (MP), iron ore was also treated as a normal commodity (C), purchased first by the 
small and medium firms from either overseas or domestic suppliers at the price of M, and 
sold later to other participants in the Chinese market for M’. This is interpreted through 
Marx’s movement of commercial capital as shown in Figure 6.8. In other words, the small 
and medium firms were in the mindset of a commercial capitalist. 
 
Third, the Big Three regarded iron ore price from not only the perspectives of the productive 
and commercial capitalists but also the view of a financial capitalist. This is because, while 
there were the traditional productive and commercial activities undertaken by the three major 
iron ore suppliers (as illustrated in Figure 6.9), financial capital also manifested in (1) the 
indexed pricing mechanism and (2) the shareholding structure of the Big Three and the index 
publisher. On the one hand, in relation to the methodology of the indexed price (i.e. Platts 
IODEX), the calculation of iron ore price involves not just the confirmed trades, but also 
bids, offers, and expression of interest to trade (see Platts, 2015b) which exhibit considerable 
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resemblance to transactions in the financial market. That is, under the index pricing 
mechanism, iron ore price would be affected by the virtual transactions through bids and 
offers. Furthermore, the rise of the financial derivatives associated with the iron ore index 
price also adds the character of financial products to the new pricing mechanism. As such, 
iron ore is perceived as a globally tradable commodity, the purpose of which is not only for 
steel production, but also for sale in the spot market as well as the financial market. In 
relation to the capital movement explained by Marx, apart from the productive and 
commercial activities (as shown in Figure 6.9), the adoption of index price depicts the circuit 
of financial capital in Figure 6.10: it begins with bids, offers, contracts, swaps, or other 
associated financial derivatives at the price of M, and will be sold later for M”. 
 
On the other hand, the shareholding structure of the Big Three brings the mining giants even 
closer to the global financial market. According to Tables 4.1-4.6, most of the top 20 
shareholders at the Big Three are investment banks and other financial institutions such as 
HSBC and J.P. Morgan. The corresponding movement of financial capital is illuminated in 
Figure 6.11: the financial institutions first invest M in the Big Three which then undertake the 
productive and commercial activities, and later receive their investment return in the form of 
dividends (M”) from Big Three’s profit ∆M. Moreover, there are also some overlaps between 
the two types of financial capital mentioned above. For instance, some major shareholders of 
the big Three such as Capital Group Companies, State Street, The Bank of New York were 
also among the key shareholders of McGraw Hill Financial Inc. (i.e. the parent entity of 
Platts). Therefore, taking the nature of the indexed price and the shareholder relationship of 
the Big Three into account, it is the role of financial capitalist which the Big Three have 
played in promoting the indexed price of iron to the Chinese market during negotiations. 
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Having identified the relevant perspectives adopted by the three groups, the discrepancies 
between CISA and Big Three’s connotations of a fair iron ore price are explained through the 
different modes of production. While the traditional long term contract based price was 
supported by the CISA from the perspective of a productive capitalist, the quarterly index 
based price was promoted and adopted by the Big Three based on a financial capitalist’s 
point of view. Also, since financial sector will be “the driving force in its (capitalist) 
development to its highest and ultimate form” (Marx, 1959, p.433), it becomes probable, in 
the end of chapter six, that perhaps financialisation in the global iron ore market is inevitable. 
If so, it will be able to answer, at least in part, the research question concerning the reasons 
behind CISA’s failure in resisting the financialised price of iron ore. Therefore, the analysis 
continues in chapter seven where the process of financialisation in the Chinese iron ore 
market is then extensively discussed. 
 
9.1.2. The inevitable trend of financialisation in the Chinese iron ore market 
Consistent with the second aspect of analysis outlined in chapter five, chapter seven focuses 
on the interaction among production, commerce, and finance in the context of the Chinese 
iron and steel industry. From the perspective of the capitalist mode of production, the 
particular process in which commercial and financial capitalists emerge in the Chinese iron 
ore market is explored, in order to determine whether financialisation was irresistible even to 
the CISA. The analysis is undertaken chronologically by dividing the process into two 
different consecutive periods, consistent with not only the range of data collected (as outlined 
in chapter five) but also the result of each year’s negotiation. Moreover, the story is 
illuminated in accordance with Marx’s interpretation that changes in the mode of production 
come from and serve as the solution to the contradiction between productive forces and the 
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corresponding social relations. In so doing, the first reason behind CISA’s failure in resisting 
the financialised index pricing mechanism is investigated. 
 
9.1.2.1. Financialisation as the solution to the conflict between social relations and 
productive forces 
From 2008 to 2009, the Chinese iron ore market witnessed the shift of the small and medium 
enterprises and some of the major SOEs from traditional productive capitalists to commercial 
capitalists. This is, according to Marx, the result of as well as the solution to the conflict 
between the social relations within the Chinese iron ore market and the relevant productive 
forces (i.e. the increased iron ore demand). First, in terms of the Big Three, on the one hand, 
the traditional annual price negotiation (as the old form of social relation with the Chinese 
market)did not produce any outcome, since Vale and Rio Tinto withdrew from the 
negotiation one after another (Cao, 2009c), and BHP Billiton was interested in the index 
pricing mechanism (Liu, 2009). Faced with the unsettled annual negotiation incapable of 
assigning an official price to both parties on the supply and demand chain, on the other hand, 
the increased iron ore demand (i.e. the corresponding productive force) from the Chinese 
SOEs and the small and medium enterprises (due to China’s economic stimulus package in 
2008) could not be satisfied. Thus, the spot market transaction came into existence as the 
solution: in 2009 the Big Three began to privately trade in China’s spot market with the small 
and medium firms and even some SOEs. Thus, iron ore transaction was no longer limited to 
steel producers but became available to commercial capitalists (i.e. the small and medium 
firms) who resell the mineral product for profits. While meeting the productive forces at both 
the small and medium firms and the Big Three themselves, the spot market transaction as the 
new form of social relation gave rise to the new mode of production incorporating the 
interaction between productive and commercial  capital. 
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Second, in terms of the small and medium enterprises, a similar story is perceived, only from 
the other end of the supply and demand chain. On the one hand, regardless of the negotiation 
outcome, the small and medium firms had to purchase the second hand iron ore, at 
prohibitive prices, from the major SOEs which initially imported iron ore from overseas with 
the stable annual contract based price. This form of social relations was long argued by the 
small players as unfair (Li RX, 2010a). On the other hand, these small and medium firms 
needed to purchase an increased amount of iron ore so as to keep the factories operating (i.e. 
increase productive forces) due to government’s economic stimulus package as well as the 
pressure of being merged with the major SOEs (Wang J, 2009c). Thus, the commercial trade 
of iron ore in spot market came as the solution to the conflict between (1) the traditional form 
of social relations between the small and medium firms and the major SOEs; and (2) the need 
to increase productive forces of the former group. 
 
As a consequence of the emergence of commercial capitalists in the Chinese iron ore market 
from the two groups above during the 2009 iron ore negotiation, both parties exhibited the 
increased levels of productive efficiency, which was also consistent with Marx’s (1959) 
depiction of the interaction between productive and commercial capitalists in Figure 7.1. For 
instance, on the one hand, the Big Three announced their forthcoming investments in iron ore 
reserves (Dong, 2009c) and indicated that their production reached the full capacity (Xu YL, 
2009e). On the other hand, the small and medium enterprises in the Chinese iron and steel 
sector showed that they outperformed their state-owned counterparts thanks to Big Three’s 
opened door to iron ore spot market (Zhang Yan, 2009). 
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In the subsequent year (i.e. 2010), the newly established iron ore spot market did not solve 
the fundamental conflicts since the collapse of the 2009 negotiation (1) between the Big 
Three’s social relations with the Chinese market and the corresponding productive force; and 
(2) between the small and medium firms’ relations with the CISA and the respective level of 
steel output therein. First, in terms of Big Three’s social relations with the Chinese market on 
the one hand, not only did they lose the interest in the annual contract based pricing 
mechanism for both financial (Zhou XY, 2010; Chen SS, 2010b) and political (Zhang HY, 
2009a; Yuan, 2010b) reasons, but they also encountered some regulatory obstacles imposed 
by the CISA in China’s spot market (Xu YL, 2009i; Yue & Zhou, 2009). On the other hand, 
the Big Three kept increasing their level of iron ore output (i.e. productive forces) in the 
belief that China’s iron ore demand would increase substantially and the rest of the world 
economy could recover gradually (Yang Y, 2009a). The conflict still remained between (1) 
the increased level of iron ore output and (2) the time consuming annual price negotiation as 
well as a highly regulated spot market. Consequently, the quarterly index pricing mechanism 
came into play as the solution: the social relations between the Big Three and their clients 
would be, according to the Big Three, more transparent and smoother in that the index price 
helped avoid the direct conflict and hostility between the buyer and the sellers at the 
traditional closed door meeting each year (Deng, 2009c; Tang, 2009); Big Three’s productive 
forces (i.e. iron ore output level) would also be better perceived and predicted on a 
continuous basis by the index price (Zhou XY, 2010; Chen SS, 2010b; China Business 
Network, 6 May 2010). Coupled with such changes in the new form of the social relation was 
the shift in the mode of production from commercial to financial activities. 
 
Second, in terms of the small and medium enterprises, on the one hand, the problem of 
unfairness still existed even in the spot market transactions: (1) while some small and 
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medium players were able to privately import and sell iron or to make profits, others were not 
(Deng, 2009c); (2) for those who did have the private access to iron ore overseas, the major 
SOEs such as Sinosteel and China National Building Materials Group could easily push up 
the spot price via their financial and political advantages (Deng Y, 2010a). Despite the 
unfairness in purchasing iron ore, both trading companies and steel plants in small and 
medium size held that iron ore price would increase in any case; the productive forces at 
trading companies (i.e. purchase and sell iron ore) and steel plants (i.e. level of steel output) 
were expected to increase. Again, the financialised quarterly index price came into effect: the 
index pricing mechanism would grant everyone the same access to the seaborn iron ore 
market, solving the conflict between the unfair trade in spot market (as the old form of social 
relation) and the increased iron ore demand (as the corresponding productive force). 
 
As a result of the adoption of the quarterly index price, operations of the two groups 
discussed above were expected to exhibit a certain level of improvement consistent with 
Marx’s (1959) illustration of the incorporation of financial capital into the circuit of 
productive capital in Figure 7.2. On the one hand, the Big Three argued that the new pricing 
mechanism would provide smoother communication between buyers and sellers (Tang, 
2009), reflect market information in real time (Liu, 2009), and thus improve market 
efficiency (Wan, 2010a). On the other hand, the small and medium firms proved in reality 
that they were able to adopt the flexible index price more quickly than their state-owned 
counterparts and showed better profit margin ratios (Li Y, 2010b). 
 
To summarise the current section, it has presented a story of the changes in the mode of 
production in iron ore trading from between productive capitalists (i.e. the Big Three and the 
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Chinese steel plants via the traditional annual price based contract), through between 
productive capitalists and commercial capitalists (i.e. the Big Three and the small and 
medium enterprises via China’s spot market), and to between productive, commercial, and 
financial capitalists (i.e. the Big Three, the Chinese enterprises, and capital investors via the 
global financial market). Consistent with Marx’s interpretation of social change (Marx & 
Engels, 1974, p.52), the shifts in the modes of production are thus necessary and inevitable, 
as a result of the conflict between the social relations involved (including the unsettled annual 
price negotiations in 2009 and 2010, the unfair trade of second hand iron ore from major 
SOEs to small and medium firms, and a heavily regulated spot market) and the relevant 
productive forces therein (including the increased demand for iron ore from the Chinese 
market, and the increased level of iron ore output by the Big Three).While the attitude and 
reactions of the Big Three and the Chinese small and medium enterprises towards 
financialisation are explored, which have demonstrated that the adoption of the financialised 
quarterly index price in China is the natural evolution of the capitalist mode of production in 
the global capitalist economy, the views and actions of the CISA are also analysed to further 
confirm the inevitability of financialisation. 
 
9.1.2.2. Financialisation independent of productive capital and CISA 
Standing in vivid contrast with the small and medium enterprises, the CISA attempted to ban 
the spot market transactions of iron ore within China in 2009 and stifle the financialised 
index price in its own cradle. In particular, the association formed the investigation team with 
relevant government departments to shut down the Rizhao Centre in two weeks after its 
establishment. Instead of the index price which the Centre was planning to launch, the 
association proposed a unified price that would only apply to the Chinese market and thus 
replace both the spot price and the traditional annual price (Yue & Zhou, 2009). To help 
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implement the unified price, the association also introduced several policies which required 
the self-discipline of the industry. During the 2010 negotiation when the quarterly index price 
seemed impending, the association initiated a nationwide boycott against the Big Three, 
asking all Chinese firms to stop purchasing iron ore from the three mining giants for two 
months (i.e. April and May). 
 
However, despite CISA’s close connection with the Chinese government and its SOE 
constituents as the leading players in the domestic industry, the association’s boycott 
campaign and the call for a nationwide unified price failed. This is explained through Marx’s 
(1959) interpretation of the mystified movement of financial capital: M – M’. That is, the 
same party could first take the bid (M) and, before receiving the actual iron ore shipment, and 
then sell the offer to other parties for M’. In so doing, iron ore has become an underlying 
item, equipped with the same self-expanding capacity of capital (M) from which M’ derives 
effortlessly (at least on surface). Correspondingly, the value of iron ore also shifts from 
manufacturing steel to creating money straightway independently of the actual production 
process. This is particularly the case in the actual practice of iron ore transactions in the 
Chinese iron ore market. That is, in addition to the small and medium enterprises (Wang & 
Xu, 2010; Zhu, 2010a), even some top 20 steel plants confessed that had they not accepted 
the quarterly indexed pricing mechanism in time, iron ore price would have been skyrocketed 
afterwards (Sina Finance, 11 April 2010; Li RX, 2010c). In other words, iron ore transactions 
began to take place not only in the traditional sphere of productive capital: M – C (L, MP) … 
P … C’ – M’ (as shown in Figure 6.7), but also in the simplified circuit of financial capital: 
M – M’ (Figure 6.10). As such, even suppose all of the Chinese companies, as proposed by 
the CISA, stopped purchasing iron ore, the mineral product would have still been frequently 
traded in the financial market around the world, not as the raw material for steel production, 
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but as a financial product. To paraphrase Marx’s own words, “(t)he more rapid the process of 
reproduction, and the more developed the function of money as a means of payment, (and the 
more developed the function of iron ore as capital per se)… the smaller that portion (required 
from productive capital) is in relation to the total capital” (Marx, 1959, p.189). 
 
Thus, the political and regulatory limit, which in this case refers to the boycott and relevant 
policies introduced by the CISA, upon the financial capital as represented by the Big Three 
and the index pricing mechanism in particular becomes “merely quantitative and defies all 
fantasy” (Marx, 1959, p.261). This is because (1) iron ore has become a “meaningless form 
of capital, the perversion and objectification of production relations in their highest degree” 
(ibid, p.256), and (2) financial capital is “a driving force in its (capitalist mode of production) 
development to its highest and ultimate form… (as well as) the most potent means of driving 
capitalist production beyond its own limits” (ibid, p.433). Viewed in this way, regardless of 
how many more policies and regulations that the CISA and the Chinese government impose 
upon the Chinese iron and steel industry in the foreseeable future, the financialisation of iron 
ore price is again perceived as the expected offspring of the evolved form of iron ore in the 
global financial market in particular and the corresponding participation of financial capital 
therein. 
 
Having explored the process of financialisation in terms of both the changes in the mode of 
production and the relatively independent status of financial capital, the adoption of the 
financialised index price in the Chinese iron ore market is demonstrated as a structurally 
inevitable trend in the context of global capitalism. Thus, so long as China remains as a part 
of the global market economy and the biggest purchaser of iron ore in the world market, any 
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attempt to obstruct financialisation is seen as futile in the long run. This answers in part the 
research question as for the reasons behind CISA’s failure in resisting the indexed iron ore 
price. However, two more questions can still be asked. First of all, if the financialisation of 
iron ore price is unavoidable, why did not the CISA resist the Platts index by launching 
China’s very own index price? After all, if China’s small and medium enterprises could adapt 
to the financialised price, the CISA, as the unofficial industry regulator could also shift its 
mentality from a productive capitalist to a financial capitalist. This is possible considering 
that China is the largest importer and purchaser of iron ore in the global market, and China’s 
spot market (in the port of Qingdao) already serves as the platform on which the assessment 
of Platts index is based (Platts, 2015c). By answering this question, the research question of 
the thesis can also be addressed via exploring the possibility of the Chinese association 
evolving into a financial capitalist. Secondly, suppose that the CISA was not entirely in the 
mindset of a productive capitalist, but followed the theoretical guidance of Marx who 
predicted the fall of capitalism and the victory of the proletariat (Marx  & Engels, 2008, 
p.51), why was financialisation of iron ore price still irresistible? This would have been 
implausible were it not for the fact that both the Chinese CPC government (Deng, 1993; 
Jiang, 2006b, 2006c) in general and the CISA (Liu, 2013; CISA, 2011b, 2013b) in particular 
all claimed themselves as the follower of Marxism. Thus, exploring this issue would also help 
understand the research question in terms of how much China and the CISA have adopted 
and applied Marx’s theory in actual practice. The following two sections (9.1.3. and 9.1.4.) 
addresses these questions respectively by summarising the analyses in the second part of 
chapter seven (section 7.2.), and chapter eight. 
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9.1.3. CISA’s failed recognition of the connection among production, commerce, and 
finance 
In the second part of chapter seven (section 7.2), the analysis continues with the focus on the 
reasons why the CISA did not launch China’s own index price system before the Big Three 
did. This is because, if, say, the financialisation of iron ore price was an inevitable trend in 
the context of global capitalism, then the CISA, as the semi-formal leader of the Chinese iron 
and steel industry, could have been able to develop a Chinese iron ore index by taking 
advantage of China’s leading position in global iron ore trade and the country’s unique spot 
market. However, a closer examination of CISA’s discourse regarding finance, in the 
following four aspects, rules out this possibility. 
 
The first is CISA’s immediate shut down of the Rizhao International Iron Ore Trading Centre 
which would have otherwise launched the Chinese iron ore index in 2009 before its Platts 
counterpart was generally accepted in 2010. However, the CISA, in its official announcement 
regarding the compulsory closure, commented on the Rizhao index as “speculative in nature” 
(China Business Times, 16 June 2009). Thus, it is argued that the association simply opposed 
any form of index price regardless of its origin. The same attitude was carried forward in 
2010 when China’s small and medium enterprises began to use the quarterly index price and 
consequently exhibited improved efficiency. While this was consistent with Marx’s 
interpretation of the participation of financial capital into the circuit of productive capital (as 
shown in Figure 7.2), the CISA chose to chastise the improvement of the small and medium 
firms which allegedly gave rise to the chaotic steel market (Xu YL, 2009f). 
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It is then not surprising to see the association’s response and reaction after the quarterly index 
price was accepted and adopted in the Chinese iron ore market in April. This is the second 
aspect which also indicates CISA’s attitude towards finance. In particular, the association and 
its key members (namely the major SOEs) were reluctant to learn and use the index price 
(He, 2010a), for the reasons that they did not understand the new pricing mechanism (Li RX, 
2010d) and entering into transactions of those iron ore associated financial derivatives would 
be in itself a huge risk (Yang Y, 2010). 
 
Thirdly, in addition to the iron ore index, the CISA also did not recognise other types of 
financial products traded on the same industrial chain. These include steel futures, Forward 
Freight Agreements, and the BDI index, all of which have influence on the iron ore market 
and are influenced by the financial sector. The CISA however simply treated these associated 
products’ price such as the steel price and the shipping cost as something that passively 
reacted to changes in the physical demand of iron ore (Yu L, 2009a). Thus, stepping outside 
the issue of any form of financial index, it is worth exploring that if the CISA simply wanted 
to separate finance from the traditional iron and steel industry.  
 
This is addressed in the fourth aspect which demonstrates that the Chinese iron and steel 
industry, in CISA’s opinion, should operate independently of finance. For instance, when the 
CISA and FMG reached the price agreement in 2009 August, while FMG announced that, 
according to CISA’s agreement, it would receive the 5.5 to 6 billion USD financing from 
China with an interest rate lower than the market rate (Dong, 2009a; Zhang XD, 2009b), the 
CISA denied this condition. The association stated that “financing is something carried out by 
financial institutions” (Xiao, 2009). Furthermore, in response to the tightened credit 
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environment in the Chinese iron and steel sector, the CISA somehow welcomed the credit 
crunch. This is because (1) the major SOEs were “not short of money” (Deng Y, 2010b) and 
(2) the industry wide M&A could be accelerated when the small and medium enterprises 
would be running out of capital under the credit crunch (Tan, 2010).In fact, the proposal for 
the industry wide M&A promoted by the CISA serves as another area reflecting the divide 
between the iron and steel industry and the financial sector. This is illustrated through a 
comparison between the institutional arrangement of the Japanese iron and steel sector and its 
Chinese counterpart contained in the proposal: while the ‘Japanese model’ comprises a 
triangular alliance among production, commerce, and finance through the cooperation 
between steel plants and sogo shosha (Wang & Qin, 2009), its Chinese counterpart foresaw a 
production oriented M&A plan where there were only the top five SOEs to take over other 
steel plants in the iron and steel sector (State Council, 2009), downplaying the influence of 
commerce and finance. 
 
Through the four instances above, it is demonstrated that, even provided with the unique spot 
market from which index related data is collected and assessed and the pioneering attempt to 
establish China’s own iron ore index (i.e. Rizhao index), the CISA still opposed the concept 
of the financialised index price of iron ore. For the association, finance is always harmful and 
toxic to the development of the iron and steel industry. This has thus partly answered the 
research question that the CISA failed to resist the Platts index price by being unable to 
develop a Chinese index price. Furthermore, deeply rooted in the association’s separation 
between the domestic iron and steel industry and the financial sector is its omission of the 
connection among production, commerce, and finance. That is, while the interaction among 
the three is illustrated both in theory in chapter four and in practice through the first part of 
chapter seven (section 7.1), the CISA failed to recognise that finance has to date become 
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increasingly intertwined with the traditional iron and steel industry. Therefore, it did not 
proactively adapt to the advanced modes of production (i.e. the spot market transactions and 
the index pricing mechanism) in the Chinese iron ore market like the Big Three and, to a 
lesser extent, the small and medium enterprises did. 
 
Granted, while the participation of financial capital did help improve the performance of the 
traditional productive capital as shown in theory (as shown in Figure 7.2) and practice 
(sections 7.1.2.1 and 7.1.2.2.), finance does however have the potential to damage the 
conventional industry. Based on the comparison between Marx’s interpretation of the 
potential threat posed by financialisation and CISA’s repudiation of finance (section 7.2.2.), it 
confirms that the association did not understand the inner mechanism between production, 
commerce, and finance. In particular, unlike Marx’s (1973, p.214) methodology in the study 
of political economy that takes into account the prosperity, overproduction, stagnation, and 
crisis of the subject matter, the CISA straightaway jumped to the point that the 
financialisation of iron ore price would destabilise the iron and steel industry. By applying 
Marx’s concepts of overproduction, and crisis resulting from financialisation in the Chinese 
iron and steel industry, it is demonstrated that the financialisation in question has yet to reach 
the stage of overproduction and crisis. Moreover, comparing Marx’s solution (i.e. class 
struggle) to the crisis of financialisation and capitalism in general with CISA’s equivalent 
(i.e. regulations) further confirms the latter’s ignorance of the necessary, however painful it 
may be, shift to financialisation in the development of capitalism. While this underpins 
CISA’s reluctance to launch the Chinese index price serving as the second perspective by 
which the research question is answered, it also leads the analysis to the third level— a class 
analysis of the identity of the CISA. 
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9.1.4. CISA’s role as a state capitalist 
Consistent with the methodology illustrated in chapter five, chapter eight examines the 
identity of the CISA, in order to further explore the reasons behind CISA’s failure in resisting 
the quarterly index price of iron ore. This is accomplished through exploring the extent to 
which the CISA resembled a productive capitalist and / or a government organisation, and the 
extent to which the association was concerned with the working class interest. 
 
9.1.4.1. CISA’s deviation from a productive capitalist 
In comparing CISA’s mindset with that of a productive capitalist, the key question is asked 
regarding whether the association exhibited the sole pursuit of profit as Marx’s concept of 
capitalists’ only purpose of existence. This is addressed in four aspects. Firstly, the CISA 
chastised and promised to punish both the small and medium firms (Wang J, 2009c; Zhang 
Yi, 2009g) and the major SOEs (Li XL, 2009) which participated in the private and unofficial 
transactions in China’s iron ore spot market. While these firms rationalised their action as to 
minimise the cost of inventory purchase and maximise profit, the CISA however did not 
approve their activities. It even introduced relevant industry policies that were aimed at 
abolishing iron ore spot market transactions, including Procedure, Details, and Tracking 
Standards. Secondly, the association attempted to intervene in the proposed price increase of 
steel products by the major SOEs. As such, profit maximisation on the parts of the SOEs was 
not the top priority of the association. Thirdly, the increased level of steel output in the 
industry as a whole was criticised by the CISA as overcapacity (Yue & Zhou, 2009). While 
other counter argument existed to prove otherwise, the CISA (2009b) urged the entire 
industry to lower down the steel output, and thus showed no intention to maximise profits in 
this regard. Moreover, the association introduced Agreement on Iron Ore Import and 
Agreement on Domestic Steel Market to restrain the country’s steel production. Fourthly, the 
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industry wide M&A promoted by the CISA was not based on the will of the companies 
involved (including both major SOEs and the small and medium firms), but reflected the will 
of government (Deng Y, 2010d). This renders CISA’s role further away from a productive 
capitalist, and therefore brings it closer to a government organisation. 
 
9.1.4.2. CISA’s resemblance to a government organisation  
While the above four aspects demonstrate that profit maximisation was not CISA’s sole 
purpose of existence, the discourse involved in the instances actually characterises the 
association more like a government organisation. In particular, the comparison between 
CISA’s industry policies discussed above and the relevant government documents shows that 
the specific policies of the former can be traced back to the general principles and plans of 
the latter. For instance, the concept of iron ore import agency system was assigned by State 
Council’s Plan as one important objective of the CISA. The association, in turn, kept 
referring to Plan (Zhang Yi, 2009g; CISA, 2009b), while promoting the system, and 
subsequently introduced Procedure, Details, and Tracking Standards. In addition, while Plan 
stated the criteria for obsolete production and set up the annual target for overcapacity 
elimination, CISA’s Agreement on Iron Ore Import and Agreement on Domestic Steel Market 
laid down the specific requirement for steel plants to achieve the target. The MII also 
proposed similar measures at the World Steel Association conference in 2009. 
Unsurprisingly, the industry wide M&A promoted by the CISA also has its origin in State 
Council’s Plan, and MII’s forthcoming Steel Industry Mergers and Acquisitions Principles 
and Guidelines on the Promotion of the Mergers and Acquisitions of Steel Enterprises. 
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The consistency between CISA’s discourse and the corresponding government documents 
discussed above, coupled with the political background of the senior management team at the 
association, suggests that the CISA was held accountable to the government, rather than to 
any iron and steel enterprises. This gave rise to a couple of questions: since the Chinese 
government (Deng, 1993; Jiang, 2006b, 2006c) and the CISA (CISA, 2011b, 2013b; Liu, 
2013) claimed to be the follower of Marx’s theory, and given that The Communist Manifesto 
(Marx & Engels, 2008) expects that a proletarian government would finally take over 
capitalism, why did the association still fail to resist the financialised index price? Was it 
because that the Manifesto did not foresee the emergence of financialisation, or that the CISA 
became another type of government organisation different from Marx’s depiction in the 
Manifesto? Therefore, the analysis went on to see whether The Communist Manifesto could 
explain financialisation, and, if so, whether the CISA really followed the path of the 
proletarian government described in the Manifesto. 
 
On the one hand, although financialisation was something that Marx did not specifically 
analyse in his time, he did point out the general characteristics of capitalism where “(t)he 
bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, 
and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society” (Marx 
& Engels, 2008, p.38). In the actual practice of the Chinese iron ore market, this refers to the 
shifts from the traditional annual contract based price, through the spot market price in 2009, 
and ultimately the quarterly index price in 2010, with the corresponding changes in the social 
relations therein among the Big Three, CISA, and the small and medium enterprises. On the 
other hand, while the CISA, and particularly the industry wide M&A, exhibited a certain 
level of consistency with the Manifesto in terms of its political control over the iron and steel 
industry, it rarely mentioned the interest of the working class which would be able to, 
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according to the Manifesto, overthrow capitalism. This is the key to answer the research 
question from a class perspective, since class struggle is considered by Marx as the solution 
to capitalism in general (and thus to financialisation). 
 
9.1.4.3. CISA’s ignorance of the working class interest  
Subsequently, the working class interest is analysed in the context of the financialisation of 
iron ore price from three aspects: (1) productive capitalist; (2) financial capitalists and the 
working class; and (3) global iron ore market. First, in relation to CISA’s view of the Chinese 
iron and steel industry as a productive capitalist, while insisting on the traditional use value of 
iron ore as the means of production (MP) for steel, the association ignored human labour (L) 
as another indispensable component in the circuit of productive capital (as shown in Figure 
6.7). Moreover, also contained within the movement of productive capital and too was 
neglected by the CISA is the class relation between capital and labour (Marx, 1956, p.18). 
Rather, the association considered its participation in iron ore price negotiation as a corporate 
matter (Xinhuanet, 17 August 2009), with no mention of the working class. 
 
Second, in relation to CISA’s response to the index price, the association did not recognise 
the invisible exploitation (as shown in Figure 4.1 and expanded in Figure 7.3) by the financial 
capitalists who will be able to take the lion’s share of the surplus value extracted from the 
Chinese steel workers. Instead, the association emphasised the interest of China’s enterprises 
in that there must exist an interdependent relationship between the Big Three and the Chinese 
firms. Although the word interest was frequently referred to by the CISA which argued for “a 
reasonable allocation of interests on the same industrial chain” (Zhang Yi, 2009d), it was 
interpreted as the economic profit for steel plants (Zhang Yi, 2009d; Securities Times, 20 
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March 2009). Furthermore, the term national interest was also used by the CISA to unite all 
Chinese firms in the iron and steel industry (see Tie, 2009). Yet this was considered as the 
interests of the major SOEs (Li RX, 2010a) and of the government in general (Yu L, 2010e; 
Ruan, 2010). In other words, there is no evidence that the association considered the working 
class interest as one area affected by financialisation. 
 
Third, in relation to the global iron ore market as a whole, the movement of productive, 
commercial, and financial capital would, according to Marx (1973, pp.215-6), further 
exacerbate the exploitation of the working class. While dismissing the improved efficiency of 
the small and medium enterprises, the CISA did not recognise the corresponding intensified 
competition in China’s labour market. Rather, it held the same view as other government 
departments (Han, 2009c; Zhou RX, 2009b) that the increase in steel output was the obstacle 
to the healthy development of the Chinese iron and steel industry (Xu YL, 2009c). 
 
Summarising the class analysis above, a unique group of stakeholders to which the CISA is 
held accountable emerges. First of all, it is not the productive capitalist which the association 
was acting during its negotiation with the Big Three. Thus, it is more in the nature of a 
government organisation. This is particularly so when the CISA dealt with issues such as the 
iron ore agency system and the industry wide M&A within China’s domestic sector. 
However, the concept of government by the CPC in the Chinese context differs from the 
proletarian government described by Marx in The Communist Manifesto: While emphasising 
the political control over the nation’s iron and steel industry, the association made no mention 
of the working class interest throughout its discourse in iron ore price negotiation. This 
explains partly the research question as for the reasons behind CISA’s failure in resisting the 
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financialised index price of iron ore, since the concept of the working class and its class 
struggle against capitalists is considered by Marx in the Manifesto as the solution to 
capitalism. The CISA, in contrast, simply relied upon government control, which is consistent 
with its interpretation of interests as those of the major SOEs and the central government. 
 
9.1.5. Summary of the findings 
The main purpose of the thesis is to investigate the reasons behind CISA’s failure in resisting 
the financialised index price of iron ore and the association’s corresponding use of 
accounting discourse. Based on a Marxist informed discourse analysis illuminated in chapter 
five, chapters six, seven, and eight are dedicated to analyse, respectively, the relevant modes 
of production underlying the accounting discourse concerned, the interaction among the 
productive, commercial, and financial capital in the Chinese iron ore market, and the class 
status of the CISA in the iron ore negotiation in particular and the Chinese iron and steel 
industry in general. In so doing, the research question is explored in the three aspects above.  
 
First of all, the financialisation of iron ore price is an inevitable trend in the context of the 
global capitalist economy, as a result of the conflicts between (1) the social relations among 
the Big Three, the CISA, as well as the small and medium enterprises and (2) the increased 
iron ore demand in the Chinese market as the corresponding productive force. Under such 
circumstances, the index price exhibits the ability to operate independent of the actual iron 
ore consumption in the physical market, thus defying the political and regulatory constraints 
imposed by the CISA. Secondly, the CISA had no intention to launch the Chinese iron ore 
index which might have otherwise taken the priority in pricing iron ore before the Platts 
index promoted by the Big Three came into effect. This is because the CISA considered 
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finance as harmful and toxic to the traditional iron and steel industry, and the development of 
the industry itself did not need much help from finance. Deeply rooted in this view is CISA’s 
failed recognition of the interaction among the productive, commercial, and financial capital. 
Thirdly, unlike Marx’s projection in The Communist Manifesto that a proletarian government 
would be able to overthrow capitalism through the proletarian class struggle, the CISA did 
not relate the working class interest with the impending financialisation in the Chinese iron 
ore market, but primarily resorted to government control. This is also consistent with the 
special group of stakeholders to whom the association is held accountable: the CISA was 
concerned with the interests of neither the small and medium enterprises nor the major SOEs, 
but the central government of CPC. 
 
9.2. Implications for accounting and accounting discourse 
The analysis begins with the respective accounting discourse by the CISA and the Big Three 
regarding the price of iron ore, and then draws from Marx’s concepts of mode of production, 
productive forces, social relations, movement of capital, and class interests. This is based on 
Marx’s (Marx & Engels, 1974, p.47) emphasis on the material production by the producers of 
discourse. Implications for accounting in general and accounting discourse are discussed 
below. 
 
9.2.1. Implication for accounting discourse and financialisation 
While the extant accounting literature on financialisation concerns a variety of issues such as 
financialisation as a tool for management control (Alvehus &  Spicer, 2012), the rise of fair 
value accounting in the context of financialisation (Power, 2010), financial accounting 
standards and practice as the contributor to financialisation (Nolke & Perry, 2008; NewBerry 
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& Robb, 2008; Arnold, 2009; Muller, 2014) and the GFC (Hatherly & Kretzschmar, 2011), 
how the accounting Conceptual Framework has facilitated and sustained financialisation 
beyond the GFC (Zhang & Andrew, 2014), and how management accounting accommodates 
financialisation (Froud et al., 2014), research regarding the case where accounting language 
is used to resist financialisation has been sparse. Therefore, the current case study of the 
financialisation of iron ore price in the Chinese iron and steel industry presents the other side 
of the coin: the accounting discourse such as fair price, transparency, representation of 
market, cost control, production budget, and so forth were put forward by the CISA in order 
to resist the financialised quarterly index pricing mechanism. Yet the Big Three on the other 
hand used the similar discourse to promote the index price. This reinforces the view that 
accounting is a malleable tool capable of accommodating different social and political 
contexts (Funnell, 1998; Ordelheide, 2004; Ezzamel et al., 2007). 
 
9.2.2. Implications for accounting standards and financialisation 
By presenting the productive, commercial, and financial capital as represented by the CISA, 
the small and medium enterprises, and the Big Three respectively in Marx’s concept of civil 
society where the three groups interacted with one another, the analysis provides a live story, 
in the practice of the Chinese iron ore market, of the shift in the focus of contemporary 
financial reporting from historical cost accounting (HCA) to fair value accounting (FVA). 
Granted, neither the CISA nor the Big Three did actually mention such accounting concepts; 
it is argued however that these concepts do share similar theoretical underpinnings with the 
traditional annual contract based price vis-à-vis the index price. Therefore, it is also of 
practical and theoretical relevance to examine in the following sections (9.2.2.1.–9.2.2.4.) 
how the shift in the accounting measurement method has contributed to, whether directly or 
otherwise, the emergence of the index pricing mechanism of iron ore. Relevant concepts are 
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also explored including different views of income, inventory valuation, and the concepts of 
capital where conceptual connections are made with Marx’s circuits of capital. 
9.2.2.1. Annual price Vs. Index price and Historical cost Vs. Fair value 
HCA measurement has long served as the “basis in which assets are measured at historical 
acquisition cost (less accumulated depreciation and accumulated impairment losses) and 
liabilities are measured at face or nominal amount” (Henderson et al., 2014, p.81). In iron ore 
transactions, the annual contract price exhibits the same nature of HCA in that iron ore was 
priced once a year as per the outcome of the annual negotiation between sellers and buyers. 
As such, from CISA’s perspective as a productive capitalist, once the annual price is settled, 
iron ore can be purchased by steel plants as the raw material inventory for the coming 
financial year. Even there were price fluctuations, both expected and otherwise, the Chinese 
iron and steel industry shall not be affected, since (1) licensed importers would still be able to 
use the annual price for their procurement, and (2) those unlicensed firms could also purchase 
from the licensed ones at a fixed price which contains the fixed annual price plus a 3%-5% 
premium (Economy 30 Minutes, 23 June 2009). This also corresponds to HCA’s inability to 
reflect market price changes (IASB Exposure Draft Conceptual Framework 2015, para.6.6).  
 
However, as the Big Three found it difficult to reach an agreed annual price with the CISA 
and the Chinese market demand was dramatically increased thanks to China’s economic 
stimulus package (e.g. Chen, 2008a; Caijing, 27 April 2009), the mining giants turned to the 
spot market where the price was more flexible and the buyers were no longer limited to those 
licensed firms. Spot market transactions naturally give rise to fluctuating prices which, 
according to some accounting scholars (e.g. Sweeny, 1964; Edwards & Bell, 1961; 
Chambers, 1966; Deegan, 2009), would impair the reliability and relevance of HCA. Thus, 
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similar to the academics’ call for the current cost based accounting
75
 and the adoption of 
FVA, the Big Three began to use the spot price and finally adopted the index price in 2010. 
At this point, the question is whether these new pricing methods exhibit the resemblance to 
FVA. A close examination of the theoretical relationship between the newly installed index 
pricing mechanism of iron ore and fair value accounting is presented as follows. 
 
Fair value is the “price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in 
an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date” (IFRS 13, 
para.9). The three key elements of FVA are, as indicated by Loftus et al. (2013), 
“1. it is a current exit price 
2. the asset is sold or the liability is transferred in an orderly transaction 
3. the transaction is between market participants” (p.102). 
In China’s iron ore market, parallels can be drawn between FVA and the spot price and the 
quarterly index price, with reference to the three elements above. First, regarding current exit 
price, IFRS 13 para.27 states that the price measurement of a non-financial asset, which in 
this thesis refers to iron ore, takes into account “a market participant’s ability to generate 
economic benefits by using the asset in its highest and best use or by selling it to another 
market participant that would use the asset in its highest and best use” (p.13). In para.29, the 
term ‘highest and best use’ is interpreted as the price perceived from the market participants’ 
perspective, “even if the entity intends a different use” (p.14). Para.31 then specifies two 
different bases on which assets’ fair value can be assessed: (a) in-combination and (b) stand-
alone, the adoption of which depending on the ability to ‘provide maximum value to market 
participants’. In the Chinese market, this relates to the role of iron ore, which can be either 
                                                          
75 According to Deegan (2009), HCA has long been held by some accounting scholars as irrelevant in times of rising prices. 
They proposed various solutions to this problem, which, for the sake of simplicity in the thesis, I call them generally as the 
current cost based accounting. Specifically, Sweeny (1964) proposed the current purchasing power accounting. Edwards and 
Bell (1961) supported the current cost accounting. Chambers (1966) introduced the continuously contemporary accounting. 
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consumed as the means of production, combined with other raw materials, for steel 
production (i.e. in-combination basis), or resold as an individual commodity (i.e. stand-alone 
basis). As such, China’s iron ore importing enterprises would neither price iron ore based on 
its use value as a productive capitalist nor resell their first hand import to those unlicensed 
firms at fixed premiums suggested by the CISA. This is because, with China’s rising demand, 
iron ore price would have kept increasing even after the annual price was settled. Under such 
circumstances, selling iron ore in the spot market at the current exit price will evidently 
generate more value than leaving the steel making ingredient in production as sunk cost at 
entry prices. Nor is the transfer of iron ore to the unlicensed firms with CISA’s fixed 
premium rates a better deal. Thus, IFRS’s logic of highest and best use leads these licensed 
importers to iron ore’s exchange value as a commercial capitalist who sells the mineral 
product, rather than consumes within, to outside parties. 
 
Another implication of IFRS 13 para.29 is that while assessing the value of iron ore from the 
perspective of other market participants, the actual transaction of iron ore does not have to 
occur: ‘even if the entity intends a different use’ means that even if the Chinese importer 
chose to keep their import for steel production, they would still need to measure the iron ore 
price based on a hypothetical transaction. This is also confirmed by para.20 that “the entity 
does not need to be able to sell the particular asset… on the measurement date to be able to 
measure fair value” (IFRS 13, para.20), and para.3 that “an entity’s intention to hold an 
asset… is not relevant when measuring fair value” (IFRS 13, para.3). In this aspect, relevance 
can also be found in the Platts index assessment method which is based on not only 
“confirmed trades, (but also) firms bids… firm offers… expression of interests to trade with 
published bids and offers… indicative values (and so forth)” (Platts, 2015b, p.3). Moreover, 
similar to the contrast between entry price and exit price where the latter is chosen to be the 
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fair value (IFRS 13 para.2), Platts also states that “firms bids and offers that are available to 
the entire market take precedence over trades that have been concluded earlier in the 
assessment process when establishing the value of the market (p.5).  
 
Furthermore, the specific calculation of the Platts index is also somehow similar to the 
valuation technique used by FVA. While recognising that the “time of transactional 
activity… quality of iron ore, delivery location, and other specific terms of trade may be 
varied in the physical commodity markets” (p.5), Platts employs an adjustment procedure that  
“normalizes disparate information from the diverse physical commodity markets back to 
the standard (i.e. iron ore fines with an iron content of 62%) reflected in Platts price 
assessment… by analysing freight rates (for locational differences), quality differentials 
(for quality differences), the movements of all market through time (for time differences) 
and other differentials associated with the size of trades and delivery terms” (p.5). 
This corresponds to FVA’s hierarchy of inputs (IFRS 13, para.76-90), the priority of which is 
set out in a descending order from Level 1 to Level 3. Specifically, Level 1 inputs refer to the 
quoted prices in an active market for identical assets or liabilities which provide the most 
reliable evidence (IFRS 13, para.76-77). In this thesis, it refers to those iron ore with the 
exact 62% iron content in China’s spot market (Platts, 2015c). As for those that do not 
contain an exact 62% Fe content and/or are not traded in the Chinese spot market (i.e. 
Qingdao Port), Level 2 inputs are required. These, as informed by the IFRS, could include 
quoted prices for similar assets in active markets (dealing with qualify difference), quoted 
prices for identical or similar assets in non-active markets (dealing with locational 
difference), and/or other inputs than quoted prices (dealing with other differentials such as 
transaction time). Level 3 inputs purport to the unobservable inputs when market data are not 
available. In the case of the Platts index assessment however, this is not applicable. 
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The second key element to FVA is orderly transaction. This also effectively distinguishes the 
spot market price and the index price from the traditional annual price. Unlike CISA’s 
concept of order in the context of the Chinese domestic market where iron ore is first 
imported and then sold to unlicensed firms with certain fixed surcharges, IFRS’s definition of 
orderly transaction requires that the asset or liability in question be exposed to the principal 
market (or the most advantageous market) for a period before the measurement date (IASB 
13, 2013). The term order(ly) here merits special attention. While the CISA insisted on a 
‘Chinese price’ (a fixed annual price exclusive to domestic buyers) and introduced a number 
of industry policies (e.g. Procedure, Details, and Tracking Standards) to ensure the 
implementation of the fixed price, IFRS 13 however ruled out this scenario in that orderly 
transaction “is not a forced transaction” (IFRS 13, Appendix A). IFRS 13 Appendix B section 
B43 (d) specifically points out one of the transactions that is not orderly when “(t)he seller 
was required to sell to meet regulatory or legal requirements”. Based on this section alone, 
the annual price of iron ore, whether it be the outcome of the bilateral negotiation between 
the buyers and sellers or the result of CISA’s agency system, does not reflect fair value. 
 
In a similar vein, the so called principal market in which orderly transactions take place and 
fair value is measured also renders the traditional annual price insisted by the CISA far from 
being fair. IFRS 13 Appendix A defines principal market as the “market with the greatest 
volume and level of activity for the asset or liability”. Prior to the 2009 iron ore negotiation, 
this might well be the case in China’s domestic market where most of the country’s iron ore 
import were resold to the small and medium firms by the major SOEs. However, as the Big 
Three began to trade iron ore in the Chinese spot market since 2009 and ultimately adopted 
the quarterly index price in 2010, the market “with greatest volume and level of iron ore 
transaction” became the country’s own spot market. As recognised by Platts (2015c), 
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“(t)he global spot market for iron ore fines… is dominated by China’s import market… 
China demonstrates the greatest level of daily spot price transparency, due to high 
frequency of spot cargo transactions and a high volume of spot tonnage imported as a 
proportion of total imports. Much of iron ore bought and supplies in the rest of the world, 
by contract, is captive or termed. For these reasons, the CFR China price
76
 functions as a 
global benchmark for all iron ore prices” (p.1) (emphasis added). 
To paraphrase the above quote in the language of IFRS 13, the principal market for iron ore, 
insofar as the Chinese purchasers and the global importers are concerned, is China’s spot 
market. Thus, spot market price has been given legitimacy via accounting standards and in 
particular the logic of FVA. Furthermore, as for the index price, Platts (2015c) further stated 
that since its index assessment “enjoys the most use for price settlement in physical supply 
contracts of any information provider with millions of tons of material destined for delivery 
to China” (p.1), the Platts Index has become the most widely used indicator of iron ore prices. 
In other words, building upon its spot price derived from China’s spot market, Platts claims 
that its index is now being used widely as the global benchmark price. Again, in this sense, 
the principal market in which iron ore index price is assessed refers to the Chinese market. 
 
In contrast to the Big Three, Platts, and IFRS who considered China as the principal market 
and the spot price and index price as the fair value of iron ore, the CISA held the opposite 
view. It was not that the association did not recognise China’s position as the world’s largest 
iron ore importing country (see Wan, 2009b; Zhang XD, 2009c) (and thus as the principal 
market for the steel making ingredient); it is due to CISA’s different interpretation of market 
(see section 6.4.1.1.). Unlike the Big Three which recognised and participated in spot market, 
the CISA perceived a highly regulated market where the price and the (re)distribution of iron 
ore shall be fixed and supervised. Between these two interpretations of (principal) market, 
                                                          
76 CFR refers to Cost and Freight, including the cost of the product being shipped and the shipping cost. Platts’ inclusion of 
shipping cost is consistent with FVA. IFRS 13 para.26 states that fair value measurement involves transport cost if location 
is one attribute of the asset. In this case, Platts (2015b) recognises the significance of location to pricing iron ore and takes 
into account the shipping cost in the form of CFR. 
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FVA has chosen the former, as more and more transactions took place in the spot market via 
the index price and only a few major SOEs stayed in CISA’s market. Also, CISA’s concept 
of market is inconsistent with the logic of FVA. Compared with the association’s requirement 
that iron ore shall be traded at specific fixed premium rates from the licensed importing 
enterprises (mostly SOEs) to their unlicensed counterparts, IFRS 13 para.2 states that “fair 
value is a market-based measurement, not an entity-specific measurement”. Further, even 
suppose CISA’s notion of market could to some extent be realised, still the resulting price 
would not have been regarded as fair value because the “market in which the transaction 
takes place is different from the principal market” (IFRS 13, Appendix B4 (b)). 
 
Thirdly, IFRS’s definition of market participant is also against CISA’s concept of annual 
price. In particular, the IFRS defines market participants as  
“(b)uyers and sellers in the principal (or most advantageous market) market for the asset 
or liability that have all of the following characteristics: 
(a) They are independent of each other, i.e. they are not related parties as defined in IAS 
24… 
(b) They are knowledgeable, having a reasonable understanding about the asset or 
liability and the transaction using all available information… 
(c) They are able to enter into a transaction for the asset or liability. 
(d) They are willing to enter into a transaction for the asset or liability, i.e. they are 
motivated but not forced or otherwise compelled to do so” (IFRS 13 Appendix A) 
Comparing this with CISA’s discourse regarding the iron ore price and the Chinese market, a 
few inconsistencies are identified. First, the notion of market participant is presupposed upon 
the existence of a principal market, which, as demonstrated earlier, is not the CISA’s highly 
regulated and supervised market. Second, most participants within China’s domestic iron ore 
market who engaged in those iron ore transactions approved by the CISA are, arguably, not 
entirely independent of one another. This is because most of these firms are the major SOEs 
ultimately under the control of the SASAC (see Figures 6.2-6.6). Further, in the case of the 
2009 annual price between FMG and the CISA, the independent participant criterion is still 
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not met, since, among the few participants in China who had the procurement contract with 
FMG, Hunan Valin Iron and Steel group also held 17.30% shares of FMG, ranking as the 
second largest shareholder at the Australian mining firm (FMG, 2009). According to IAS 24 
Related Party Disclosures para.9 (b) (viii), if one entity provides key management personnel 
to the other entity, then the two firms are deemed related. In this aspect, FMG and Huanan 
Valin are related parties, since FMG (2009, p.35) acknowledged, based on AASB 124, that Li 
Xiaowei as one of the key management personnel, who also served as the chairman of Hunan 
Valin Iron and Steel, and the vice president of the CISA. As such, the annual price jointly 
achieved by FMG and the CISA is arguably not fair by the IFRS. 
 
Even suppose there could be many other market participants, particularly the small and 
medium firms, than those major SOEs which adopted the annual fixed price and engaged in 
the transactions as per CISA’s policy, the third and fourth factors that set the Chinese annual 
price apart from fair value are contained in criteria (c) and (d). On the one hand, the small and 
medium enterprises were unable to use the price in the actual purchase of iron ore, as FMG’s 
supply was limited to a few major SOEs (see Yue et al., 2009). Criterion (c) thus does not 
recognise them as market participants still. On the other hand, the Big Three showed no 
interest in accepting the price either (see Xinhuanet, 18 August 2009; Zhang C, 2009b), 
which, according to criterion (d), too disqualifies the iron ore suppliers as market participants. 
In fact, neither the Big Three (Wang J, 2009d; Cao, 2009c; Caijing, 27 April 2009; Liu, 2009; 
Zhou XY, 2010; Chen SS, 2010b; Yang LM, 2010b) nor the small and medium firms (Deng, 
2009c; Zhang C, 2009a; Li RX, 2010a) exhibited much confidence or interest in adopting any 
annual price in general. As such, the ‘able’ and ‘willingness’ stated in (c) and (d) are not met. 
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Through a detailed reading of IFRS 13 above, the similarities and distinctions between the 
annual fixed price, the quarterly index price, and FVA are explored. It has been demonstrated 
that, although none of the parties involved in iron ore price negotiations had referred to the 
term ‘fair value’, the index price is actually in the same nature of FVA, and the annual fixed 
price against it. This is not to say that the triumph of index price over the annual price is a 
direct consequence of the shift in accounting reporting from HCA to FVA, or vice versa; it is 
to point out that the rationale for the financialised index pricing does share similar theoretical 
ground with FVA. In fact, IFRS 13 does allow the use of quoted prices provided by third 
parties; “if an entity has determined that the quoted prices provided by those parties are 
developed in accordance with this IFRS” (IFRS 13 para.B45-47). As illustrated, the Platts 
index price has met the criteria, whereas the traditional annual fixed price after 2009 shows 
little consistence with IFRS 13. Furthermore, it can be argued here that the comparison 
between FVA and the index price also helps address the research question as to why the 
Chinese iron and steel industry failed to resist the financialisation of iron ore price. That is, 
the shift to the financialised index pricing mechanism is not only the direct consequence of 
the contradictions between (1) the social relations among the buyers and sellers in China’s 
iron ore market and (2) the corresponding productive forces (see section 7.1.), but also the 
result, however indirectly it might be, of the rising significance of FVA. 
9.2.2.2. Concept of income and the financialisation of iron ore price 
Beyond the change in accounting measurement approaches from HCA to FVA is, according 
to the extant accounting literature (e.g. Zhang & Andrew, 2014), the shift in the concepts of 
financial statement elements such as income and expenses stated in the accounting 
Conceptual Framework (CF hereafter). This is because CF provides the conceptual and 
logical consistency to standard setters so as to assist the understanding, development, 
evaluation, and interpretation of accounting standards (IFRS, 2015; Henderson et al., 2014). 
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Thus, the current section explores the theoretical connection between the concepts of income 
and other related items defined in the CF and the corresponding discourse discussed by the 
Big Three, the CISA, and the small and medium enterprises in the Chinese iron and steel 
industry, to further investigate the relevance and relationship between accounting regulations 
and the shift in iron ore pricing mechanisms. Specifically, the conceptual work analysed in 
this thesis refers to the current CF which originated from IASC’s 1989 framework, and has 
been revised by the IASB in 2010 (the 2010 framework hereafter) as a result of the joint 
project between the FASB and the IASB (IFRS, 2015). However, the 2010 framework was 
not considered complete, and the IASB restarted the CF project in 2010 (IFRS, 2015). At the 
time of writing this thesis, IASB published the Exposure Draft for a revised CF in May 2015. 
Nevertheless, relevant analyses in this thesis draw primarily from IASB’s 2010 framework 
because: (1) both the major Chinese steel plants introduced in chapter six (e.g. Baosteel, 
Shougang, Anshan Iron & Steel, and Wuhan Iron & Steel) and the Big Three are listed in 
stock exchanges that require the accounting disclosure based on the IASB; (2) the period for 
which the case study is concerned ended in May 2010, which corresponds to the underlying 
emphasis stated in CF by the IASB at nearly the same time; (3) although the Exposure Draft 
of the revised CF is released in May 2015, it is considered not as the final version, and 
relevant revisions could arguably be the result of recent developments (after 2010) in both 
accounting practice and standard setting that are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
According to the 2010 CF, income is defined as “increases in economic benefits during the 
accounting period in the form of inflows or enhancements of assets or decreases of liabilities 
that result in increases in equity, other than those relating to contributions from equity 
participants” (IASB, para.4.25). This is based on the asset-liability view as opposed to the 
conventional matching principle derived from the revenue-expense dichotomy (Erhard, 2004; 
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Bullen & Crook, 2005; Henderson et al., 2014). Specifically, the asset-liability view is 
grounded in the work of the English economist John Hicks (1946) that income is the net 
change in the entity’s wealth and what the entity consumed throughout the period. In contrast, 
the revenue-expense view attempts to match revenue with expenses within the same period.  
 
Among the two views
77
, it is the former that has long been adopted by the IASB and the 
FASB in their original CF (respectively released in 1989 and in 1978). Financial market 
regulators such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the US also consider 
that such a view “most appropriately anchors the standard setting process by providing the 
strongest conceptual mapping to the underlying economic reality” (SEC, 2003). Conversely, 
the revenue-expense concept on the other hand is labelled as inappropriate by standard setters 
and regulators even before the issue of the 2010 CF (Bullen & Crook, 2005). For instance, in 
its 1976 Discussion Memorandum (Scope and Implications of the Conceptual Framework 
Project), FASB stated that, unless elements such as income, revenue, and expenses can be 
clearly defined independently of assets, liabilities, or other subjective terminologies, income 
derived from revenue-expense perspective is highly subjective (FASB, 1976). The SEC 
shared the similar point that “(w)ithout first having an understanding of the wealth at the 
beginning of the period, it is not possible to determine the change in wealth during the 
period… the revenue/expense approach can become ad hoc and incoherent” (SEC, 2003).  
 
At present, the 2010 CF also places less emphasis on the revenue-expense view, since it has 
replaced traditional ideas of revenue and expense with concepts and recognition criteria of 
                                                          
77 This section is not concerned with which particular view is superior to the other. Rather, the attitude of accounting 
standard setters and regulators are presented and compared with relevant discourse of the CISA. For an in-depth theoretical 
discussion of both views by accounting scholars, please see Michael et al. 2008. 
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income and expense (para.4.24). CF’s concept of income comprises revenue and gains, and 
the concept of expense consists of expenses and losses: while revenue and expenses arise 
from the ordinary business activities of the entity, gains and losses could arise from either 
ordinary or non-ordinary activities (para.4.29-30&4.33-34). By giving clear definition and 
recognition criteria to these elements, CF allows the independent determination and 
measurement of relevant items, and thus relies less on the matching between revenue and 
expense where items of expense need to be identified according to relevant revenue accounts 
(Henderson et al., 2014). Moreover, unlike the conventional depiction based on the revenue-
expense view, CF’s categorisation and labelling of these income-related items enable the 
measurement of entity’s performance to be presented in different ways with varying degrees 
of inclusiveness for decision making purposes (para.4.27-28). One example is the 
presentation of the statement of profit or loss and other comprehensive income (OCI). 
According to IAS 1 para.10A, the format of the statement shall be presented as either a single 
statement containing profit or loss and OCI in two sections, or a separate statement of profit 
or loss immediately followed by the statement of comprehensive income. Here, the concept 
of profit/loss includes not only the traditional revenue and expenses, but also gains and losses 
arising from the derecognition (para.82 (aa)) or reclassification adjustment (para.82 (ca)) of 
financial assets (IAS 1 para.82). The OCI section presents other types of gains and losses 
arising from (1) the changes in the fair value of assets (i.e. available-for-sale financial assets, 
property, plant and equipment, intangible assets, etc.), liability (e.g. defined benefit plans), 
and financial instruments (e.g. hedges, forward contracts), and (2) translating the financial 
statement of foreign operations (IAS 1 para.7). In fact, the IASB has also recognised the 
conceptual significance of gains and losses. 
“Gains represent increases in economic benefits and as such are no different in nature 
from revenue. Hence, they are not regarded as constituting a separate element in this 
Conceptual Framework… Losses represent decreases in economic benefits and as such 
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they are no different in nature from other expenses. Hence, they are not regarded as a 
separate element in this Conceptual Framework” (para.4.30 & 4.33) (emphases added). 
Also, in terms of OCI, “the Board places on presenting profit or loss and other 
comprehensive income together and with equal prominence” (IAS 1 para.IN4). As such, the 
distinction between profit or loss statement and the section of OCI comes from “prescriptions 
of accounting standards and accounting policy choices, rather than being driven by 
conceptual differences” (Loftus et al., 2013, p.624). Obviously, the CF has adopted a more 
comprehensive perspective than the traditional revenue-expense view in measuring, 
recording, and communicating the financial performance of an entity. 
 
Although the two views of income were rarely mentioned by any party throughout their 
discourse studied in the thesis, parallels can still be found between the CF and relevant 
argument set forth by related groups. On the one hand, it is argued here that the CISA, as the 
semi-formal industry regulator, adopted the revenue-expense perspective while defending the 
annual contract based price and chastising the private trade of iron ore in the spot market. 
This is because, from the association’s point of view, the correct lifecycle of iron ore should 
only be first extracted by mining companies and then sold to steel plants for steel production. 
That is, the flow of iron ore is expected to be within the ordinary activities of both mining 
firms as well as steel plants on the same industrial chain where the former sells iron ore for 
revenue and the latter consumes the raw material as part of the expense for steel 
manufacturing. As such, the financialised quarterly index price that links iron ore price to 
financial market index means that the ordinary transaction in traditional physical market is no 
longer the primary determinant of iron ore price. Participants from other market will be 
invited to trade iron ore and its associated derivatives. Thus, for the CISA, the use of index 
price that directs iron ore market outside the conventional revenue-expense view is not to be 
welcomed and accepted. This is also part of the reasons behind CISA’s attempt to forbid the 
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spot market transactions in China: the private purchase and (re)sale of iron ore were 
considered beyond the ordinary business scope of the Chinese steel plants that were expected 
to focus on manufacturing steels, instead of trading iron ore. In this respect, net income of 
steel enterprises should only be the result of matching revenue with expenses. 
 
On the other hand, the asset-liability view, which is adopted by the CF, has received 
recognition by China’s small medium firms and the Big Three. First, in relation to the small 
and medium enterprises, iron ore served not only as the raw material for steel manufacturing 
but also a tradable commodity. That is, apart from those iron ore consumed in the production 
process as ordinary activities, the rest of the steel making ingredients were stockpiled and 
later to be sold at higher prices (Zhai, 2009; Zhang C, 2009a). While steel plants’ sale of iron 
ore to other market participants was not strictly perceived as falling outside the category of 
ordinary business activities, it can arguably be, from CISA’s point of view (which forbade 
the spot market transaction of iron ore in China), something that did not meet the definition 
of revenue stated in the CF (para.4.29). Thus, income derived from such activities is 
considered as gains which “represent other items that meet the definition of income and may, 
or may not, arise in the course of the ordinary activities of an entity” (paragraph 4.30). 
However, unlike the CISA who disapproved the private sale and purchase of iron ore in the 
Chinese market and thus dismissed the corresponding gain as the result of market 
speculations, the CF stated that “gains represent increases in economic benefits and as such 
are no different in nature from revenue” (para.4.30). Therefore, it is argued that the unofficial 
trade of iron ore in China’s spot market by the small and medium enterprises can be justified 
under the CF and in particular the concept of income based on the asset-liability view. 
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9.2.2.3. Concept of inventory: iron ore as raw material / commodity 
This also means that, since gains arise from the revaluation and/or disposal of non-current 
assets and marketable securities (para.4.31), iron ore has been given a new identity, instead of 
its ordinary account as raw material inventory. Specifically, while the traditional accounting 
treatment of iron ore by steel plants is to record the steel making ingredient as: raw material 
(when it is first purchased)—work in progress (during the steel production process)—finish 
goods (when the production is completed)—cost of sales (when the resulting steel product is 
sold), the identity of other iron ore for resale requires further exploration. The first question is 
whether, insofar as the Chinese steel plants are concerned, these iron ore can also be 
considered as inventory. According to IAS 2 Inventories, inventories are assets 
(a) held for sale in the ordinary course of business; 
(b) in the process of production for such sale; or 
(c) in the form of materials or supplies to be consumed in the production process or in 
the rendering of services (para.6). 
While it is relatively obvious that CISA’s definition of iron ore as the raw material for steel 
easily fits such definition, it is highly unlikely that iron ore held and resold by steel plants 
would be able to meet any of the criteria above, since selling iron ore was not steel plants’ 
ordinary course of business (para.6 (a)), and nor was the mineral product going to be put into 
steel production ((b) and (c)). This is where the investigation proceeds to two further aspects. 
 
The first step is to suppose steel plants held iron ore for sale in China’s domestic market as 
one of their ordinary activities, albeit not officially recognised by the CISA. Although iron 
ore in this sense can be considered as inventory (IAS 2 para.6 (a) & 8), the way in which it is 
measured remains different from the traditional approach in IAS 2. This is because the role of 
iron ore was no longer limited to the raw material for steel production (section 6.4.3.), but 
became, as claimed by the Big Three, a globally traded commodity in the same nature as oil, 
copper, and soybean (21st Century Business Herald, 1 June 2010). Those steel plants engaged 
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in the resale of iron ore in China’s spot market as one of their ordinary business activities 
have become commodity traders like iron ore trading firms. Thus, compared to IAS 2 para.9 
that normal
78
 inventories are measured at the lower of cost and net realisable value, those 
commodity (iron ore) traders “measure their inventories at fair value less cost to sell” 
(para.3(b)), which corresponds to the spot market price and the quarterly index price. Also 
noticeable is that the net realisable value is not necessarily equal to fair value, as the former is 
an entity-specific value derived from how much an entity expects to realise from the sale of 
inventory in the ordinary course of business (IAS 2 para.7), whereas the latter uses a market-
based measurement regardless of any individual entity’s decision (IFRS 13, para.B42). 
 
Furthermore, para.3 (b) states that changes in the fair value of iron ore (as commodity) are 
recognised in profit or loss during the period, which also reinforces the concept of income 
based on the asset-liability view (discussed in section 9.2.3.1.). Therefore, it is argued that the 
distinction between the measurement approaches above lends the conceptual legitimacy to 
the resale of iron ore in the Chinese market: while para.9 applies to the traditional status of 
the mineral product as the raw material for steel production and requires it be measured at the 
lower of cost and net realisable value, para.3 (b) acknowledges the profit derived from the 
unofficial trade of iron ore inside China which the CISA did not approve. 
 
It is not only the commodity trader that is exempt from the traditional measurement of 
inventory stated in IAS 2, iron ore producers also measure their inventories at “net realisable 
value in accordance with well-established practices in those industries” (para.3(a)). In the 
                                                          
78 Here, the word normal refers to inventories other than those agricultural, forest, and/or mineral products traded by their 
producers (IAS 2 para.3 (a)), and those traded by commodity brokers or traders (para.3 (b)), since the measurement of these 
types of inventories does not follow the one stated in para.9 (lower of cost and net realisable value) (see para.3). 
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case of the Big Three, well-established practices refer to the annual pricing mechanism till 
2009 and the quarterly index pricing mechanism since 2010. In this sense, accounting 
standards for inventory serve to distinguish the role of iron ore accounted by (1) the Big 
Three and (2) the small and medium firms in the Chinese iron and steel industry from the one 
considered by (3) the CISA, allowing the former two groups to measure iron ore at its fair 
value, and the CISA at the historical cost. Moreover, IAS 2 para.3 (a) states that “changes in 
that (net realisable) value are recognised in profit or loss in the period of the change”. In other 
words, similar to what para.3 (b) enables iron ore traders to recognise changes in the fair 
value of iron ore as profit or loss, para.3 (b) justifies Big Three’s replacement of the annual 
fixed pricing mechanism. This is because, with Big Three’s firm belief in the rising demand 
in the global iron ore market (Chen, 2008a; Gold Bull Information, 20 May 2009; Deng, 
2009a; Yang Y, 2009a; Wang J, 2010a; Wan, 2010b; Chen SS, 2010a) where the quarterly 
index price would be higher than the annual benchmark price, more profits could be realised 
from just holding the mineral products and recognised in the statement of comprehensive 
income. As such, it is demonstrated that the measurement of iron ore as inventory reinforces 
the concept of income based on the asset-liability view by rationalising and sustaining the 
different accounting treatment of the mineral product between (1) the Big Three and the small 
and medium enterprises in the Chinese iron ore market and (2) the CISA: while the former 
group measures iron ore as a commodity based on FVA and recognises profits from simply 
holding the steel making ingredient, the latter follows the traditional approach that treats 
inventory as raw material measured at the lower of historical cost and net realisable value. 
 
While the above sections analyse relevant financial reporting standards (IFRS 13 and IAS 2) 
and the CF regarding the identity and measurement of iron ore, one thing which underpins 
these concepts and yet which has not been discussed is the concept of capital (see CF 
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para.4.57-4.65). Thus, the following section first discusses capital and its conceptual 
relationship with fair value, inventory, and the concept of income. Then, the connection is 
made between CF’s concept of capital and Marx’s counterpart. 
9.2.2.4. Concept of capital: physical vs. financial 
According to the 2010 CF, two concepts of capital—financial capital and physical capital—
are offered to the preparers of financial statements. 
“Under a financial concept of capital… capital is synonymous with the net assets or 
equity of the entity. Under a physical concept of capital… capital is regarded as the 
productive capacity of the entity based on, for example, units of output per day” (para. 
4.57). 
“a financial concept of capital should be adopted if the users of financial statements are 
primarily concerned with the maintenance of nominal invested capital or the purchasing 
power of invested capital. If, however, the main concern of users is with the operating 
capability of the entity, a physical concept of capital should be used” (para.4.58). 
While the CF allows the entity to choose in between these concepts “based on the needs of 
the users of its financial statements” (para.4.58), the concept of financial capital is “adopted 
by most entities” (para.4.57). Indeed, a close examination of the term users in para.4.58 
suggests that the CF actually leans towards financial capital. Specifically, para.OB5 points 
out that the primary users of financial reports are the participants in capital market including 
existing and potential investors, lenders, and other creditors. Thus, while “regulators and 
members of the public other than investors, lenders and other creditors may also find general 
purpose financial reports useful… those reports are not primarily directed to these other 
groups” (para.OB10). Too excluded from the group of primary users is management who has 
the access to additional information (if needed) other than financial reports (para.BC1.19). 
Thus, with the CF’s emphasis on the information need of capital market (para.BC1.16(b)), it 
is highly likely that the primary users of financial reports are more concerned with their 
invested capital, and thus the financial concept of capital is adopted (see para.4.58). This also 
suggests a remote possibility of the adoption of physical capital by other interested parties 
such as management who might concentrate more on the operating capacity of the firm.  
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Furthermore, CF’s preference for financial capital can also be linked to the concepts of 
income, inventory, and FVA discussed earlier. First of all, in relation to income, while the CF 
states that “(t)he recognition and measurement of income expenses, and hence profits, 
depends in part on the concept of capital and capital maintenance” (para.4.24), its definition 
of income does exhibit certain level of resemblance to that under the financial concept of 
capital. In particular, whilst CF’s general concept of income is the increase in assets and/or 
decrease in liabilities that result in a net increase in the entity’s equity (para. 4.25(a)), profit 
(net income) based on the financial concept of capital refers to the increase in the nominal 
money capital which is “synonymous with the net assets or equity” (para.4.57). In other 
words, both versions emphasise on the increase in net asset. The profit under the physical 
concept of capital, in contrast, is the increase in the physical productive capacity, the 
adoption and measurement of which, according to para.4.58, might be difficult. 
 
In fact, it is not only the definition of income, the components of income, and in particular 
gains, also indicate relevant conceptual consistency between the two. Granted, para.4.63 and 
4.64 provide two types of profit based on the two concepts of capital respectively that 
“(u)nder the concept of financial capital maintenance… increases in the prices of assets 
held over the period, conventionally referred to as holding gains, are, conceptually, 
profits…Under the concept of physical capital maintenance…All price changes affecting 
the assets and liabilities of the entity… are treated as capital maintenance adjustments 
that are part of equity and not as profit” (para.4.63-4.64) (emphases added). 
Although two treatments of holding gains are given under different concepts of capital, CF’s 
definition of income is more consistent with financial capital, as it recognises unrealised 
gains from value changes in assets and liabilities (para.4.31). The particular phrase used in 
para.4.30 that gains are “no different in nature from revenue” bears similar theoretical basis 
as the gains under financial capital described in para.4.63 which “are, conceptually, profits”. 
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The physical concept of capital, in contrast, does not recognise holding gains as income but 
rather as capital maintenance adjustments as part of equity (2010 CF para.4.64). 
 
Secondly, in relation to inventory, parallels can be drawn to the physical and financial 
concepts of capital. Particularly, there are two streams of inventory measurement approaches 
corresponding to the two concepts of capital: (1) the lower of cost and net realisable value 
and (2) fair value less cost to sell. The first stream is based on the role of inventory as raw 
materials for production defined in IAS 2 para.6 (b) and (c), where inventory is measured at 
the lower of net realisable value and historical cost. In this regard, the focus of inventory 
recording is more on the productive capacity of the entity, and less on the invested capital, 
thus connoting the physical concept of capital.  
 
The second stream rests upon other types of inventories to which IAS 2 measurement does 
not apply, including financial instruments, commodities, and biological, agricultural, forest, 
and mineral products held by their producers (IAS 2, para.2-3). Specifically, financial 
instruments (IFRS 9 Financial Instruments), biological assets related to agricultural activity 
and agricultural produce at the point of harvest (IAS 41 Agriculture), and commodities (IAS 
2 para.3 (b)) are measured at fair value with transaction cost adjustments, whereas 
agricultural and forest products after harvest and minerals (IAS 2 para.3 (a)) are assessed by 
the net realisable value in the respective industries. To measure these types of inventories, it 
is more likely that the financial concept of capital applies. This is because neither the fair 
value nor the net realisable value concerned in the cases above fits the physical concept of 
capital that focuses on entities’ productive capacity, as both values are the exit price based on 
the assumption that the inventory is a complete product at the stage ready for sale. Fair value, 
for instance, presupposes the existence of a hypothetical transaction in an active market, and 
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thus disregards the potential continued use of inventory in the production process (IFRS 13 
para.29). Similarly, the use of net realisable value also assures the incoming sale of 
inventories (IAS 2 para.4). Moreover, the way in which value changes of these inventories 
are recorded (IAS 41 IN4; IAS 2 para.3) also corresponds to the idea of profit under the 
financial concept of capital that encompasses holding gains (2010 CF para.4.63). Thus, it is 
argued here that this stream of inventory is measured under the financial concept of capital.  
 
Furthermore, there also exists the relationship between FVA and the financial concept of 
capital. Granted, the concept of financial capital maintenance, as per the CF, does not require 
any definitive measurement method (among historical cost and current value), and nor is use 
of HCA necessary under the physical capital maintenance concept (2010 CF, para.4.61). 
However, in the present case study, it is argued that connections can be made between HCA 
and the physical concept of capital, and between FVA and the financial concept of capital. 
 
On the one hand, in relation to physical capital, while the CF requires the adoption of the 
current cost basis of measurement (2010 CF, para.4.61), the concept of current cost in the 
Chinese iron ore market prior to 2009 is no different than HCA. First, both are after all the 
entry value “in the market in which the entity acquires the asset or incurs the liability” (2015 
CF Exposure Draft, para.6.18). Second, the conventional annual pricing mechanism of iron 
ore actually equates the historical cost to the current cost of the mineral product: once the 
original fixed price (as the historical cost) was set up by the annual negotiation, it would 
remain unchanged for the rest of the financial year. Third, CISA’s iron ore import agency 
system based on the annual fixed price also corresponds to the accounting treatment of 
holding gains under the physical concept capital: while the former sets out that iron ore shall 
not be resold within the domestic market for profit-making purposes, the latter indicates that 
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increases in the value of iron ore inventory are not recognised as profits. Last but not least, 
the CISA, while defending the annual fixed pricing mechanism throughout the 2009 and 2010 
negotiation, equated iron ore demand with the steel production demand in China’s domestic 
market (Chen, 2008a; Gold Bull Information, 12 June 2009), and thus was primarily 
concerned with the productive capacity of the Chinese steel plants (China Business Network, 
2 April 2010). This is consistent with the adoption of the physical concept of capital stated in 
the CF (para.4.57) as CISA’s main focus was on the operating and productive capacity of 
steel plants. As such, even though these accounting concepts are not discussed or clarified by 
any parties concerned in the iron ore pricing negotiation, conceptual connections can be made 
between the annual fixed price, HCA, and the physical concept of capital. 
 
On the other hand, in relation to financial capital, the quarterly index price as the fair value of 
iron ore (see 9.2.2.1.) is more likely to apply. First, FVA is an exit value based on a 
hypothetical transaction from the perspective of market participants, and thus it is less likely 
that this measurement would be concerned with the entity-specific productive capacity with 
which the physical concept of capital might otherwise be concerned. Regardless of the 
intended use of iron ore by steel plants, the index price is assessed based on, not the 
immediate use into steel production, but the bids and offers in the spot market (Platts, 2015b). 
Secondly, coupled with the change in the price assessment method is a widened range of 
buyers and sellers. The adoption of iron ore spot market price, the index price, and the 
associated financial derivatives invites other market participants within China and around the 
globe than the licensed steel plants and trading firms,  linking iron ore price to financial 
market movements. Not only the iron ore traders who purchase and sell iron ore for profit 
making purposes (Suo, 2010), steel plants also characterise their purchase and storage of the 
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steel making material as strategic investment decisions (Zhu, 2009; Baosteel, 2010, p.32). As 
such, the index price, FVA, and the financial concept of capital are also conceptually linked. 
Summarising how the iron ore pricing mechanism shift is related to accounting standards, 
two groups of concepts are presented in Table 9.1, with connections between CF’s physical 
and financial concepts of capital and Marx’s productive, commercial, and financial capital. 
Table 9.1 iron ore pricing mechanisms and accounting concepts 
 annual fixed price quarterly index price 
measurement basis historical cost fair value 
concept of income revenue-expense view asset-liability view 
concept of inventory raw material  commodity 
CF’s concepts of capital physical capital financial capital 
Marx’s circuits of capital productive capital commercial and financial capital 
For the first group which is consistent with the circuit of productive capital presented in 
Figure 9.1 below, the traditional annual fixed price depicted by the CISA measures iron ore 
based on historical cost (i.e. the annual fixed price) as raw material (MP) for steel production 
(P). Profit in this regard only comes from consuming iron ore into steel manufacturing, with 
relevant input of manufacturing labour (L), in the first place and selling the resulting steel 
product (C
P
) later at the price of M
P
. In the language of Marx’s circuit of productive capital, 
profit = M
P 
– (L + MP). Correspondingly, a physical concept of capital is adopted which 
focuses on the productive capacity of (the Chinese) steel plants. 
 
For the second group to which the quarterly index price corresponds, Marx’s concepts of 
commercial and financial capital are present. The Platts index price resembles the 
characteristics of fair value. Profit is based on an asset-liability view: net income is not only 
obtained from the matching of revenue against expense but also realised by the holding gains. 
While giving a new identity to the Chinese iron ore buyers as commodity traders, this view 
also rationalises the unofficial trade of iron ore in China’s domestic market and reinforces the 
different accounting treatments of inventory measurement. On the one hand, the CISA 
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considers iron ore as raw material (MP) measured at the lower of historical cost and net 
realisable value; on the other hand, the Big Three and the small and medium firms in the 
Chinese iron and steel industry regard the mineral product as a commodity (C
C
) assessed at 
fair value (M
C
). Thus, other than the traditional form of productive capital presented in Figure 
9.1, the circuit of commercial capital is also formed and shown in Figure 9.2.In this sense, 
profit not only derives from the sale of steel products as shown in Figure 9.1 [i.e. M
P 
– (L + 
MP)], but also the (re)sale of iron ore as an individual commodity (i.e. M
C
 – M). 










Furthermore, increases in the fair value of iron ore are recognised as profits (IAS 2 para.3 (b)) 
which are no different in nature from revenue (2010 CF, para.4.30). This is interpreted in 
Marx’s circuit of financial capital (Figure 9.3): while iron ore is purchased at the price M, its 
fair value as at the end of the financial reporting period is M
F
. In this aspect, profit is M
F 
–M. 
Iron ore has gone beyond a commodity, as it has been equipped with the same self-expanding 
capacity of capital M, from which M
F
 derives. Indeed, coupled with the changed role of iron 
ore to commodity, the opened door to other market participants than steel plants has added 
“an apparent financial attribute” (Baosteel, 2010, p.25; Baosteel, 2011) to iron ore pricing. 
Thus, the financial concept of capital is more likely to apply. Taking into account the circuits 
of productive, commercial, and financial capital, profit = M
P 
– (L + MP) + M
C




In the current section (9.2.2.), the relationship between iron ore pricing mechanisms and the 
relevant accounting concepts and standards is explored. The financialisation of iron ore price 
serves as the result of as well as the background in which accounting regulations and 
practices have undergone significant changes. Similar to the findings of previous literature 
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(Nolke & Perry, 2008; NewBerry & Robb, 2008; Arnold, 2009; Muller, 2014; Zhang & 
Andrew, 2014), the discussion presents a certain level of association between accounting 
regulation and financialisation where the former promotes the latter. At the same time, it also 
helps to explain, at least in part, reasons behind CISA’s failure to resist the index price of iron 
ore: the adoption of the iron ore index price is not only the direct consequence of the shift in 
iron ore pricing mechanism but a result of the underlying social, economic, and political 
structure comprised of contradictions in social relations and productive forces from which 
neither the shift in iron ore pricing nor the evolution of accounting concepts and standards 
can escape. Specifically, the way in which the CISA interpreted accounting primarily stayed 
at the technical level. For instance, during the 2009 and 2010 annual price negotiations, the 
CISA’s secretary general proposed that the effective period to which annual price applies 
should begin from January to December each year to accommodate the Chinese accounting 
reporting period, to produce better financial budgets and corporate strategies on the parts of 
the Chinese enterprises (Gold Bull Information, 30 September 2009; Guan, 2010). Also, with 
particular reference to income, expense, and profit, the CISA simply confined these terms to 
the traditional purview of steel plants as productive capitalists: income refers to the sales 
revenue of steel products (Zhang Yi, 2010d); expense is the price of iron ore as the raw 
material cost for steel (Yao, 2008; Zuo, 2009; Guan, 2010); and thereby profit only derives 
from sales revenue less raw material cost [or, in Marx’s terms, M
P 
– (L + MP)] (Xiao, 2008; 
Xu Y, 2009; Yu, 2010i). In this regard, it is argued that, although China has gradually opened 
its door to the rest of the world since the opening reform in the late 1970s and adopted the 
IFRS in 2007, the way in which the Chinese government and the CISA in particular 
understood and interpreted accounting did not keep the same pace with the global market and 
especially the financialisation of iron ore price. 




9.3.1. Contribution to literature 
The thesis has studied financialisation in the context of the Chinese iron and steel industry 
which passively participated in the process and accepted the resulting financialised index 
price of iron ore. Unlike some of the extant PEA literature, the case study involves not only 
the Chinese market in which the financialised iron ore price is adopted but also the interactive 
process between China (represented by the CISA) and the Big Three that, as demonstrated in 
chapter seven, has inevitably resulted in the shift in iron ore pricing mechanism from 
traditional annual negotiation to quarterly index assessment.  
 
Also distinguished from the previous research in the area of financialisation is that the thesis 
has studied the issue from the other side: while being the largest iron ore importing and 
consuming market, the Chinese iron and steel sector was somewhat at the periphery of the 
global financial sector, standing in vivid contrast with the Big Three whose key shareholders 
consist of the major financial conglomerates around the world (see Tables 4.1-4.7), not to 
mention the inextricably entangled web weaved by financial market investors among the Big 
Three and the Platts index (see Figure 4.2). In other words, the story depicts how and why the 
world’s largest emerging economy, with the powerful government control and state-owned 
conglomerates, has been forced to accept the financialisation of iron ore price. 
 
In relation to accounting literature in particular, the thesis has studied accounting discourse in 
the debate over iron ore price between the Big Three and the CISA. With the same set of 
discourse including market representation, transparency, and fair price put forward by the two 
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groups to support their own interpretation of iron ore price, the case study has shown that 
accounting is a malleable tool which can be used both for and against financialisation. 
Furthermore, by connecting the annual contract based price and the quarterly index price with 
the corresponding accounting concepts including HCA, FVA, income, inventory, and capital 
based on a detailed reading of IASB and CF, the close relationship between accounting and 
financialisation, consistent with the extant literature (Nolke & Perry, 2008; NewBerry & 
Robb, 2008; Arnold, 2009; Muller, 2014; Zhang & Andrew, 2014), has been demonstrated 
and reaffirmed. This also indicates how accounting is understood, interpreted, and used in the 
Chinese iron and steel industry, which largely stays at the technical level. Despite the fact 
that China has adopted IFRS in 2007, the way in which accounting concepts such as fair 
value, income, inventory valuation, and capital maintenance are interpreted and imposed 
upon the domestic industry by the CISA is limited within the confine of productive capital, 
while leaving the theoretical connection between accounting and financialisation untouched. 
 
9.3.2. Methodological and Theoretical contribution 
The thesis contributes to the study and application of Marx’s theory in three aspects. First, it 
applies Marx’s analysis of capitalism to the contemporary issue of financialisation and has 
developed a Marx-informed theoretical framework for financialisation. More specifically, not 
only are the connections made in between the circuits of productive, commercial, and 
financial capital, the corresponding productive forces and social relations which promote the 
shifts in the mode of production in the Chinese iron and steel industry are explored. In so 
doing, a detailed story of the financialisation of iron ore pricing mechanism is depicted and 
analysed that involves both the promoters of financialisation (i.e. the Big Three) and the 
passive receiver (i.e. CISA). It has thereby shown the feasibility of applying Marx’s theory in 
the study of financialisation. 
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Secondly, the thesis has also developed a methodological framework based on Marx’s work 
to analyse accounting discourse. In particular, based on Marx’s ontological, epistemological, 
and methodological perspectives, three levels of analyses have been established and 
conducted with the respective focuses on material production, civil society, and class 
perspective. The first step is to explore the underlying mode of production which constitutes 
and conditions the basis of the (accounting) discourse on the surface (Marx & Engels, 1974, 
p.47); then the interaction among different modes of production is analysed in Marx’s 
concept of civil society which transcends national contexts and lays down the foundation of 
the “state and of the rest of the idealistic superstructure” (ibid, p.57); in the third stage a class 
analysis is carried out from perspectives of both the ruling class and the ruled to explore the 
capacity of the discourse to change the status quo. In the current case study, this method is 
particularly consistent with Marx’s theory for financialisation. The interaction of productive, 
commercial, and financial capital is examined through first identifying the types of capital 
underneath the discourse concerned, then investigating the conflict between the 
corresponding social relations and productive forces, and thirdly exploring the potential 
solution to financialisation via a class analysis. In so doing, it can be argued that both the 
theoretical and methodological frameworks developed in the thesis are useful to the study of 
political economy accounting, and particularly accounting discourse and financialisation. 
 
Thirdly, the thesis considers Marx’s theory as part of the socio-political background of China. 
Thus, while the Chinese government labels the dominant ideology as the application of 
Marxism in the Chinese context (see Jiang, 2006a, p.157, 2006b, p.8; Hu, 2006), and the 
CISA claims to be the follower of Marxism (CISA, 2011b, 2013b), this thesis applies the 
Marx-informed theory for financialisation and methodology for discourse analysis to such a 
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context to shed light on both the application of Marxism in the Chinese context as well as the 
contemporary significance of Marx in modern capitalist economy. 
 
9.4. Further research directions  
In relation to the global iron ore market in general, the ex post effect that the financialisation 
of iron ore price has upon the iron ore as well as the steel industry needs to be explored. The 
thesis has explored the process of financialising the iron ore price for the period from 2008 
October to 2010 May that witnessed the transition of iron ore pricing mechanism from the 
conventional annual negotiation model to the quarterly index model. In the end of this period, 
iron ore price skyrocketed by nearly 200%. However, there has been a dramatic decrease in 
the price of the mineral product from 2012 to 2015. It is thus of interest to investigate the 
factors behind the price plunge, with particular reference to Marx’s view regarding the limits 
upon the movement of commercial and financial capital as discussed in chapter seven (see 
section 7.2.2.1.). Specifically, while “the time of production” and “the velocity and volume of 
the total individual consumption” (Marx, 1959, p.203) are considered as the limit upon the 
operation of commercial capital, the participation of financial capital helps release 
commercial capital from these limits via derivatives and credit driving “capitalist mode of 
production beyond its own limits… to its highest and ultimate form” (p.433). Financial 
capital, in this regard, is viewed by Marx as the “one of the most effective vehicles of crises 
and swindle” (p.433). Bear in mind such limits, further research attention can be drawn to the 
relationship between the iron and steel sector both globally and within China and the price 
movement of iron ore index, which will also be a good opportunity to apply Marx’s political 
economy framework in a post-financialisation context. From the perspective of accounting 
standards, the drastic price drop of iron ore is also worth further examination. While FVA has 
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been considered as one of the contributing factors to capital market instability during the 
GFC (Biondi, 2011; Biondi & Giannoccolo, 2015), it will also be interesting to explore to 
what extent the financialised index price has contributed to the price fluctuations of iron ore, 
given the similar theoretical underpinnings shared by FVA and the newly installed pricing 
mechanism. 
 
In relation to the Chinese iron and steel industry, the industrial development needs to be 
further examined. For instance, while it has been discussed in chapter seven (see section 
7.2.1.) that the CISA simply wanted to separate the domestic iron and steel sector from 
financial market and failed to do so by being forced to accept the quarterly index price, the 
association’s view of finance afterwards is of interest to further explore. In particular, 
although it quickly shut down the Rizhao centre that attempted to launch the Chinese iron ore 
index in 2009 May (China Business Times, 16 June 2009) and reiterated in 2010 that the 
financialised iron ore index was always speculative and could easily be manipulated (Li RX, 
2010d, 2010e), yet the association, together with the CCCMMC, launched the China Iron Ore 
Price Index (CIOPI hereafter) just one year later (in 2011 October). However, it was not until 
2015 that major iron ore suppliers such as BHP Billiton first adopted the CIOPI (Chen, 2015; 
Zhu, 2015). Even with Big Three’s acceptance of the CIOPI, commentators including 
researchers at the Ministry of Commerce pointed out that such adoption of the Chinese iron 
ore index serves more in a symbolic sense, and so China still has a long way to go to obtain 
the pricing right of iron ore in the global market (Zhu, 2015). There are at least three areas of 
interest to be explored further. The first is CISA’s changed attitude towards finance and the 
index price in particular. Factors behind the association’s dramatic turn need to be studied 
from a class perspective: has the CISA finally adopted the perspective of financial capital and 
indeed connected the nation’s iron and steel industry with the financial sector? To what 
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extent does the association balance the interests (1) among the productive, commercial, and 
financial capital, (2) between major SOEs and small and medium firms, and (3) between iron 
and steel enterprises and the working class at large? Also, in comparison with its 
interpretation of accounting concepts during the negotiation which largely stayed at the 
technical level, how would the association understand and use the corresponding accounting 
concepts after its promotion of the Chinese index price? Secondly, it is also interesting to 
undertake a comparative study between the CIOPI and the Platts index to investigate the 
overlaps and distinctions in terms of data assessment methods and the organisational structure 
therein. Thirdly, the reason behind Big Three’s acceptance of the CIOPI merits further 
attention. For instance, to what extent do the Big Three actually adopt the CIOPI? What are 
the socio-political and economic contexts in which the Chinese iron ore index is accepted? 
 
In relation to the identity of the CISA, the institutional arrangement is also of particular 
interest to further analyse. More specifically, in the context of the Chinese President Xi 
Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign since 2013, high ranking government officials have been 
arrested for bribery and corruption. The nation’s iron and steel industry has also been under 
investigation. Shan Shanghua, the then secretary general and the spokesperson of the CISA 
which represented the Chinese iron ore buyers at the iron ore price negotiation table from 
2008 to 2010, is charged with ‘distributing state assets to private individuals’, sentenced to 
three years imprisonment and suspended for three years (Tencent Finance, 21 January 2014). 
Deng Qilin, the then chairman of the CISA and also the president, the chairman of the board 
of directors and the deputy party secretary at Wuhan Iron and Steel group, is also found 
guilty of corruption. Ironically, while calling for government punishment upon those 
enterprises that break the order of the country’s iron ore import market by engaging in and 
profiteering from speculative activities (Yu, 2010i), Deng Qilin also engaged Wuhan Iron and 
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Steel group into reselling iron ore import to private enterprises for personal gain. In particular, 
from 2007 to 2008 while the annual contract based iron ore price was lower than its spot 
market counterpart, the group sold its own iron ore import at the annual contact price to a 
private trading company owned by Deng’s family which then sold the same mineral product 
back to the group at the spot market rate (Mi, 2015). After the spot market price plunge in the 
same year when the spot market price became lower than the annual contract price, the 
private company began to sell iron ore back to Wuhan Iron and Steel at the annual rate, 
rendering greater losses for the group (Sina Finance, 5 February 2016). This stands in violent 
contrast with how Deng commented on the dramatic drop of iron ore price in the aftermath of 
the GFC in 2008: “if steel plants continued to purchase iron ore at the annual contract rate, it 
would have been no different than suicide” (Xu YL, 2009f). Therefore, comparing the 
discourse of these officials regarding iron ore price during the 2009 and 2010 annual 
negotiations with what they have been charged, the institutional arrangement at the CISA and 







21st Century Business Herald (2010), ‘The tilted table for iron ore negotiation: Chinese steel 
enterprises petition again’, 21st Century Business Herald, 16 March, Viewed on 22 March 
2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100316/00557572131.shtml 倾斜的铁矿
石谈判桌：中国钢企再度上书, 21 世纪经济报道. 
21st Century Business Herald (2010), ‘Vale announced the new iron ore pricing formula’, 21st 
Century Business Herald, 1 June, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20100601/22288041303.shtml 淡水河谷明确铁矿石定价新
公式, 21 世纪经济报道. 
Abeysekera, I. (2003), ‘Political economy of accounting in intellectual capital reporting’, The 
European Journal of Management and Public Policy, vol.2, no.1, pp.65-79. 
Adams, C.A., Hill, W.Y. & Roberts, C.B. (1998), ‘Corporate social reporting practices in Western 
Europe: Legitimating corporate behaviour?’, British Accounting Review, vol.30, pp.1-21. 
Aglietta, M. & Breton, R. (2001), ‘Financial systems, corporate control and capital accumulation’, 
Economy and Society, vol.30, no.4, pp.433-66. 
Alvehus, J. & Spicer, A. (2012), ‘Financialization as a strategy of workplace control in professional 
service firms’, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, vol. 23, pp.497-510. 
Andersson, T., Haslam, C. & Lee, E. (2006), ‘Financialized accounts: Restructuring and return on 
capital employed in the S&P 500’, Accounting Forum, vol.30, pp.21-41. 
Andersson, T., Haslam, C., Lee, E. & Tsitisanis, N. (2007), ‘Financialized accounts: Share buy-
backs, mark to market and holding the financial line in the S&P 500’, Accounting Forum, 
vol.31, pp.165-178. 
Andersson, T., Haslam, C., Lee, E. & Tsitisanis, N. (2008), ‘Financialization directing strategy’, 
Accounting Forum, vol.32, pp.261-275. 
Andersson, T., Haslam, C., Lee, E., Katechos, G. & Tsitisanis, N. (2010a), ‘Corporate strategy 
financialized: Conjuncture, arbitrage and earnings capacity in the S&P500’, Accounting 
Forum, vol.34, pp.211-221. 
Andersson, T., Gleadle, P., Haslam, C. & Tsitisanis, N. (2010b), ‘Bio-pharma: A financialized 
business model’, Accounting Forum, vol.21, pp.631-641. 











Anshan Iron and Steel Group Corporation (2014), Profile, accessed 30 September 2014, 
http://en.ansteelgroup.com/gsgk/gsjj/ 
Arnold, P.J. (1990), ‘The state and political theory in corporate social disclosure research: a 
response to Guthrie and Parker’, Advances in Public Interest Accounting, vol.13, pp.177-81. 
Arnold, P. & Hammond, T. (1994), ‘The role of accounting in ideological conflict: lesions from the 
South African divestment movement’, Accounting, Organisations and Society, vol.19, no.2, 
pp.111-26. 
Arnold, P.J. & Cooper, C. (1999), ‘A tale of two classes: the privatisation of Medway ports’, 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting, vol.10, pp.127-152. 
Arnold, P.J. (2009), ‘Global financial crisis: The challenge to accounting research’, Accounting, 
Organisations and Society, vol.34, pp.803-809. 
Arnold, P.J. (2012), ‘The political economy of financial harmonisation: The East Asian financial 
crisis and the rise of international accounting standards’, Accounting, Organisations and 
Society, vol.37, p.361-381. 
Arrighi, G. (1994), The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times, 
Verso, London and New York. 
Arrighi, G. (2007), Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century, Verso, London. 
Bao, D. (2012), “Steel and Iron Industry already on the verge of loss ‘the low profitability % heavy 
investment’ trend wanes”, People’s Daily, 1 Aug, accessed 15/10/2012, 
http://finance.people.com.cn/n/2012/0801/c1004-18641526.html 钢铁行业已处于亏损边
缘 “不赚钱猛投资”势头减弱, 人民日报. 
Bao, X.A. (2009), ‘Expand Iron Ore Import Channel’, Securities Daily, 18 August, Viewed on 20 
March 2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20090818/03526628619.shtml 应多途径拓宽铁
矿石进口渠道, 证券日报. 
Baoshan Iron & Steel Corporation Limited (2000), Annual Report 2000, accessed 30 September 
2014, http://www.baosteel.com/group/plc/04ir2/pdf/report/600019_2000_0.pdf 
Baoshan Iron & Steel Corporation Limited (2005), Annual Report 2005, accessed 30 September 
2014, http://tv.baosteel.com/ir/pdf/report/AR2005_en.pdf 
Baoshan Iron & Steel Corporation Limited (2009), Annual Report 2009, accessed 30 September 
2014, http://tv.baosteel.com/ir/pdf/report/AR_2009_E.pdf 
Baoshan Iron & Steel Corporation Limited (2010), Annual Report 2010, accessed 30 September 
2014,http://tv.baosteel.com/ir/pdf/report/AR_2010_E.pdf 





Baoshan Iron & Steel Corporation Limited (2012a), Half Year Report 2012, accessed 16/10/2012, 
http://tv.baosteel.com/ir/pdf/report/600019_2012_z.pdf 
Baoshan Iron & Steel Corporation Limited (2012b), 宝山钢铁股份有限公司《关于出售不锈钢
、 特 钢 事 业 部 相 关 资 产 的 议 案 》 的 补 充 公 告 , accessed 16/10/2012, 
http://tv.baosteel.com/ir/pdf/bulletin/600019_20120228_2.pdf 
Baoshan Iron & Steel Corporation Limited (2012c), 宝山钢铁股份有限公司关于回购股份的债
权 人 通 知 , accessed 
16/10/2012,http://tv.baosteel.com/ir/pdf/bulletin/600019_20120920_1.pdf 
Baoshan Iron & Steel Corporation Limited (2013), Annual Report 2013, accessed 30 September 
2014, http://tv.baosteel.com/ir/pdf/report/600019_2013_e.pdf 
Baosteel Group Corporation (2014), Brief Introduction, accessed 2 October 2014, 
http://www.baosteel.com/group_en/contents/2880/39991.html 
Bay, C., Catasus, B. & Johed, G. (2012), ‘Situating financial literacy’, Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting, vol.25, no.1, pp.36-45. 
Beijing Business Today (2010), ‘Vale not in a hurry to conclude the iron ore price negotiation’, 
Beijing Business Today, 21 January, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/future/fmnews/20100121/02017280739.shtml 淡水河谷称
不急于完成铁矿石价格谈判, 北京商报. 
BHP Billiton (2009), ‘Update on Iron Ore Price Negotiations’, Media Release 15 Sept, Melbourne, 
BHP Billiton Group. 
BHP Billiton (2013), Annual Report 2013, accessed 2 October 2014, 
http://www.bhpbilliton.com/home/investors/reports/Documents/2013/BHPBillitonAnnualRep
ort2013.pdf 
Biondi, Y. (2011), ‘The pure logic of accounting: A critique of the fair value revolution’, 
Accounting, Economics, and Law, vol.1, no.1, article 7. 
Biondi, Y. & Giannoccolo, P. (2015), ‘Share price formation, market exuberance and financial 
stability under alternative accounting regimes’, Journal of Economic Interaction and 
Coordination, vol.10, no.2, pp.333-362. 
Blas, J. (2010), ‘Annual iron ore contract system collapses’, Financial Times, 30 March, Viewed 
on 24 March 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e8a78a74-3c21-11df-b40c-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz4387RAJla 
Bloomberg (2009), Rio workers obtained Chinese notes on ore talks, Herald reports, 10 July 2009. 
Boland, R.J. & Pondy, L.R. (1983), ‘Accounting in organizations: A union of natural and rational 
perspectives’, Accounting, Organisations and Society, vol.8, no.2-3, pp.223-234. 
Boyer, R. (2000), ‘Is a finance-led growth regime a viable alternative to Fordism? A preliminary 




Brett, D. & Ericsson, M. (2006), ‘Chinese Expansion to Create New Global Mining Companies’, 
Commodities Now, October issue, pp.22-28. 
Bryer, R.A. (1991), ‘Accounting for the “railway mania” of 1845—a great railway swindle?’, 
Accounting, Organisations and Society, vol.16, no.5/6, pp.439-486. 
Bryer, R.A. (1993), ‘The late nineteenth-century revolution in financial reporting: accounting for 
the rise of investor or managerial capitalism?’, Accounting, Organisations and Society, 
vol.18, no.7/8, pp.649-690. 
Bryer, R.A. (1994), ‘Why Marx’s labour theory is superior to the marginalist theory of value: the 
case from modern financial reporting’, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, vol.5, pp.313-
340. 
Bryer, R.A. (1999a), ‘A Marist critique of the FASB’s conceptual framework’, Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, vol.10, no.5, pp.551-589. 
Bryer, R.A. (1999b), ‘Marx and accounting’, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, vol.10, no.5, 
pp.683-709. 
Bryer, R.A. (2000a), ‘The history of accounting and the transition to capitalism in England.Part 
one: theory’, Accounting, Organisations and Society, vol.25, pp.131-162. 
Bryer, R.A. (2000b), ‘The history of accounting and the transition to capitalism in England. Part 
two: evidence’, Accounting, Organisations and Society, vol.25, pp.327-381. 
Bryer, R.A. (2005), ‘A Marxist accounting history of the British industrial revolution: a review of 
evidence and suggestions for research’, Accounting, Organisations and Society, vol.30, 
pp.25-65. 
Bryer, R.A. (2006), ‘The genesis of the capitalist farmer: towards a Marxist accounting history of 
the origins of the English agricultural revolution’, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 
vol.17, pp.367-397. 
Bryer, R.A. (2012), ‘Americanism and financial accounting theory – Part 1: Was America born 
capitalist?’, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, vol.23, pp.511-555. 
Bryer, R.A. (2013a), ‘Americanism and financial accounting theory – Part 2: The ‘modern business 
enterprise’, America’s transition to capitalism, and the genesis of management accounting’, 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting, vol.24, pp.273-318. 
Bryer, R.A. (2013b), ‘Americanism and financial accounting theory – Part 3: Adam Smith, the rise 
and fall of socialism, and Irving Fisher’s theory of accounting’, Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting, vol.24, pp.572-615. 
Bullen, H.G. & Crook, K. (2005), FASB/IASB Revisiting the Concepts: A New Conceptual 
Framework Project, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&
blobwhere=1175818825710&blobheader=application%2Fpdf 
Cai, R. & Liu, X. (2008), ‘The Monetization and Financialization in China: Affecting Factors and 




Caijing (2009), ‘Caijing: the collapse of iron ore negotiation mechanism’, Caijing, 27 April, 
Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090427/13526154317.shtml 财经网：铁矿石谈
判机制裂变, 财经网. 
Caijing (2010), ‘巴西淡水河谷确认施行铁矿石新定价机制’, Caijing, 24 March, Viewed on 21 
March 2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100324/16447624981.shtml 
Cao, K.H. (2009a), ‘The war of iron ore trade: the Big Three with different opinions for the first 
time’, China Business News, 16 July, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/20091019/01546852374.shtml铁矿石贸易战: 三
矿山首现分歧, 第一财经日报. 
Cao, K.H. (2009b), ‘The sellers’ market already in the past, iron ore buyers will lead future 
negotiations’, China Business News, 19 October, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/20091019/01546852374.shtml 卖方市场已成过
去 铁矿石买方将主导未来谈判 第一财经日报. 
Cao, K.H. (2009c), ‘The Ministry of Commerce delegates the China Iron and Steel Association the 
new bottom line for the iron ore negotiation’, China Times, 27 February, Viewed on 22 
March 2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20090227/23015912622.shtml 铁矿石谈判设新
底线商务部放权钢协’, 华夏时报. 
Carmona, S & Ezzamel, M. (2007), ‘Accounting and accountability in ancient civilisations: 
Mesopotamia and ancient Egypt’, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, vol.20, 
no.2, pp177-209. 
Carter, C. & Mueller, F. (2006), ‘The colonisation of strategy: Financialisation in a post-
privatisation context’, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, vol.17, pp.967-985. 
Chambers, R.J. (1966), Accounting, Evaluation and Economic Behavior, Prentice Hall, Englewood 
Cliffs. 
Chand, P. & Cummings, L. (2008), “The Political and Unstable Nature of the IASB’s ‘Stable 
Platform’: Post-Convergence Australian Experience”, Australian Accounting Review, vol. 18, 
no. 46, pp. 175-184. 
Chen, J.S. (2009), ‘China Iron and Steel Association held the meeting and emphasised on unifying 
the price of iron ore import’, DFdaily, 31 July, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090731/01476552659.shtml 中钢协召开会议强
调统一铁矿石进口价, 东方早报. 
Chen, L. (2011), ‘Study on Chinese Petroleum Financial Strategy under the Background of 
Petroleum Financialization’, Technology & Economics in Petrochemicals, vol.27, no.3, pp.6-
10. 

Chen, J.S. (2010), ‘Iron ore negotiation begins The China Iron and Steel Association stops 






Chen, N.X. (2015), ‘Chian wins the first round of iron ore pricing’, Changjiang Times, 26 October, 
Viewed on 22 December 2015, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20151026/075423576782.shtml 中国争夺铁矿石
定价权初战告捷, 长江商报. 
Chen, S.S. (2008a), ‘Iron Ore Negotiation leaning towards the buyers’ side’, China Business News, 
3 November, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20081103/06465459662.shtml  铁矿石谈判砝码向买
方倾斜, 第一财经日报. 
Chen, S.S. (2008b), ‘Iron ore negotiation starting soon Zero possibility for spot market based index 
price’, China Business News, 5 December, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20081205/06355594086.shtml 铁矿石谈判启动在即现
货指数定价免谈, 第一财经日报. 
Chen, S.S. (2009a), ‘Japan determines that this year’s iron ore negotiation price for fine ore will be 
33% less’, China Business Network, 26 May, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090526/13466274177.shtml 日本确定今年铁矿
石谈判首发价粉矿降价 33%, 第一财经网. 
Chen, S.S. (2009b), ‘Chian Iron and Steel Association acquiesced steel plants import iron ore based 
on the 33% price cut’, China Business Network, 17 July, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090717/02196491407.shtml 中钢协默许钢厂按
33%降幅进口长协矿, 第一财经日报. 
Chen, S.S. (2009c), ‘Iron ore spot price hits the record high within the year The forthcoming annual 
negotiation faces predicament’, China Business Network, 19 December, Viewed on 20 March 
2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20091219/02327126376.shtml 铁矿石现货价创年内新
高新年度谈判面临困境, 第一财经日报. 
Chen, S.S. (2009d), ‘Annual negotiation will start Some promote iron ore index’, China Business 
Network, 21 October, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://business.sohu.com/20091021/n267580571.shtml 年度谈判将启各路人马推销铁矿石
指数, 第一财经日报. 
Chen, S.S. (2009e), ‘欧洲价格无碍中国模式铁矿石谈判只差临门一脚 ’, China Business 






Chen, S.S. (2009f), ‘BHP Billiton adopted the mixed pricing method for 30% of its iron ore’, China 
Business Network, 30 July, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20090730/02576546476.shtml 必和必拓三成矿石实现混合
定价, 第一财经日报. 
Chen, S.S. (2010a), ‘Iron ore negotiation unfinished Some steel enterprises accept the temporary 
price containing the 40% price cut’, China Business Network, 22 February, Viewed on 20 
March 2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20100222/02207431531.shtml 铁矿石谈判未完
部分钢企接受 40%临时定价, 第一财经日报. 
Chen, S.S. (2010b), ‘BHP Billiton reached the new price in negotiation The effective period for the 
price not yet announced’, China Business Network, 31 March, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20100331/02397663816.shtml 必和必拓谈下神秘首发价涨
幅及执行期限未公布, 第一财经日报. 
Chen, S.S. (2010c), ‘Baosteel: Chinese steel enterprises still consider the long term contract based 
import as the main procurement channel’, China Business Network, 25 March, Viewed on 22 
March 2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20100325/16277634006.shtml 宝钢称中国钢企
仍追求长协为主采购模式, 第一财经日报. 
Chen, S.S. (2010d), ‘Iron ore pricing mechanism changes Many fight for index pricing’, China 
Business Network, 26 April, Viewed on 24 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20100426/00457822876.shtml 铁矿石定价机制转变 各路人
马争夺指数定价权, 第一财经日报. 
Chen, Y.M. (2010), ‘Iron ore negotiation likely to be left unsettled Steel and iron industry should 
look in the long term’, Xinhuanet, 3 May, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100503/09477866515.shtml 铁矿石谈判或将不
了了之钢铁行业应立足长远, 新华网. 
China Business Journal (2008), ‘Speculation in futures for shipping cost Iron ore price being 
pushed upwards’, China Business Journal, 20 January, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20080120/11024427222.shtml 爆炒海运期货铁矿石
价格遭推涨, 中国经营报. 
China Business Network (2010a), ‘BHP Billiton will sign up short term supply contract with its 
Asian clients’, China Business Network, 30 March, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20100330/09417658896.shtml 必和必拓将与亚洲客户签订
短期销售合同, 第一财经网. 
China Business Network (2010b), ‘Chinese steel enterprises yet to accept BHP Billiton’s short term 






China Business Network (2010), ‘China Iron and Steel Association calling for the boycott against 
the Big Three in the following two months’, China Business Network, 2 April, Viewed on 21 
March 2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100402/15347685137.shtml 中钢
协号召未来两月抵制三大矿山铁矿石, 第一财经网. 
China Business Network (2010), ‘Vale reached the quarterly price agreement with all its clients’, 
China Business Network, 6 May, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/20100506/14037887309.shtml 淡水河谷已同所
有客户达成季度定价协议, 第一财经网. 
China Business Times (2009), ‘China Iron and Steel Association halts speculation in iron ore 
trade’, China Business Times, 16 June, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090616/11046354949.shtml 中钢协叫停铁矿石
投机,中华工商时报. 
China Daily (2010) ‘Mills allowed to reach private deals with mining companies: CISA’, 24 
February, Viewed on 25 March 2014, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2010-
04/28/content_9787800.htm 
China Economic Times (2008), ‘The focus of next year’s iron ore negotiation: pricing mechanism 
and the shipping price’, China Economic Times, 13 November, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20081113/00165499766.shtml 明年铁矿石谈判焦点：定价
机制与海运费差价, 中国经济时报. 
China Galaxy Securities (2009), ‘Iron and steel industry: iron ore negotiation brings transactional 
opportunities’, China Galaxy Securities, 5 June, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/hyyj/20090605/16516311229.shtml 钢铁行业：铁矿石谈判
带来的交易性机会, 银河证券. 
China Iron and Steel Association (2009a), Announcement of the 2009 annual price of iron ore 
import in China, accessed 20 March 2014, 
http://www.chinaisa.org.cn/gxportal/DispatchAction.do?efFormEname=ECTM40&key=Am
EJNg9kWDkAYQUyBGNVNAdjVTYIbAA3X20HMQRjV2EBEglGDBcENAcWAkUDFA
Fj 关于 2009 年度中国进口铁矿石价格谈判结果的公报 
China Iron and Steel Association (2009b), CISA’s 4th industrial information press conference in 
2009, accessed 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20091103/13476917366.shtml 中钢协 2009 年第
四次行业信息发布会 
China Iron and Steel Association (2009c), Steel Industry Self-discipline Agreement on 







China Iron and Steel Association (2009d), Steel Industry Self-discipline Agreement on 
Standardising the Order of Domestic Steel Market, accessed 22 March 2014, 
http://www.sbmia.org.cn/Item/414.aspx 钢铁行业规范国内钢材市场秩序自律公约 
 
China Iron and Steel Association (2009e), The 2009 ranking of the Chinese steel enterprises, 
accessed 22 March 2014, http://wenku.baidu.com/link?url=0--QJOxKxo75zwGkSWK-
b3FgZrcULl19JZ71q52wgg4KNGUmuTPOX-EZj4-
lN_HeciqzUtc_yVUpBeyXnueEZ4_FN9fat1UB8T7S4xv0t7K  2009 年中国钢铁企业排名 
China Iron and Steel Association (2010), CISA’s 2nd industrial information press conference in 
2010, accessed 22 March 2014, 
http://www.chinaisa.org.cn/gxportal/DispatchAction.do?efFormEname=ECTM40&key=VjU
KNVw3UzIEZQM0XjkAYVczBWZWMgQzBDZWYFE2UG1XRAlGWUIHNwYXVxBR
RlEz 中国钢铁工业协会 2010 年第二次行业信息发布会 
China Iron and Steel Association (2011a), Entry requirements for new member firms at the CISA, 




China Iron and Steel Association (2011b), Progress report by the Communist Party Committee at 




China Iron and Steel Association (2012a), The Third Session Leading Members of China Iron & 




China Iron and Steel Association (2012b), The Third Session Leading Members of China Iron & 




China Iron and Steel Association (2013a), Brief introduction of China Iron and Steel Association, 







China Iron and Steel Association (2013b), Activity Plan: The implementation plan of the CISA’s 
party committee to further the educational and practical activities of the Mass Line, China 




China National Radio (2009), ‘China Iron and Steel Association asks Rizhao International Iron Ore 
Trading Centre to rename and restructure’, China National Radio, 26 June, Viewed on 22 
March 2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/20090626/19596406806.shtml 中钢
协要求日照国际铁矿石交易中心更名并整改, 中国广播网. 
China News Service (2009), ‘Ministry of Industry and Information discussed the Rio Tinto 
espionage case and hoped iron ore negotiation resulting in a fair price agreement’, China 
News Service, 22 July, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090722/18486515477.shtml 工信部谈力拓案望
铁矿石谈判达成公平价格协议, 中国新闻网. 
China News Service (2009), ‘BHP Billiton claimed to achieve iron ore price agreement with some 
clients The participation of Chinese enterprises not disclosed’, China News Service, 29 July, 
Viewed on 21 March 2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20090729/21442979255.shtml 必
和必拓称达成部分铁矿石协议未说是否含中企, 中国新闻网. 
China News Service (2009), ‘Li Yizhong: Iron ore negotiation has already affected national 
interests Unify internally against outsiders’, China News Service, 13 August, Viewed on 22 
March 2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090813/11316611790.shtml 李毅
中:铁矿石谈判已影响国家利益推举一家对外, 中国新闻网. 
Chua, W. F. (1986), ‘Radical Developments in Accounting Thought’, The Accounting Review, 
vol.LX1, no.4, pp.601-632. 
Cook, N., Smith, S.J. & Searle, B.A. (2009), ‘Mortgage markets and cultures of consumption’, 
Consumption Markets & Culture, vol.12, no.2, pp.133-154. 
Cooper, C. (1997), ‘Against Postmodernism: class oriented questions for critical accounting’, 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting, vol.8, pp.15-41. 
Cooper, D.J. (1980), ‘Discussion of Towards a Political Economy of Accounting’, Accounting, 
Organisations and Society, vol.5, no.1, pp.161-166. 
Cooper, D.J. & Sherer, M.J. (1984), ‘The value of corporate accounting reports: arguments for a 
political economy of accounting’, Accounting, Organisations and Society, vol.9, no.3/4, 
pp.207-232. 
Cooper, D.J. & Tinker, T.M. (1994), ‘Accounting and Praxis: Marx after Foucault’, Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, vol.5, no,1, pp.1-3. 




Crotty, J.R. (1990), ‘Owner-Manager Conflict and Financial Theories of Investment Instability: A 
Critical Assessment of Keynes, Tobin, and Minsky’, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 
vol.12, no.4, pp.519-542. 
Crotty, J.R. (2005), The Neoliberal Paradox: The Impact of Destructive Product Market 
Competition and ‘Modern’ Financial Markets on Nonfinancial Corporation Performance in 
the Neoliebral Era, in G. Epstein. (ed.), Financialization and the World Economy, Edward 
Elgar, Northampton, MA. 
Crotty, J.R. (2009), ‘Structural causes of the global financial crisis: a critical assessment of the 
‘new financial architecture’’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol.33, pp.563-580. 
Cutler, T. & Waine, B. (2001), ‘Social insecurity and the retreat from social democracy: 
occupational welfare in the long boom and financialization’, Review of International Political 
Economy, vol.8, no.1, pp.96-118. 
Deegan, C.M. (2009), Financial accounting theory, 3rd edn, McGraw-Hill Australia, Australia.   
Demir, F. (2007), ‘The Rise of Rentier Capitalism and the Financialisation of Real Sectors in 
Developing Countries’, Review of Radical Political Economics, vol.39, no.3, pp.351-359. 
Deng, X.P. (1993), Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume III, People’s Publishing House, 
Beijing. 
Deng, Y. (2009a), ‘Vale withdrew from iron ore negotiation, leaving the pricing right to BHP 
Billiton and Rio Tinto in the expectation of a high price’, 21st Century Business Herald, 29 
April, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20090429/01446162325.shtml 淡水河谷退出铁矿石谈判权
力给两拓期待高价, 21世纪经济报道. 
Deng, Y. (2009b), ‘China Iron and Steel Association turned to the small and medium size mining 
companies to negotiate the long term contract price’, 21st Century Business Herald, 7 
August, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20090807/03106583410.shtml 中钢协转寻中小矿企洽谈长
协合同, 21世纪经济报道. 
Deng, Y. (2009c), ‘Fight for spot price: Changes in iron ore trade both within and outside China’, 
21st Century Business Herald, 21 July, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20090721/01032960308.shtml 争夺现货价：中外铁矿石贸
易变局, 21世纪经济报道. 
Deng, Y. (2009d), ‘Iron ore negotiation revealed: the protagonist changed from Baosteel to China 
Iron and Steel Association’, 21st Century Business Herald, 22 July, Viewed on 21 March 
2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/sdbd/20090722/00036510882.shtml 铁矿石谈判大
起底：从宝钢到中钢协的主角轮换, 21世纪经济报道. 
Deng, Y. (2009e), ‘Vale sits back from the iron ore negotiation ’, 21st Century Business Herald, 19 






Deng, Y. (2010a), ‘Iron ore negotiation becoming passive again: Sinosteel and China National 
Building Materials help push up iron ore prices’, 21st Century Business Herald 21 世纪经济
报 道 , 13 January, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20100113/00297232888.shtm 铁矿石谈判再临被动局面：中
钢中建材助推行情, 21世纪经济报道. 
Deng, Y. (2010b), ‘China Iron and Steel Association: credit crunch has limited impact on large size 
steel enterprises’, 21st Century Business Herald, 5 February, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20100205/23237378872.shtml 中钢协：信贷紧缩对大型钢企
影响不大, 21世纪经济报道. 
Deng, Y. (2010c), ‘Iron ore negotiation only exists in name Ministry of Industry and Information 
planning on a new mechanism for iron ore import’, 21st Century Business Herald, 16 April, 
Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100416/01097760439.shtml 铁矿石谈判名存实
亡工信部拟建进口新机制, 21世纪经济报道. 
Deng, Y. (2010d), ‘Ministry of Industry and Information diagnosing the steel and iron industry 
Steel enterprises suggest to establish the national mining company’, 21st Century Business 
Herald, 2 March, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100302/02247480528.shtml 工信部会诊钢铁业
钢企建议成立国家矿业公司, 21世纪经济报道. 
Deng, Y. &Gao, J.H. (2008), ‘Steel enterprises suffering more losses Iron ore price cut raised 
again’, 21st Century Business Herald, 21 October, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20081021/02485410900.shtml 钢企亏损加重铁矿石
降价呼声再起, 21世纪经济报道. 
DFdaily (2008), ‘First round of the 2009 iron ore price negotiation starts’, DFdaily, 7 November, 
Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20081107/07555478986.shtml 2009 年铁矿石价首轮
谈判启动, 东方早报. 
DFdaily (2009), ‘Ministry of Industry and Information strongly supports China Iron and Steel 
Association: China’s proposed iron ore price drop is reasonable’, DFdaily, 17 June, Viewed 
on 25 March 2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090617/07086359494.shtml
工信部力挺中钢协：中方所提铁矿石降幅合理, 东方早报. 
DFdaily (2010), ‘Deutsche Bank’s report expected this year’s iron ore contract price increase by 





测今年铁矿石合约价或涨 35%, 东方早报. 
DFdaily (2010), ‘BHP Billiton: China’s iron ore demand stronger than expected’, DFdaily, 11 
February, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20100211/00553219163.shtml 必和必拓：中国铁矿石需求
强于预期, 东方早报. 
DFdaily (2010), ‘Iron ore negotiation confirmed to exercise the benchmark price based on the 
Chinese financial year’, DFdaily, 8 March, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20100308/02393237864.shtml 铁矿石谈判确定按中国财年
执行基准价, 东方早报. 
DFdaily (2010), ‘Australia urged China not to intervene in the iron ore market’, DFdaily, 6 April, 
Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100406/03067693042.shtml 澳大利亚呼吁中国
别干预铁矿石市场, 东方早报. 
Dillard, J. (1991), ‘Accounting as a Critical Social Science’, Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability Journal, vol.4, no.1, pp8-28. 
Ding, S. & Graham, C. (2007), ‘Accounting and the reduction of state-owned stock in China’, 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting, vol.18, pp559-580. 
Dixon, A.D. & Monk, A.H.B. (2009), ‘The power of finance: Accounting harmonisation’s effect on 
pension provision’, Journal of Economic Geography, vol.9, pp.619-639. 
Dobb, M. (1973), Theories of Value and Distribution since Adam Smith: Ideology and Economic 
Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Dong, W.S. (2009a), ‘Iron ore price cut by 35% agreement reached with FMG Killing two birds 
with one stone’, Xinhuanet, 18 August, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090818/07396629749.shtml 铁矿石降价 35%协
议达成 FMG价格让步一箭双雕, 新华网. 
Dong, W.S. (2009b), ‘No iron ore negotiation outcome reached yet on June 30 between China and 
foreign companies’, China Securities Journal, 1 July, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090701/04276422488.shtml 6月 30日中外铁矿
石谈判暂交白卷, 中国证券报. 
Dong, W.S. (2009c), ‘Zoujian: the global iron ore supply recently increased by nearly 500 million 
tons’, China Securities Journal, 16 July, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/yjsy/20090716/07016486636.shtml 邹健：全球铁矿石




Dong, W.S. (2009d), ‘Baosteel Group Chairman Xu Lejiang: Iron ore negotiation still ongoing in 
July’, China Securities Journal, 6 July, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090706/01366441926.shtml 宝钢集团董事长徐
乐江：7月铁矿石谈判还在进行, 中国证券报. 
Dow Jones (2010), ‘Steel market braces for change’, 14 February. 
Du, J. (2012), ‘New platform gives Chinese iron ore traders muscle’, China Daily, 09 May, 
accessed 15/10/2012, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90778/7812241.html 
Du, X.Y. (2009), ‘Iron ore negotiation starts this week Big Three planning to increase by 30-35%’, 
China Economic Net, 15 October, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20091015/08516841811.shtml 铁矿石谈判本周展
开三巨头拟涨价 30-35%, 中国经济网. 
Dumenil, G.& Levy, D.(2004), Capital Resurgent: Roots of the Neoliberal Revolution, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Dziubla, R.W. (1982), ‘International Trading Companies: Building on the Japanese Model’, 
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, vol.4, no.2, pp.422-496. 
Economy 30 Minutes, Medium and small steel enterprises unable to share the iron ore negotiation 
result embarrass the Chinese Iron and Steel Association,(2009), television programme, China 
Central Television, China, June 23 2009. 
Economic Daily, (1991), 1 April 1991. 
Economic Information Daily (2009), ‘Big Three promoting for the 30% increase of iron ore price’, 
Economic Information Daily, 10 November, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20091110/07006943844.shtml 三大矿业巨头为铁
矿石涨价 30%造势, 经济参考报. 
Economic Information Daily (2009), ‘Big Three planning to reduce iron ore supply for more 
discourse power in negotiation’, Economic Information Daily, 29 December, Viewed on 22 
March 2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20091229/01487165856.shtml 铁矿
石三巨头欲缩减供货谋谈判筹码, 经济参考报. 
Economic News, Steel futures help our nation become the price setter of steel around the globe, 
(2009), television programme, China Central Television, China, 27 March 2009. 
Economic News, Influence of the unsettled iron ore price on China’s steel enterprises, (2009), 
television programme, China Central Television, China, June 30 2009. 
Edwards, E.O. & Bell, P.W. (1961), The Theory and Measurement of Business Income, University 




Elliot, R.K. (1986), ‘Dinosaurs, passenger pigeons, and financial accountants’, World, pp.32-35, as 
reproduced in S.A. Zeff & Dharan, B.G. (1996), Readings and Notes on Financial 
Accounting, 5th edn, McGraw-Hill, New York. 
Erhard, L. (2004), ‘Chapter 3: The IASC’s conceptual framework – an obstacle to international 
harmonisation’, Ludwig Erhard Lectures, University of Bayreuth, viewed on 22 March 2014 
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/voddocs/458/1640/Ch3_IASC%20conceptual%20frame
work.pdf 
Ezzamel, M., Xiao, J. Z. & Pan, A. (2007), ‘Political ideology and accounting regulation in China’, 
Accounting Organisations and Society, vol.32, pp.669-700. 
FASB (1976), Scope and implications of the conceptual framework project / Financial Standards 
Board, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Stamford, Conn. 
Feng, H., Fround, J., Johal, S., Haslam, C. & Williams, K. (2001), ‘A new business model?The 
capital market and the new economy’, Economy and Society, vol.30, no.4, pp.467-503. 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (1978), ‘The Objectives of Financial Reporting by Business 
Enterprises’, in Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No.1, Connecticut, Stamford. 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (1980), ‘Qualitative characteristics of Accounting 
Information’, in Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No.2, Connecticut, Stamford. 
Fine, B. (2007), ‘Financialisation, Poverty, and Marxist Political Economy’, paper presented to the 
Poverty and Capital Conference, University of Manchester, 2-4 July, 2007. 
Fine, B. (2010), ‘Locating Financialisation’, Historical Materialism, vol.18, pp.97-116. 
Fortescue Metals Group Limited (2009), Annual Report 2009, accessed 22 March 2014, 
http://fmgl.com.au/media/2119/2009_annual_report.pdf 
Froud, J., Johal, S., Papazian, V. & Williams, K. (2004), ‘The temptation of Houston: a case study 
of financialisation’, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, vol.15, no.6-7, pp.885-909. 
Froud, J., Johal, S., Leaver, A. & Williams, K. (2014), ‘Financialization across the pacific: 
Manufacturing cost ratios, supply chains and power’, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 
vol. 25, pp.46-57. 
Funnel, W. (1998), ‘Accounting in the service of the Holocaust’, Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting, vol.8, pp.435-464. 
Gaffikin, M.J.R. (2008), Accounting Theory Research, regulation and accounting practice, Pearson 
Education, Australia. 
Gao, L.Y. (2009), ‘June’s iron ore import at 55 million tons The smoke screen of supply cut 
collapses in itself’, Southern Metropolis Daily, 15 July, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090715/08136481807.shtml 6 月铁矿石进口




Global Times (2010), ‘Big Three planning to increase price by 80-90% Iron ore negotiation 
becomes more difficulty this year’, Global Times, 9 March, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100309/08527526786.shtml 三巨头寻求涨价
80-90% 铁矿石谈判今年更艰难, 环球时报. 
Gold Bull Information (2009), ‘Shan Shanghua: Steel enterprises would still suffering losses even 
iron ore price could drop to the 2007 level’, Gold Bull Information, 15 May, Viewed on 21 
March 2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/future/20090515/09466230335.shtml 单尚华
：铁矿石降到 2007年水平仍有钢企亏损, 金牛财顺. 
Gold Bull Information (2009), ‘Vale: Iron ore negotiation approaching to an end Price to be 
revealed in the following weeks’, Gold Bull Information, 20 May, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/future/20090520/09006249483.shtml 淡水河谷：铁矿石
谈判近尾声价格未来数周内公布, 金牛财顺. 
Gold Bull Information (2009), ‘Long term contract not to last long China Iron and Steel 
Association will promote the new mechanism for iron ore negotiation’, Gold Bull 
Information, 12 June, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/future/20090612/09456340290.shtml 长协难长中钢协将
推铁矿石谈判新机制, 金牛财顺. 
Gold Bull Information (2009), ‘Iron ore negotiation in a stalemate Outside forces push steel 
enterprises to accelerate restructuring and reorganisation’, Gold Bull Information, 23 July, 
Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/future/20090723/08456518177.shtml 铁矿石谈判僵持不
下外部压力倒逼钢企重组整合加速, 金牛财顺. 
Gold Bull Information (2009), ‘Rio Tinto withdraws from spot market and sells iron ore at 
benchmark price’, Gold Bull Information, 21 August, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/future/20090821/13466649019.shtml 力拓退出现货市场
目前以指标价格出售铁矿石, 金牛财顺. 
Gold Bull Information (2009), ‘The 2010 Iron ore negotiation will strictly implement the unifying 
price’, Gold Bull Information, 24 September, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/future/20090924/09336787882.shtml 2010 年铁矿石谈判
将严格执行统一价格, 金牛财顺. 
Gold Bull Information (2009), ‘The 2010 iron ore negotiation starts in October’, Gold Bull 
Information, 29 September, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/future/20090929/09466805360.shtml 2010 年度铁矿石谈
判 10月启动, 金牛财顺. 
Gold Bull Information (2009), ‘China Iron and Steel Association: calling for changing the starting 




Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/future/20090930/08156809445.shtml 中钢协：寻求每年 1
月份开谈铁矿石, 金牛财顺. 
Gong, X. (2011), Using Critical Discourse Analysis in the study of visual images within accounting 
annual reports: the case of China Mobile, unpublished honours thesis, School of Accounting 
and Finance, University of Wollongong. 
Gong, W. & He, L. (2009), ‘Ministry of Commerce Spokesperson said that the pricing mechanism 
of iron ore merits acknowledgement’, People’s Daily, 18 August, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090818/06436629229.shtml 商务部新闻发言人
表示铁矿石定价模式值得肯定, 人民日报. 
Grabel, L. (1995), ‘Speculation-led economic development: a Post-Keynesian interpretation of 
financial liberalisation programmes in the Third World’, International Review of Applied 
Economics, vol.9, no.2, pp.127-149. 
Grady, J.K. & Ackroyd, S. (2013), ‘Economy, Class, Ideology and the Transformation of the 
Organisational Landscape: A Marxian Speculation’, Organisation: The Critical Journal of 
Organisation, Theory and Society, forthcoming. 
Gray, R., Kouhy, R. & Lavers, S. (1995), ‘Corporate social and environmental reporting A review 
of the literature and a longitudinal study of UK disclosure’, Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, vol.8, no.2, pp.47-77. 
Guan, P. (2010), ‘Iron ore negotiation confirmed to exercise the benchmark price based on the 
Chinese financial year’, DFdaily, 8 March, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20100308/02393237864.shtml 铁矿石谈判确定按中国财年
执行基准价, 东方早报. 
Guan, P. (2011), ‘Iron ore import agency system under consideration again’, DFdaily, 31 July, 
Viewed on 21 March 2014, http://www.dfdaily.com/html/113/2011/7/31/638656.shtml 进口
铁矿石代理制再上路, 东方早报. 
Guthrie, J. & Parker, L.D. (1989), ‘Corporate Social Reporting: A Rebuttal of Legitimacy Theory’, 
Accounting and Business Research, vol.19, no.76, pp.343-352. 
Hall, P.A. & Soskice, D.W. (2001), Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of 
Comparative Advantage, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Han, Z. (2009a), ‘China Iron and Steel Association held the closed door meeting to set the final 
tone for the iron ore negotiation’, Beijing Business Today, 30 July, Viewed on 20 March 
2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090730/01196546084.shtml 中钢协开闭
门会为铁矿石谈判最后定调, 北京商报. 
Han, Z. (2009b), ‘Rio Tinto said China could use an exclusive price’, Beijing Business Today, 3 





Han, Z. (2009c), ‘Iron ore import criticized by government as irrational for the first time’, Beijing 
Business Today, 13 August, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20090813/01043007835.shtml 铁矿石进口首次被官方斥为
非理性, 北京商报. 
Han, Z. (2010a), ‘China Iron and Steel Association dissatisfied by the media attention on the 
progress of iron ore negotiation, indicating that mining enterprises bully China’, Beijing 
Business Today, 10 February, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100210/01307397685.shtml 中钢协不满舆论热
炒谈判进程坦言矿企欺负中国, 北京商报. 
Hanlon, G. (1996), ‘“Casino capitalism” and the rise of the “commercialised” service class—an 
examination of the accountant’, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, vol.7, pp.339-363. 
Hanlon, G. (1997), ‘Commercialising the service class and economic restructuring—a response to 
my critics’, Accounting, Organisations and Society, vol.22, no.8, pp.843-855. 
Harvey, D. (1989), The Condition of Post modernity, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 
Haslam, C., Tsitsianis, N., Hoinaru, R., Andersson, T. & Katechos, G. (2015), ‘Stress Testing 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS): Accounting for Stability and the Public 
Good in a Financialized World’, Accounting, Economics and Law: A Convivium, 
forthcoming, pp.1-26. 
Hassard, J., Sheehan, J. & Morris, J. (1999), ‘Enterprise Reform in Post-Deng China’, Studies of 
management and organization, vol.29, no.3, pp.54-83. 
Hatherly, D. & Kretzschmar, G. (2011), ‘Capital and income financialization: Accounting for the 
2008 financial crisis’, Accounting Forum, vol. 35, pp.209-216. 
He, X.R. (2008), ‘Possible production cut by the Big Three before the iron ore negotiation’, 
Xinhuanet, 8 December, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20081208/18105606326.shtml 铁矿石谈判前夕三大铁
矿石巨头或虚或实减产, 新华网. 
He, X.R. (2010a), ‘Foreign institutions come to China to promote iron ore index price Chinese steel 
plants on alert’, Xinhuanet, 25 April, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100425/10387821695.shtml 外资机构来华推铁
矿石价格指数中国钢厂警惕应对, 新华网. 
He, X.R. (2010b), ‘Iron ore negotiation effectively finished Three majors lessons worthy of 
deliberation’, Xinhuanet, 29 April, Viewd on 25 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100429/16377853231.shtml 铁矿石谈判曲未终
人已散 三大教训值得思考, 新华网. 
Henderson, S., Peirson, G., Herbohn, K. Artiach, T. & Howieson, B. (2014), Issues in Financial 




Hicks, J.R. (1946), Value and Capital, 2edn, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
Hines, R. (1988) ‘Financial accounting: in communicating reality, we construct reality’, 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, vol. 13, no. 3, pp.251-262. 
 
Holbig, H. (2009), ‘Remaking the CCP’s Ideology: Determinants, Progress, and Limits under Hu 
Jintao’, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, vol.38, no.3, pp.35-61. 
Holes, H. (2013), ‘A brief history of iron ore markets’, Macrobusiness, 16 August, Viewed on 24 
March 2014, http://www.macrobusiness.com.au/2013/08/a-brief-history-of-iron-ore-markets/ 
Hopwood, A.G. (1994), ‘Accounting and everyday life: An introduction’, Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, vol.19, no.3, pp.299-301. 
Hopwood, A.G. (2009), ‘Exploring the interface between accounting and finance’, Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, vol.34, editorial, pp.549-550. 
Hou, H. & Yang, X.H. (2009), ‘A game theory analysis of international iron ore manufacturers 
strategic alliance’, Chinese Control and Decision Conference, 2009, pp.3535-3539. 
 
Hu, J.T. (2006), ‘Hu Jintao’s speech at the seminar of Studying <<Selected Works of Jiang 
Zemin>>’, The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, accessed 25 
March 2014, http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2006-08/15/content_362771.htm 胡锦涛在学习《江泽
民文选》报告会上讲话 
Hu, M., Pauliuk, S., Wang, T., Huppes, G., van der Voet, E., & Muller, D.B. (2010), ‘Iron and steel 
in Chinese residential buildings: A dynamic analysis’, Resources, Conservation and 
Recycling, vol.54, no.9, pp.591-600. 
 
Huang, J. (2010), ‘Traders’ stockpile of steels at 100 million RMB pushing up iron ore price’, 
China Business Journal, 1 March, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100301/07597474255.shtml 贸易商千亿囤积助
涨铁矿石, 中国经营报. 
Huang, J.P. & Mei, L. (2010), ‘The questionable identity of the CISA’, Southern Weekly, 22 April, 
Viewed on 24 March 2014, http://www.infzm.com/content/4412 中钢协身份悬疑, 南方周末 
IFRS (2015), Work plan for IFRS: Conceptual Framework, viewed on 29 December 2015, 
http://www.ifrs.org/Current-Projects/IASB-Projects/Conceptual-
Framework/Pages/Conceptual-Framework-Summary.aspx 
International Accounting Standards Board (2015), Exposure Draft: Conceptual Framework for 
Financial Reporting, International Financial Reporting Standards Foundation, Viewed on 5 
November 2015, https://webapps.library.uow.edu.au/refcite/style-guides/html/ 
Jefferson, G.H. (1990), ‘China’s Iron and Steel Industry’, Journal of Development Economics, 
vol.33, pp.329-355. 





Jiang, Z.M. (2006b), Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Volume II, People’s Publishing House, 
Beijing. 
Jiang, Z.M. (2006c), Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Volume III, People’s Publishing House, 
Beijing. 
Jiao, L.K. (2009a), ‘Chian Iron and Steel Association turned down the 33% iron ore price cut’, 
Morning Post, 1 June, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090601/06516286219.shtml 中钢协拒绝接受铁
矿石降价 33%, 北京晨报. 
Jiao, L.K. (2009b), ‘Difficult progress of China’s iron ore negotiation One last day before the 
deadline’, Morning Post, 29 June, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090629/07076411381.shtml 中国铁矿石谈判寸
步难行最后期限只差一天, 北京晨报. 
Jiao, L.K. (2009c), ‘Chian Iron and Steel Association not worried about the 10 million tonne 
stockpile of steels’, Morning Post, 22 December, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20091222/22323156231.shtml 中钢协称千万吨钢材库存不
必恐慌, 北京晨报. 
Jiao, L.K. (2010a), ‘BHP Billiton and Rio Tinton bypass China and negotiate with Japan and Korea 
to increase iron ore price by 35%’, Morning Post, 19 January, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100119/00287265097.shtml 两拓绕开中国先与
日韩谈判铁矿石被涨价 35%, 北京晨报. 
Jiao, L.K. (2010b), ‘BHP Billiton unilaterally increased price by 40% China’s participation in the 
iron ore negotiation becomes bleak’, Morning Post, 3 March, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100303/07037489422.shtml 必和必拓单方提价
四成中国铁矿石谈判前景黯淡, 北京晨报. 
Jiao, L.K. (2010c), ‘Ministry of Industry and Information strongly supports the long term pricing 
mechanism of iron ore and firmly resists any form of monopoly’, Morning Post, 24 March, 
Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100324/02417619384.shtml 工信部力挺铁矿石
长协定价称坚决抵制任何垄断, 北京晨报. 
Jin, J. (2009), ‘China Iron and Steel Association turned to Vale to negotiate iron ore price?’, 
Guangzhou Daily, 20 July, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/future/20090720/09306502081.shtml 中钢协改同淡水河
谷谈铁矿石价？ 广州日报. 
Kavussanos, M.G. &Visvikis, L.D. (2004), ‘Market interactions in returns and volatilities between 





Kavussanos, M.G., Visvikis, L.D. & Batchelor, R.A. (2004), ‘Over-the-counter forward contracts 
and spot price volatility in shipping’, Shipping Finance and Port Issues, vol.40, no.4, pp.273-
296. 
Keynes, J.M. (1936), The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
Kirk, W.S. (2004), ‘China’s Emergence as the World’s Leading Iron-ore-consuming Country’, 
Minerals & Energy, vol.19, no.2, pp.16-27. 
Krippner, G. (2005), ‘The financialization of the American economy’, Socio-Economic Review, 
vol.3.no.2, pp.173-208. 
Lang, Z. & Zhang, G.D. (2010), ‘India increases tariff Chinese steel enterprises importing iron ore 
faces difficulty again’, National Business Daily, 4 May, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20100504/03477869299.shtml 印度调高关税中国钢企进口矿
石再遇搅局, 每日经济新闻. 
Langley, P. (2004), ‘In the Eye of the ‘Perfect Storm’: The Final Salary Pensions Crisis and 
Financialisation of Anglo-American Capitalism’, New Political Economy, vol.9, no.4, 
pp.539-558. 
Langley, P. (2006), ‘The making of investor subjects in Anglo-American pensions’, Environment 
and Planning D: Society and Space, vol.24, pp.919-934. 
Lapavitsas, C. (2009a), ‘Financialised Capitalism: Crisis and Financial Expropriation’, Historical 
Materialism, vol.17, no.2, pp.114-148. 
Lapavitsas, C. (2009b), ‘Financialisation, or the Search for Profits in the Sphere of Circulation’, 
Economiza, no.72, 3rd quarter, pp.98-117. 
Lapavitsas, C.(2011), ‘Theorizing financialization’, Work, employment and society, vol.25, no.4, 
pp.611-626. 
Lavoie, M. (1992), Foundations of Post-Keynesian Econometric Analysis, Edward Elgar, 
Aldershot. 
Lazonick, W. (2008), ‘The quest for shareholder value: stock repurchases in the US economy’, 
Louvain Economic Review, vol.74, no.4, pp.479-540. 
Li, J.L. (2009a), ‘Internal sources say that the 2009 iron ore negotiation begns to favour China’, 
China Industrial and Economic News, 7 January, Viewed on 21 March, 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20090107/23225729755.shtml 业内人士称 2009 铁矿
石谈判天平开始向中国倾斜, 中国产经新闻. 
Li, J.L. (2009b), ‘China gradually loses advantages in the iron ore negotiation’, China Industrial 






Li, L.X. (2009), ‘Shipping cost rises exponentially and poses more pressure on this year’s iron ore 
negotiation’, Webstock Information, 10 February, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/future/futuresroll/20090210/09045836157.shtml 海运费近
期暴涨今年铁矿石谈判压力骤增, 文华财经. 
Li, Q. (2009), ‘Iron ore negotiation approaching to an end BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto become 
unusually high profile’, Shanghai Morning Post, 31 July, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090731/08446553912.shtml 铁矿石谈判逼近收
官两巨头异乎寻常高调, 新闻晨报. 
Li, Q. & Liu, L. (2009), ‘Iron ore spot price increases sharply China Iron and Steel Association 
already failed to suppress’, Shanghai Morning Post, 12 August, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090812/07226604270.shtml 铁矿石现货价格飙
升中钢协压价已难成功, 新闻晨报. 
Li, R. (2009), ‘Baosteel said the profitability of global steel enterprises does not support the iron 
ore price increase next year’, Xinhuanet, 21 December, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/20091221/21357133853.shtml 宝钢称全球钢企
盈利情况不支持明年铁矿石涨价, 新华网. 
Li, X.H. (2009), ‘Iron ore negotiation will continue Suppliers announce to trade in spot market 
from today’, DFdaily, 1 July, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20090701/01362924132.shtml 铁矿石谈判将继续供应商称
今起进行现货交易, 东方早报. 
Li, R.X. (2010a), ‘Long term contract price of iron ore approximating the spot market price Steel 
enterprises say they could not afford in the long run’, China Securities Journal, 2 April, 
Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100402/04067681074.shtml 铁矿石长协逼近现
货钢企表示长期力不能支,中国证券报. 
Li, R.X. (2010b), ‘Nippon steel blamed China’s iron ore procurement system for being chaotic’, 
China Securities Journal, 10 May, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100510/01107902134.shtml  新日铁指责中方铁
矿石采购体制混乱, 中国证券报. 
Li, R.X. (2010c), ‘86% of the small and medium size steel enterprises compromise with the price 
raise in long term contract based iron ore ’, China Securities Journal, 16 June, Viewed on 21 
March 2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100416/02597761167.shtml 中小
钢企对长协矿价涨逾 86%妥协, 中国证券报. 
Li, R.X. (2010d), ‘Ministry of Industry and Information: China still has bargaining chips in the iron 






Li, R.X. (2010e), ‘Vale confirmed to use the quarterly price agreement’, China Securities Journal, 
31 March, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100331/06127665190.shtml 淡水河谷明确铁矿
石季度长协价基准,中国证券报. 
Li, R.X. (2010f), ‘CISA and CCCMMC investigate the speculation in iron ore trade and will set up 
the joint office for iron ore import’, China Securities Journal, 6 April, Viewed on 22 March 
2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100406/05587693324.shtml 两协会严查
炒矿将成立进口铁矿石联合办公室,中国证券报. 
Li, J. & Lu, C.X. (2008), ‘Pricing and application of FFA in the international dry bulk shipping 
market’, China Water Transport, vol.8, no.7, pp.10-12. 
Li, X.L. (2009), ‘China Iron and Steel Association: rather being bankrupt than not having at least a 
40% price cut’, Yangcheng Evening News, 12 June, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20090612/14002891822.shtml 中钢协: 不降 40% 宁可减产, 
羊城晚报. 
Li, Y. (2010a), ‘BHP Billiton announced to reach the short term agreement with its Asian clients’, 
Caijing, 30 March, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100330/10287659189.shtml 必和必拓称与亚洲
客户达成更短期合同, 财经网. 
Li, Y. (2010b), ‘State-owned steel plants raise prices of steel sharply after losing the cost leadership 
advantage’, Caijing, 16 April, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100416/14297766024.shtml 丧失矿价优势 国有
钢厂大幅提高产品价格, 财经网. 
Lin, J. (2010), ‘Nippon Steel reached the price increase agreement with Vale’, Caijing, 30 March, 
Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/20100330/14287660880.shtml 新日铁与淡水河
谷初步达成涨价协议, 财经网. 
Lin, W.X. (2009), ‘BHP Billiton promotes mixed pricing to challenge the long term contract price’, 
Global Times, 30 July, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/world/gjjj/20090730/16316550711.shtml 必和必拓推铁矿石混合
定价挑战长协制, 环球时报. 
Liu, D. (2009), ‘BHP Billiton strongly promotes index pricing Iron ore negotiation may stop 






Liu, D.Q. & Otsuka, K. (2004), ‘A comparison of management incentives, abilities, and efficiency 
between SOEs and TVEs: The case of the iron and steel industry in China’, Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, vol.52, no.4, pp.759-780. 
Liu, Z.J. (Vice chairman, and the Secretary of the CPC committee of CISA) 2013, Speech at  the 
CISA and its other subordinate organisations’ conference for promoting the educational and 
practical activities of the Mass Line, media release, 17 July, China Iron and Steel 




Loftus, J., Leo, K., Picker, R. Wise, V. & Clark, K. (2013), Understanding Australian Accounting 
Standards, John Wiley & Sons Australia, Milton. 
Lowenstein, R. (2004), Origins of the Cash: The Great Bubble and Its Undoing, The Penguin 
Press, New York. 
Lu, F. & Li, Y.F. (2009), ‘China’s factor in recent global commodity price and shipping freight 
volatilities’, Working paper series, no.E2009007, China Center for Economic Research, 
Peking University. 
Lu, Z. (2010), ‘BHP Billiton’s iron ore production hit the record high Placing the firm in a 
favourable position in the negotiation’, China Securities Journal, 21 January, Viewed on 22 
March 2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/20100121/06377282247.shtml 必和
必拓铁矿石产量创新高称在谈判中处有利地位, 中国证券报. 
Luo, G. (1998), Explanation about the State Council’s organisational reform proposal (1998), The 
National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, Beijing, accessed 24 March 
2014, http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/1998-03/06/content_1480093.htm 关于国务院
机构改革方案的说明 (1998 年) 
Ma, J.K. (2010a), ‘China claimed to raise the iron ore negotiation to the national level Australia 
said no government intervention’, The Economic Observer, 15 March, Viewed on 20 March 
2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100315/16447567932.shtml 中方呼吁铁
矿石谈判升至国家层面澳方称不干预, 经济观察网. 
Ma, J.K. (2010b), ‘Suppliers sidestepped China and turned to Japan to negotiate the iron ore price’, 
The Economic Observer, 12 January, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20100112/15507231329.shtml 供应商撇开中方转向日本谈
判铁矿石价格, 经济观察网. 
Macve, R. (1999), ‘Critical and Financial Accounting: A Commentary on Bryer’s “A Marxist 





Marx, K. (1887), Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I, Progress Publishers, 
Moscow. 
Marx, K. (1956), Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume II, Progress Publishers, 
Moscow. 
Marx, K. (1959), Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume III, International Publishers, 
New York. 
Marx, K. (1969), Marx / Engels Selected Words, Volume I, Progress Publishers, Moscow. 
Marx, K. (1973), The Poverty of Philosophy, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow. 
Marx, K. (1974), Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Progress Publishers, Moscow. 
Marx, K. & Engels, F. (1974), The German Ideology, International Publishers, New York. 
Marx, K. & Engels, F. (2008), The Communist Manifesto, Pluto Press, London. 
Mattesich, R. (1964), Accounting and Analytical Methods: Measurement and Projection of Income 
and Wealth in the Micro- and Macro-Economy, Richard D. Irwin, Illinois, Homewood. 
McSweeney, B. (2009), ‘The roles of financial asset market failure denial and the economic crisis: 
Reflections on accounting and financial theories and practices’, Accounting, Organisations 
and Society, vol.34, pp.835-848. 
Mei, X.X. (2009), ‘Mei Xinyu: The order of iron ore import needs to be re-established’, DFdaily, 
16 July, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/review/20090716/08106487118.shtml 梅新育：铁矿石进口秩序
需要重建, 东方早报. 
Mi, L. (2015), ‘Former chairman of Wuhan Iron and Steel Deng Qilin under investigation The 
inspection team has arrived’, China Business News, 31 August, Viewed on 24 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/20150831/013223121083.shtml 武钢原董事长邓
崎琳被调查 缘起巡视组进驻, 第一财经日报. 
Miao, X.L. (2009), ‘Iron ore negotiation became white-hot Rio Tinto pressing hard and China 
sticking with the bottom-line’, DFdaily, 7 May, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/20090507/10446194602.shtml 铁矿石谈判进入
白热化力拓紧逼中方毫不松口, 东方早报. 
Miao, X.L., Li, Q. & Zhou, W.W. (2009), ‘China iron and Steel Association refutes the rumour that 
the 33% cut of iron ore price had been confirmed’, Shanghai Morning Post, 16 July, Viewed 
on 20 March 2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090716/07366486932.shtml
传铁矿石敲定 33%降幅中钢协称消息不属实, 新闻晨报. 
Miao, S. (2010), ‘Rio Tinto says China and India push up commodity prices, and expects a bull 
market in the next 15 years’, China Economic Net, 16 March, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20100316/12367573825.shtml 力拓称中印接力推高价格大




Michael, B., Macve, R. & Sunder, S. (2008), “The Conceptual Framework: Revisiting the Basics A 
comment on Hicks and the concept of ‘income’ in the conceptual framework”, in The British 
Accounting Association Financial Accounting and Reporting Special Interest Group 
Symposium on The Future of Financial Reporting 2008, London, 11 January 2008, Viewed 
on 22 March 2014, 
http://grammatikhilfe.com/accounting/facultyAndStaff/Conceptual%20framework-
Revisiting%20the%20Basics_mbrmv__Fri4Jan08_.pdf 
Ming, X. (2010), ‘Rio Tinto’s iron ore production goes up by 49% in the 4th quarter’, Sina 
Finance, 14 January, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/20100114/15437245293.shtml 力拓第四季度铁
矿石产量上升 49%, 新浪财经. 
Mining Weekly (2010a), ‘BHP won’t ink new iron-ore benchmark contracts’, 11 February. 
Mining Weekly (2010b), “Iron-ore benchmark system must ‘evolve’—Rio Tinto’s Albanese”, 1 
March. 
Minsky, H. (1975), John Maynard Keynes, Columbia University Press, New York. 
Minsky, H. (1982), The Financial Instability Hypothesis: Capitalist Processes and the Behavior of 
the Economy, in C. Kindleberger. & J. Laffargue. (eds.), Financial Crisis: Theory, History 
and Policy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Minsky, H. (1983), ‘Money and Crisis in Schumpeter and Keynes’, Working Papers, Economics 
Department, Washington University. 
Movshuk, O. (2004), ‘Restructuring, productivity and technical efficiency in China’s iron and steel 
industry, 1998-2000’, Journal of Asian Economics, vol.15, pp.135-151. 
Muller, J. (2014), ‘An accounting revolution? The financialisation of standard setting’, Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, vol. 25, pp.539-557. 
Mulvenon, J. (2009), “Chairman Hu and the PLA’s ‘New Historic Missions’”, China Leadership 
Monitor, vol.1542-4197, no.27, pp.1-11. 
Naughton, B. (2007), The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth, MIT Press, Cambridge. 
Neimark. M. (1990), ‘The King is Dead. Long Live the King!’, Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting, vol.1, no.1, pp.103-114. 
Neimark, M. (1994), ‘Regicide Revisited: Marx, Foucault and Accounting’, Critical Perspectives 
on Accounting, vol.5, pp.87-108. 
Neu, D. & Taylor, A. (1996), ‘Accounting and the politics of divestment’, Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting, vol.7, pp.437-469. 
NewBerry, S. & Robb, A. (2008), ‘Financialisation: Constructing shareholder value … for some’, 




Nolan, P. & Yeung, G. (2001), ‘Big Business with Chinese Characteristics: Two Paths to Growth 
of the Firm in China under Reform’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, vol.25, no.4, pp.443-
465. 
Nolke, A. & Perry, J. (2008), ‘The Power of Transnational Private Governance: Financialization 
and the IASB’, Business and Politics, vol. 9, no. 3. 
OECD, (2000), Reforming China’s enterprise, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, Paris. 
Ordelheide, D. (2004), ‘The Politics of Accounting: A Framework’, in C. Leuz, D. Pfaff. & A. 
Hopwood. (eds), The Economics and Politics of Accounting, International Perspectives on 
Trends, Policy, and Practice, Oxford University Press, New York, pp.267-284. 
Orhangazi, O. (2008), ‘Financialisation and capital accumulation in the non-financial corporate 
sector: A theoretical and empirical investigation on the US economy: 1973-2003’, Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, vol.32, pp.863-886. 
Owen, A.S. (2003), ‘Measuring large UK accounting firm profit margins, mergers and 
concentration’, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, vol.16, no.2, pp.275-297. 
Owen, A.S. (2010), The political economy of the accounting firm, PhD thesis, Warwick Business 
School, University of Warwick. 
Palmrose, Z.V. (2009), ‘Science, Politics, and Accounting’, The Accounting Review, vol.84, no.2, 
pp.281-297. 

Parker, L.D. (2005), ‘Social and environmental accountability research A view from the 
commentary box’, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, vol.18, no.6, pp.842-860. 
Pei, C.H. (2005), ‘Analysis of China’s Foreign Trade Growth and Discussion of Related Policies’, 
China & World Economy, vol.13, no.2, pp.26-38. 
Peng, X.Z. (1987), ‘Demographic Consequences of the Great Leap Forward in China’s Provinces’, 
Population and development review, vol.13, no.4, pp.639-670. 
Perry, J. & Nolke, A. (2006), ‘The political economy of International Accounting Standards’, 
Review of International Political Economy, vol.13, no.4, pp.550-586. 
Platts (2015a), The price of Iron Ore Index – IODEX, accessed 17 May 2015, 
http://www.platts.com/price-assessments/metals/iodex-iron-ore 
Platts (2015b), Methodology and Specification Guide—Iron Ore, accessed 17 May 2015, 
http://www.platts.com/IM.Platts.Content/MethodologyReferences/MethodologySpecs/ironore
.pdf 







Power, M. (2009), Financial accounting without a state, in C.S. Chapman, D.J. Cooper. & P.B. 
Miller (eds.), Accounting, organizations and institutions: Essays in honour of Anthony 
Hopwood, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, pp.324-340. 
Power, M. (2010), ‘Fair value accounting, financial economics and the transformation of 
reliability’, Accounting and Business Research, vol. 40, no. 3, pp.197-210. 
Rawski, T.G. (1976), ‘On the Reliability of Chinese Economic Data’, Journal of development 
studies, vol.12, no.4, pp.438-441. 
Ricardo, D. (1952), Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Rio Tinto (2013), Annual Report 2013, accessed 2 October 2014, 
http://www.riotinto.com/documents/RT_Annual_report_2013.pdf 
Robinson, J. (1961), ‘Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory’, Oxford Economic Papers, vol.13, 
no.1, pp.53-58. 
Robson, K. (1999), ‘Social Analysis of Accounting Institutions: Economic Value, Accounting 
Representations and the Conceptual Framework’, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 
vol.10, no.5, pp.643-670. 
Ross, M. & Feng, L. (1991), ‘The energy efficiency of the steel industry of China’, Energy, vol.16, 
no.5, pp.833-848. 
Rosser, A. (1999), ‘The Political Economy of Accounting Reform in Developing Countries: The 
Case of Indonesia’, Working Paper, no.93, Asian Research Centre, Murdoch University. 
Rossman, P. & Greenfield, G. (2007), ‘Financialization: New routes to profit, new challenges for 
trade unions’, Global Labour Institute and the International Union of Food, Agricultural, 
Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers’ Associations, Geneva. 
Ruan, Y.L. (2009a), ‘The 2009 global iron ore negotiations in the heat The level of price cut 
becomes the focus’, China News Service, 28 April, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090428/15366161150.shtml 2009年全球铁矿石
谈判博弈正酣降幅成争议焦点, 中国新闻网. 
Ruan, Y.L. (2009b), ‘Iron ore negotiation still going on China iron and steel Association: oppose 
artificial speculation’, China News Service, 31 July, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/yjsy/20090731/15346556123.shtml 铁矿石谈判仍在推
进中钢协：反对人为炒作, 中国新闻网. 
Ruan, Y.L. (2010), ‘CISA denounced the Big Three: to solve the issue of iron ore at the nation’s 
strategic level’, China News Service, 28 April, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100428/14067843990.shtml 中钢协痛斥 3 巨头:
从国家战略高度解决铁矿石问题, 中国新闻网. 
Samuelson, R.A. (1999), ‘Commentary on A Marxist Critique of the FASB’s Conceptual 




Schaberg, M. (1999), Globalization and the Erosion of National Financial Systems, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham. 
Securities Times (2009), ‘CISA said that this year’s iron ore negotiation strategy is to using 
quantity advantage to achieve a lower price’, Securities Times, 20 March, Viewed on 20 
March 2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20090320/02346000882.shtml 中钢协称
今年铁矿石谈判策略是以量换价, 证券时报. 
SEC (2003), Study Pursuant to Section 108 (d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the Adoption 
by the United States Financial Reporting System of a Principles-Based Accounting System, 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/principlesbasedstand.htm#1a 
SGIS Songshan Corporation Limited (2012), Half Year Report 2012, accessed 16/10/2012, 
http://www.sgss.com.cn/yjbg_2012zq.pdf 
Shanghai Morning Post (2009), ‘China and Australia’s FMG have reached the iron ore agreement 
price Using huge financing aid to exchange price cut’, Shanghai Morning Post, 18 August, 
Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090818/07346629723.shtml 中国与澳 FMG 敲
定铁矿石协议以巨额融资换降幅, 新闻晨报. 
Shanghai Securities News (2010), ‘Steel enterprises’ presidents: Iron ore negotiation is fairly 
difficult Calling for the increase in the concentration level of the industry’, Shanghai 
Securities News, 11 March, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100311/02227541054.shtml 钢企老总：铁矿石
谈判十分艰难呼吁提高集中度, 上海证券报. 
Shaw, M. (1972), ‘The Coming Crisis of Radical Sociology’, in R. Blackbum (ed), Ideology in 
Social Science, Fontana, Glasgow. 
Shougang Company Limited (2009), Annual Report 2009, accessed 30 September 2014, 
http://www.sggf.com.cn/asp-bin/news_images/519_1.DOC 
Shougang Concord International Company Limited (2010), Annual Report 2010, accessed 30 
September 2014, http://www.shougang-intl.com.hk/eng/ir/reports/ar2010.pdf 
Shougang Group (2014), Introduction of the Group, accessed 2 October 2014, 
http://www.shougang.com.cn/shougang_cn_web/gsjj/index.htm 
Sina Finance (2008), ‘CISA says that our country wants the iron ore price to drop to the 1994 
level’, Sina Finance, 9 December, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20081209/14025611152.shtml 中钢协表示我国希望
铁矿石价格降至 1994年水平, 新浪财经. 
Sina Finance (2008), ‘Foreign giants cut production China asks for the 80% cut in the iron ore 






Sina Finance (2010), ‘Merrill Lynch: the iron ore contract price will increase by 50% from 2010 to 
2011’, Sina Finance, 14 January, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100114/14287244736.shtml 美林：2010-11 年
铁矿石合同价格将上涨 50%, 新浪财经. 
Sina Finance (2010), ‘CISA: the 2010 annual iron ore price negotiation begins’, Sina Finance, 9 
February, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100209/14037394758.shtml 中钢协 2010 年度
铁矿石价格谈判已启动, 新浪财经. 
Sina Finance (2010), ‘Iron ore benchmark pricing approaching to an end Quarterly pricing ready to 
come’, Sina Finance, 22 March, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100322/23077610320.shtml 铁矿石基准价格终
结倒计时季度定价呼之欲出, 新浪财经. 
Sina Finance (2010), ‘Rio Tinto denied that it had reached any agreement with steel enterprises’, 
Sina Finance, 23 March, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20100323/13437615344.shtml 力拓否认已与钢铁企
业达成任何交易, 新浪财经. 
Sina Finance (2010a), ‘Rio Tinto prefers the quarterly pricing mechanism of iron ore’, Sina 
Finance, 24 March, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100324/15047624043.shtml 力拓称青睐铁矿石
季度定价, 新浪财经. 
Sina Finance (2010b), ‘Rio Tinto expects China’s steel production to double in 2020’, Sina 
Finance, 24 March, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100324/13057623254.shtml 力拓预计中国钢铁
产量 2020 年扩大一倍, 新浪财经. 
Sina Finance (2010), ‘BHP Billiton reached the short term iron ore supply contracts with many of 
its Asian clients’, Sina Finance, 30 March, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100330/07347657315.shtml 必和必拓与许多亚
洲客户达成更短期铁矿石合同, 新浪财经. 
Sina Finance (2010), ‘Korea’s Posco Steel announced to reach the initial agreement with Vale’, 






Sina Finance (2010), ‘Big Three overthrow the long term pricing mechanism Iron ore traders did 
not receive the ban on importing iron ore’, Sina Finance, 11 April, Viewed on 21 March 
2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20100411/23287728174.shtml 三大矿山颠覆长协铁矿
石贸易商未收到进口禁令, 新浪财经. 
Sina Finance (2010), “‘Seven years of iron ore negotiation Could not save even one cent’”, Sina 
Finance, 21 April, Viewed on 25 March, 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/sdbd/20100421/22417804701.shtml ‘铁矿石七年谈判 一分钱
也没谈下来’, 新浪财经. 
Sina Finance (2010), ‘Brazil’s Vale claimed to have reached agreement with all its iron ore clients’, 
Sina Finance, 8 May, Viewed on 25 March, 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/sdbd/20100421/22417804701.shtml 巴西淡水河谷称已与所有
铁矿石客户达成协议, 新浪财经. 
Sina Finance (2016), ‘Wuhan Iron and Steel Deng Qilin’s steel story: The domineering and 
superstitious chairman’, Sina Finance, 5 February, Viewed on 4 March 2016, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/2016-02-05/doc-ifxpfhzk8985287.shtml 武钢邓
崎琳的钢铁江湖: 霸道董事长笃信方术, 新浪财经. 
Smith, A. (1980), The Wealth of Nations, Penguin, London. 
Spence, C. (2007), ‘Social and environmental reporting and hegemonic discourse’, Accounting, 
Auditing and Accountability Journal, vol.20, no.6, pp.855-882. 
Sraffa, P. (1960), The Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities: Prelude to a Critique 
of Economic Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Stanway, D. (2012), ‘First Chinese physical iron ore trading platform’, Australia Paydirt, vol.1, 
no.191, accessed 15/10/2012, 
http://search.informit.com.au/fullText;dn=181977839512591;res=IELBUS 
State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2009), Iron & Steel Industry Adjustment and 
Revitalisation Plan, State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Beijing, accessed 22 
March 2014, http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2009-03/20/content_1264318.htm 钢铁产业调整和振兴规
划 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (2014), Main Functions and 
Responsibilities of SASAC, accessed 2 October 2014, 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2963340/n2963393/2965120.html 
Sterling, R.R. (1970), Theory of the Measurement of Enterprise Income, University of Kansas 
Press, USA. 
Stockhammer, E. (2004), ‘Financialisation and the slowdown of accumulation’, Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, vol.28, pp.719-741. 
Su, M. (2009), ‘BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto charter ships delivering iron ore to China and pushing 






Su, Y. (2011), ‘The Analysis of Financialization in Price Variation of Global Agriculture 
Commodity’, Issues in Agricultural Economy, vol.32, no.3778, pp.89-95. 
Sugimoto, T. (1993), ‘The Chinese steel industry’, Resources policy, vol.19, no.4, pp.264-286. 
Sukagawa, P. (2010), ‘Is iron ore priced as a commodity? Past and current practice’, Resources 
Policy, vol.35, pp.54-63. 
Sun, G.S. & Xiang, T. (2011), ‘The strategic motivation for long term contract and oligopolistic 
collusion: Explanation on iron ore benchmark price mechanism’, 2nd International 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Management Science and Electronic Commerce, 
Northeastern University, Shenyang, China, 8-10 Aug 2011 
Sun, J.L. (2009a), ‘Rio Tinto is evasive about the espionage case and still in the iron ore 
negotiation’, Securities Daily, 15 July, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/world/gjjj/20090715/00346479884.shtml 力拓对间谍门闪烁其词
称仍在进行铁矿石谈判, 证券日报. 
Sun, J.L. (2009b), “BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto’s plan to combine sales collapses Experts anticipate 
the iron ore price to increase by 20%”, Securities Daily, 16 October, Viewed on 22 March 
2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/hgjj/20091016/02456845387.shtml 两拓合并销售设
想告吹专家预测铁矿石价涨 20%, 证券日报. 
Suo, H.X. (2009a), ‘Steel enterprises report to the central government to cast doubt on the CISA’s 
strategy in iron ore negotiation’, China Business Journal, 22 August, Viewed on 21 March 
2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20090822/09086652039.shtml 钢企上书中央质疑中钢
协铁矿石谈判策略, 中国经营报. 
Suo, H.X. (2009b), ‘Vale refuses to negotiate CISA held the closed door meeting for 
countermeasures’, China Business Journal, 8 August, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20090808/11566590568.shtml 淡水河谷拒绝谈判中钢协闭
门密议对策, 中国经营报. 
Suo, H.X. (2010), ‘Pessimistic expectations of iron ore negotiation Industries on the lower stream 
have to bear the pressure of the rising prices’, China Business Journal, 20 March, Viewed on 
22 March 2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20100320/14427600759.shtml 铁矿石谈判预
期悲观下游产业无奈承接涨价压力, 中国经营报. 
Sweeny, H.W. (1964), Stabilised Accounting, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, New York.  
Tan, J.L. (2010), ‘Baosteel chairman Xu Lejiang: iron ore supply and demand relationship will be 






Tang, F. (2009), ‘BHP Billiton: the global steel demand will be doubled within the next 15 years’, 
Sina Finance, 16 September, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/future/20090916/20596758195.shtml 必和必拓：全球钢
铁需求 15 年内将翻一番, 新浪财经. 
Tang, K. & Xiong, W. (2012), ‘Index Investment and the Financialization of Commodities’, 
Financial Analysts Journal, vol.68, no.6, pp.54-74. 
Tang, Y.W. (2000), ‘Bumpy Road Leading to Internationalization: A Review of Accounting 
Development in China’, Accounting Horizons, vol.14, no.1, pp.93-102. 
Tang, Y. (2007), ‘Analysis on Financialization and its Effect on Economic Structural Reform’, 
Journal of Guangxi University of Finance and Economics, vol.20, no.4, pp.52-105. 
Tao, Y.Z. (2009), ‘CISA fought back by mining firms Everyone else has to pay for the iron ore 
negotiation’, China Times, 7 August, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090807/21316588427.shtml 中钢协强势遭矿山
反击全民被迫为矿石谈判买单, 华夏时报. 
Tencent Finance (2014), ‘Former secretary general of the CISA Shan Shanghua on probation’, 
Tencent Finance, 21 January, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.qq.com/a/20140121/018370.htm 原中钢协秘书长单尚华获缓刑, 腾讯财经. 
The Baltic Exchange (2015a), About Us, The Baltic Exchange, Viewed 8 May 2015, 
http://www.balticexchange.com/about-us/ 
The Baltic Exchange (2015b), What is an FFA?, The Baltic Exchange, Viewed 10 May 2015, 
http://www.balticexchange.com/ffa/what-is-an-ffa/ 
The Beijing News (2010), ‘BHP Billiton doubled the iron ore price for its Asian clients’, The 
Beijing News, 8 April, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20100408/01553275255.shtml 必和必拓供亚洲客户价格翻
番, 新京报. 
The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China (2004), Constitution of the 
People’s Republic of China, The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of 
China, Beijing, accessed 22 March 2014, 
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2004/content_62714.htm 中华人民共和国宪法 
The Economist (2012), ‘The lore of ore’, accessed 15/10/2012, 
http://www.economist.com/node/21564559 
Tie, D. (2009), ‘Iron ore negotiation: Two sides of one coin Who wins’, Securities Times, 4 July, 
Viewed on 22 2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/t/20090704/00506438547.shtml 铁矿石
谈判：一个硬币的两面谁输谁赢, 证券时报. 
Tinker, A.M. (1980), ‘Towards a political economy of accounting: an empirical illustration of the 




Tinker, A.M., Merino, B.D. & Neimark, M.D. (1982), ‘The normative origins of positive theories: 
ideology and accounting thought’, Accounting, Organisations and Society, vol.7, no.2, 
pp.167-200. 
Tinker, T. & Neimark, M. (1987), ‘The role of annual reports in gender and class contradictions at 
General Motors: 1917-1976’, Accounting, Organisations and Society, vol.12, no.1, pp.71-88. 
Tinker, T., Lehman, C. & Neimark, M (1991), ‘Falling down the Hole in the Middle of Road: 
Political Quietism in Corporate Social Reporting’, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability, 
vol.4, no.2, pp.28-54. 
Tinker, T. (1999), ‘Mickey Marxism rides again!’, Critical perspectives on Accounting, vol.10, 
no.5, pp.643-670. 
Tinker, T. & Carter, C. (2003), ‘Spectres of Accounting: Contradictions or Conflicts of 
Interest?’,Organization, vol.10, no.3, pp.577-582. 
Tinker, T. & Gray, R. (2003), ‘Beyond a critique of pure reason From policy to politics to praxis in 
environmental and social research’, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, vol.16, 
no.5, pp.727-761.  
Tobin, J. (1977), Asset Markets and the Cost of Capital, in B. Balassa. & R. Nelson. (eds.), 
Economic Progress, Private Values, and Public Policy: Essays in the Honor of William 
Fellner, North-Holland Publishing Co., pp.235-262. 
Toms, S. (2005), ‘Financial control, managerial control and accountability: evidence from the 
British Cotton Industry, 1700-2000’, Accounting, Organisations and Society, vol.30, pp.627-
653. 
Trench, J.G. (2004), ‘Role of the Chinese Steel Industry in the Economic Development of China 
and Australia’s Construction to the Industry as a Supplier of Raw Materials’, PhD thesis, 
Murdoch University. 
Tung, R.L. (1981), ‘Patterns of Motivation in Chinese Industrial Enterprises’, Academy of 
Management Review, vol.6, no.3, pp.481-489. 
UNCTAD (2011), Trust fund on iron ore information, iron ore market 2010-2012, United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, vol.1, pp.1-102.  
Vale (2010), ‘Vale explains prices for third quarter of 2010’, Press Release, 1 June 2010, Rio De 
Janeiro, Vale, S.A. 
Vale (2013), Annual Report 2013, accessed 30 September 2014, 
http://www.vale.com/EN/investors/Quarterly-results-reports/20F/20FDocs/20F_2013_i.pdf 
van Dijk, T.A. (2001), ‘Multidisciplinary CDA: a plea for diversity’, in R. Wodak. & M. 
Meyer.(eds.), Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, Sage, London, pp.95-120. 
van Treeck, T. (2009), “The political economy debate on ‘financialization’ – a macroeconomic 
perspective”, Review of International Political Economy, vol.16, no.5, pp.907-944. 
Wan, X.X. (2009a), ‘Iron ore negotiation mechanism collapses Mining companies promote index 






Wan, X.X. (2009b), ‘Secretary general of the CISA: Iron ore negotiation will last more than just 
half month’, The Economic Observer,, 19 June, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20090619/23176375034.shtml 中钢协秘书长：铁矿石谈判
并非只剩半个月, 经济观察网. 
Wan, X.X. (2010a), ‘Vale: has shifted from the current contract based pricing to the index based 
pricing’, The Economic Observer, 1 June, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20100601/18298040617.shtml 淡水河谷：已从现有合约体
系过渡指数价格体系, 经济观察网. 
Wan, X.X. (2010b), ‘BHP Billiton’s profit increases by 134% Continue to bet on the increasing 
iron ore demand in China’, The Economic Observer, 11 February, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/20100211/16087410077.shtml 必和必拓利润增
134% 继续唱多中国铁矿石需求, 经济观察网. 
Wang, F. (2010), ‘Foreign press said that the negotiation between China and the Big Three fell into 
a stalemate’, The Economic Observer, 22 April, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/world/qtdq/20100422/11287806072.shtml 外电称中国与铁矿石
三巨头谈判陷入僵局, 经济观察网. 
Wang, H.L. (2007), ‘China’s representative in the iron ore negotiation is still Baosteel’, DFdaily, 
14 July, Viewed on 25 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20070714/02303784926.shtml 铁矿石谈判中国代表
仍是宝钢, 东方早报. 
Wang, H.P. (1986), A History of Industrial Economy in China, Economic Management Press. 
Wang, J. (2009a), ‘Rio Tinto on several moves Psychological warfare in the iron ore negotiation 
intensifies again’, 21st Century Business Herald, 6 May, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090506/05566186885.shtml 力拓连续出牌铁矿
石谈判心理战再升级, 21世纪经济报道. 
Wang, J. (2009b), ‘Arbitrage games played by some large steel enterprises: selling the long term 
contract based iron ore to small and medium companies at higher prices’, 21st Century 
Business Herald, 16 July, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20090716/00222951644.shtml 部分大钢企套利游戏：低价
长协矿高价给中小企, 21世纪经济报道. 
Wang, J. (2009c), ‘Big Three selling in private to pose pressure on the iron ore negotiation CISA 






Wang, J. (2009d), ‘Psychological war rises again in the iron ore negotiation Foreign press said the 
price to be increased by 5%’, 21st Century Business Herald, 26 February, Viewed on 22 
March 2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20090226/02035902068.shtml 铁矿石谈
判心理战又起：外媒传出加价 5%, 21世纪经济报道. 
Wang, J. (2009e), ‘New mechanism for iron ore negotiation under doubt International mining 
companies refuse to compromise’, 21st Century Business Herald, 28 October, Viewed on 22 
March 2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20091028/00176890438.shtml 铁矿
石谈判新模式遭质疑国际矿商拒不让步, 21世纪经济报道. 
Wang, J. (2009f), ‘CISA responded to the change in iron ore negotiation: the representative has 
always been Baosteel’, 21st Century Business Herald, 15 August, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090815/02146620644.shtml 中钢协回应铁矿石
谈判变更：代表一直是宝钢, 21世纪经济报道.  
Wang, J. (2009g), ‘BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto speed up the acquisition of Australia’s small mining 
firms to prevent the investment from China’, 21st Century Business Herald, 25 November, 
Viewed on 22 March 2014, http://money.163.com/09/1125/01/5OU7N353002524SO.html 两
拓加速收编澳洲小矿企防止被中国买走, 21世纪经济报道. 
Wang, J. (2010a), ‘Vale: Iron ore benchmark price will approximate to the spot market price’, 21st 
Century Business Herald, 17 March, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100317/02547577773.shtml 淡水河谷扬言：铁
矿石基准价将比肩现货市场, 21世纪经济报道. 
Wang, J. (2010b), ‘The hidden chain of interest behind the prediction of iron ore price’, 21st 
Century Business Herald, 20 January, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/sdbd/20100120/00057272289.shtml 铁矿石价格预测风
潮中的隐秘利益链条, 21世纪经济报道. 
Wang, J. (2010c), ‘CCCMMC: Traders did not disturb the market and should participate in the iron 
ore negotiation’, 21st Century Business Herald, 9 April, Viewed on 22 March, 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100409/03027715256.shtml 五矿商会：贸易商
未扰乱市场应参与铁矿石谈判, 21世纪经济报道. 
Wang, J. & Xu, Y. (2010), ‘Iron ore short term agreement not yet finalised Quarterly price already 






Wang, J. & Qin, Y.B. (2009), ‘CISA blamed for being lack of motivation in the iron ore 
negotiation’, 21st Century Business Herald, 17 July, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/sdbd/20090717/02526491618.shtml 中钢协被指缺乏铁
矿石谈判动力, 21世纪经济报道. 
Wang, W. & Zhang, S. (2010), ‘CISA admitted for the first time that iron ore supply is less than the 
demand’, Shanghai Morning Post, 11 May, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100511/07297911098.shtml 中钢协首次承认铁
矿石供不应求, 新闻晨报. 
Wang, Y.J. (2008), ‘BHP Billiton gave up the acquisition of Rio Tinto Iron ore pricing power 
changed’, China Economic Times, 27 November, Viewed 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20081127/03415562268.shtml 必和必拓放弃收购力
拓致铁矿石定价权生变, 中国经济时报. 
Wang, Z.K. (2009), ‘BHP Billiton: reached the new agreement of the iron ore price with some 
clients’, Shanghai Securities News, 30 July, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/t/20090730/02436546309.shtml 必和必拓：和部分客户达
成铁矿石新价格协议, 上海证券报. 
Wang, H.Y., Pei, Y.F. & Liu, J. (2010), “The nature and potential risks of the ‘Financialisation of 
iron ore’”, Futures Daily, 9 August, Viewed on 25 March 2014, 
http://futures.jrj.com.cn/2010/08/0906597896031.shtml ‘铁矿石金融化’的本质及潜在风险,
期货日报. 
Wang, W.Y., Teng, W.R. & Liu, P. (2014), ‘A Study on How Strengthening of Financial Attribute 
of the Imported Iron Ore and China’s Counter-measures’, Academic Research, no.3, pp.70-
75.  
Weber, M. (1964), The theory of social and economic organization, Collier-Macmillan, London. 
Willmott, H. & Sikka, P. (1997), ‘On the commercialization of accountancy thesis: a review essay’, 
Accounting, Organisations and Society, vol.22, no.8, pp.831-842. 
Wilson, J.D. (2011), ‘Resource nationalism or resource liberalism? Explaining Australia’s 
approach to Chinese investment in its minerals sector’, Australian Journal of International 
affairs, vol.65, no.3, pp.283-304. 
Wilson, J.D. (2012), ‘Chinese resource security policies and the restructuring of the Asia-Pacific 
iron ore market’, Resources Policy, vol.37, pp.331-339. 
World Bank (1997), ‘China’s management of enterprise assets: The state is shareholder’, Report 
no.16265-CHA, The World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Woodward, D. & Woodward, T. (2000), ‘The case for a political economy of accounting: a critique 





Wuhan Iron and Steel Company Limited (2009), Annual Report 2009, accessed 30 September 
2014, http://www.wisco.com.cn/wisco/5/38/list_1.shtml 
Wuhan Iron and Steel Company Limited (2012), Interim Report Summary 2012, accessed 
15/10/2012, 
http://www.wisco.com.cn/wiscoapp/attached/file/2012/08/31/20120831085450_9300.pdf 
Wuhan Iron and Steel Company Limited (2013), Annual Report 2013, accessed 30 September 
2014, http://www.wisco.com.cn/wisco/5/38/list_1.shtml 
Wuhan Iron and Steel Group Corporation (2014), Introduction to WISCO, accessed 2 October 
2014, http://www.wisco.com.cn/wisco_en/Intruction.shtml 
Xia, Z.H. (2009), ‘CISA: Iron ore price plunge has become a consensus, National Business Daily, 
29 April, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20090429/04246163022.shtml 中钢协：铁矿石大降价已成
共识, 每日经济新闻. 
Xiao, J.Z.H., Weetman, P. & Sun, M.L. (2004), ‘Political influence and coexistence of a Uniform 
Accounting System and Accounting Standards: Recent Developments in China’, ABACUS, 
vol.40, no.2, pp.193-218. 
Xiao, D. (2009), ‘Remote possibility of the Big Three conceding Limited impact of FMG’, The 
Economic Observer, 19 August, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090819/09086636015.shtml 铁矿石三巨头让步
可能性小 FMG 影响有限, 经济观察网. 
Xiao, J. (2008), ‘CISA says that our country wants the iron ore price to drop to the 1994 level’, 
Sina Finance, 9 December, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20081209/14025611152.shtml中钢协表示我国希望铁
矿石价格降至 1994年水平, 新浪财经. 
Xiao, M., Wu, H.X. & Zhu, P.C. (2012), ‘Feasible paths of pricing iron ore import under the 
financialisation of the commodity prices’, China Management Informationization, vol.15, 
no.5, pp.33-35. 大宗商品定价金融化背景下进口铁矿石定价的可能路径, 中国管理信息
化. 
Xie, L.B. (2012), ‘A brief analysis on the price determinants of iron ore in the context of 
financialisation’, Market Modernization, no.691, p.15. 浅析铁矿石定价金融化背景下的价
格影响因素, 商场现代化. 
Xinhuanet (2009), ‘CISA: Must establish the Chinese system for the price negotiation of iron ore 






Xinhuanet (2009), ‘Rio Tinto refutes the representativeness of FMG China’s mission remains 
difficult’, Xinhuanet, 18 August, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090818/07256629703.shtml 力拓否认 FMG 样
本意义中方博弈之路依然艰难, 新华网. 
Xinhuanet (2010), ‘Foreign iron ore suppliers kill the hen for eggs Steel enterprises have no options 
left’, Xinhuanet, 18 March, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100318/02007584563.shtml 国外铁矿石生产商
杀鸡取卵钢企被逼无路可退, 新华网. 
Xinkuaibao (2008), ‘Foreign giants cut production one after another China asks for the 80% cut in 
iron ore price’, Xinkuaibao, 10 December, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20081210/07265614985.shtml 国外巨头纷纷减产中
国要求铁矿石降价八成, 新快报. 
Xing, Y. (2009), ‘Rio Tinto selling iron ore to Asian steel plants with the temporary 20% price cut’, 
Sina Finance, 7 April, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/world/gjjj/20090407/14386071690.shtml 力拓向亚洲钢厂出售铁
矿石暂时降价 20%, 新浪财经. 
Xiong, A.Z. (2012), ‘How are the intentional commodities priced?’, China Financial and 
Economic News, 11 Oct, accessed 15/10/2012, http://futures.hexun.com/2012-10-
11/146636711.html 国际大宗商品是如何定价的, 中国财经报网. 
Xu, K.X. (2010), ‘Ministry of Industry and Information strongly supports the long term negotiation 
based pricing mechanism of iron ore’, China Business News, 24 March, Viewed on 20 March 
2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20100324/01227618895.shtml 工信部力挺铁矿石长协
定价机制, 第一财经日报. 
Xu, Y. (2009), ‘Negotiation not concluded on the last day CISA will be in overtime’, Sina Finance, 
30 June, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20090630/21256421142.shtml 最后一天未签协议中钢协要
打加时赛, 新浪财经. 
Xu, Y.L. (2008), ‘CISA orders steel plants to boycott BHP Billiton’s index pricing’, Shanghai 
Securities News, 25 December, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20081225/06295682684.shtml 中钢协强令钢厂抵制
必和必拓指数定价, 上海证券报. 
Xu, Y.L. (2009a), ‘2009 iron ore negotiation in progress: Supply over demand has become a 






Xu, Y.L. (2009b), ‘CISA: wants to establish the Chines price of iron ore’, Shanghai Securities 
News, 14 October, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20091014/02316834879.shtml 中钢协：希望制定
铁矿石中国价格, 上海证券报. 
Xu, Y.L. (2009c), ‘CISA said iron ore negotiation is still in process’, Shanghai Securities News, 31 
July, Viewed on 21 March, http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/t/20090731/02596552389.shtml 
中钢协称铁矿石谈判仍在继续中, 上海证券报. 
Xu, Y.L. (2009d), ‘Negotiation still in process Steel enterprises temporarily use the 33% discount 
price to purchase iron ore’, Shanghai Securities News, 16 July, Viewed on 21 March, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090716/03066486062.shtml 谈判仍在进行钢企
暂以长协价 6.7折采购铁矿, 上海证券报. 
Xu, Y.L. (2009e), ‘Brazil’s Vale has no intention to negotiate with China for the price cut of iron 
ore’, Shanghai Securities News, 27 August, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20090827/01536669241.shtml 巴西淡水河谷无意就
铁矿石降价与中方谈判, 上海证券报. 
Xu, Y.L. (2009f), ‘The predicament of the iron ore negotiation: Hundreds of Tieben blowing 
bubbles in the steel market’, Shanghai Securities News, 30 July, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090730/02476546380.shtml 铁矿石谈判之殇：
上百铁本吹大钢铁泡沫, 上海证券报. 
Xu, Y.L. (2009g), ‘CISA: Rizhao Iron Ore Trading Centre must change its name and restructure’, 
Shanghai Securities News, 27 June, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20090627/02136407504.shtml 中钢协：日照铁矿石交易中
心必须更名并整改, 上海证券报. 
Xu, Y.L. (2009h), ‘Luo Bingsheng suggested to stop iron ore spot market transactions’, Shanghai 
Securities News, 29 July, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/t/20090729/03336540750.shtml 罗冰生建议取消铁矿石现
货贸易, 上海证券报. 
Xu, Y.L. (2009i), ‘CISA: Iron ore negotiation will be in overtime’, Shanghai Securities News, 30 
June, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090630/01336415639.shtml 中钢协：铁矿石谈
判将进入加时赛, 上海证券报. 
Xu, Y.L. (2009j), ‘CISA: Iron ore import market needs to be reorganised and regulated’, Shanghai 






Xue, T. (2010a), ‘Ministry of Commerce said to assist the iron ore negotiation via the means of 
trade’, Sina Finance, 16 March, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20100316/11077573083.shtml 商务部称可为铁矿石
谈判提供贸易手段支持, 新浪财经. 
Xue, T. (2010b), ‘Ministry of Industry and Information continued to pay attention to China’s 
participation in the iron ore negotiation’, Sina Finance, 18 March, Viewed on 20 March 
2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100318/22127591348.shtml 工信部称将
对中国铁矿石谈判保持关注, 新浪财经. 
Xue, T. (2010c), ‘Ministry of Commerce said to undertake the anti-monopoly investigation on the 
Big Three’, Sina Finance, 15 April, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/hgjj/20100415/11337756364.shtml 商务部称将研究对三大
矿山进行反垄断调查, 新浪财经. 
Yan, H.Y. (2009), ‘Experts said regulating and reorganising iron ore traders is same as putting the 
cart before the horse’, China Business Journal, 23 November, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://www.clic.org.cn/gtfc/33228.jhtml 专家称整顿铁矿石贸易商是本末倒置, 中国经营
报. 
Yang, L. (2007), ‘The relationship between FFA market and spot market’, Maritime China, no.3, 
pp.48-49. 
Yang, L.M. (2009), ‘Brazil’s Vale expected the iron ore price to increase by more than 10% next 
year’, Xinhuanet, 15 December, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/20091215/10587105441.shtml 巴西淡水河谷预
计铁矿石价格明年涨幅将超 10%, 新华网. 
Yang, L.M. (2010a), ‘Brazil’s Vale will adopt the new iron ore pricing policy’, Xinhuanet, 24 
March, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/20100324/10557622664.shtml 巴西淡水河谷公
司将实行新的铁矿石价格政策, 新华网. 
Yang, L.M. (2010b), ‘Vale’s CEO said to launch the iron ore quarterly pricing mechanism this 
year’, Xinhuanet, 30 March, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/yjsy/20100330/13067660259.shtml 淡水河谷总裁称今
年推出铁矿石季度定价机制, 新华网. 
Yang, Y. (2009a), ‘China’s import exceeds the demand BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto’s 3rd quarterly 






Yang, Y. (2009b), ‘War outside the next year’s iron ore negotiation starts Rio Tinto implied a 30% 
price increase’, Economic Information Daily, 10 November, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20091110/06526943843.shtml 明年铁矿石谈判外
围战开打力拓暗示涨价 30%, 经济参考报. 
Yang, Y. (2010), ‘The iron ore quarterly pricing mechanism has become certain Steel plants trade 
swaps for trial to save costs’, Economic Information Daily, 14 May, Viewed on 22 March 
2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20100514/00477932508.shtml 铁矿石季度定价成定局
钢厂为自救试水掉期, 经济参考报. 
Yang, Z. & Chen, S. (2011), ‘The reasons and countermeasures of lacking discourse power of 
China in international iron ore price negotiations’, Paper presented to 2011 International 
Conference on Management and Service Science, Wuhan, 12-14 Aug, 2011. 
Yangcheng Evening News (2009), ‘Ministry of Industry and Information: Insufficient discourse 
power in the international trade of iron ore’, Yangcheng Evening News, 14 August, Viewed 
on 21 March 2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/dfjj/20090814/14396618687.shtml 工信
部：铁矿石国际贸易中的话语权不够, 羊城晚报. 
Yao, D. (2008), ‘Large and medium steel enterprises showed a nearly 1.2 billion RMB loss in the 
first 9 months’, The Beijing News, 31 October, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20081031/02572491192.shtml 前 9 月大中型钢铁企业亏损
近 12亿, 新京报. 
Yao, S.J. & Sutherland, D. (2009), ‘Chinalco and Rio Tinto: A Long March for China’s National 
Champions’, The China Quarterly, vol.199, pp.829-836. 
Yao, S.J., Sutherland, D. & Chen, J. (2010), ‘China’s Outward FDI and Resource-Seeking 
Strategy: A Case Study on Chinalco and Rio Tinto’, Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & 
Economics, vol.17, pp.313-326.  
Ye, Y. & Qin, F.F. (2010), ‘Vale’s senior management indifferent to criticisms from the Chinese 
industry’, Shanghai Securities News, 31 March, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100331/03577664195.shtml 淡水河谷高管漠然
面对中国业界指责, 上海证券报. 
Yellishetty, M., Ranjith, P.G. & Tharumarajah, A. (2010), ‘Iron ore and steel production trends and 
material flows in the world: Is this really sustainable?’, Resources, Conservation and 
Recycling, vol.54, pp.1084-1094. 
Yu, L. (2009a), ‘CISA: Limited room for iron ore price increase’, Sina Finance, 3 November, 
Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20091103/10216916423.shtml 中钢协：铁矿石进
一步涨价的空间很小, 新浪财经. 
Yu, L. (2009b), ‘Vale decided to increase the iron ore price next year Baosteel disagreed’, Sina 






Yu, L. (2010a), ‘Steel enterprises suggest to establish a national mining corporation unifying the 
import of iron ore’, Sina Finance, 1 March, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20100301/00447472898.shtml 钢企建言成立国家矿业公司统
一进口铁矿石, 新浪财经. 
Yu, L. (2010b), ‘A sudden turn in the iron ore negotiation Large steel enterprises seek assistance 
from the higher level of the government’, Sina Finance, 15 March, Viewed on 20 March 
2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100315/01017562609.shtml 铁矿石谈判
形势急转直下大钢企寻求更高层支持, 新浪财经. 
Yu, L. (2010c), ‘CISA supported European Steel Association’s argument against the 80-90% price 
increase proposed by mining companies’, Sina Finance, 16 March, Viewed on 20 March 
2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100316/17437575848.shtml 中钢协声援
欧钢联反对铁矿商提价 80-90%, 新浪财经. 
Yu, L. (2010d), ‘Big Three overthrew the long term pricing mechanism Trading companies haven’t 
received the ban on purchase’, Sina Finance, 11 April, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20100411/23287728174.shtml 三大矿山颠覆长协铁矿石贸
易商未收到进口禁令, 新浪财经. 
Yu, L. (2010e), ‘CISA acquiesced that steel enterprises import iron ore at the temporary price’, 
Sina Finance, 28 April, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20100428/12557843529.shtml 中钢协默许钢企进口
铁矿石临时价格, 新浪财经. 
Yu, L. (2010f), ‘Former deputy minister of the MMI chastised the Big Three’s monopoly over 
China’, Sina Finance, 9 February, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/yjsy/20100209/13177394415.shtml 原冶金部副部长炮
轰三大矿山借垄断欺压中国, 新浪财经. 
Yu, L. (2010g), ‘BHP Billiton plans to use coking coal as the breakthrough point to overthrow the 
annual pricing mechanism’, Sina Finance, 26 February, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/20100226/09317463084.shtml 必和必拓拟以焦
煤做突破点推翻年度价格机制, 新浪财经. 
Yu, L. (2010h), ‘A sudden turn in the iron ore negotiation Large steel enterprises seek assistance 






Yu, L. (2010i), ‘CISA suggests government to punish those iron ore importing firms involved in 
speculations’, Sina Finance, 5 February, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100205/12437376080.shtml 中钢协建议政府处
罚炒作进口铁矿石企业, 新浪财经. 
Yu, X. (2009), ‘CISA sticks with the 40% price cut bottom line Iron ore negotiation will be a 
protracted war’, Securities Daily, 6 June, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090606/03576313022.shtml 中钢协坚守 40%降
幅底线铁矿石谈判将打持久战, 证券日报. 
Yu, G.Y. & Zhu, Y.Q. (2009), ‘Literature Review of the Research on Forward Freight Agreements 
(FFA)’, China Market, no.15, pp.99-111. 
Yuan, H. (2013), ‘China Steelmakers Challenge Platts Iron Ore Pricing: Commodities’, Bloomberg 
News, 28 May, viewed 13 October, <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-05-28/china-
steelmakers-challenge-platts-iron-ore-pricing-commodities> 
 
Yuan, X.L. (2009a), ‘Iron ore negotiation struggling with the Chinese haggle Price may be 
increased by more than 10% in 2010’, China Times, 25 December, Viewed on 20 March 
2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20091225/22397157367.shtml 铁矿石谈判纠结中国式
杀价 2010年涨幅或超 10%’, 华夏时报. 
Yuan, X.L. (2009b), ‘CISA changed attitude in 3 days Iron ore negotiation shows the turning 
point’, China Times, 19 June, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20090619/23016374979.shtml 中钢协 3 天内态度生变铁矿
石谈判现转机, 华夏时报. 
Yuan, X.L. (2010a), ‘CISA provoked by spot market transactions Calling importers for a boycott 
against the Big Three’, China Times, 2 April, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100402/21417686551.shtml 中钢协被现货惹怒
首次号召进口商抵制三大矿山, 华夏时报. 
Yuan, X.L. (2010b), ‘Steel enterprises discuss in private Iron ore price raise expected to be no more 
than 40%’, China Times, 5 February, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100205/23097378692.shtml 钢企密商铁矿石谈
判预计价格涨幅不超过 40%, 华夏时报. 
Yue, W. (2009), ‘淡水河谷首次认同现货指数压力抛给中钢协’, National Business Daily, 4 
August, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090804/03036565921.shtml , 每日经济新闻. 
Yue, W. & Zhou, X.F. (2009), ‘CISA discussed the unification of the iron ore import price for the 






Yue, W., Zhou, X.F. & Zhang, C. (2009), ‘Breakthrough in iron ore negotiation provokes Big 
Three’, National Business Daily, 18 August, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20090818/03053016352.shtml 铁矿石谈判获突破刺激三大巨
头, 每日经济新闻. 
Zhai, R.M. (2009), ‘Iron ore negotiation will end soon CISA and Big Three in an embarrassing 
stalemate’, The Time Weekly, 25 June, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090625/06236396469.shtml 铁矿石谈判即将结
束中钢协与三大巨头尴尬胶着, 时代周报. 
Zhang, C. (2009a), ‘10% of the long term contract based iron ore resold Intermediaries’ revenue 
exceeds 20 billion RMB’, National Business Daily, 1 July, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/20090701/02596422075.shtml 10%铁矿石长协
矿被转卖中间商去年收入超 200亿, 每日经济新闻. 
Zhang, C. (2009b), ‘Big Three implying an increase in the iron ore price Chinese price faces 
challenges again’, National Business Daily, 16 October, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/future/fmnews/20091016/07556846719.shtml 三巨头暗示
涨价铁矿石中国价格再遇挑战, 每日经济新闻. 
Zhang, C. (2009c), “Vale plans to establish the distribution centre in China to form a ‘virtual 
mine’”, National Business Daily, 26 November, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://money.163.com/09/1126/04/5P15UHMQ002524SO.html 淡水河谷在华建分销中心
形成‘虚拟矿山’, 每日经济新闻. 
Zhang, C. (2009d), ‘BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto do not accept the Chinese price The long term 
based price reached by Japan and Korea becomes the mainstream’, National Business Daily, 
2 September, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20090902/02526693939.shtml 两拓称未接受中国价格日韩长
协价成主流, 每日经济新闻. 
Zhang, G.D. (2010), ‘Vale launches the index price Doubling China’s bottomline’, National 
Business Daily, 25 March, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20100325/04457628026.shtml 淡水河谷推指数定价要价翻
番超中方底线, 每日经济新闻. 
Zhang, H.Y. (2009a), ‘Iron ore negotiation still in process China may reassess the qualification 
criteria of importing iron ore’, Webstock Information, 15 July, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/future/20090715/08056481650.shtml 铁矿石谈判仍在进
行中国或重审铁矿石进口资质, 文华财经. 
Zhang, H.Y. (2009b), ‘Iron ore spot price is 10 USD/tonne higher than the long term contract 





长协 10 美元/吨, 文华财经. 
Zhang, J. & Yang, Y.Z. (2006), ‘Application of FFA in shipping market risk management’, World 
Shipping, vol.29, no.5, pp.36-37. 
Zhang, Q. (2009), ‘The hidden war behind the 2010 iron ore negotiation escalates Conflict between 
China and foreign mining giants intensifies’, China Daily, 16 October, Viewed on 22 March 
2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20091016/23546849909.shtml 2010 年铁矿
石谈判暗战升级中外矿业巨头冲突加剧, 中国日报. 
Zhang, S., Xue, X., Liu, X., Duan, P., Tang, H., Jiang, T., Wang, D. & Liu, R. (2006), ‘Current 
situation and comprehensive utilisation of iron ore tailing resources’, Journal of Mining 
Science, vol.42, no.4, pp.403-408. 
Zhang, X.D. (2009a), ‘Under the Rio Tinto case: Iron ore negotiation stays in the stalemate Steel 
enterprises still resell iron ore’, The Economic Observer, 24 July, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20090724/22486527015.shtml 力拓案之下：铁矿石谈判僵
持钢企倒矿依旧, 经济观察报. 
Zhang, X.D. (2009b), ‘Condition for iron ore price cut: FMG announced China will help its six 
billion USD financing’, The Economic Observer, 17 August, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/20090817/20586627656.shtml 铁矿石降幅有条
件: FMG称中方需为其融资 60亿美元, 经济观察报. 
Zhang, X.D. (2009c), ‘Unifying the price of iron ore import in the nation CISA announced that 
whoever speculates will be disqualified’, The Economic Observer, 31 July, Viewed on 21 
March 2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20090731/22206557557.shtml 进口铁矿价全国
统一中钢协称谁投机准出局, 经济观察报. 
Zhang, X.D. (2009d), ‘Shan Shanghua responded to FMG’s discontinued contract: Three principles 
in the iron ore negotiation’, The Economic Observer, 21 October, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20091021/17396866427.shtml 单尚华回应 FMG
不续约铁矿石谈判三原则, 经济观察报. 
Zhang, X.D. (2009e), ‘The 2010 iron ore negotiation starts in October’, The Economic Observer, 
11 September, Viewed on 25 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20090911/23496739676.shtml  2010 铁矿石谈判十月启动, 
经济观察报. 
Zhang, X.D. (2010a), ‘CISA proposed to decrease the tax rate for domestic mining enterprises to 
increase the level of self-sufficiency’, The Economic Observer, 28 April, Viewed on 21 





Zhang, X.D. (2010b), ‘CISA undertaking the anti-monopoly investigation of the joint venture by 
BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto’, The Economic Observer, 28 April, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100428/16537845396.shtml 中钢协正在参与对
两拓合资的反垄断调研, 经济观察报. 
Zhang, X.M. (2009), ‘Sources from the CISA indicated the limited room for the price rise of iron 
ore price next year’, Wenhuibao, 4 November, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20091104/06486920091.shtml 中钢协有关人士称
明年铁矿石提价空间很小, 文汇报. 
Zhang, Y., Andrew, J. & Rudkin, K. (2012), ‘Accounting as an instrument of neoliberalisation? 
Exploring the adopting of fair value accounting in China’, Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability, vol.25, no.8, pp.1-29. 
Zhang, Y. & Andrew, J. (2014), ‘Financialisation and the Conceptual Framework’, Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, vol. 25, pp.17-26. 
Zhang, Yan. (2009), ‘Iron ore import increases by 29.3% in the first half of the year’, Beijing 
Times, 22 August, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20090822/01553026230.shtml 上半年铁矿砂进口同比增长
29.3%, 京华时报. 
Zhang, Yi. (2009a), ‘Iron ore import may use the quarterly pricing mechanism’, The Beijing News, 
21 July, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090721/02066505508.shtml 铁矿石进口或酝酿
按季定价, 新京报. 
Zhang, Yi. (2009b), ‘Iron ore import price set to decrease by 35%’, The Beijing News, 18 August, 
Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090818/02136628173.shtml 铁矿石进口价敲定
降 35%, 新京报. 
Zhang, Yi. (2009c), ‘Iron ore price negotiation breaks the deadlock Chinese steel enterprises save 
40 million USD’, Beijing Times, 18 August, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20090818/03243016456.shtml 铁矿石价格谈判打破僵局中
钢企节省 4000万美元, 京华时报. 
Zhang, Yi. (2009d), ‘A new protracted war starts in the iron ore negotiation’, The Beijing News, 2 
March, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20090302/07385916645.shtml 铁矿石谈判拉开新一
场持久拉锯战, 新京报. 
Zhang, Yi. (2009e), ‘Rio Tinto reached the 33% iron ore price cut agreement with Korea and 






Zhang, Yi. (2009f), ‘Iron ore negotiation Small and medium enterprises changed side and reached 
agreements with Vale’, The Beijing News, 10 June, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090610/06526327518.shtml 铁矿石谈判中小钢
企倒戈与淡水河谷达成协议, 新京报. 
Zhang, Yi. (2009g), ‘CISA strictly regulates the spot market bidding between steel enterprises, 
BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto’, The Beijing News, 20 June, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20090620/01522905313.shtml 中钢协严控钢企参与两拓铁
矿石现货招标, 京华时报. 
Zhang, Yi. (2010a), ‘Iron ore negotiation Big Three considers short term pricing’, The Beijing 
News, 22 January, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20100122/02497289206.shtml 铁矿石谈判三巨头考虑短期
议价, 新京报. 
Zhang, Yi. (2010b), ‘淡水河谷下月推铁矿石按季定价取代长协定价机制’, The Beijing News, 25 
March, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100325/02297627233.shtml 淡水河谷下月推铁
矿石按季定价取代长协定价机制, 新京报. 
Zhang, Yi. (2010c), ‘CISA chairman Deng Qilin: No good news from the iron ore negotiation’, The 
Beijing News, 8 March, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/yjsy/20100308/07397518391.shtml 中钢协会长邓崎琳
：铁矿石谈判没有好消息, 新京报. 
Zhang, Yi. (2010d), ‘Steel enterprises increase production not revenue CISA commented their last 
year 30% decrease in profit as unreasonable’, The Beijing News, 5 February, Viewed on 22 
March 2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100205/02007371746.shtml 钢企
增产不增收去年利润降三成中钢协称不合理, 新京报. 
Zhang, Z. & Wang, H. (2009), ‘Financialization of Commodities and Cyclical Dynamics in 
Chinese Economy’, Paper presented to The Seventh HKIMR Conference on the Mainland 
Economy: “Macroeconomic Statistics and Surveillance in Mainland China”, Hong Kong 
Institute for Monetary Research, 16-17 Nov, 2009. 
Zhao, L. (2012), ‘On the Financialization Trend of China’s Artistic Works—In Reference to the 
Art Trust and Investment Fund’, Shantou University Journal (Humanities & Social Sciences 
Bimonthly), vol.28, no.1, pp.39-43. 
Zheng, X.Y. & Huang, H.M. (2011), ‘The Game Analysis of the Reasons for Chinese Defeat in 





Zhou, B. (2009), ‘The collapse of the long term iron ore pricing mechanism is expected’, 21st 
Century Business Herald, 30 June, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/review/20090630/01366415741.shtml 铁矿石长协机制瓦解是正
常的, 21世纪经济报道. 
Zhou, R.X. (2009a), ‘Li Yizhong: The disorderly import of iron ore seriously damaged national 
interests’, Securities Times, 14 August, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20090814/07176616015.shtml 李毅中：铁矿石无序进口严重
损害国家利益, 证券时报. 
Zhou, R.X. (2009b), ‘Li Yizhong: Little improvement in the disorderly import market of iron ore’, 
Securities Times, 13 October, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/t/20091013/07486830328.shtml 李毅中：铁矿石进口无序
状况未见改善, 证券时报. 
Zhou, X.F. & Zhang, M. (2009), ‘Big Three absent from the warm up meeting of the iron ore 
negotiation’, National Business Daily, 15 October, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20091015/01436840128.shtml 三大矿山缺席铁矿
石谈判热身会, 每日经济新闻. 
Zhou, X.F. (2010a), ‘Iron ore spot price decreased after keeping increasing for the last three 
month’, National Business Daily, 21 January, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100121/04347281929.shtml 连涨 3 月后铁矿石
现货价首度下跌, 每日经济新闻. 
Zhou, X.F. (2010b), ‘CISA: Big Three’s monopoly doubles the iron ore price in advance’, National 
Business Daily, 21 May, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100521/03177976864.shtml 中钢协：三矿山垄
断致矿价超前翻番, 每日经济新闻. 
Zhou, X.Y. (2010), ‘Rio Tinto asks to reform the long term pricing mechanism of iron ore’, 21st 
Century Business Herald, 26 March, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://news.hexun.com.tw/2010-03-27/123128549.html 力拓要求改革铁矿石长协定价体系
, 21世纪经济报道. 
Zhou, Y. (2009a), ‘CISA: China will not concede in the iron ore price negotiation’, Securities 
Times, 21 May, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090521/06516254061.shtml 中钢协：铁矿石价
格谈判中方不会让步, 证券时报. 
Zhou, Y. (2009b), ‘Big Three push up shipping cost to create favourable conditions for the iron ore 
negotiation Chinese steel enterprises being restricted’, 21st Century Business Herald, 29 






Zhou, Y. (2009c), ‘Steel and iron industry shows production overcapacity Authorities say that iron 
ore negotiation is still in process’, Securities Times, 23 July, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090723/08416518157.shtml 钢铁行业现产能过
剩官方称铁矿石谈判还在进行, 证券时报. 
Zhou, Y. (2010), ‘谈判成最后通牒结局对双方都不利’, Securities Times, 16 April, Viewed on 21 
March 2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100416/05487762135.shtml , 证券
时报. 
Zhu, K.Y. (2015), ‘Iron ore giant adopts the Chinese index for the first time’, Beijing Youth Daily 
20 October, Viewed on 23 December, 2015, http://epaper.ynet.com/html/2015-
10/20/content_159973.htm?div=-1 铁矿石巨头首次采用中国指数, 北京青年报. 
Zhu, L. (2009), ‘No progress in iron ore negotiation CISA plans to investigate the disorderly 
import’, China Business Journal, 20 June, Viewed on 21 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090620/11396376550.shtml 铁矿石谈判久难破
局中钢协计划彻查无序进口, 中国经营报. 
Zhu, Y.C. (2010a), ‘Reject Big Three’s quarterly price Large steel enterprises take the lead to resist 
in silence’, Shanghai Securities News, 9 April, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100409/03157715335.shtml 拒绝三大矿业巨头
季度定价大钢企带头沉默对抗, 上海证券报. 
Zhu, Y.C. (2010b), ‘Baosteel shows its view for the first time: Shift in iron ore pricing mechanism 
is driven by the general trend’, Shanghai Securities News, 6 May, Viewed on 20 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100506/01577882940.shtml 宝钢首次表态：铁
矿石定价机制变化大势所趋, 上海证券报. 
Zhu, Y.C. (2010c), ‘Iron ore quarterly price will be based on Platts index’, Shanghai Securities 
News, 12 May, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100512/03227917864.shtml 铁矿石季度定价将
按普氏指数结算, 上海证券报. 
Zhu, Y.C. & Ruan, Q. (2010), ‘Australia’s third largest mining firm FMG changes its side to 
support the flexible pricing mechanism’, Shanghai Securities News, 22 April, Viewed on 20 
March 2014, http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20100422/02477801191.shtml 澳第
三大矿商 FMG倒戈表态支持灵活定价, 上海证券报. 
Zhu, Z. (2012), Identifying Supply and Demand Elasticities of Iron Ore, Honours thesis, Trinity 




Zuo, Y. (2009), ‘CISA chairman sticks with the principle that production schedule must be based 
on sales volume’, Wuhan Evening News, 3 August, Viewed on 22 March 2014, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090803/15526564298.shtml 中钢协会长规劝钢
企坚持以销定产, 武汉晚报. 
